On 8 April, Farah Rasmi published with Atlantic Council a brief on the history of French-Libyan relations. The paper navigates the particular links between France and Libya and most particularly focuses on the complex relationship between Qaddafi and Sarkozy, which shaped the role played by France in the 2011 NATO intervention.
Click here to download the full report.
In the wake of the report by a panel of UN experts highlighting mercenary activities in Libya, Jodi Vittori calls for the United States and the international community to reinforce their fight against mercenaries and money laundering in an article with Inkstick on 29 March.
Click here to read the article.
In a report published with Foreign Policy, Colum Lynch examines the complex relationship of the US to Libya, pondering what should the approach of the Biden administration be. For Lynch, the US intervention in Libya revealed to some extent the limit of US power and foreign policy.
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On 22 February, Anas El-Gomati and Nadja Berghoff published for the Sadeq Institute “The Great Game”, a collection of articles by Libyan experts retracing foreign interference in the Libyan crisis since the 2011 uprising and NATo-led intervention. The dossier explores the foreign policy towards Libya of 12 key states, either neighboring states such as Morocco, Tunisia, or Algeria, or regional powers such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey, as well as European powers such as France, Italy and the UK, and the USA.
Click here to read the articles.
On 17 February, at the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Libyann uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, France 24 hosted a discussion on the consequences of the uprising and perspectives for Libya’s future. The debate gathered experts and analysts following the Libya file, among which Jalel Harchaoui, Senior Fellow, Global Initiative, Anas El-Gomati, Director, Sadeq Institute, Catherine Norris-Trent, Senior reporter, FRANCE 24 and Mohamed Eljarh, Co-founder, Libya Outlook for Research and Consulting. Participants of the debate considered the complexity of the past decade for Libya, marked by persisting security and political tensions as well as international interferences. The discussion also evoked that the anniversary of the uprising comes at another pivotal moment for Libya, in which a new political body has been elected to guide the country towards election in a climate of prevailing uncertainty.
Click here to watch the recording.
Quoted in a Financial Times article by Heba Saleh published on 5 February, Libya analyst Tim Eaton commented on the appointmentt by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) of Abdul Hameed Dabaiba as the new Prime Minister for Libya and Mohammad Menfi as the President of the three-man Presidential Council. Eaton warns while representing a positive development, the appointment of this transitional body does not signify that Libya has completed its national reconciliation process. As many have indeed expressed, uncertainty remains on whether this UN-brokered arrangement will allow for a true stabilisation of Libya’s political and social tensions.
Click here to read the full article.
On 28 January, The Times reported that a Russian air defense missile system was secretly flown from Zuwwara to a US air base in Germany. According to The Times, the covert operation was ordered due to concerns that the Pantsir S-1 missile battery could be held by a militia or arms smugglers. The missile system was sold by Russia to the UAE, who transferred it to forces aligned with the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. The missile system was captured from the LNA at the Watiyya airbase in May 2020 and transferred to Zawiyya where it was seized by the militia commander Mohamed Bahroun, aka al-Far, ‘the Rat’.
Government of National Accord (GNA) Ministry of Interior forces later took control of the system and it was subsequently brought to Zuwara for collection by a US Air Force cargo plane. It is significant that the GNA Ministry of Interior took control of the missile system and arranged for its handover to the US authorities. Fathi Bashaagha, the GNA Minister of Interior, has been known for his profound efforts to cultivate relations with the United States, having been part of the US-Libya security dialogue launched in November 2019 and his desire to handover the third Lockerbie suspects and other measures. By securing this most recent coup, Bashaagha is likely to have been seeking to enhance his profile among the US intelligence community. At the same time, the fact that the missile system is reported to have been transferred by the UAE to Haftar’s forces feeds into disquiet in Washington about the UAE’s role in the region. The Biden administration has already paused a 23 billion USD arms sale to the UAE signed on Donald Trump’s last day in office. The US government is understood to be reviewing in the deal in light of the UAE’s breaches of the arms embargo in Libya, as well as its role in the war in Yemen.
On 7 January, Libya researcher and expert Jalel Harchaoui published with War On The Rocks an article in which he analyses Russia’s discreet yet strong and continuous involvement in the Libyan crisis. For Harchaoui, over the course of the past two years, Russia has successfully established itself as an influential foreign actor and power broker in Libya through what he characterizes as a ‘skillful soft-power maneuvering with the use of force through an unacknowledged semi-state actor’. A reason for this success, as developed by Harchaoui, is Russia’s strategic management of the network of competing foreign powers fighting for influence over Libya, such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Click here to read the full article.
On 23 November, Emadeddin Badi, released with the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) its latest research, focusing on armed groups in Libya and perspectives for the security sector reform. Articulated in three parts, the research aims at mapping the evolution of Libya’s security structures as modified by the 2011 revolution, and their correlation with Libyan social structures. In his demonstration, Badi identifies the Libyan security sector as hybrid, a complex mix between formal and informal institutions and actors, with different levels of reach. For Badi, this hybrid nature consequently renders impractical the traditional approaches to security sector reforms. In this light, he particularly calls in his recommendations for security sector reform (SSR) approaches to consider economic issues to understand the motivations of armed groups. Indeed, as demonstrated by scholars (see Pack’s conceptual framework on this subject), economic tensions lie at the heart of the Libyan conflict and must be addressed for an effective stabilization of the country?
Click here to read the full research.
In an article published on 25 November with French newspaper Libération, Mathieu Galtier interviews Vito Todeschini, Associate Legal Adviser at the International Commission of Jurists, Middle East and North Africa Programme, on the security climate in Libya. Todeschini denounces militia violence against civilians, and most particularly the issue of enforced disappearances.
Click here to read the article.
On 11 November, the 74 participants in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), who had begun face-to-face meetings in Tunis on 9 November, announced they had agreed on a roadmap for a fourth transition phase. The delegates said the roadmap they had approved would create a new 3-member Presidential Council (PC) and Government of National Unity (GNU) and that it was essentially a draft that had been presented to them by UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with some amendments. On the evening of 15 November, the UN-facilitated LPDF concluded its discussions in Tunis without appointing new executive authorities for a planned fourth transitional phase. Acting Head of the UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, said that ‘no names had been discussed’ for new Presidential Council members or a new unity government. Williams added that ‘we have agreed to reconvene in about a week in a virtual meeting (to) agree on the selection mechanism for the coming authority’. The LPDF’s hasty conclusion coincided with credible reports that some delegates had been offered significant bribes for preferential voting on the new head of the Presidential Council and the Prime Minister positions. Williams said an investigation would be opened into these claims.
Despite the momentum and attention it has received in recent weeks, the LPDF now appears on the brink of collapse, having failed to achieve its primary aim of naming new transitional leaders, and its previously questionable legitimacy has been further (and likely fatally) undermined with claims of attempted bribery of delegates. Moreover, Russia, Turkey, Egypt and France are all likely positioning themselves to supplant the UN as the leader of the Libya file during this critical stage and are expected to introduce in the coming days alternative dialogues and roadmaps they have long been preparing. As this is happening, key regional and international actors may attempt to position their own domestic Libyan clients in favorable positions as a means of securing their own influence in North African’s future political environment and protecting their strategic and commercial interests in Libya. Although the UN will likely attempt to portray continued momentum when the dialogues resume, it is assessed unlikely that any outcome in the upcoming session will be achieved.
On 23 November (at 11:30 EST =4:30pm GMT), the Middle East Institute (MEI) will hold a virtual event to mark the publication of founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack and Colonel Wolfgang Pusztai’s research, ‘Turning the Tide: How Turkey Won the War for Tripoli‘. The discussion will focus on Turkey’s involvement in Libya, as well as understanding the new form of war that has recently come into being. This is the first in a series of two Zoom events. This one will tackle the Libya battle space and its implications for the future of the country. The second event will focus on the larger military implications for the world. To be noted that Pack and Pusztai’s research will also be available in Arabic in a couple of days time on MEI’s website.
Click here to register.
In an article published on 09 November, Deutsche Welle discusses the implications and expectations surrounding the UN-backed Libyan Political Diaogue Forum, set to take place throughout November between a variety of groups representing the Libyan society. Drawing on the ceasefire implemented last month under the auspices of the UN, the talks aim at paving the way for national elections in Libya. For DW, it is a positive sign that the talks are effectively happening, as many initiatives have failed in the past. However, the positive outcomes of such an initiative remains uncertain given the deep divisions and contentious topics to be covered.
Click here to read the report.
On 1 November, Hiba Zayadin published with Human Rights Watch (HRW) a report on Sudanese security guards used against their will as mercenaries in Libya by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The testimonies recorded by HRW recount that an indefinite number of Sudanese workers (around 400) who thought they were recruited to work as security guards in the UAE, were in fact recruited and trained by private security firms to be sent to locations in the Libyan oil crescent to guard oil facilities. Such testimonies reveal the tension faced by the UAE to find resources to support its regional agenda.
Click here to read the report.
Writing for Middle East Eye on 30 October, Paul Cochrane discusses perspectives for oil-rich countries, and most particularly for Middle Eastern countries, which are increasingly confronted with the global demand for renewable and or cleaner energy sources. Cochrane highlights the strong need for economic diversification in the region to anticipate future drops in oil demand and their social consequences for highly oil-dependent countries.
Click here to read the article.
In an article posted on 30 October with The National Interest, Thomas Trask, Jonathan Ruhe and Ari Cicurel denounce the United States (USA)’s approach to the Libyan crisis. For the authors, Washington’s “lead from behind” strategy in Libya created a vacuum which allowed for strong Russian and Turkish involvement. And the past months have demonstrated that such involvement only resulted in more tensions in Libya and the broader Eastern Mediterranean region. As a result, Trask, Ruhe and Cicurel call for the USA to revisit their diplomatic engagement through the appointment of a Special Envoy for the Eastern Mediterranean.
Click here to read the article.
On 30 October, head of the Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj postponed his resignation, which he had announced earlier in September, international and local media outlets report. Initially set to leave his responsibilities at the end of October 2020, Sarraj will remain in office until the ongoing inter-Libyan talks come to an end, to ensure a smooth transition, as called for by international stakeholders, such as the UN Special Mission to Libya.
Click here to read the report.
On 23 October, the United Nations Special Mission to Libyan (UNSMIL) announced that the two rival Libyan factions had signed on the same day an agreement for a permanent ceasefire to be applied throughout the Libyan territory. Military representatives from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and General Khalifa Hifter’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), namely the 5+5 Joint Military Commission appointed earlier this year were the signatories of the agreement, which was welcomed by Interim UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams and UN Secretary General Antionio Guterres as an encouraging step towards Libya’s stabilisation after years of protracted conflict. To mark this event, which could be a turnpoint in Libya’s post 2011 history, AL Jazeera (English) retraces in an article a panorama of international reactions to this announcement, among which Turkey’s scepticism.
Click here to read the report.
On 16 October, Elizabeth Tsurkov published with The New York Review of Books an insightful and through provoking article recounting the tragic fate of the Syrian mercenaries involved in the foreign wars pursued by Russia and Turkey. As illustrated by the report, these fighters have recently found themselves partaking in Turkey and Russia’ respective international agendas, among which the Libyan file, and risking their lives motivated by deep socio-economic issues.
Click here to discover the article.
Jamila Rizgalla is a Libyan self-taught artist who works in pastel to achieve quick, emotive compositions. Her work is spontaneous and done in any location, a result of both her personal style as well as necessity during times of lockdown in Libya. In this period of isolation, her work expresses stages of sadness, loss, endurance, and hope which, while intimate emotions, are also experiences shared globally. The Big Leaving memorializes all of those who have died during the pandemic and were not afforded the opportunity to say goodbye. Torn between the desire to leave the house and the danger of the pandemic, the artist’s work Worry visually manifests the parallel desires to cradle worry and listen to reason.
Rizgalla has participated in several exhibitions in Libya and Malta, recently Take us on your journey through quarantine at Art House, Libya (2020) and Wings of my Soul at Manoel Theatre, Malta (2008). Her work is featured in collections internationally, including Tempra Museum for Contemporary Art, Malta; Museo Tempra della Biennale de Malta, Italy; Museo della Grafica, Italy; and Istituto Italiano di Cultura, Libya. In addition to her visual arts practice, Rizgalla is a veterinarian by education and is currently a lecturer in the Department of Aquaculture at the University of Tripoli.
Visit the Middle East Institute (MEI) website to discover her artwork and support her.
On 19 October, the Middle East Institute (MEI) will host a Zoom webinar gathering major Libya experts for a discussion on the dynamics of the Libyan conflict. Moving away from the current discussion on foreign interference, the MEI intends to refocus the debate on internal divisions within Libya’s civil society and political institutions which have also played a fundamental role in destabilizing the country since the fall of Moamar Gaddafi in 2012. The Middle East Institute, the Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Policy Center for the New South are pleased to jointly host a group of experts to discuss these questions and more in a closed roundtable format. Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack will be among the panelists.
Click here to learn more about the event and register.
Preparation also began this week for a tribal conference to be held on 10 October in Sirte, organised by representatives of Libya’s eastern-based government and parliament. Although this meeting is unlikely to lead to the incorporation of tribal representation into the current internationally-mediated dialogues (from which the tribes and all ‘bottom-up’ social forces have been sidelined), the planned meeting in Sirte is an indication that the internationally-led dialogue process is at risk of failing if it does not recognise the importance of integrating tribal and communal components into the Libyan state-building process.
In a commentary published with The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), George Tzogopoulos argues that to face the tensions in the Mediterranean region, the EU should embrace a holistic approach considering both security and economic disputes. For Tzogopoulos, the EU should take the lead in the mediation and decision-making on the issues at stake between Mediterranean actors.
Click here to read the article.
On 27 September, Al Marsad reposted in English an op-ed originally published in Arabic by Al-Wasat by Azza Maghur, one the leading Libyan lawyer and expert on constitutional law. In this op-ed, Maghur evaluates the international community’s new plan for Libya, highlighting the issues at stake. Maghur severely criticizes the proposal for a regional division of Libya, arguing that it presupposes regional homogeneity and agreement when it is not a Libyan reality. For her, a tripartite form of government is likely to result in political discord and inefficiency.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 24 September with Inside Arabia, Alessandro Bruno recounts the different stages of Libya’s peace process over the course of the past months, opening a discussion on the conditions for stabilization in the conflict-torn country. Bruno’s report comes to agree with Jason Pack’s research, as he also demonstrates that Libya’s core divisions are linked to the issue of fair distribution of revenue, especially oil revenues as Libya is a rentier state. As a result, Bruno argues that the orientation given to the current tensions in Sirte will likely determine Libya’s chances to find a consensus on a solution to its crisis.
Click here to read the article.
On 21 September, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Mohamed Elshinawi for Voice of America (VOA)’s Africa News Tonight segment. Pack discussed General Haftar’s announcement on 18 September regarding the partial, conditional lift of the oil blockade over Libya’s oilfields which reportedly resulted from an agreement concluded with political figures from the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). For Pack, the lifting of the oil blockage is a political gambit which reveals the efforts towards the reconfiguration of Libya’s political landscape.
Click here to listen (from 12:20 to 17:00).
On 17 September, the head of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj announced in a televised speech his intention to resign from his position at the end of October, Middle East Eye reported on the same day. The announcement follows the renewal of dialogue between Libyan political rival factions to push forward a political solution to Libya’s crisis, and come before new rounds of negotiations under the auspices of the international community. In these upcoming talks set to take place in Geneva in October, rival factions are expected to find an agreement on a new political and institutional organization for Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 15 September, Steven A. Cook published an article in Foreign Post on the surge of French presence in the Mediterranean, commenting France’s regional agenda. For Cook, France has clearly manifested a desire to impose itself as a central power in the Mediterranean, initially driven by its interest in energy resources. Cook also highlights that its antagonism with Turkey and its desire to limit migration waves are strong incentives for France’s regional involvement. However for Cook, it remains unclear whether France will have the power to support its ambitions.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 14 September with Middle East Institute (MEI), founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack highlights that the current efforts underway within the international community, regional powers and Libyan actors to push forward a solution to the Libyan crisis fail to address the real causes of the country’s disruption. For Pack, as advocated in his January 2020 research, economy is at the heart of Libya’s crisis, and as such, efforts must focus on the fair distribution of resources and the shaping up of effective, transparent state institutions. Pack writes:
Libya’s civil war is extremely complex but only economic transparency followed by fundamental reforms to the opaque, counterproductive, and corrupt structures of the economy can yield genuine results in removing the causes of fighting and militia recruitment.
Click here to read the article.
