On 12 August, Jason Pack spoke to the BBC’s World Service to discuss the UN-brokered ceasefire in Libya, the significance of some actors on the ground in Tripoli violating the ceasefire, and what impact this partial, temporary truce might have on longer term peace efforts. Listen to his interview here https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w172wn2ss82h53z
On 24 July, a delegation from the pro-Libyan National Army (LNA) faction of the House of Representative (HoR) in eastern Libya was reported to be in Washington DC on a mission to gain US support for the LNA’s campaign to take control of Tripoli. The delegation held a series of meeting with US State Department, Defence Department and White House officials. The meetings reportedly involved the delegates promoting the LNA’s legitimacy by saying its actions in Tripoli have been sanctioned by the HoR, which they claim is a democratically elected political entity, unlike the Government of National Accord (GNA), which they deem illegitimate. The HoR delegation is being assisted by Linden Government Solutions, a lobbying firm employed by LNA head Khalifa Haftar to lobby US officials on his behalf.
Meanwhile, on 26 July, another delegation from the HoR which is established in Tripoli undertook an ‘official’ visit to Moscow to meet with Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov to discuss the current state of affairs in Libya. Bogdanov is reported to have reaffirmed Russia’s commitment to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), and that there can be no military solution to the Libya crisis. This meeting highlights the deepening of divisions within the HOR. Indeed, when the LNA attacked Tripoli in April, the HoR membership split down pro-LNA/ anti-LNA lines, with a group of mainly western-based HoR members setting up breakaway entity in Tripoli in May.
As the US position on the conflict in Libya remains ambiguous, Libyan factions to lobby the country for support. The internal division with the HoR is indicative of broader political fragmentation within Libya, with the polarisation increasingly going along east-west lines. While the HoR has not been an effective or cohesive parliament and has frequently undermined or derailed previous political processes, this trend towards a formal division between Tubruq and Tripoli increases the threat of deeper de facto or even de jure political partition between the eastern and western regions in the longer term.
On 29 July, the United Nations (UN) made available online the the twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The report assesses the threat posed by terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in the light of recent developments such as the fall of the Islamic State caliphate in March 2019. Regarding Libya, the report notes that Islamic State related activities gained momentum over the course of the past months as the political and security crisis deepened in Libya.
Click here to read the full report.
On 23 July, Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaïd Lazib published with Proxy War Project (PWP) Conflict Studies a report on Libya untitled Proxy War Dynamics in Libya. PWP is an initiative funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York focusing on the wars in the Arab world. In the report, Harchaoui and Lazib propose a review of the actors of the Libyan conflict and the history of the conflict since the fall of Qaddafi. They also illustrate the links between national actors and regional and international powers, reaching the conclusion that “conflicts are often both hyperlocal and closely linked to foreign states”. Harchaoui and Lazib argue that in the midst of these tensions, the United States appears as the only actor who could play the role of peace broker. However, they note:
Given that Washington is unlikely to make a genuine comeback in Libyan affairs as a peace broker, a more probable scenario is perpet-uation of the civil war.
Click here to download the report.
On 15 July, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that since the clashes began in Tripoli at the start of April, over 1 093 people have been killed, including 106 civilians, with as many as 5 752 people injured. More than 100 000 people have been displaced. Fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces continued in southern Tripoli last week, with notable clashes in Wadi al-Rabea, Ain Zara, Salahuddin and Khallat Furjan. On 10 July, the LNA claimed control of the latter after intense clashes.
The LNA has continued to conduct aerial assaults over Tripoli, apparently gaining aerial superiority over the GNA-aligned forces over the reporting period. The LNA also undertook a series of air strikes in the Fezzan region last week (See Murzuq and Sharara reports further below). The frontlines in southern Tripoli are likely to remain relatively static in the short term, though the threat of collateral damage, revenge attacks and massacres will only increase as the conflict continues and the stakes rise.
On 9 July, reports began emerging of a new political movement in eastern Libya, backed by the UAE, that will see a new ‘national government’ formed, with former Tripoli-based ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Aref Ali Nayed, as its head. There have reportedly been multiple meetings between Nayed and the head of the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tubruq, Aqeela Saleh.