On 27 August, the United States and United Nations co-chaired a meeting regarding the Berlin Process on Libya. During the meeting, the US welcomed calls by House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aqeela Saleh and Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj on 21 August for a ceasefire and the resumption of oil production. The US also reiterated its support for Libyan efforts to build on this momentum and ‘to achieve a peaceful political solution that preserves Libyan sovereignty.’
On 30 August, the head of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, met with Acting Head of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) Stephanie Williams in Cairo to discuss the latest developments in Libya. At the meeting, the two parties agreed on the importance of building on the joint calls for a ceasefire and vowed to end all hostilities in Libya. They also called for presidential and parliamentary elections and the resumption of oil exports.
The meetings between Williams and the Arab League and the Berlin Libya Process conference signal that the international community remains intent on pursuing a political solution to Libya’s conflict and to ending the oil blockade as a first step, and is attempting to ride the momentum created by last week’s announcements. However, the broad statements issued by the various parties following these talks indicate that no concrete steps toward an agreement have been reached. Although Saleh and High Council of State (HCS) leader Khalid Mishri are expected to hold a dialogue over the formation of a possible unity government, this process remains vulnerable to the internal turmoil within the GNA.
On 28 August, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister and head of the Presidency Council (PC) Fayez al-Serraj announced that he was suspending Interior Minister Fathi Bashaagha and called for an investigation of Bashaagha’s handling of street protests. Serraj said the investigation of Bashaagha would occur within 72 hours; meanwhile, his duties would be assumed by a deputy minister, Khalid Mazen. Bashaagha responded in a statement by expressing readiness for an investigation but said it should be televised to ensure transparency.
This development should be viewed as an effective pushback by the status quo powers against economic, military and political reforms. These deepened divisions within the GNA now make any temporary ceasefire more difficult and will likely scuttle international peace mediation, as international and western political priorities will now need to re-focus on stabilising the western region’s political structures before moving to mediation with eastern Libya.
Serraj’s announcement of Bashaagha’s suspension coincided with a series of other appointments that we envision will effectively serve to placate major cities, including Misrata, Zawiyya and Zintan. However, even these delicate political gambits could backfire and reignite tensions between Misrata, Tripoli and Zintan, and potentially also inflame tensions among Tripoli’s armed groups. Furthermore, the LNA may try to seize this opportunity to justify an assault on Tripoli or Misrata, or – more likely – launch an overt media relations campaign criticising the integrity of the PC / GNA.
In an article published on 31 August with The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief (Volume 20-Issue 15), Ryan Oliver discusses the strategic implications of Chinese Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as demonstrated through their use in the current Libyan conflict. The article illustrates the extent to which UAVs have become an essential tool in the new wave of confrontations between rival Libyan factions, as well as the Geo-economic dimension of such weapons provided by competing foreign powers.
Click here to read the article.
On 4 August, Jared Malsin of the Wall Street Journal reported that international forces facing off on Libya’s new frontline of Sirte ‘threaten to transform Libya’s internecine struggle into a wider, regional fight.’ Malsin describes the economic and geostrategic interests at stake for Turkey and Egypt, as well as their various allies. The article cites experts warning that a small misstep in the standoff could easily lead to escalation.
Click here to read the article.
On 30 July, the deputy spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexey Zaytsev, stated that Russia and Turkey would be holding a third round of consultations on Libya in Moscow ‘in the near future’. Zaytsev added that delegations from the two countries would discuss ‘different aspects of the Libyan crisis’ including a ceasefire declaration. On 27 July, Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar said that continued external military support from countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Russia, France and Saudi Arabia to Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar represents the ‘greatest obstacle to peace’ in Libya. Akar said that Turkey’s main objective in Libya is to support a comprehensive political solution led by Libyans themselves, while criticising the LNA’s foreign allies for their disingenuous support of a political solution.
The follow up discussions between Turkey and Russia come after the two countries announced on 22 July that they were working towards a ceasefire agreement for Libya and have created a joint working group on Libya. That came just days after the Egyptian parliament approved the deployment of troops to Libya if needed, to counter Turkish aggression. Russia and Turkey continue to dominate the Libya file, with their influence heightened in recent weeks due to the influx of military capabilities and mercenary forces being deployed by both international actors to their Libyan clients – the LNA forces and the Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces respectively – around Sirte and Jufra.
It seems that while the LNA’s withdrawal from Tripoli and western Libya in early June was in large part pre-arranged between Turkey and Russia, the agreement between the two countries broke down after the GNA forces moved on Sirte, with Russia wanting to ensure that the LNA-Russia retain control of Sirte, Jufra and access to the Oil Crescent ports, while the GNA-Turkey want to take control of these sites themselves. Turkey has said that the LNA should evacuate Sirte and Jufra in order for a ceasefire to be sustainable, and that it will negotiate with eastern political actors, but not Haftar. It is likely that the terms of any ceasefire would involve the LNA withdrawing from Sirte provided the GNA-Turkey forces agree not to push further east, but it is less clear whether the LNA or Russia would be willing to hand over control of Jufra airbase.
On 28 July, Foreign Policy reported on advances within the Trump administration towards the enforcement of sanctions on Turkey and Russia for their involvement in the Libyan crisis. The bill, called the Libya Stabilization Act, demonstrates a revival of the US policy towards Libya, revealing the strong US concern against Russia’s growing influence in Libya.
Click here to read the report.
On 27 July, Michael Young published with Carnegie Middle East Center an interview with Soli Özel, senior lecturer at Kadir Has University in Istanbul discussing Turkey’s ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa. Over the course of the past month, Turkey has demonstrated a willingness to project its power in the MENA region, most notably by imposing itself as an essential power in the Libyan crisis. For Özel, the goal of the Erdogan government is clearly to turn Turkey into a hegemonic regional power. Özel moves on to describe the different factors weighing into Turkey’s regional ambitions, whether political, religious or economic.
Click here to read the article.
In their latest article with The Wall Street Journal, Benoit Faucon and Jared Malsin highlight that tensions are heightening between the United States and Russia, most particularly regarding the control over oil resources. Following reports that military contractors linked to the Russian government have taken control of two oil facilities, the US administration is now threatening with sanctions actors interfering with Libyan oil resources and push for a compromise to be reached. For Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack, quoted in the article, recent developments indicate that ‘The Russians are doing things that are bolder and bolder’.
Click here to read the article.
Middle East Eye reports that in a statement issued on 18 July, France, Italy and Germany who were gathered in Brussels for an emergency meeting to discuss post-Covid 19 strategies for economic recovery in the European Union (EU), declared that they were prepared to take sanctions against foreign powers in violation of the UN arm embargo in Libya. The statement came as tensions continue to rise in Libya between foreign powers competing for opposing interests, namely Egypt and Turkey via the Government of National Accord (GNA), with threats of military interventions. Such a statement seems to indicate the EU’s willingness to actively participate in initiatives towards the stabilization of Libya. However, the EU’s capacity to enforce the embargo, which has been blatantly disregarded by foreign powers, remains very limited.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 15 July, Global Village analyses that while small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could be a vector for development in Libya by contributing to the diversification of its economy, the persisting state of chaos hinders their development. As a result of the fighting and political instability, many entrepreneurs have been forced to abandon their business.
Click here to read the article.
On 16 July, writing for L’Opinion, Pascal Airault discusses the current developments in Libya with Hamed Elhouderi, Ambassador to Libya in Paris, France. Elhouderi comments on the escalating tensions between Turkey and Egypt, rival foreign powers, over the Libyan matter. For Elhouderi, the Government of National Accord (GNA) deplores France’s strategy in favour to Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). For the Libyan ambassador, the GNA had no choice but to turn to Turkey given that it did receive the support it expected from powers such as France.
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On 13 July, Al Arabiya published a timeline of the crisis in Libya since November 2019, from the signature of the Turkey-Government of National Accord (GNA) memorandum on maritime boundaries to recent debate over the closure of oilfields by Eastern tribal groups. The article recounts the numerous events which have redefined the Libyan conflict, and most particularly details the progressive involvement of Turkey and Russia in Libyan affairs.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 10 July on Wirecards’s chief operating officer Jan Marsalek, Sam Jones, Paul Murphy and Helen Warrell of the Financial Times reveal that Marsalek had controversial activities and interests in Libya. The report brings forward new elements to the scandal around the Wirecard financial institution, as Marsalek is suspected of having financed foreign militia groups in Libya. Research suggests connections between Marsalek and networks linked to Russia’s military intelligence directorate, the GRU. Sources indicate that Marsalek’s interest for Libya were driven by a desire to gain power and influence. Mr Marsalek, who has now vanished, is a person of interest to three western intelligence agencies, according to officials in three countries.
Click here to read the article.
In the early hours of 5 July, Watiya airbase was attacked with several waves of aerial attacks. The alleged target was the al-Nadab barracks at the airbase, where Turkish personnel had set up their operations after the site was captured from by Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces in May. Local source indicate there were a significant number of casualties, though the GNA and Turkey have both denied any casualties. No one has formally claimed responsibility for the attack. The GNA condemned the attacks by a ‘foreign air force’ and warned that a response would be made at ‘the right time and the right place.
This comes within the context of the ongoing military standoff around Sirte, and threats by Egypt to deploy forces to Libya if the GNA/ Turkey forces take control of Sirte and Jufra. At present, there appears to be a waiting game in Sirte amid various international negotiations to try and reach a ceasefire and reopen the oil ports. So far, Turkey has not officially reacted to the attack on Watiya and the GNA has not accused specific countries of being behind the aerial attack. This suggests that they are being cautious about their response, given the potential for significant escalation from Russia or Egypt if the Turks retaliate with tit-for-tat airstrikes against Jufra. This reticence may also suggest that Turkey doesn’t currently have the aerial capacity in Libya to be confident of taking Jufra by force at this point. Nevertheless, even if Turkey does not respond in kind immediately, this attack is likely to put further strain on international ceasefire and oil blockade talks while any significant escalation in reaction to the Watiya attack is likely to severely undermine such talks.
Drawing on Egypt’s proposal for peace in Libya in June, Mourad Kamel discussed in an article published on 1 July with The Africa Report Egypt and Libya’s relationship. For Kamel, it is essential to consider Egypt and Libya’s historical relationship to understand Egypt’s involvement in Libya affairs, which goes beyond security concerns.
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Writing for Carnegie Europe on 2 July, Marc Pierini argues that the crisis in Libya should be considered by Europe as a priority matter, and as such should drive European state members to act jointly. For Pierini, the divisions among European state members regarding Libya leave room for Turkey and Russia to push forward their interests, at the expense of the EU. He deplores the incapacity of European states to move past their divisions and calls for the EU to take the lead in peace initiative.
Click here to read the article.
On 29 June, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) confirmed that there have been ongoing negotiations to resume oil production over the past few weeks between the Government of National Accord (GNA), the NOC and regional countries, under the supervision of the UN and the US. The same day, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Libyan Sheikhs & Elders, Sheikh al-Senussi al-Haleeq, announced their demands for ending the oil shutdown, as part of the international negotiations referred to by the NOC. Haleeq said that they want an international bank account to be established in which all for Libya’s oil revenues will be deposited. This must be under the auspices of the UN and the revenues would then be funneled to Libya’s three regions (East, West and South). He stressed that the revenues cannot be used for military purposes.
According to informed sources, the talks are broadly between the US, the UN, the GNA, and the NOC one side, and France, the UAE, the LNA, and Saudi Arabia on the other side. However, in the day-to-day it is the US, the UN and the NOC interfacing with the French, who in turn are acting on behalf of the Emiratis. Each side is pushing alternative proposals, with the main focus on how to fairly distribute the oil revenues. The US-led proposal is for Libya’s oil revenue to be held for four months in the NOC’s reconciliation holding account at the Libyan Foreign Bank prior to it being remitted to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) ‘after reconciliation.’ The UAE/ France proposal is that a UN-administered fund is set up – this is essentially the proposal put forward by Haleeq
At this stage, it remains unclear how a UN-managed international bank account for Libyan oil revenues would be established or managed. Although the NOC and the Americans are more optimistic about lifting the oil blockade than they have been in months, the NOC’s cautious language and Haleeq’s broad brush demands highlight that there is likely a way to go before the finer details of any deal can be agreed, and longer still before it will be put into effect. It is important to note that nothing which is being discussed is a permanent solution. It is a way to get oil restarted in a face-saving way for the East which averts the need for the Turkish/GNA forces to reconquer the Oil Crescent.
In an article published on 30 June with London School of Economics’ Middle East Centre Blog, Moin Kikhia, Founder and President of The Libyan Democratic Institute, presents his plan for Libya in terms of political reconstruction and stability. Drawing on the works of Jason Pack (founder of Libya-Analysis LLC) and Ethan Corin, Kikhia advocates for deep reforms of the Libyan system, emphasizing the importance of developing a new economic system allowing for a better distribution of resources. Kikhia also denounces foreign intervention on Libyan soil. Nevertheless, he encourages the United States and the United Kingdom to continue playing a formative role on Libya’s future.
Click here to read the article.
On June 25, Julian Pecquet reported in an article for the Foreign Lobby website that the contract between US lobby firm Linden Government Solutions and the Decision Support Center of Libya, an entity which represents Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA), came to an end this June. According to Pecquet, the US lobby did not petition for the contract to be renewed, given the developments on the ground, namely Haftar’s battlefield defeats in the battle for Tripoli. It would seem that Haftar is progressively losing influence over Libyan affairs.
Click here to read the article.
On 24 June, Jalel Harchaoui, Libya analyst at the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute, was interviewed by France 24 to discuss the escalation of tensions between France and Turkey following comments made by French officials regarding Turkey’s involvement in Libyan affairs.
Click here to watch the interview.
On 22 June, the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Serraj, hosted a closed-door meeting in Zuwara with a US AFRICOM delegation led by General Stephen Townsend and accompanied by US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. In an article published on 23 June, The Arab Weekly commented that following the meeting, the US published a statement suggesting that the Trump administration had drawn a ceasefire line going beyond the present line of separation between the warring factions, at the limits of the area of Misrata.
The recent uptick in US engagement in Libya through the embassy and AFRICOM is predominantly driven by the desire to counter Russian influence in the country. The US likely hopes that by actively engaging with key Libyan actors and pushing for a resumption of the UN-mediated talks, the Russian-dominated ceasefire and dialogue process will be weakened due to lack of support from the Libyan clients and increased wariness among other countries engaged in Libya. However, the US is likely to remain unwilling to exert meaningful political or military capital to create the conditions in which a UN-mediated process might succeed. As such, the UN-mediated process remains unlikely to gain traction any time soon.
In an article published with Inside Arabia on 19 June, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack pays a tribute to former colleague Ian Taylor of Vitol, UK philanthropist and a founding father of modern oil deceased on 8 June. Providing an interesting explanation of how the complex world of oil trading, Pack highlights how Taylor’s legacy on modern oil trading has left an indelible mark on Libya.
Click here to read the article.
In the June/July 2020 issue of The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Elaine Pasquini commented Middle East Institute (MEI)’s virtual roundtable on 7 April which gathered Tim Eaton (London) and Abdul Rahman al-Ageli (Tripoli) both with Chatham House, Megan Doherty (DC) of Mercy Corps, Jason Pack (NYC) of Libya-Analysis LLC and MEI, and Former US Special Envoy to Libya Jonathan Winer (DC) also of MEI to discuss the topic of ‘Militias in the time of the Pandemic: The Community Dynamics and Economic Interests of Libyan Armed Groups’. Notably, Pasquini quotes Pack’s demonstration on the economic dimension of the Libyan conflict.
Click here to read the article.
Writing for Atlantic Council in an article published on 16 June, David Mack critically reviews Egypt’s ceasefire proposal to the Government of National Accord (GNA), arguing that it does not further Libyan prospects for peace but rather participates in advancing Cairo’s interests in Libya and puts Libya at risk of a partition. Mack advocates for a stronger involvement of the United States in the efforts to push forward a political solution in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
As the conflict which destabilized Libya for over a year between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and their foreign backers takes a new direction, prospects for peace and stabilisation are discussed with a new energy at the international level. And the question on everybody’s mind seems to be: which foreign power should take the lead to guide Libya towards peace? On 16 June, Arturo Varvelli and Tarek Megerisi argue in a commentary published with European Council on Foreign Relations that now is the time for Italy to take the lead for Europe on Libyan matters. Earlier this week, Ranj Alaaldin and Emadeddin Badi advocated for the United States to revise its strategy towards Libya at this crossroad moment for Libya, and last week numerous articles and analysts warned against Turkey and Russia’s growing influence on Libya. While the question of who’s to take the lead remains unanswered at the moment, what appears clear is that the Libyan conflict has allowed for the emergence of new regional, international actors, which threaten traditional international actors such as the United-States, or Europeans states.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Brookings on 15 June, Ranj Alaaldin and Emadeddin Badi highlight the proxy nature of the Libyan conflict, especially since increased military support from Turkey to the Government of National Accord (GNA) allowed to destabilize Khalifa Haftar’s advances in Westen Libya. Alaaldin and Badi argue that Libya’s future is highly dependent on the strategies adopted by external actors such as Turkey or Russia in the short term. Considering this, they encourage the United States as well as Europe to join their efforts to present an alternative for Libya.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 8 June with The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Anna Jacobs discusses how the battle for Tripoli in Libya is subject to international interference and regional rivalries. Jacobs analyses that, Russia’s ever growing influence in Libya even in the aftermath of the partial defeat of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Haftar to the Government of National Accord (GNA), is most likely to work as an incentive for the United-States to become more involved with Libyan matters.
Click here to read the article.
On 8 June, Rhiannon Smith, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC was interviewed by Mohamed Elshinawi for Voice of America (VOA)’s Africa News Tonight segment. They discussed Egypt’s so-called “Cairo Initiative” for a ceasefire and the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) decision to seize Sirte. Smith highlights the significance of Haftar’s presence alongside Saleh at the announcement of the ceasefire initiative and argues that the initiative pushed forward by Egypt translates as an attempt to present Eastern Libyan forces and their foreign backers in a positive light, but is unlikely to lead to an effective ceasefire on the ground. Smith also explains Sirte’s strategic importance for both the GNA and Eastern forces.
Click here to listen to the interview (from min.11:45 to 18):
On 6 June, Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, flanked by the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, and Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aqeela Saleh, announced a new peace initiative for Libya and declared that a ceasefire would begin on 8 June at 6:00 am local time. No ceasefire has been enforced at the time of writing. On 8 June, GNA Interior Minister, Fathi Bashaagha, stated that the GNA would only hold political talks after it had captured Sirte and al-Jufra.
The contents of what has been now dubbed the “Cairo” initiative is essentially a rehashed version of Saleh’s political road map – which he put forward in late April, reportedly with significant oversight from Russia- involving reducing the Presidential Council to three members, one from each region. The Cairo initiative is nevertheless believed to be the public face of the Russia-Turkey deal on Libya. This deal between Moscow and Ankara appears to have been negotiated between the two countries in recent weeks, with ‘lines in the sand’ being agreed between the two involving Russia and the LNA withdrawing to pre-April 2019 positions, but no further. The GNA’s continued push on Sirte may highlight a point of contention between Moscow and Ankara with regards to the agreed red lines, given the GNA did control Sirte up until January 2020, as well as highlighting rifts within the GNA over their strategy. Nevertheless, Turkey is still believed to be broadly ‘on board’ with this deal.
The announcement of this “Cairo initiative” signals the temporary conclusion of the LNA’s offensive on Tripoli but is unlikely to lead to an immediate cessation of fighting on the ground. Strategically, the initiative by the eastern bloc and its international backers is likely designed as a stalling mechanism to give the LNA coalition more time to replenish and organize their forces (both domestic and foreign), strengthen the defence of the locations they have (Sirte and Jufra) and burnish their international reputation by being the side attempting to seek peace. This will strengthen the eastern bloc’s leverage in any political process, or if that fails, will allow it to reset for a renewed assault on Tripoli in the longer term.
Haftar’s presence alongside Saleh at the announcement signifies that the LNA commander’s influence both domestically and among his foreign backers is waning – rather than being the sole powerbroker in the East, Haftar’s role is being relegated to a purely military one while Saleh’s influence as the East’s main political powerbroker appears to be strengthening. The joint announcement is symbolic given the recent rift between the two men, and indicates that Egypt and other allies want to ensure that the eastern ‘bloc’ has a unified approach to the crisis.
On 9 June, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack commented for Al Jazeera the Government of National Accord (GNA)’s decision to launch an offensive to seize Sirte, recently evacuated by forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar. For Pack, there is no strategic rationale for a GNA push eastward. In the contrary, such a move could prove counterproductive and further the conflict.
Click here to read the article.
On 2 June, Mieczysław P. Boduszynski, Christopher K. Lamont published with Middle East Institute (MEI) a research on Japan-Libya relations entitled ‘Japan-Libya Relations: A Window on Japan’s Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa’. As formulated by Boduszynski and Lamont, the research traces the history of Japan’s approach to the Middle East and North Africa region, and most particularly to Libya. The two authors demonstrate that Japan managed to develop strong business connections with Libya to support its energy needs with a unique approach to Libya based on the Japanese anti-Western ideology. This particular approach, which is rooted in Japan’s contemporary history, allowed Japan to distinguish itself from Western counterparts which also had interests in Libya.
Click here to read the research
On 1 June, UNSMIL released a statement welcoming agreement from both the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) to resume ceasefire talks and related security arrangements based on the 5 + 5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks. The new round of negotiations would occur through video communication due to the coronavirus pandemic, however, no date for the talks was given. In the statement, UNSMIL noted that the resumption of the JMC talks will mark the beginning of “a calm on the ground and a humanitarian truce to allow the opportunity to reach a final ceasefire agreement.” UNSMIL stressed the need for the parties to “commit to fully authorizing their representatives in the negotiations to enable them to complete the ceasefire agreement”, and also called on states that support the parties to the conflict to respect what they agreed upon in the Berlin Conference and various Security Council resolutions, notably the cessation of all forms of military support permanently.
The UN-mediated 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) meetings in Geneva began in early February 2020 as an output from the Berlin Conference in January 2020. The JMC talks were between five senior military delegates from the GNA and five from the LNA – the representatives did not meet in person. The first round concluded on 8 February after 6 days of talks. On 23 February, the second round of discussions concluded and produced a draft permanent ceasefire agreement that included the return of civilians to their homes and a joint monitoring mechanism supervised by the JMC and UNSMIL. The process has been stalled since then, in part due to the UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame resigning from his post, with the conflict significantly escalating in the meantime.
Given no date has been set for these talks yet, it is likely that any ceasefire talks will take some time to organise and likely even longer for any sort of agreement to be potentially made. Even if a ceasefire agreement were made through the JMC representatives in the coming weeks, it remains unclear if and how this would translate into reality on the ground. For the GNA, it does not effectively control the various forces that are aligned to it, so coordinating a full ceasefire or pullback of forces that encompasses multiple social and armed group interests will be challenging, if not impossible. On the LNA side, Haftar has shown that ultimately the “buck” stops with him and that he will not be beholden to any agreement without his signature, and in some cases even with his signature. As has been shown in many other cases, his agreement to a ceasefire or political agreement has largely been disingenuous, and as long as he remains the head of the LNA, there is no reason to believe this pattern would change because he is on the backfoot.
On 2 June, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC was interviewed by Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America (VOA)’s Africa News Tonight segment. Pack discussed US reports on Russian fighter jets deployed to Libya, underlining the discrepancies in the US policy towards Libya. Pack also commented on Russia and Turkey tacit military agreement in the aftermath of the capture by Government of National Accord (GNA) forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA)-controlled Al-Watiya airbase, arguing that such a military victory has turned Turkey into an essential actor in future mediation attempts for the return of peace in Libya.
Click below to listen to Pack (between minutes 5:40 and 11:10):
In a report entitled “Deep sea rivals: Europe, Turkey, and new eastern Mediterranean conflict lines” and published with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Asli Aydıntaşbaş, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Cinzia Bianco, Hugh Lovatt and Tarek Megerisi analyse the complex interactions between Turkey and the European Union (EU) in the eastern Mediterranean. They demonstrate that the escalation of tensions in eastern Mediterranean results from competing interests between Turkey and European Union members and discuss the direct impacts such tensions have had on the Libyan crisis.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published in 27 May, Courrier International examines the complex interactions between Russia and Turkey in Libyan affairs. Since late 2019, the two powers have become major foreign backers to Libya’s rival factions and been competing for rival interests, giving a proxy-war dimension to Libya’s internal divisions. According to analysts, Courrier International reports, it seems however that following the defeat of Khalifa Haftar against forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA), Moscow and Ankara have reached a tacit agreement to not engage in a direct confrontation on Libyan ground. For analysts, this could indicate that Turkey and Russia will once again attempt to shape Libya’s future.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published with Middle East Institute (MEI) on 27 May, Jonathan M.Winer argues that the UN political roadmap for Libya which was presented in late 2019 remains the ‘only realistic path to regain economic viability, political stability and physical security’ in the aftermath of the battle for Tripoli between forces aligned with Government of National Accord (GNA) and factions aligned with Khalifa Haftar. Winer also highlights that a cease-fire can only be successfully be implemented if foreign powers supporting Libyan factions support it and focus on a political and diplomatic solution instead of a military one.
Click here to read the full article.
On 27 May, Bernard Smith discussed in a live for Al-Jazeera Inside Story the recent developments in Libya with founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack, Sami El-Atrash, lawyer and Head of the Political office of the Libyan National Assembly February 17 Revolution and Wolfgang Pusztai, Security and Policy Analyst and Austria’s former Defence Attaché to Libya. Pack, Pusztai and El-Atrash debated on how foreign powers interests in Libya were most likely to define the next stage of the Libyan crisis.
Click here to watch the debate:
On 19 May, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, stated on Twitter that in order to make progress on the Libyan crisis, “an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire and a return to the political process” is required. He also said that Libya would have no future until “combatants aim higher than tactical territorial gains.”
On 19 May, acting UN Special Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, called on the UN Security Council to pressure international players in Libya to cease their support of the competing Libyan factions, stressing that the increase in foreign fighters and military capabilities in Libya would see clashes escalate further and the humanitarian situation worsen. She highlighted the direct involvement of foreign parties in the current conflict, including UAVs and the presence on the ground of air defence systems, in blatant violation of the arms embargo. Williams welcomed the new political initiative proposed by House of Representatives (HoR) head Aqeela Saleh in late April and the constructive stance adopted by GNA head Fayez al-Serraj, while condemning Haftar’s declaration of military rule.
In a conversation on 20 May, US President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron noted “worsening foreign interference” in Libya and “agreed on the need for urgent de-escalation,” according to the White House.
On 20 May, Russia and Turkey called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Libya and the resumption of the political process under the auspices of the United Nations and within the framework of the Berlin Conference.
The statements from the UAE – the LNA’s main military backer – in support of a ceasefire indicate a shift in the UAE stance on Libya. According to media reports quoting a Libyan political source close to Haftar, the UAE and Egypt see Haftar as being “on his way out” and that “no one can bet on Haftar again”. This apparent shift in approach by the LNA’s main foreign backers towards supporting a new political initiative in Libya indicates they are positioning themselves for Haftar to be defeated – as such are manoeuvring themselves and potentially creating/identifying new eastern Libyan “clients” to maintain influence and leverage in both eastern Libya and the wider country in a post-Haftar environment. However, this does not mean that these countries will drop their support of the LNA as an institution nor change their ideological and strategic aims in Libya. As such, any new political initiative that might emerge from this development is likely to be strongly influenced by international dynamics and interests, and therefore will face the same challenges as previous initiatives. This international tug of war over Libya also means that the interests of the country itself and its people are unlikely to be a priority.
In article published with Middle East Institute (MEI) on 27 May, Jason Pack argues that the capture by Government of National Accord (GNA) forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) controlled Watiya airbase made possible by the support provided by Turkey to the GNA is a turning point in the battle for Tripoli. For Pack, Haftar is now losing this battle, and Libya’s future partly depends on how Turkey will decide to use their newly gained momentum over Libyan affairs. In this regard, Pack strongly argues in favor of Turkey adopting the role of dealmaker to mediate between Libyan factions and allow for an end of the political and security crisis.
Click here to read the article.
Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was invited to address the 2020 Student Model Arab League Conference in the USA and gave a lecture entitled: ” From Qadhafi to Chaos: Libya’s Centrality in Western Geostrategy.” It is an educational/general audience introduction to Libya and his experiences in the field. So if you would like to learn more about Libya and have the spare time you can watch it on your TV by casting the YouTube to your smart TV… should beat a lot of the stuff on Netflix these days.
Click here to watch the lecture:
On 24 May, Middle East Eye (MEE) reported that Russian fighters deployed to Libya have been seen retreating from front lines in the Tripoli area. Officially Russia supports the UN political roadmap, however Russia also stands as one of Khalifa Haftar’s international supporter in his military campaign against the UN-recognized Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), manifesting its support through the deployment of mercenaries by Russian private firms allegedly linked to the Kremlin. For MME, the retreat of Russian fighters from Westerb Libya results from the recent territorial gains made by the GNA against the LNA in Western Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 19 May, Libyan and international media outlets reported that forces aligned with the GNA captured on 18 May the Libyan National Army (LNA) controlled Watiya airbase, located south of Zuwara in Western Libya. For a few weeks now, GNA forces had concentrated their attacks against this LNA position, with the support of Turkey. The airbase was a key strategic facility upon which the LNA relied for the supply of goods and ammunition to its forces in western Libya and from which it launched aerial capabilities. On 19 May, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Al Jazeera to comment on the GNA’s territorial gain along with Peter Millet, former British Ambassador to Libya (2015-2018) and Mansour El-Kikhia, professor of Politics at the University of Texas in San Antonio. Pack, Millet and El-Kikkhia assess what the capture of the airbase means for the LNA and the GNA in the fight for the control of Tripoli. For Pack, the capture constitutes a significant shift in the battle for Tripoli. He notes that the future of the battle will also be determined by the responses of the LNA and GNA international backers to this turn of event.
Click below to watch the interview (Pack speaks between 7:45-9:55, 14:00-15:47 and 19:04-21):
In a commentary entitled “Haftar, Tribal Power, and the Battle for Libya” published on 15 May with War On The Rocks, Alison Pargeter demonstrates how alliances between Khalifa Haftar and tribes have enabled him to strengthen its power in Eastern Libya and penetrate Western Libya. In doing so, Pargeter highlights the importance of tribes in modern-day Libya’s social and political structures. Pargeter sheds some particularly interesting comments on the Government of National Accord (GNA) difficulty to regain control of Western Libya in case of a military victory against the Libyan National Army (LNA) given that alliances were made between the LNA and local Western tribes, allowing for the LNA’s penetration in the Tripoli area.
Click here to read the article.
On 15 May, in an article for Daily Sabbah, Merve Sebnem Oruc reports on the conflict opposing the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to the forces aligned with Eastern-Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar ongoing since April 2019. The author highlights the support provided by Turkey to the GNA which contributed to its recent military gains. Analysing Haftar’s strategy and resources, Oruc quotes founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack’s report for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies published in May 2019. In this report, Pack demonstrates that war economy is at the heart of the Libyan conflict and is the key for the international community to put an end to the crisis.
Click here to read the article.
On 13 May, in an article published with Al-Monitor, Kirill Semenov argues that the latest developments in Libya suggest a potential shift in Russia’s strategy for Libya. Semenov reports that Russia has had increasing contacts with the Eastern-based parliament, which presented in late April a political roadmap for Libya reportedly drafted with the help of Russian experts. At the same time, Russia has been openly critical of Khalifa Haftar’s stand against a political solution for Libya and of Government of National Accord (GNA) PM Al-Sarraj refusal to engage in negotiations with Haftar.
Click here to read the article.
Christopher O’Brien analyses for International Policy Digest in an article published on 13 May the potential outcomes of the conflicts in Libya and Syria. O’Brien identifies as two plausible outcomes for the conflict in Libya the military victory of either the Libyan National Army (LNA) or the Government of National Accord (GNA), or a negotiated settlement brokered by international powers, such as the UN. Detailing such scenarios, O’Brien also underlines the key role played by international powers in both outcomes.
Click here to read the article.
Throughout the week (with significant incidents on 8, 9,10, and 11 May), Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Turkish drones launched aerial attacks on the Libyan National Army (LNA) controlled Watiya airbase, located south of Zuwara. On 6 May, according to the Libya Red Crescent, 20 bodies were recovered from the region surrounding Watiya airbase. LNA has claimed as many as 64 fighters were killed. On 11 May, the GNA’s Volcano of Rage spokesperson claimed that they had struck a military vehicle, with an additional six aerial operations striking the location.