The UAE, which is a long-time supporter of Libya’s eastern political and military factions, is allegedly keen to consolidate the HOR’s political standing in the wake of wavering military progress in Tripoli. It is thought to be exerting pressure on LNA leader Khalifa Haftar to submit to a civilian government. The UAE’s push for Nayed to become either the president or prime minister of a new government effectively complements Egypt’s new political initiative, the aim of which appears to be to facilitate a viable agreement amongst HoR members for a new unity government.
However, this remains an eastern initiative, with little evidence of any buy-in or dialogue with any representatives of the western or anti-LNA factions. Egypt and the UAE’s shift towards a political track is indicative of their increased fatigue and possible doubt about the LNA’s capacity to resolve the current crisis through military means. The conflict in Tripoli has become protracted and appears to have become more entrenched following the LNA’s loss of its base in Ghariyan at the end of last month. Given a quick victory seems highly unlikely and international appetite for backing the LNA may be waning, the LNA’s regional backers are looking for an alternative (plus cheaper and more controllable) track. At present, this ‘plan b’ political track is running in parallel to the military track, but if it gains momentum, the LNA may find its military provisions, training and fiscal reimbursements curtailed and come under pressure to submit to the new government.
For Consortium News, Giorgio Cafiero discusses Israel’s involvement in Libya. He highlights that Israel’s policy towards Libya joins the policies adopted by several Arab states through support to Eastern-Libya based Khalifa Haftar
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with the Los Angeles Times on 11 July, Nabih Bulos gives an account of what happens in Tripoli’s black-market, and what it says of the severe economic crisis the country is experiencing. Bulos depicts the business of unlicensed traders selling various amounts of different currencies to citizens who try to navigate Libya’s cash shortage.
Click here to read the article.
In a piece for War on The Rocks published on 11 July, Anas El Gomati analyses the evolution of the conflict in Tripoli between forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA). Interestingly, El Gomati uses the term “civil war” to address the current conflict in Tripoli, adding that
The transformation of the conflict from a localized battle in Tripoli’s suburbs and low intensity civil war into a large-scale, foreign-led air campaign seems more likely now than it ever has been before.
Click here to read the article.
Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was interviewed by A News. Jason discussed the airstrike by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on the Tajoura Detention Center. For Pack, the strike can be understood as a gesture of active desperation and revenge on Khalifa Haftar’s part, in response to the loss of Gharyan. Pack also discusses the divisions among the international community regarding Libya and how it influences the situation in Libya.
Click here to listen to the interview.
On 2 July, the Libya Herald reported the latest comments by Mustafa Sanalla, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the oil sector in Libya. Speaking at the OPEC Summit in Vienna on 1 July, Sanalla warned against the threat posed by fighting to oil production and attempts by parallel Eastern Libyan institutions to export oil illegally. Tensions regarding the control of oil resources and their distribution are most likely to persist over the course of the coming months. Meanwhile, on the same day, Reuters reported that finding clean, drinkable water was also becoming a concerning issue in Libya. In Western Libya, both the power grid and water control system have been damaged during the fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and the anti-LNA coalition, Reuters reports. Experts fear that the situation could escalate in a humanitarian crisis.
Click here for The Libya Herald article and here to read Reuters’ article.
In an article published with Al-Monitor on 1 July, Hagar Hosny looks at the support provided by Egypt to Khalifa Haftar and his armed forces, the Libyan National Army (LNA).
Click here to read the article.
In June 2019, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime published a report by Noria Research untitled “Predatory Economies in Eastern Libya – The Dominant role of the Libyan National Army (LNA)”. Drawing on the fighting in South Tripoli between the LNA headed by Khalifa Haftar and forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA), the report analyses the LNA’s strategy to gain control of streams of revenue to sustain its military advances. For the authors, the LNA has adopted a predatory behaviour in the territories it has overtaken since the breakthrough in Benghazi in July 2017.
Click here to read the report.
Khalifa Haftar’s sudden willingness to engage with the UN and equivocally set out his political position in an interview, which is a rare event in itself, follows Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s launch of a new peace initiative on 16 June, which inside sources indicate was pre-planned with the US.
According to insiders, Sarraj’s initiative revolves around 3 key points:
Sarraj’s effort to push for a ceasefire and new political negotiations appears to be a high-level strategic move designed to ensure his political survival and that of the GNA rather than reflecting a genuine attempt to reach a ceasefire or enter political negotiations. While both Sarraj and Haftar appear to be going through the motions of diplomatic engagement in response to this international shift, the conditions laid out by both are predicated on their forces winning the conflict, not on finding a negotiated end to it. In reality, the depth and vitriol of political polarisation in Libya at present mean neither Haftar nor Sarraj could agree to grant the concessions that would be required to reach a ceasefire, otherwise they would lose their support base and their leadership positions, while their loosely aligned forces carried on fighting.