The GNA-aligned forces have also undertaken aerial strikes targeting LNA forces thought to be supporting those at Watiya. On 8 May, the GNA launched aerial attacks killing nine LNA fighters at a checkpoint at the entrance to Rujban. This barrage of aerial attacks on Watiya and the surrounding area comes after GNA-aligned forces launched on the facility on 5 May. While the GNA forces made some gains around the site, it is also believed that they suffered significant casualties
It appears the GNA forces have shifted their tactics away from a ground assault towards a continuous bombardment of Watiya by air. The broadening of the aerial attacks suggests the GNA is actively seeking to prevent any assistance to forces at the location. If this aerial assault can be maintained (and it looks as if the GNA/Turkey aerial capabilities remain strong at present) and LNA reinforcements prevented from reaching the airbase, it is likely that the LNA forces stationed at Watiya will eventually be forced evacuate the facility. Control of Watiya would provide the anti-LNA coalition with a major tactical win, providing Turkish forces with a much-needed site from which to effectively launch the aerial capabilities it has transported to assist the GNA-aligned forces in recent weeks
In an article published with Lawfare on 10 May, Sandy Alkoutami and Frederic Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment give an extensive analysis of China’s strategy towards Libya since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Wehrey and Alkoutami point out that while committing to its nonalignement policy, Pekin has still shown its capacity to adapt to Libya’s evolving political and security situation. For Wehery and Alkoutami, China has chosen a shifting approach to Libya, based on “economic penetration and behind-the-scenes diplomacy”.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Carnegie Europe on 5 May, Stefano Marcuzzi argues that the current pandemic presents European powers with an opportunity to regain influence in Libya as the crisis is likely to undermine the capacity of external actors such as Russia and Turkey to assert their influence over Libyan factions.
Click here to read the full article.
On 5 May, forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) began a ground assault on the Watiya airbase, controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) located south of Zuwara. It is unclear how much progress had been made at the time of writing, with unconfirmed reports indicating that the GNA forces have reached the perimeter of the facility but not made it further. Watiya airbase is the LNA’s main aerial base in western Libya and is a key strategic site – the LNA launches aerial assets from here and it also forms a vital logistical supply line for the LNA’s forces in western Libya. Notably hard to defend due to its flat terrain, it is currently defended by Zintani forces aligned with the LNA. In late March, GNA Western Military forces launched an unsuccessful assault to capture Watiya airbase.
Control of Watiya would provide the anti-LNA coalition with a major tactical win, providing Turkish forces with a much-needed site from which to effectively launch the aerial capabilities it has transported to assist the GNA-aligned forces in recent weeks. Speaking with Al Jazeera founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack highlighted the shift in air superiority with Turkish drones now dominating the skies.
If the LNA loses control of Watiya, it will lose a significant strategic facility which it relies upon for supplies, goods and ammunition to its forces in western Libya and from which it launches aerial capabilities. However, it is possible that the LNA will be able to hold onto Watiya even in the face of a major GNA assault, as it is a relatively defensible site, though there are likely to be many casualties. In either scenario, there is a real danger that this assault could sow the seeds of local conflicts and tensions, particularly in Zintan, as members of the same community are likely to end up confronting one another in battle.
Following the speech made by Khalifa Haftar on 27 April in which the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) declared his refusal of political dialogue for Libya, International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 4 May an analysis of Haftar’s strategy. For ICG, the implications behind Haftar’s declaration remains unclear. In that regard, the article presents different potential outcomes.
Click here to read the article.
In a speech on 27 April, Libyan National Army (LNA) head Khalifa Haftar’s declared he had the people’s mandate to abolish the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and establish military rule in Libya. Such a declaration sparked numbers of reactions, nationally and internationally.
The reactions of Haftar’s main backers, namely the UAE, Egypt and Russia, have varied from tacit support through to clear disapproval. On 30 April, the UAE issued a statement in which it did not explicitly refer to Haftar’s statement, but instead “commended” the LNA for its “anti-terror operations” and expressed its “categorical rejection of the Turkish military intervention”. It also issued a vague call for Libyan parties to commit to the UN-mediated political process to end the war. On 28 April, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed Egypt’s adherence to a political solution in Libya but stressed this “should not lead to complacency in confronting extremist terrorist Turkish-backed currents in Libya, or engaging with them in negotiations about the future of Libya. On 28 April, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, told media outlets that Russia did not approve of Haftar’s attempt to declare military rule in Libya and stressed Russia has contact with all actors in the Libyan conflict and is committed to finding a political solution.
Predictably, Haftar’s main international opponent, Turkey, explicitly denounced Haftar’s declaration while reiterating its support for a political solution to the conflict. France did not directly comment on Haftar’s announcement, but instead reiterated that it supports a political solution in Libya, within the framework of the Berlin conference. Likewise, UNSMIL and Italy avoided direct reference to Haftar, but reiterated their support for a political solution and for the Libyan institutions legitimised by the LPA – namely the GNA. The US embassy expressed its “regret” over Haftar’s move, while stating it remained keen to engage him in serious dialogue about how the country can move forward.
The flurry of international statements issued in the wake of Haftar’s announcement highlights both the potential significance of his move and the desire of the key international powerbrokers involved in Libya to ensure they remain engaged by making their voices heard. While most of the statements and reactions were predictable in their vague content and lack of tangible action, it is significant that Russia has highlighted its disapproval of Haftar’s move and that the UAE and Egypt did not actively reiterate their support of him personally. This supports the analysis that his backers were blindsided by this move and this may increasingly lead his allies to strengthen their relationships with alternative high level interlocuters within the LNA or among eastern political institutions, with a view to eventually withdrawing their support from Haftar.
On 1 May, Oana-Cosmina Mihalache published with E-International Relations an essay on the involvement of mercenaries in current conflicts, taking the example of the Libyan conflict. Mihalache reports on Turkey and Russia sending mercenaries to Libya as part of their military support to Libyan factions, commenting that “Mercenaries provide a semi-permanent stronghold in Libya for countries like Russia and Turkey and allow them to continue the fight while eschewing international accountability.”
Click here to read the essay.
On 23 April, Middle East Monitor reported on Frederic Bodin’s article for French newspaper Le Monde on 17 April. In this article, Bobin argued that Turkey’s support to the Government of National Accord (GNA) has allowed for a change in balance in the conflict with Libyan National Army (LNA) forces. For Bobin, such a shift was made possible by the Turkish support and the instruction of the Libyan field of new generation drones.
Click here to read the article.
On 22 April, Al Jazeera released a video of a debate presented for Al Jazeera by Adrian Finighan and hosting Claudia Gazzini, senior analyst on Libya at the International Crisis Group, Noufal Abboud, executive director at The Nordic Center for Conflict Transformation and Salah Elbakkoush, former adviser to the Libyan High Council of State. The three analysts discussed the territorial gains by forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) over the course of the past weeks. For analysts, such territorial gains could mark a change in the conflict’s balance of the GNA forces prove able to maintain their positions. However, they underline that the potential outcome of the confrontation remains unclear and conditions are still not met for a successful political dialogue.
Click here to watch the debate :
In an article published on 21 April, Al-Monitor presents Joe Biden’s advisers on Middle East affairs and analyses the potential changes to the US policies towards the Middle East Joe Biden could encourage. The former vice president Joe Biden has recently won over his opponent Bernie Sanders to represent the Democrats in the upcoming presidential election. Al-Monitor highlights that many of Biden’s foreign policy advisers are known for their opposition to the Trump administration’s foreign policy.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 19 April with Responsible Statecraft, Khalil Al-Anani highlights the international dimension of the Libyan crisis transpiring through the failure of political dialogue and the continued military support provided by regional powers to the warring Libyan factions. As reported by Al-Anani, the pressure resulting from the involvement of international and regional actors has once again derailed perspectives for stabilisation in Libya as the United States rejected the selection of the former Algerian foreign minister, Ramtane Lamamra, as the new UN envoy to Libya allegedly due to pressure from Egypt and the UAE.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published on 15 April with Open Democracy, Nikkon Balial reports on the development of local initiatives in Libya to provide support to Libya’s weak healthcare system during the COVID-19 crisis. He presents two local businesses which have decided to focus on the production of medical supplies such as masks, ventilator maintenance facilities and disinfection of public places. At the time of writing, 26 cases of COVID-19 cases have been identified in Libya, and there are serious concerns about Libya’s healthcare capacities to face the virus. Even more so in a context of continued fighting between rival factions.
Click here to read the article.
In an op-ed for The Hill on 9 April, Ben Fishman demonstrates the failure of diplomatic efforts in Libya as fighting continues to rage between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and forces aligned with Khalifa Haftar. For Fishman, an intervention by the United States is needed to reignite political dialogue and negotiations.
Click here to read the full article.
In his latest article published with The New York Times on 6 April, Frederic Wehrey analyses the potential impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the Middle East. For Wehrey, the propagation of the virus could deepen the instability of the Middle Eastern regimes and lead to renewed unrest.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Airwars on 6 April, Oliver Imhof provides interesting data on airstrikes and casualties resulting from Khalifa Haftar’s year long assault on Tripoli.
According to Airwars data, between 324 and 458 civilians have been killed nationally by 2,034 air and artillery strikes since April 4th 2019, and another 576 to 850 injured.
Imhof completes this analysis with details on the numbers of airstrikes by foreign powers such as the UAE or Turkey, which have sided with the rival factions fighting for Tripoli, and details on the weaponry used. On one side, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Jordan and Egypt have chosen to support Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA). On the other side, Turkey and Qatar which have chosen to support the Government of Nation Accord (GNA).
Click here to read the article.
On 5 April, media outlets reported the death of Mahmoud Jibril in Cairo from complications due to the Coronavirus. Jibril was an important figure of Libyan politics given that he was Libya’s first post-Gaddafi era head of government. In 2011, Jibril headed the National Transitional Council (NTC) at the time of the insurrection against Gaddafi and in 2012, he acted as Libya’s interim country until the first post-Gaddafi elections were organized.
Thus far, Libyan authorities have reported a total of 18 cases of coronavirus.
Click here to read the report.
In an article published on 27 March, Jihâd Gillon comments for The Africa Report on the identification of a first case of coronavirus in Libya and assesses the country’s health care system. Gillon highlights the limited capacity of Libya to address an epidemic due to a very fragile health care system.
Click here to read the article.
8 cases of coronavirus have been identified in Libya, Reuters reported on 29 March. According to the National Centre for Disease Control, the new cases are located in the Northwestern of Misrata, which has been at the heart of fighting between forces allied with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and factions aligned with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). As Reuters reports, fighting continues to rage in Western Libya, despite calls for ceasefire.
Click here to read the article.
On 25 March, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack published with Nate Mason an article for Middle East Institute on the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis in the Middle East/North Africa region. Pack and Mason ponder whether the health crisis induced by the spread of the virus could lead to an ‘Arab Spring 2.0’. For Pack and Mason, the health crisis is most likely to have ripple effects on the political, security and social situations in the MENA region, given the relative state fragility in the area. Pack and Mason also consider the role of the United States in such a context.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Middle East Monitor (MEMO), Mustafa Fetouri discusses the influence of Egypt over the Libyan file. For Fetouri, Egypt’s concerned with developments in Libya is rooted in security issues and the need to contain threats along the shared Libyan-Egyptian border.
Click here to read the article.
On 17 March, the embassies of Algeria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Turkey, the UK, the US and the EU delegation to Libya called on the Libyan parties to sustain a humanitarian ceasefire and spare the country more suffering in the light of the COVID-19 outbreak. On 21 March, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the “positive responses” by the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) to the ceasefire calls on 18 March and 21 March respectively and expressed the hope that that the parties “stop the fighting immediately on all fronts to allow national health authorities and health partners to respond to the potential threat of COVID-19 in the country”. This came after LNA spokesperson Brigadier Ahmed al-Mismari announced that the LNA General Command “welcomed” the calls for a truce and is committed to stopping fighting so long as the other parties abide by it.” However, fighting does not appear to have ceased on Tripoli’s southern frontlines. On 24 March, forces aligned to the LNA in Tarhouna reported grad rockets striking the town while anti-LNA forces near Tripoli claimed shells struck Mitiga airport, killing two and wounding one.
Both parties to the Libyan conflict remain keen to burnish their international reputations and be seen to be the “good guys” when the opportunity arises. Given that a humanitarian pause in fighting is nominally an apolitical move, and given the coordinated call from key international players, it is not surprising that both the GNA and LNA moved to “welcome” a truce and continue to pay lip service to a ceasefire. However, the continued fighting on the ground, the reiteration of the need for the other side to abide by the ceasefire (meaning each side has a ‘get out’ clause), and the lack of any tangible mechanisms or parameters for a humanitarian pause mean that a meaningful truce is unlikely to take effect in the immediate term. There may be a lull in the fighting in the coming days in recognition of the humanitarian situation, while it is possible that terms for a temporary truce may be agreed in the short term if COVID-19 cases are confirmed and escalate in the country. The ongoing military standoff in southern Tripoli is likely weaken the efforts of health workers to contain the disease and further undermine efforts to detect and quarantine the cases of COVID-19.
In an article published on 22 March, Middle East Eye (MEI) reports on measures adopted by the Government of National Accord (GNA) to limit the spread of the coronavirus pandemic to Libya. After declaring a state of emergency last week, the GNA has imposed a night-time curfew and the closure of public spaces. Similar measures have reportedly been take in Eastern Libya. Due to the fragile health situation, there have also been calls for a ceasefire between rival parties, the Daily Sabah reports.
Click here to read the MEI article and here to read the Daily Sabah article.
On 11 March, Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced the designation of Stephanie Turco Williams of the United States to act as the UN Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until the appointment of a successor for Ghassan Salame. Salamé stepped down after acting for 3 years as the UN Special Envoy to Libya.
Click here to read the full article.
On 3 March, Wolfram Lacher published for War On the Rocks an analysis of the patterns of warfare in Libya as the conflict in Tripoli drags on, fuelled by the support of international powers. For Lacher, the three pillars of warfare in Libya are drones, deniability and disinformation.
Click here to read the article.
As of 8 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said current oil production was 114,331 bpd, down from 119,867 bpd on 4 March, with cumulative losses of $2.93 billion since 17 January. The NOC stressed that while it continues to supply hydrocarbons to all regions in sufficient quantities to meet the transport and domestic needs of citizens ‘for now’, some fuel storage levels are running low and next week some areas are at risk of shortages.
The economic and logistical impacts of the oil blockade will be increasingly felt in Libya in the coming weeks, yet there are no immediate signs that these negative trends have affected popular support for the oil blockade in eastern Libya. The significant drop in the global price of oil in the last week, combined with increased supply and decreased demand, means that meaningful international pressure on Haftar to end the strike is unlikely to be forthcoming in the short term. In short, the oil blockade is likely to remain in place for at least the coming month, and may be in place for several months.
In an article published on 6 March with Al-Monitor, Fehim Tastekin analyses the connection between Turkey’s policy in Syria and its recent involvement in Libya, underlining the increasingly proxy nature of the Libyan crisis. This article echoes an article published by Arab News on 9 March, which ponders whether the cease-fire negotiated in Idlib, Syria by Turkey and Russia will have impacts on the situation in Libya. In that regards, in an article published on 4 March, French newspaper le Monde Afrique reported on the rapprochement between Khalifa Haftar and the Syrian regime.
Click here for the Al-Monitor article, here for the Arab News article and here for the Le Monde Afrique article.
In a podcast released by The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), Wolfram Lacher, who is Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), discussed his latest publication, a book entitled ‘Libya’s Fragmentation’. In this book, Lacher focuses on conflict dynamics in Libya, and most particularly on the tensions deriving from the fragmentation of the Libyan landscapes in a variety of competing forces.
Click here to access to the podcast.
In an article published with The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Markus Kaim and René Schulz argue that the EU will not be able to enforce the UN Arms Embargo in Libya, despite its commitment to do so following the Berlin Conference. Kaim and Schulz demonstrate the extent to which the issue of arms control is central to the Libyan crisis, and the limitations faced by the EU in its attempt to tackle the issue.
Click here to read the article.
On 28 February, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack took part in a panel of experts as part of the SMA AFRICOM Speaker Series. The panelists included LTG(R) Michael K. Nagata (Consolidated Analysis Center, Incorporated [CACI]) and Mr. Jonathan Winer (Middle East Institute). During the debate, Jason Pack demonstrated the strategic importance of Libya from a NATO perspective and highlighted the growing proxy nature of the conflict.
Click here to listen to the discussion.
On 25 February, writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Cinzia Bianco published a policy brief on how Europe can gain influence with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Bianco highlights the increasing role the Gulf countries play in conflicts such as Libya and Yemen, and advocates for Europe to develop a common European foreign and security policy on the GCC. As such, she insists on the need for Europe to improve its coordination.
Click here to read the report
Public Eye and TRIAL International released on March 2020 an in-depth investigation : entitled “Libyan fuel smuggling: a Swiss trader sailing through troubled waters”, the report looks at the international criminal networks taking advantage of the complex situation in Libya to make profit through fuel smuggling. Public Eye and TRIAL International investigated over a year in Switzerland, Malta and Sicily.
Click here to download the report.
On 2 March, the French newspaper Libération reported that Ghassan Salamé, the UN Special Envoy to Libya since June 2017 announced his resignation. Salamé justified his decision due to the deterioration of his health. For Rhiannon Smith, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC, interviewed by Liberation, the timing of Salamé’s resignation also reflects the failure of the Berlin conference, and the deterioration of the situation in Libya. Despite numerous efforts by the international community under the auspices of the UN since January 2020, negotiations between Libyan rival parties have not been successful, fighting has continued, and the oil blockades persist, endangering the already fragile economic situation in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 27 February, Rhiannon Smith discussed with journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight” the undergoing UN initiatives to foster dialogue between the rival Libyan parties fighting in Tripoli since April 2019. Smith highlights the complexity of the UN efforts, given that the fighting continues in Tripoli and Libya is on the verge of an important economic crisis resulting from blockades on oil operated by the Libyan National Army (LNA). She also discusses the recent announcements regarding a US base in Libya , which stands as yet another illustration of the influence of foreign actors on the Libyan file.
Click here to listen to the interview (between Minutes 1 and 6:30):
On 24 February, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said in its public information bulletin that oil outputs had dropped to 122,430 bpd, resulting in cumulative losses of $2.1 billion since the start of the oil blockade on 18 January 2020. This bulletin expanded the coverage of fuel storage facilities to include figures for western Libya (Tripoli, Zawiyya and Misrata), with Tripoli and Tubruq fuel supplies at the lowest across the country. NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah said that the attack on Tripoli port could have led to a humanitarian and environmental disaster. The NOC condemned the attack in the strongest possible terms and asked the international community to intervene rapidly to prevent a serious escalation in the conflict and to allow NOC to manage fuel supplies.
There are no indications that domestic support for the blockade in eastern Libya is waning, despite the growing logistical and economic toll on the country. At present, it is Tripoli and southern Libya that are suffering most from the fuel shortages and power cuts. While the East is experiencing some fuel shortages and power cuts, this seems unlikely to dampen support in the short term. However, as the economic impact of the blockade worsens, the Central Bank is likely to stop or delay the payment of state salaries as well as the payment of institutional and operational budgets. This economic decline is likely to affect the East more than the West given the eastern banking system has no access to central reserves. As such, that could be the tipping point at which domestic support begins to erode.
There appear to be two separate lawsuits against Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar in the US – a Virginia civil suit and a DC District Court suit – submitted by two Virginia-based Libyan-American complainants. On 10 February, a press release concerning lawsuits against Haftar was issued by Martin McMahon Law Associates. On 12 February, this press release was distributed by Mercury Public Affairs LLC – the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) lobbyists in the US – and included in Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) disclosures. On 21 February, it was included in the Al-Monitor Lobbying Tracking.
The lawsuits against Haftar are unlikely to result in him being punished or sanctioned by the US courts in the short term. Nevertheless, they remain quite significant because, as long as they are in still in progress, they effectively block Trump from pivoting towards Haftar, inviting him for a White House visit, or embracing him as Libya’s rightful leader – even if he were to take Tripoli or figure out how to effectively export oil. The lawsuits also create a counter narrative for the GNA to use to try and undermine Haftar’s legitimacy and credibility. Finally, if a default judgment were issued against Haftar, it could spur more Congressional action for sanctions against a range of Libyan individuals and entities.
As the conflict intensifies in Tripoli between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA), Middle East Eye published on 23 February a report on the areas overtaken by the LNA in Western Libya. The report indicates that there is a perception among local residents that the control of the LNA on these areas has brought along stabilisation to some extent, event though they also denounce certain restrictions. MME’s report is interesting to read in comparison to David D. Kirkpatrick’s article for New York Times on the impact of Haftar on life in Benghazi.
Click here to read the article.
Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was quoted in an Al Jazeera article published on 18 February. Al Jazeera reports on the renewal of tensions in Tripoli resulting from airstrikes by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli port. The LNA reportedly targeted a Turkish cargo ship carrying ammunition and weapons, indicating its opposition to the Turkish support provided to the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA responded by accusing the LNA of targeting civilian infrastructure, and suspended its participation in the second round of negotiations with the UNSMIL-mediated 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission. For Pack, the ceasefire talks are not likely to succeed as long as the UN arms embargo is not successfully implemented in Libya.
Click here to read the full article.
On 19 February, Al Jazeera published a documentary on Libya’s desert rallies for cars and motorcycles. Entitled ‘A Rally for Hope’, the documentary demonstrates the resilience of Libyans as the country continues to face instability and political chaos.
Click here to watch the full documentary.
On 17 February, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said that oil production had dropped to 135,745bd due to the ongoing oil blockade, with cumulative losses at 1.617 billion USD. This comes after the NOC said on 13 February that crude oil storage at Zueitina oil terminal is full, resulting in the shutdown of the Waha-operated Farigh field and the loss of around 100 million cubic feet of gas per day. The NOC stressed that fuel supplies to the eastern and central regions remain sufficient, although the southern and Tripoli regions still face supply shortages due to the poor security situations.
The availability of fuel and electricity is likely to decrease further over the coming weeks as a result of gas fields connected to Zueitina going offline and Zawiyya refinery remaining offline. Despite efforts by the NOC to distribute fuel as fairly as it can across the country and despite it not being responsible for the blockade, it is likely that efforts by those in the East who oppose the NOC (namely the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the parallel eastern institutions) and see it as aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and therefore with Turkey and ‘terrorists’ will seek to use the situation to undermine and attack the NOC. As such, although the logical conclusions of worsening fuel and power shortages in the East would seem to be a dwindling of support in the region for the oil blockade, it may be that the combination of a targeted anti-NOC narrative and the polarised nature of Libyan society means that easterners are convinced that these shortages are yet another example of why the oil blockade is necessary for Libya’s long term stability and security.
On 17 February, following an EU foreign minister meeting in Brussels, the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell announced that 27 European Union (EU) foreign ministers had agreed to establish a military mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya, though the legal text for the mission has yet to be drafted. The aerial and naval mission will be known as Operation EU Active Surveillance and it will involve naval ships, planes and satellites. The mission will operate in the eastern Mediterranean and will not be a part of the EU’s existing Operation Sophia, which has a search and rescue function. The EU leaders were keen to stress that this new mission has a clear and different mandate and is not connected to migrant smuggling. Borrell stated that the EU was not in a position to monitor the Libya-Egyptian land border, where military capabilities are being transported to the Libyan National Army (LNA).
At this time, both Turkey and the UAE are continuing to send military provisions to Libya via sea and air – with the UAE notably sending in large volumes to Benghazi – in violation of the UN arms embargo. The LNA is also receiving military goods by land from Egypt. Although the UN arms embargo on Libya has been in place since 2011, it has frequently and increasingly been openly flouted by various foreign actors, especially as the conflict in Libya has intensified in the last year. The UN Panel of Experts has documented these violations, but no action has been taken to enforce the embargo or sanction those responsible, in part due to divisions within the UNSC on this issue and in part because it is unclear who would be willing to take on the role of enforcing the embargo on the ground. This is a notable step by the EU to actively work to stop the trafficking of arms into Libya, and is a sign that the EU is willing to act, rather than just talk about acting, to help halt the drivers of conflict in Libya.
On 17 February, Yacoub El Hillo, the U.N humanitarian coordinator for Libya and deputy representative reported in a briefing to international media outlets on the dire humanitarian situation in Libya, the Daily Mail reports in an article published on 18 February. Addressing the press from Tripoli, El Hillo denounced the violence suffered by the Libyan population, and most particularly in Tripoli as the conflict drags on.
Click here to read the article.
In the United States, democrats have demanded sanctions on Khalifa Haftar, Bryant Harris reported for Al-Monitor 12 February. According to the article, the democrats consider that the Trump administration has been too soft on Haftar and also denounce the Russian influence and support received by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The call for sanctions on Haftar by the democrats is based under the 2017 US sanctions on Russia and is articulated in the line of US efforts to counter influence in Libya. The Libya file is a subject of significant interest in Washington, as both rival sides, the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar, have commissioned Washington-based lobby firms to defend their interest and win US support.
Click here to read the article
On 16 February, Mathieu Galtier published for French-written newspaper Jeune Afrique a report on the reality of daily life in Tripoli as fighting continues to rage around the capital between forces allied with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and forces allied with the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the influence of Khalifa Haftar. The interviews give a certain sense of how the conflict has impacted civilian lives: higher rents, fear of bombings, garbage piling up and most notably a sense of despair as the conflict drags on. Galtier also highlights an anger against the meddling of foreign powers.
Click here to read the full article.
On 12 February, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution calling for a lasting ceasefire in Libya, France 24 reports. Through this, the UNSC aims for a viable ceasefire to be implemented between the warring parties in Western Libya, the resolution comes to reaffirm the principles of the January Berlin Conference which had gathered the international community to discuss the Libya file. Reports indicate that the 55-point ‘ceasefire roadmap’ was drafted by Britain approved by 14 votes out of 15 with Russia abstaining. However it remains uncertain whether such an initiative will truly allow for stabilisation. As reported by Forces Network, it will depend on the parties on the ground and most importantly on their foreign backers.
Click here to read France 24 ‘s report and Forces Network ‘s.
On 24 February, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation will be hosting in London (King’s College) Edouard Belloncle for a talk on “Peace, Security and Crisis Response in Libya”. Belloncle has been working within the European Commission at political, policy and programming level on issues related to peace and security in regions including MENA, Africa, and Asia. He is currently based in Tunis where he directs EU-supported interventions funded under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) in the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia).
Click here to register.
On 12 February, Human Rights Watch published a report on the conflict in Libya, addressing what the organisation identified as a “steady deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in Libya since the beginning of 2019”.
According to the report,
In addition to the conflict-related abuses, Human Rights Watch has documented other systematic violations, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture. Widespread abuses against migrants and asylum seekers by smugglers and the GNA-linked coast guard and prison authorities have reached horrifying levels of ill-treatment and inhumane detention conditions.
As a result, Human Rights Watch calls on the UN Human Rights Council to establish a Commission of Inquiry to research and document such violations and report on the human rights situation.
Click here to read the full report.
Over the course of the past weeks, international media outlets have been reporting growing tensions between the international actors involved in the Libyan crisis, and most particularly between France and Turkey. The tensions transpired through a declaration by French President Macron against the deployment of Turkish forces in Libya. In an article published on 6 February for Al-Monitor, Fehim Tastekin analyses that Turkey’s growing influence in Africa, in the economic, diplomatic and military sectors is threatening France’s influence in the continent.
Click here to read the article.
Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was featured in an article by Ximena Sampson for Radio-Canada published on 8 February in French. The article analyses the role played by international powers in the Libyan crisis since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. In the article, Pack highlights the dependence of the Government of National Accord to Turkish support in the fight against Khalifa Haftar and its self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA).
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 4 February, Farouk Chothia reports for BBC News on the African Union meeting which took place in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, last week. The AU discussed the Libyan file. According to BBC News, AU members are feeling increasingly left out of the discussion regarding the Libyan crisis but suffer directly from its consequences.
Click here to read the full article.
On 3 February, the UNSMIL-mediated 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission began in Geneva between the GNA and LNA military representatives. The meetings are being moderated by the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame. The Commission was established as one of the points of the communique agreed by the international community at the Berlin Conference on 19 January. On 4 February, Salame said the parties have agreed on the principle of turning transform the truce into a more solid one, less often violated by either side, but stressed that now the question is what the conditions will be. He added that so far the two delegations had not met, but that he hoped they would be willing to sit in the same room eventually.
On 24-25 March, London will be host to a conference on Libya’s healthcare system, Libya Herald reported on 1st February. The event is organised by the Libyan British Business Council (LBBC), the UK International Healthcare Management Association (UKIHMA) and the UK Department for International Trade (DIT) and will address the urgent requirements and future prospects for the Libyan healthcare sector.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 30 January with Ahval, Nicholas Morgan exposes the links between Turkish and Government of National Accord (GNA) lobbying actions in Washington. As reported on Libya-Analysis, it was publicly known that the GNA had signed contracts with prime lobbying firms in Washington to influence the Trump administration in its favour. Morgan writes for Ahval that Turkey is engaged in similar affairs in Washington and that the GNA and Turkey have in fact reached out to the same firms.
Click here to read the article.
On 30 January, The Guardian published in an editorial its view on Libya, drawing on the Berlin conference which gathered Libya’s main political and military actors as well as foreign powers involved in the Libyan file. For The Guardian, the conference’s outcomes lack substance and do not set the ground for the end of fighting. In their understanding, the Berlin conference did not only reveal the weakness of the European Union as a mediator, but also highlighted the growing importance of foreign actors, such as Turkey.
Click here to read the editorial.
Force majeure remains in place on all four Oil Crescent ports ( Brega, Ras Lanuf, , Zueitina, and Sidra) and the eastern port of Hariga where all exports have been suspended. Separately force majeure is in effect on exports from Sharara and al-Feel in western Libya due to valve closures at Hamada. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has begun issuing ‘Public Information Bulletins’ on the situation. As of 24 January, the NOC confirmed that oil production had fallen to 284,153bpd from an average of 1.22 million bpd prior to the start of the blockade on 18 January and that losses in oil revenue amounted to 318 million USD so far. The NOC anticipates that oil output will drop to around only 72,000 bpd in the coming days as the remaining storage facilities are filled up, with the cumulative economic impact being a loss of $440m.
Given international pressure and condemnation of the blockades has been woefully limited, support in eastern and central Libya for the blockades remains strong – buoyed by the desire to see corruption in Tripoli definitively ended – and the truce has largely broken down, it seems likely that the blockade could last for another 1 – 2 months. Nevertheless, if the UNSC and other key actors are able to reach an agreement and bring their influence to bear on both the blockade and the enforcement of the arms embargo, or if local support starts to diminish as the economic and humanitarian consequences of the blockades compound over time, then it is possible that the blockade could be lifted sooner.
On 27 January, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya,” especially those conducted even after concerned countries made commitments to abide by the arms embargo during the Berlin conference held on 19 January 2020. UNSMIL said the fragile truce between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) is now threatened by the ongoing further transfer of foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition and advanced systems to the parties by member states, including several who participated in the Berlin Conference. The statement condemned these ongoing violations and called on the countries involved to live up to their commitments to the UN arms embargo. Yet, the statement lacked a mention of concrete penalties or enforcement mechanisms.
On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas met EU High Representative Josep Borrell in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya. Maas called for the UN Security Council to enforce sanctions against those who breach the UN arms embargo on Libya, and said he hopes that the 5+5 committee will meet this week to discuss the possibility of a UN-brokered truce. The continuing violations of the UN Arms embargo in the wake of the Berlin Conference should come as no surprise. That conference provided no concrete penalties to those nations caught violating the embargo. As such, UNSMIL’s and the EU’s follow on statements, meetings and conferences about how to finally give the arms embargo ‘teeth’ remain likely to fail unless a major state (like the US or UK) states that they will unilaterally or bilaterally sanction or impose other penalties on states seen to be in violation.
In an article published on 23 January, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) proposes a tour of European capitals, looking at perceptions from Berlin, Rome, Paris and London of the Berlin initiative, the Germany-led initiative to solve the Libyan crisis. This European tour of a sort allows for a better understanding of the different positions on the Libya file among EU member states, and the resulting difficult to implement concrete actions.
Click here to read the article.
Earlier this month, Turkey’s joint attempt with Russia to broker a cease-fire in Libya caught the international community’s attention on the ties between Turkey and the African countries. On 27 January, in an article published with Al-Monitor, Barin Kayaoglu analyses Turkey’s strategy towards Africa. The author demonstrates that Turkey’s interests towards the African continent are not limited to the Libyan file. Kayaoglu’s article reveals that Turkey has developed since 1998 a fully-formed, multidimensional strategy towards Africa, serving its military, political and commercial interests.
Click here to read the article.
On 21 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC discussed the outcomes of the Berlin Conference with Voice of America’s Mohamed Elshinnawi for Africa News Tonight. In the discussion, Smith argues that the while the final statement of the conference conveys an impression of a comittment of the international community to avoid prevent Libya from descending into more chaos, there were no real actions or measures to be implemented in the short tterm put forward. Smith also highlights the conflicting agendas and attitudes of the international powers which participated to the event.
Click below to listen (between 5:00 and 10:00 minutes).
On 17 January, a meeting of influential tribal leaders from eastern Libya and the Oil Crescent region issued a call to close down all the oil ports under their control and by the end of the day, oil exports from Brega, Ras Lanuf, Hariga, Zueitina, and Sidra ports had been halted Kufra. On 18 January, the Supreme Council of the Oil, Gas and Water Basin (SCOGB) issued a statement confirming the closure of all oilfields in the area of Zilla, Marada, Awjila, Jalu, al-Jakherra, Tazirbou and Kufra. Although the tribes appeared to drive the closures, a blockade on this scale can only have taken place with express permission and support from the Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA likely encouraged the blockade to strengthen its leverage prior to the Berlin negotiations and to highlight its territorial dominance.
On 18 January, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on Brega, Ras Lanuf, Hariga, Zueitina, and Sidra ports saying that the blockade instructions were issued by Major General Nagi al-Moghrabi, the commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) appointed by the LNA, and Colonel Ali al-Jilani from the LNA’s Greater Sirte Operations Room. The NOC said the instructions were given directly to the NOC subsidiaries in LNA-controlled areas – Sirte Oil Company, Harouge Oil Operations, Waha Oil Company, Zueitina Oil Company and Arab Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO). This blockade in the Oil Crescent has shut in 800,000bpd of crude – a daily financial losses of approximately $55 million per day – and prevented tankers from lifting.
Due to the Berlin conference taking place on 19 January, the international response to the blockade has been very muted. The United Nation Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) condemned the oil disruption and warned against devastating economic consequences, and the final statement from Berlin reiterated that the NOC is Libya’s sole independent and legitimate oil company and rejected any attempt at damaging Libya’s oil infrastructure or any illicit exploitation of its energy resources. On 21 January, the US Embassy in Libya issued a statement saying they are deeply concerned that the suspension of NOC operations risks exacerbating the humanitarian emergency in Libya and that NOC operations should resume immediately.
Although the fragile ceasefire is just about holding in Tripoli at the time of writing, Serraj and Haftar did not meet in Berlin and did not agree to formal ceasefire terms. Instead, both have agreed to nominate 5 military officials each to a commission to discuss the ceasefire in Geneva next week. However, there is a significant disconnect between Berlin and events on the ground, and there seems to be little appetite among the Libyan belligerent for real negotiations. As a result, it seems unlikely that the truce will be converted into a formal ceasefire in the coming weeks and that fighting will start once more.
There are indications that both sides are using the ceasefire as an opportunity to regroup and bed down, with Turkey and the UAE actively resupplying their allies on the ground even while participating in the Berlin conference. Turkey has continued to send Syrian mercenaries as well as air defence systems to the GNA-aligned forces, while the UAE also appears to have been flying in shipments. Once one side unequivocally breaks the truce, the other will be ready to respond, meaning renewed conflict remains likely in the short term.
On 13 January 2020, during a public panel at the Middle East Institute, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack presented his latest research, a policy paper entitled “An International Financial Commission is Libya’s Last Hope”, which he designed as a tool for policy-makers working on Libya to advance towards stabilisation.
Click here to watch the video of Pack’s presentation and following discussions.
According to Daniel R. DePetris in his latest article published with The National Interest on 20 January “Libya is dead […], for the past nine years, Libya has ceased to be a sovereign country”. Through this strong, challenging statement, DePetris wants to shed light on the highly complex situation in Libya, which sees its future and fate discussed by foreign actors, in events such as the 19 January Berlin international conference.
Click here to read the article.
On 20 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC Rhiannon Smith was interviewed by Russell Padmore for World Business Report on BBC World Service Radio and Radio 4. Smith commented the conclusions of the international conference on Libya which took place in Berlin on 19 January, and most particularly the reaction of the international community to the pressure applied to the oil sector by forces aligned with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).
Click here to listen to the interview (between 1:00 and 06:32)
On 17 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Carol Castiel and Mohamed Elshinawi as part of Voice of America’s Press Conference USA for a special Libya update. In this detailed interview, Pack highlights the changing nature of the Libyan file, where external actors such as Russia and Turkey have gained significant influence. For Pack, these actors are progressively taken the place of traditional foreign actors such as the United States, or European countries such as France or Italy. In that regards, he reminds of the strategic importance of Libya, at both a regional and international levels, and urges the international community to implement the right solutions to help Libya out of its chaos. Drawing on his recent researches, Pack demonstrates Libya’s critical need for economic reform and how breaking the cycle of war economy could pave the way for stabilisation.
Click here to listen to the interview:
On 19 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC discussed the Berlin Conference with CNN Newsroom as the meeting was taking place in Berlin, gathering Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj as well as Khalifa Haftar and 12 countries and international as well as regional organizations. Smith highlighted the determination of the Berlin conference participants in the initial communiqué on the matter of the protection of oil infrastructure, following the news on 17 January of a blockade operated by forces aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) on most of Libya’s Eastern oil terminals.
On 17 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Mohamed Elshinawi for Voice of America’s International Edition to discuss the situation in Libya as the international community prepared for the Berlin conference. In this interview, Pack insists on the extraordinary nature of the Libyan conflict, which witnesses foreign powers fighting directly against each other on the Libyan soil. For him, this confrontation is almost unprecedented and aggravates the Libyan crisis.
The same day, Pack also appeared on Al Jazeera, where he discussed the meeting of Khalifa Haftar with Greek government representatives on 17 January. For Pack, the meeting has to be understood as a reaction to the Turkey-Government of National Accord (GNA) MoU on maritime and military cooperation, which boosted the support of Turkey to the GNA and the threat posed by Turkey to Greece. Moving on, Pack also presented the aims of the Berlin conference set to take place on 19 January in Berlin.
Click here to listen to Pack’s discussion for VOA (between 04:40 and 10:08) and here to listen to the AJ interview.
On 13 January, writing for Al-Monitor, Aaron Schaffer reports that during summer 2019, lobbyists associated with Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) met with US Republican lawmakers and officials in charge of energy policy. The meetings, which were revealed by the disclosing of lobbying filling, Al-Monitor indicates, stands as another demonstration of the double games played by international powers such as the US regarding the Libya file. While most of the international actors support officially the Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA), sole institution to be recognized by the UN, international actors have also been developing contacts and attempted to negotiate with Haftar and his aligned forces. According to experts, such initiatives tend to disrupts UN-led attempts to create of dialogue between the GNA and Haftar.
Click here to read the report.
Following a series of rapidly moving developments resulting in the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Serraj, and the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, agreeing to implement a ceasefire in Tripoli from 12 January, both visited Moscow with the aim of them signing the Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement on 13 January. According to media reports at the time of writing, Haftar declined to sign the ceasefire deal because it did not include a deadline for disbanding the GNA forces and nor several demands he had made to Russia such as Turkish forces being withdrawn from Libya and the cancellation of the recent GNA-Turkey security agreement.
Haftar has a long history of bowing to initial pressure from international allies with regards to ceasefire and peace deals, but then either completely disregarding the processes or failing to adhere to the terms of the agreement. However, it is less clear if his unwillingness to agree to the ceasefire was due to his own desire to continue the military operations, pressure from his Libyan support base, or pressure from Egypt and the UAE – or a combination of all three. Although the conflict is now into its tenth month and the LNA’s resources remain strained, Haftar has always stated his desire to achieve a military solution to the Libyan crisis and had made no recent claims that his stance or that of the LNA had changed. Furthermore, the LNA has made small advances in southern Tripoli recently and made a significant gain by seizing control of Sirte on 6 January.
Despite Russia’s claims that Haftar is taking more time to consider the ceasefire deal and that mediation to this end will continue, it seems unlikely that Haftar will agree to sign the deal having made such a dramatic exit. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the current fragile ceasefire will automatically end and it may be that it continues up until the Berlin conference planned for 19 January. However, if the Berlin conference fails to take place or offers little in the way of tangible outcomes, then fighting is likely to resume.
On 14 January, German Chancelor Angela Merkel announced the organisation on 19 January of the international conference dedicated to the Libyan crisis referred to as the “Berlin Conference”. Germany had announced its intention hold the conference in September 2019, but the event was delayed. The precise cause for the delay remains unclear, most likely due to divisions between the international community and local actors on how to proceed with such an event. Since September 2019, in the context of the persisting tensions in Tripoli between Government of National Accord (GNA) forces and Libyan National Army (LNA) forces, the Libyan crisis has been a subject of deep divisions within the international community as international actors took sides in the conflict. The announcement by Chancelor Merkel follows the news that the attempt by Turkey and Russia to foster a cease-fire agreement between the GNA and the LNA fell through on 13 January. Indeed, Turkey and Russia had issued a joint call for a cease-fire, and invited both GNA Al-Sarraj and LNA Haftar in Moscow to discuss and sign the deal. However, reports suggest that Khalifa Haftar walked away from the deal as it did not encompass certain conditions he regards as non-negotiable.
In the March/April 2020 issue of The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Elaine Pasquini reviewed Jason Pack’s research on an economic approach to peace in Libya, which he had published on January 2020 and presented at a public panel at the Middle East Institute. The event also featured former commercial officer at the American Embassy in Tripoli, who supported Pack’s argument. Pack’s latest research provides an in-depth analysis of the roots of Libya’s unique forms of dysfunction and seeks to examine how the Berlin Conference process and pending Congressional legislation (the 2019 Libya Stabilization Act) can be used as correctives and incentives to move towards an economic-based approach to peacemaking in Libya.
Click here to read the full article.
On 27 December, Dr. Tankut Öztas and Ferhat Polat released with TRT World a report entitled “Turkey – Libya Relations: Economic and Strategic Imperatives”. The report aims at analyzing the multilayered dynamics which have bound Turkey and Libya over the past decades, in order to bring light on the recent rapprochement between Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). For the authors, Trukey’s involvement in Libya resulted of the instability created by Libya’s long standing power vacuum.
Click here to download the report.
Interviewed on 9 Jan by journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight”, Managing editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith commented on Russia and Turkey’ joint call for a cease-fire between rival factions in Libya. For Smith, there are no clear indications that the factions are willing to negotiate even if they respond positively to the call for a cease-fire. Given the proxy nature of the conflict, Smith advocates for the international community to enforce and respect the UN arms embargo on Libya to pave the way for a political solution to the conflict in Libya.
Click here to listen (between 2:10 and 6:30):
On 9 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack published with Middle East Institute a policy paper untitled “An International Financial Commission is Libya’s Last Hope”. The paper will be presented on 13 January 2020 from 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm during a public panel at the Middle East Institute’s new building at 1763 N Street NW. Pack’s latest research provides an in-depth analysis of the roots of Libya’s unique forms of dysfunction and seeks to examine how the Berlin Conference process and pending Congressional legislation (the 2019 Libya Stabilization Act) can be used as correctives and incentives to move towards an economic-based approach to peacemaking in Libya. This policy paper echoes Pack’s It’s the Economy Stupid: How Libya’s Civil War Is Rooted in Its Economic Structures, published in September 2019 with Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
Click here to download the report.
On 6 January, the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an assault on the city of Sirte, resulting in the withdrawal of local anti-LNA forces and Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Misratan forces stationed there and the LNA gaining effective control of most of the city‘s suburbs, airport, and seaport. Following their withdrawal, the anti-LNA forces are reported to be planning a counter-attack. Brigadier General Ibrahim Bait al-Mal, GNN Central Military Region and Misrata Military Council member, has been assigned as the head of a new Sirte and Jufra Operations Room. Misratan forces are reported to have already started a counter-attack.
The timing of the capture of Sirte is critical as it comes in the wake of Turkey stating it will be deploying troops to assist the GNA in southern Tripoli and after the LNA issued an ultimatum to Misratan fighters to withdraw from Tripoli. The LNA likely wanted to “get the jump” on the anti-LNA forces by quickly gaining then consolidating territorial control prior to Turkey providing the anti-LNA forces with new aerial capabilities and ground forces. Strategically, Sirte marks the boundary between eastern and western Libya and has been controlled by Misratan forces since they drove Islamic State (ISIS) fighters out of the city in late 2016.
The LNA’s capture of Sirte is the most significant development in the LNA’s campaign to control Tripoli, both strategically and symbolically, since it lost control of Ghariyan mid-2019. The event is also the most overt ground encroachment by the LNA towards Misrata itself. As such, it is likely to boost the morale of the LNA forces and supporters, and allow them to continue to project an image of military dominance. It also allows LNA forces to push closer to Misrata, though they are unlikely to be able to make much headway in this direction. The LNA’s takeover of Sirte is likely to force Misrata to deploy forces away from Sirte in the immediate term to protect its own city from a potential ground assault and draw away troops from defending the capital. The LNA is likely to hold Sirte until the Misratan forces gain additional aerial support – both to defend their forces from the LNA drones and to attack the LNA positions in the city. It is unclear if and when this is to occur. Even with aerial support, the Misratan forces may struggle to re-take Sirte without significant ground fighting if the LNA are able to bed down and secure support from the local population. However, if aerial capabilities become more balanced, then Misrata is likely to have the upper hand in any drawn out ground fighting in the city due to the LNA’s manpower constraints.
Following talks between presidents Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin in Istanbul, on 8 Jan Turkey and Russia called on Libyan factions to end hostilities and declare a cease-fire as of 12 Jan, midnight. The call for a cease-fire happens at a pivotal moment as Turkey had recently pledged to send troops to Libya to support the GNA against Libyan National Army (LNA) advances in the Tripoli area. This joint statement by Russia and Turkey could stand as a turning point in the conflict that has prevailed in Libya since April 2019 between factions aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and with Eastern Libya-based General Haftar. Thus far, Libyan actors have not responded to the call.
Click here to read the article.
On 4 January, 50 members of the Tubruq-based House of Representatives (HoR) held an emergency meeting in Benghazi and 38 members voted to annul the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), cut relations with Turkey, cancel the maritime agreement between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA), and bring GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj to justice for high treason. The HoR asked the international community to withdraw its recognition of the GNA, and renamed itself the “Libyan Government.” The HoR also called upon Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces to disrupt all ports and airports under control of the GNA to prevent the influx of mercenaries and arms to groups in Tripoli.
The GNA rebuffed the HoR emergency meeting, claiming the session was illegal, and reaffirmed its MoU with Turkey. The High Council of State (HSC) head Khalid al-Mishri said the HoR decisions are meaningless and are a result of pressures exercised by the “military oligarch who seized power in eastern Libya”. The HoR is seeking to use the current international division and chaos over Libya to undermine the GNA and reinforce its own position. While this decision has no legal standing and does not appear to have much wider support in Libya either at this time, it does highlight the HoR’s current strategy to influence the international landscape. Although nullifying the LPA would also technically undermine the HoR’s current legal standing, the HoR would likely say it is reverting to its mandate from the 2014 elections and use this to try and leverage international support. This development is indicative of the broken and polarised state of Libya’s political institutions.
On 27 December, Manager of Libya-Analysis LLC Rhiannon Smith was featured in Petroleum Economics exposéwith an on the current situation of the Libyan oil sector. For Smith, despite the worsening conflict, on the surface, Libya’s oil sector appears to be weathering the storm. However, she notes that:
The NOC remains chronically underfunded and the ongoing conflict has diverted further monies away from its budget. In addition, since the conflict started, the GNA has suspended much needed economic reforms—meaning Libya’s economy is likely to remain under strain, even if the conflict ends soon. As a result, the NOC will likely struggle to fund all the maintenance works required to keep production steady in 2020, let alone begin new expansion projects. As long as the conflict continues, and even if a ceasefire is agreed, it is likely that meaningful reengagement and investment from IOCs will be delayed until longer-term stability looks more assured.
Click here to read the analysis.
On 25 December 2019, writing for Oil Price, Viktor Katona analyses the resumption of operations in Libya’s Oil Crescent by Russian oil company Tafnet. The company resumed operations in early December in its Block 04 acreage within the Ghadames Basin, with hopes that the investments will lead to tangible results. In the context of the tensions between Russia and Turkey on the Libyan crisis, such findings suggest that these tensions are likely to increase given Russia’s various interests in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 24 December 2019 with the New York Times, Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage and Eric Schmit report that the Trump administration is considering a reduction or potential pullout of American Forces from West Africa. This maneuver would be the first phase of a review of the global deployment of US troops around the globe, suggesting a shift in the US’s foreign affairs, breaking from the post 9/11 strategies deployed to fight against terrorism.
Click here to read the full article.
On 27 December, Jason Pack, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC, was interviewed by Voice of America (VOA)’s Mohamed Elshinawi about the recent developments in Libya. Pack provides an insightful analysis of the stakes of the Turkey-Libya rapprochement and regarding the motivations of foreign actors.
Click here to listen to the interview between minutes 9:02 and 13:40.
Writing on 18 December for The Moscow Times, Emadeddin Badi commented on Russia’s increased involvement in Libya, while on 17 December, Tarek Megerisi and Asli Aydıntaşbaş published with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) an analysis of Turkey’s rapprochement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). Whether for Turkey or Russia, Badi, Megerisi and Aydıntaşbaş reach a similar conclusion, which is that these countries are filling up a void left by traditional Western actors such as European countries or the United States.
Click here to read Badi’s article on Russia, and here to read Megerisi and Aydıntaşbaş’ article on Turkey.
On 12 December, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that it had signed two exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA VI) with the German energy company Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft for Areas 91 (previously named Area 96) and 107 (previously named Area 97) in the Sirte Basin. Under the agreement, Wintershall is to carry out exploration activities at its own cost and bear half the development cost, as well as provide 150 million USD for corporate social responsibility and sustainable development programmes and projects.
This agreement between the NOC and Wintershall marks the end of several years of dispute between the two organisations, which had led Wintershall to consider exiting the country in September 2019. Wintershall operates 8 fields near the Jakherra and Jalu oases in the Sirte Basin, most notably the Sarah field, and has been in Libya since 1966. Wintershall’s production in Libya had averaged around 160,000 bpd but by August 2017 it had dropped to 65,000 bpd and hasn’t risen much above that since. This agreement comes just days after the NOC approved Total’s acquisition of Marathon Oil Libya Limited’s shares (16.33%) in the Waha Concessions, a process initiated in March 2018 by Total and hotly contested by the NOC ever since. The NOC has now solved its main outstanding disputes with IOCs in Libya.
The NOC’s agreement with Wintershall is a positive development which is likely to improve investor confidence in Libya’s oil sector and the wider operating environment. The NOC’s decision has likely been driven by the increasing need to secure international investment and expertise to be able to deliver its ambitious 2.1bpd by 2024 plan, coupled with the deteriorating financial and operational conditions in the oil sector due to the ongoing conflict in Tripoli. It is unlikely that this new arrangement with Wintershall will lead to an immediate increase in production but it is possible that production from these fields will increase in the short- medium term.
On 12 December, in a brief televised video on the pro-LNA al-Hadath TV channel, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar announced a new ‘Zero Hour‘ for all his units stationed in southern Tripoli. Haftar told his troops that “today we begin the decisive advancement to the heart of the capital.” In his speech Haftar said that his forces’ victory was inevitably and urged all those who had joined the militias and terrorist groups in Tripoli to withdraw immediately.
In response, Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj called Haftar’s speech the ”zero of illusions” and urged his forces and what he called the “17th February Revolution” fighters to stand against the LNA. The LNA has announced at least four “Zero Hours” since the conflict began on 4 April 2019, with none leading to any notable gains or changes in strategy by the LNA. So far, this latest announcement seems to be following the same pattern. The timing of the speech was likely motivated by Turkey’s strengthening relationship with the GNA and its announced intentions to make a partial deployment of forces and/or provision of advanced weapons to the anti-LNA coalition forces in Tripoli.
As the conflict drags on and resources, manpower and morale come under strain, it is becoming increasing vital for the LNA to make a quick entry to Tripoli. Haftar’s speech is likely intended to serve as an attempted catalyst for a renewed push but also as a way to retake control of the narrative in Tripoli and posture to its international backers, domestic supporters and opponents in Tripoli that it is on the brink of making significant gains. While it is possible that the LNA may succeed in advancing into Tripoli, this is unlikely to signal an ‘end’ to the conflict – there is likely to be persistent street fighting with extreme deterioration in security, in addition to significant cost in human casualties and severe damages to infrastructure.
In an article published with Al-Monitor on 16 December, Amberin Zaman discussed Turkey’s reaffirmed commitment of Turkey to protect the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in the wake of the controversial maritime deal between the two countries. For Zaman, this could likely lead to a Turkish intervention in Libya against the forces aligned with Eastern Libya-based General Haftar which have been fighting GNA forces for the control of Tripoli. For Kirill Semenov, also writing for Al-Monitor, Turkey’s renewed involvement in the Libyan conflict on the GNA’s side could also spark tensions between Turkey and Russia, who unofficially provides support to General Haftar.
On 12 December, Khalifa Haftar announced a “decisive battle” for Tripoli, international media report. The conflict opposing forces aligned with Haftar and forces aligned with the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) entered this December its tenth month as mediation efforts were not able to be pursued. Both rival sides are receiving important military support from foreign actors and have mobilised significant fighting resources. In a briefing paper published in August 2019 with Small Arms Survey/Security Assessment in North Africa, analyst Wolfram Larcher examines the identities and interests of the forces fighting each other over control of Tripoli. For Larcher, the 2019 conflict for Tripoli is not only deeply disrupting prospects for peace in Libya but also transforming the country’s military landscape.
Click here to read the report and here to consult the briefing paper.
In his latest article published on 10 December published with The Middle East Institute, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack discusses the proxy nature of the Libyan conflict, and focuses on explaining Turkey’s renewed interest in Libyan affairs which manifested itself through the controversial MoU with the Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea. Recounting the political and economic ties between Libya and Turkey, Pack explains this reinforced cooperation in the context of the current conflict, which opposes the GNA to the forces mobilized by Khalifa Haftar. For Pack, the GNA is likely to have agreed to the deal in order to receive from the Turkey the increased military support it needs to counter the Haftar offensive. As Pack demonstrates, in doing so, the GNA is risking its credibility as Libya’s sole legitimate government power.
Click here to read the full analysis.
In an article published on 10 December with The Global Observatory, Nate Mason highlights that despite efforts at international levels to push forward a solution to the Libyan crisis, the situation in Libya is not likely to get better any time soon. Mason explores different outcomes and demonstrates that while some solutions have been identified as a way out of the crisis, the exact contrary could still happen. As an example, Mason explores what could happen if the military solution did take over the Libyan conflict. Mason argues that to prevent the military solution to prevail, the United States should work to limit the influence of actors such as Egypt and Russia in Libya as they tend to favour General Haftar and his resort to violence.
Click here to read the article.
On 9 December, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on crude loadings from Mellitah port after the 73,000bpd al-Feel oilfield went offline on 5 December due to “an unlawful valve closure” on the export pipeline from al-Feel field to Mellitah complex. This incident comes just days after operations at the Mellitah-operated al-Feel field were temporarily suspended on 27 November following clashes at the facility when the local Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Southern Protection Forces (SPF) attempted to take control of the field from the Libyan National Army (LNA)-aligned forces securing it.
The fact that the NOC has been forced to declare force majeure, despite waiting several days to do so, indicates initial attempts to strike a deal to reopen the valve have stalled. Despite the NOC’s zero tolerance stance towards blockaders, Sanallah will want to do everything he can to ensure that the pipeline reopens as soon as possible, especially given he is currently on an international investment drive for the Libyan oil sector and this force majeure, coming so soon after the attack on al-Feel, is likely to make IOCs and investors nervous. In the past, similar pipeline closures have tended to last 1 – 2 weeks, though the ongoing conflict in Tripoli and intensifying proxy warfare dynamics could mean that reopening the valve is less of a priority for actors other than the NOC, possibly hampering or slowing efforts to increase the pressure on those responsible. Nevertheless, the NOC is likely to apply maximum pressure to reopen the pipeline as soon as possible.
As the conflict enters its tenth month, tensions and disputes between the Government of National Accord (GNA) ministries and various armed groups continue to grow, with the coup of downing a Libyan National Army (LNA) jet being undermined because the anti-LNA forces involved have arrest warrants against them for possible ISIS links. The LNA continues to try and expand its support base in western Libya and maintain its posturing, gaining a controversial pledge of support from some Amazigh elders, while ICC-wanted Warfalli has reportedly deployed to the frontlines. The conflict shows no signs of abating and there have been no major territorial shifts, but the LNA does appear to maintain the upper hand at present. However, Turkey has pledged to send troops to Libya if requested by the GNA, which could shift the balance if this were to happen.
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The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, faces accusations it is deliberately denying food to some refugees and migrants in order to force them out of a housing facility.The Gathering and Departure Facility in Tripoli was intended to temporarily accommodate migrants selected for evacuation from Libya. But other refugees, fearing street violence, have gathered there, and the facility is now at twice its capacity. Meanwhile, evacuations from Libya continue 117 refugees and migrants were flown out to Rwanda in late November. UNHCR denies the charges.
In a leaked report, the European Union admitted it cannot effectively monitor the Libyan coast guard — which has been involved in repeated human rights abuses. Moreover, the EU report claimed that the detention of migrants is “a profitable business model” for the Libyan government. In October, the EU and Italy renewed a deal to support the coast guard, but the French defense ministry — under pressure from NGOs and facing a legal challenge — cancelled its plan to donate six boats to the Libyan coast guard for its operations.
As NATO members are currently gathered in London to discuss NATO’s future, Ethan Chorin argues in an article published with Forbes on 3 December that the Libyan crisis should be at the heart of NATO’s agenda. For Chorin,
“what happens next in Libya is immediately relevant to core NATO interests including combatting terrorism, addressing Europe’s migrant crisis, curbing Russian opportunism in the Middle East”
For Chorin, NATO may be the only organization with the capacity to push forward a solution to the persisting Libyan crisis. Chorin puts forward a controversial view, given the numerous critics NATO received following its initial intervention in Libya in response to Gaddafi, which led to the dictator’s fall and the subsequent period of chaos and tensions.
Click here to read the article.
Over the course of the last week, the Libyan National Army (LNA) maintained its aerial dominance over Tripoli, while the Government of National Accord (GNA) did not launch any aerial attacks. The LNA undertook aerial attacks on the southern Tripoli frontlines, particularly in and around Ghariyan, Aziziya, and Swani. Both the GNA and the UN condemned these attacks which caused civilian casualties. This coincides with reports that the LNA is now utilizing attack helicopters in Tripoli. The LNA also launched air attacks on Tripoli’s western and southern periphery. On 30 November, the LNA undertook aerial attacks targeting the National Mobile Force based along the Coast Road near the Tripoli West Power Station.
The LNA has successfully degraded the anti-LNA’s drone and aerial capabilities. Over the course of the last few months, the LNA destroyed at least 15 Baykar Bayraktar TB-2 drones. The GNA’s new military and security agreement with Turkey is thought to include the replacement of these lost capabilities, though a timeframe for their delivery remains unknown (as are the reasons for Turkey’s reasons for not providing them sooner). While the LNA has dominated the skies over Tripoli for the last few months, this has not resulted in a change in territorial control on the ground nor led to a successful decimation of the anti-LNA armed group leadership. As such, the LNA’s recent attacks on the Tripoli peripheries may hint at a new strategy or approach in its use of aerial capabilities.
On 27 November, the Government of National Accord (GNA) signed an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey, along with a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to expand security and military cooperation. The maritime agreement seeks to extend Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction in the eastern Mediterranean, though neither the GNA nor Turkish officials have provided details about the geographical boundaries or terms covered. This maritime MoU has led to rebukes and criticism from Greece, Egypt and Cyprus. Turkey is pushing to become the main natural gas hub for Europe and is competing with Cyprus and Greece for naval sovereignty over waters in the eastern Mediterranean in order to secure for access to and rights over oil and natural gas reserves in these waters by declaring an “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) where they have the right to explore and exploit natural resources. However, because of the concave shape of the Eastern Mediterranean, there is an overlap between the areas that each country can claim.
With regards to Libya, the agreement with the GNA will likely permit Turkey to expand and share its maritime jurisdiction with Libya, allowing it to exploit any hydrocarbon reserves in the swathe of territory between north-eastern Libya and south-western Turkey. Turkey has been in discussions with the GNA over the terms of this deal for several months. In the longer term, it is likely that Turkey will see greater benefit from this maritime deal than Libya if it is upheld, but the GNA is in dire need of short-term military support.
As such, it is likely that Turkey has been able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in return for continued or possibly increased provision of military and security support for the GNA-aligned forces currently fighting against the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Tripoli. This is vital given the LNA has been making some gains along the Tripoli frontlines in the past few weeks and the LNA’s aerial capacities, supported by the UAE, have dominated that of the GNA-aligned forces, supported by Turkey. Turkey also has broader strategic and economic interests in Libya, with over $19 billion-worth of contracts in progress in Libya. The GNA-Turkey maritime agreement is likely to deepen international fault lines and divisions with regards to Libya in multiple arenas, including NATO, the EU and the UN Security Council. This is likely to increase the proxy warfare dynamics of the Libyan conflict in the short term.
Interviewed by journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight” on 2 December, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack discussed the renewed interest of the United States in Libya. Pack notes that over the course of the past weeks, the U.S demonstrated a renewed willingness to engage in Libyan affairs. For Pack, the U.S renewed intention to play a role in the resolution of the Libya crisis can be understood as Washington’s reaction to reports about growing Russian presence and influence in Libya.
Click here to listen to the interview (between 13:55 and 17):
In an article published in the New York Review of Books, Libya specialist Frederic Wehrey discusses the Desert Encounter, a book recounting the travels and thoughts of Knud Holmboe in 1930’s Libya. Holmboe has often been compared to the mythic Lawrence of Arabia, though the two characters differ. Wehrey recounts Holmboe’s story as he travels through the Italian colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in a compelling manner, and also draws parallel between Holmboe’s experience of Libya and the current times, deploring the persisting chaos in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
In his latest article published on 20 November with The Chatham House, Tim Eaton highlights the key role of economic matters in the tensions between Libyan factions. As a result, Eaton advocates for the creation of an economic commission as a tool to ensure transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances. For Eaton, the economic aspect should be included in the negotiations for a political solution that are expected to take place within the coming months with the Germany pushed initiative for the resolution of the crisis.
In his latest research, Jason Pack, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC, has also demonstrated the central role of economy in the Libyan crisis and drawn recommendations for an economy-driven approach to mediating the Libyan conflict.
Click here to read the article.
On 23 November, Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced a “No Fly Zone” (NFZ) over most of the greater Tripoli airspace. The LNA informed the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), civilian air transport companies, and all parties that utilize the Libyan airspace not to use the designated area due to it being a military operation zone. This decision intervenes after two drones, an Italian and a US military drone, were taken down over Tripoli.
The LNA’s increasing aerial dominance over Tripoli is giving it additional political leverage within some domestic and international audiences by projecting an image of dominance. It is likely to take credit for any downing of enemy drones (or those linked to the opposing side in the case of Italy), even if it is not actually responsible, as this strengthens this image. Likewise, it is likely that the LNA’s announcement about a NFZ is a move to project power and reinforce the message that it was the LNA which brought down the foreign drones last week, rather than marking a significant ramping up in efforts to shoot down drones or any efforts to target civilian aircraft in the airspace. Nevertheless, the LNA is the dominant aerial power in Tripoli and western Libya at present, and it is possible that it is receiving advanced military support for its current aerial operations from external supporters or foreign mercenaries on the ground.
On 21 November, members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Chris Coons, Lindsey Graham, Chris Murphy, and Marco Rubio – introduced a piece of legislation called ‘the Libya Stabilization Act’ which attempts to clarify and enhance US policy in support of a diplomatic resolution to the Libyan crisis. The proposed bill would see the creation of a report on foreign government involvement in the crisis, require a strategy to counter Russian influence, see sanctions placed on individuals considered to be furthering the conflict, and marshal humanitarian assistance and economic reform to support the Libyan people. The document also calls for the appointment of ‘US Special Envoy for Libya’ to coordinate with other foreign governments and international entities to advance ‘a sustainable diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya.’
This bipartisan bill has been introduced in both the House (this took place in October) and the Senate, but it has not yet been debated or passed in either. If it is passed, most of the provisions within the bill will likely require several months to be implemented, likely longer for the process of sanctioning specific actors. This Senate version of the bill is very similar to the House version, and both are in lock step with UNSMIL’s approach of late. It has bipartisan support and may be passed without debate.
This bill is likely to be a negative blow for the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s hopes of winning the US over to its side of the conflict and its push for a military solution to the crisis. However, it should not necessarily be seen as an overt political move in favour of the GNA as many of the sanctionable actions identified in the bill will also apply to forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as GNA officials and their international allies. In addition, while this bill clearly advocates a political approach to solving the Libya crisis and will likely strengthen the perception among Libyans and internationals that the US is more willing to seriously engage on Libya in the coming months, the bill is primarily symbolic and meant to deter Russia rather than to compel any specific US action. This bill should be seen more as a step towards consolidating and clarifying misperceptions about US policy towards Libya.
On 22 November, U.S military reported having lost an unmanned drone aircraft over Tripoli. According to official reports, the drone was lost while assessing the security situation and monitoring extremist activity. On 25 November, a senior of the Libyan National Army (LNA) declared that the LNA was responsible for the destruction of the drone, which was reportedly mistaken by LNA forces for a Turkish drone. LNA officials apologized for taking down the drone and agreed to coordinate operations over Tripoli with U.S military. The complex situation in Libya, and most particularly in Tripoli over the course of the past months, has seen the growing use of technological items such as drones.
On November 14, Husni Bey published an op-ed with Libya Herald in which he analysed the results of the economic reforms implemented by the Government of National Accord (GNA), marking the first anniversary of their implementation. For Bey, these fiscal policy reforms which were designed to address Libya’s monetary policy failures have been met with success. Among other things, Bey highlights that these measures allowed for the strengthening of the Libyan dinars. In his conclusion, Bey draws recommendation for the GNA on how to pursue these efforts.
Click here to read the article.
On 17 November, the Libyan National Army (LNA) Military Prosecutor, Gen. Faraj al-Sousa, refused the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) appeal to apprehend the al-Saiqa Special Forces unit commander, Maj Mahmoud al-Warfalli, to stand trial for alleged war crimes. Al-Sousa said they have already cooperated with the ICC concerning a number of alleged war crimes and human rights violations in Libya, and that al-Warfalli was already under domestic investigation in Libya.
On 6 November, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, renewed her call upon relevant authorities in Libya to apprehend Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli and Al-Tuhami Mohammed Khalid (Qadhafi Libya head of the Internal Security Directorate) Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli. Bensouda stated the current cycle of violence and impunity provided a breeding ground for atrocities in Libya. Referencing ”reliable information” Bensouda made known the ICC’s view on the whereabouts of all three suspects: Saif is in Zintan, Al-Tuhami is in Cairo, while al-Waraflli is in Benghazi where he still in command of a Saiqa unit. Bensouda deplored the promotion of al-Warfalli twice since the ICC issued a first arrest warrant against him in August 2017, a second arrest warrant in July 2018.
The LNA Military Prosecutor issued an investigation order of Al-Warfalli in August 2017 following the ICC arrest warrant. However, the court proceedings were never publicized nor ever reached a final verdict. Later in July 2018, Hafter was pressured by the ICC into ordering an immediate arrest of al-Warfalli. However, al-Warfalli resisted the arrest order, leading his fellow soldiers to stage a protest across Benghazi. Despite this, he was apprehended. The LNA is likely to continue in declining the ICC calls of surrendering al-Warfalli. Al-Warfalli remains popular in Benghazi and the LNA’s extradition would likely cause schisms within the local population, as well as outrage on behalf of Madkhalist Salafists within the LNA’s rank and file.
On 18 November, Libya Observer reported the appointment of US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland as Honorary President of the US-Libyan Chamber of Commerce. The mission of the organization is to facilitate the entry of US companies in the Libyan market, hence the appointment of Norland as Honorary President suggests a willingness to boost economic cooperation between Libya and the US.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 18 November with National Interest, Emily Estelle looks at Russia’s growing presence and influence in Libya, arguing that Russia is currently capitalizing on the void left by the U.S in Libya. For Estelle, the U.S should react to Russia’s Libyan policy by revising its own strategy for the country.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on 13 November 2019, Nate Wilson and Abigail Corey report on the peace pact signed in Ubari in September 2019 to address violence and retaliation between communities such as the Tebu and the Tuareg. In partnership with a local association, the Azgar Association, USIP worked with local actors and communities to address Ubari’s history of inter tribe violence. The peace pact stands as a result of this community-based initiative for dialogue.
Click here to read the article.
Over the course of the past week, France 24 has released a series of video reports on the conflict in Libya. In short videos, journalists Julie Dungelhoeff, Abdallah Malkawi and Catherine Norris Trent explore different aspects of the crisis, whether the militia fighting in the Tripoli area, or the fate of migrants or Benghazi’s slow reconstruction. The series interestingly presents the multiple aspects of Libya’s protracted conflict.
Click here to listen to Julie Dungelhoeff’s presentation of the series and access the different videos.
Following a meeting in Washington D.C between the U.S Department of State and a delegation of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) represented by Foreign Minister Mohamed Siala and Minister of Interior Fathi Bashaga, the Department of State issued on 14 November a joint statement on U.S.-Libya Security Dialogue. In the statement, the U.S Department of State calls for the Libyan National Army (LNA) to end its offensive on Tripoli and warns against Russia’s « attempts to exploit the conflict » in support to Libya’s territorial integrity. This declaration follows a thread of reports about Russia’s alleged undercover activities in Africa in general, and in Libya in particular. The statement can be interpreted as a sign of the U.S’s renewed interest in the Libyan crisis and willingness to be involved.
Click here to read the report.
In an article published on 13 November with Avhal, David Lepeska looks at Turkey’s involvement in Libya, noting that since May 2019, Ankara has imposed itself as a key player of the Libyan crisis by openly supporting the forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and its allies through weapon deliveries and trainings. For Lepeska, the reason behind Turkey’s involvement in Libya has to do with Turkey’s close relationship with Qatar.
Click here to read the article.
On 7 November, Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud published with Al Jazeera an article in which they expose Italy’s controversial policies in Libya, and most particularly its policies relating to the refugee crisis. For the two journalists, Italy’s policies in Libya are driven by security and economic interests, which contribute to the complexity of the situation.
Click here to read the article.
On 31 October, Voice of America (VOA) reported on Facebook’s decision to take down social media accounts that were allegedly used by Russian entities to interfere with African political affairs. Facebook allows the publication of paid political adds on its platforms and according to the reports, this solution was used by Russian entities to influence public opinion in some countries, among which Libya. The article reports that in Libya this campaign was in support of Khalifa Haftar and Saif Al-Islam. For experts, this is an example of what Russia is capable to do to increase its influence over new territories.
Click here to read the article.
On 3 November, a spokesperson for the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Volcano of Rage Operation said that the Libyan National Army (LNA) had conducted four airstrikes against Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, forcing a passenger plane flying from Tunisia to nearby Misrata airport to be rerouted. It is not clear whether any damage was caused by the attack. The LNA confirmed the strike on the “military parts” of Mitiga airport, targeting “storage facilities used to prepare unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and store ammunition”. This comes after the GNA formally reopened Mitiga airport on 29 October and said that they planned to resume flights in the next two weeks
The LNA appears to be pushing for territorial advances on the ground in Tripoli and as such LNA airstrikes against strategic targets in Tripoli, Misrata and locations west of Tripoli are likely to continue in the short term. Likewise, LNA forces are likely to continue to attempt to gain ground along the Tripoli frontlines, in particular along the southwestern and central axes. However, unless it receives a major influx of foreign support or additional manpower, it remains unlikely that the LNA will succeed in taking control of Tripoli in the short term.
On 1 November, reports emerged that, at the end of September, Maltese authorities seized and impounded two 2,000 cubic feet containers packed with Russian-printed Libyan currency destined for eastern Libya as the shipment docked in Malta. Maltese authorities have allegedly informed the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Foreign Ministry that they will temporarily hold on to the banknotes and proceed in coordination with the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL)
Russian customs data published by Reuters on 29 October shows an increase in the amount of Russian-printed Libyan bank notes delivered to the parallel CBL in eastern Libya this year – both prior to and after the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched its assault on Tripoli. From February to June, four shipments with around 4.5 billion Libyan dinars in total were shipped to the East.
Aside from concerns about the influx of cash undermining confidence in Libya’s currency and disrupting efforts to address the country’s monetary policy, these revelations highlight what appears to be the LNA’s dependence on cash deliveries to finance its military machine and campaign in Tripoli. It is unclear whether the diversion of this cash delivery will directly undermine the LNA’s ability to fund its military activities in the short term or whether it will simply look to access funds from elsewhere. In the longer term, the LNA will either need to access more of Tripoli’s financial resources (by force or through a political agreement) or find alternative ways to maintain the funds it needs to keep operating (through predatory economic behaviour, international support or de facto partition). Russia’s willingness to supply the cash and Malta’s move to impound the shipment clearly highlight the growing proxy nature of Libya’s conflict, a destabilizing factor which is unlikely to disappear in the short term.
On 15 November, the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NUCSLR) will host its third annual conference in Washington D.C. The subject of the conference is “Re-engineering Libya: economic, institutional and security requirements” and will gather a dozen of scholars, analysts and activists who focus on Libyan matters. Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack will take part in the event and present his latest research “It’s All About the Economy, Stupid” which focuses on how to integrating transparency and accountability in Libya’s political agenda.
On 02 November, Wolfgang Pusztai Chairman of the Advisory Board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NUCSLR) published with the German journal Orient a note on the key factors of instability in Libya. Pusztai presents and analyses the different factors which make the complexity of the Libyan crisis and insists on the idea that the current conflict should not be reduced to the fight against Khalifa Haftar or Islamist factions.
On October 29, Reuters reported as an exclusive information that supplies of bank notes from Russia to parallel Eastern Libyan institutions accelerated over the course of the past year. Reuters collected the data from Russian customs, which indicates that between February to June 2019, Russia sent these parallel institutions nearly 4.5 billion Libyan dinars ($3.22 billion). Both Western and Eastern Libya face a severe liquidity crisis. Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack commented the event in an interview with Al-Jazeera on 29 October. He explains how this support by Russia undermines the legitimacy and authority of the Western-Libya based Central Bank of Libya (CBL) which supposedly holds the prerogative of controlling the amont of currency in circulation in the country. For Pack, this event underlines the war on economy taking place in Libya as the same time than the war for territory and political legitimacy between rival military and political factions.
Click here to read the Reuters report and here to listen to J. Pack.
On 23 October, the Waha Oil Company announced the beginning of operating tests of phase 2 at the Farigh field. Farigh field’s gas production capacity is set to increase by 180 MMSCFD in the next two weeks – bringing the total quantity of gas to be pumped from Farigh field to approximately 250,000 MMSCFD by November 2019, in addition to the production of 15,000 barrels of condensates. This development is seen as part of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) five-year strategy to increase oil and gas production. The NOC said that Farigh’s gas will be used to increase the efficiency of crude oil production at the Intisar 103 field and could supply power plants in the eastern region such as the Benghazi North power station, replacing subsidized liquid fuel. The project will also increase gas supply to methanol plants and the Libya Norwegian Fertilizer (LifeCo) at Brega port [O-A1]. The NOC is awaiting the General Company for Gas Transmission & Distribution’s completion of gas pipeline installations to connect the Farigh field with the Sarir power plant, carried out in collaboration with Petrojet, an Egyptian company.
The development of the Farigh field is an important baby step towards achieving the longer-term production targets of the NOC. Apart from the potential revenues generated by increased gas exports, light-fuel fed power stations in eastern and central Libya could ultimately be replaced with gas supplies. This, however, requires financing of a modern downstream infrastructure which is less costly to operate and guarantees safer and steady supplies to power stations. However, that goal is likely to be unattainable currently amid serious shortages in NOC development financing and the on-going division of state’s financial institutions.
In his latest article with Al-Monitor, Kirill Semenov argues that Government of National Accord (GNA) PM Fayez Al-Sarraj’s recent visit to Sochi, Russia, exposed the internal Russian divisions on Russia’s Libya policy. On 23-24 October, Russia hosted the first Africa-Russia summit and Economic Forum in Sochi, an event which was designed by Russia as a way to expand its influence in the African continent. For Semenov, Sarraj’s visit to Sochi can be interpreted as a gesture of recognition of Sarraj’s political legitimacy and compensate for the alleged strong links between Russia and Libya’s Eastern-based armed forces and parallel institutions. According to Semenov’s sources, Russia had objected to the presence of Libyan parallel factions at the forum. Over the past months, there have been growing controversies regarding Russia’s involvement in the Libyan crisis.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Global Risk Insights on 20 October, Ibrahim Sowan assesses Khalifa Haftar’s options in regards to the persisting stalemate resulting from the launch of an armed offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. For Sowan, Haftar’s options heavily depend on the material and financial support provided to the Libyan National Army (LNA) by foreign powers.
Click here to read the article.
On 21 October, the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Ambassador to Italy, Omar Tarhouni, stated that the planned international conference on Libya to be held in Berlin will occur in April 2020. The precise cause for the delay is unclear, but it does not come as a surprise as international actors and their Libyan allies have been setting competing trajectories for peace, insisting on uncompromising and often unachievable conditions for their attendance, and in some cases seeking new approaches – often requiring the exclusion of others.
In the meantime, Libyan politics are likely to be marked by the development of international tensions within the GNA. Indeed, the main aim of the international conference is to establish a new political process which would likely see the whole GNA structure dismantled, removing Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj source of authority and legitimacy. Internal tensions have already surfaced, with reports that the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashagha, is pushing for a reshuffle of the GNA’s ministerial positions in order to include more Misratan powerbrokers and allies in the international recognised government – and possibly to even supplant PM Sarraj himself.
The delay to the Berlin conference reinforces the assessment that momentum for a peace process in Libya appears to be stalling. This delay is likely to increase pressure on Serraj and his inner circle in the short term, and he will likely be scrambling to find other avenues to retain his hold on power in the coming weeks. Other actors within the GNA and broader anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) coalition are likely to seek to turn this delay to their advantage by using the time to better position themselves politically and strategically in anticipation of the eventual mediation.
In his latest article published on 22 October with Petroleum Economist, Chris Stephen argues that political and security instability in Libya is derailing attempts by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to convince international oil companies (IOCs) to resume activities in Libya. Explorations by Italian oil company ENI were expected to resume in 2019, with the hope to boost Libya’s oil output, however the project was slowed down by the escalation of tensions between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and rival forces aligned with General Haftar. For Stephens, the system is plagued by an erratic governance, which could result in a partition of the institution, as warned by NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah in a visit to Washington this month.
Click here to read the article.
On 14 October, the US Embassy in Libya released on its website a report on the activities of US new ambassador to Libya Richard Norland during his first 60 days in Libya. The report aims at demonstrating the renewed involvement of the United States in Libyan affairs and most especially the support provided by the US to key institutions such as the National Oil Corporation.
Click here to read the report.
On 15 October Michael O’Hanlon and Federica Saini Fasanotti wrote for The Hill an article untitled “What is the future of Libya” in which they present recommendation on solutions to rebuild the Libyan state through decentralization. Their analysis is supported by a report initially published in February 2019.
This new article by O’Hanlon and Fritz echoes a previous publication earlier this week on The National, in which they present the crisis in Libya as an opportunity fo the Trump administration to demonstrate its foreign policy abilities.
Click here to read the article.
On 15 October, Russian media Sputnik released an interview of Eastern Libyan Khalifa Haftar, discussing the fighting in Tripoli between Haftar’s allied Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and the factions aligned with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) as well Haftar’s ambitions regarding elections in Libya.
In the interview, Haftar claims to be defending Tripoli, and not attacking it and deplores the impact the conflict has had on civilians. Haftar provides Sputnik with a lengthy explanation of his ambitions regarding Libya, advocating that the international community should support the LNA and the offensive on Tripoli as a measure to restore stability in Libya, and denouncing the weakness of the GNA.
This interview by Russian-media Sputnik seems to stand as an attempt to portray Haftar under a different light, countering the mainstream representation of Haftar as a renegade war lord.
Click here to read the article.
The planned “Berlin Conference” on Libya will be delayed until at least November, or even as late as early 2020 according to some reports, despite originally being slated for this October. Germany is now looking to hold a pre conference meeting with international states involved with the Libya crisis, excluding Libyan actors. The precise cause for the delay is unclear, though both domestic and international actors have been digging in their heels and setting uncompromising conditions for their attendance – often requiring the exclusion of others.
On 11 October, the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, said he remained hopeful that the Berlin Conference would lead to a UN Security Council resolution preventing foreign countries from escalating the crisis in Libya through a proxy war, as well as the implementation of mechanisms to enforce the arms embargo. In an interview he added that the countries where those weapons are produced or bought should commit publicly to stop any transfer of arms to Libya
International momentum towards a peace process in Libya appears to have stalled as a result of international actors and their domestic clients insisting on setting unhelpful and often unachievable terms for their participation. In addition, while the international drivers of the Libyan conflict are significant and justify an international focus to the talks, the prospect of holding a Libya conference without the presence of any Libyan actors could undermine the conference’s integrity, particularly among Libyans. This in turn would undermine the chances of converting any international agreement into a political agreement on the ground in Libya. While Salame and other actors are undoubtedly working as best they can to bring about productive talks, there is little indication at present that the actors (foreign and Libyan) responsible for the worst of the destructive, partisan behaviour in Libya are serious about changing their approaches.
In an article for Al Bawaba published on 9 October, Sebastian Rees comments the reports of Russia’s involvement in Libya through the presence of mercenaries. For Rees,
The increased privatisation of Libya’s war through the involvement of Private Military Contractors augurs badly for an end to hostilities in the country
Click here to read the article.