On 21 June, Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated media outlets conducted an interview with Khalifa Haftar. Much of the interview was repetition of Haftar’s previously stated positions including that military operations will only stop once the LNA has achieved its objectives and the need to disband all militias and all the political bodies created by the Libyan Political Agreement. However, a new element was Haftar’s assertion that in the transitional phase, once the LNA’s objectives have been met, a national unity government would be formed but may not be based in Tripoli (but in a different Libyan city) if there are any “temporary logistical and security reasons” that prevent it operating from there.
President Trump’s call to Haftar shortly after his forces launched their assault on Tripoli in April created confusion around US policy towards Libya and was read by many as tacit US endorsement for Haftar’s offensive. However, Trump’s nomination of Norland as the U.S ambassador to Libya and the latter’s clear support for a ceasefire indicates a clearer a US position against the conflict in Libya is emerging. The renewed international push for a ceasefire in Libya signals the first serious attempt by international actors to end the stalemated conflict. It also appears that this renewed engagement is being driven by a clearer US position in support of a ceasefire and a new peace process. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to halt the conflict in the short term and could even lead to intensified clashes in the coming weeks as the LNA tries to push more forcefully to gain ground in the capital.
On 20 June, the United States Department of State released the “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report”, in which a section focuses on the issue of people trafficking in Libya. There have been significant records of trafficking in persons in Libya during the reporting year, according to the report, which also draws the link between this serious issue and the political and security vacuum in Libya. As a matter of fact, the report states:
During the reporting year, there were continued reports that criminal networks, militia groups, government officials, and private employers exploited migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in sex and labor trafficking. Endemic government corruption and militias’ influence over government ministries contributed to the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) inability to effectively address trafficking.
Click here to read the report.
Media outlets reported that on 22 June, the head of the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) Ghassan Salamé met with General Haftar in Eastern Libya. The meeting occurs as Tripoli enters in its third month of fighting between Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Since the eruption of fighting in April, neither side has been able to make significant progress in Tripoli. As the situation stalls the meeting appears as an attempt by UNSMIL to relaunch the political dialogue in Libya. However, it remains unlikely that Haftar will be willing to engage in negotiations.
Last week, Richard B. Norland was officially nominated by U.S President Trump as the next U.S Ambassador to Libya, replacing Peter Bodde. In his opening statement before the SFRC Confirmation Hearing, Norland announced three key priorities as the U.S new representative in Libya, namely the resolution of the ongoing fighting, the re-launch of a political agreement and supporting the economic development of the oil-rich country. For analysts, the Trump administration has been sending mixed signals regarding its policy towards Libya since fighting erupted in Tripoli in early April revealing an apparent uncertainty on whether the U.S should get more involved in the efforts to stabilize Libya and under which conditions.
In an article published on 17 June with the Los Angeles Times, Nabih Bulos demonstrates that the tensions on the ground between rival Libyan factions also reveal themselves in the media and social networks, and most particularly on Facebook. Facebook, Bulos reports, which is the primary communication mode for more than two-thirds of the country, has become another battlefield for armed factions, political figures and civil society activists. For Bulos, the platform is used as a channel to communicate rival factions’ narratives and as such generates additional confusion and chaos to the already complex situation.
Click here to read the article.
This month, Development Transformations (DT) with Elbiro Media Foundation released a report elaborated in partnership with consultants from PeaceTech Lab on the hate-speech Lexicon in Libya. They identified, studied and explain the hate speech terms used by Libyan in media and social networks. In its introduction, the report accurately points out the tensions and issues at stakes in Libya, and their analysis contextualises the use of the terms identified on networks.
Click here to consult the lexicon.
In an article published on 9 June, Libyan Express listed the companies that are still operating in Tripoli in spite of the persisting tensions, such as Giga Firm, a Telecommunication firm.
Click here to read the article.
On 20 June, in an op-ed published with Middle East Eye, Barah Mikaïl provides an overview of the situation in Libya and potential outcomes of the crisis. Mikhail evokes a defiance regarding France in Western Libya since the eruption of fighting between General Haftar and forces affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and denounces the tensions resulting from international interference.
Click here to read the article.
On 16 June, the Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister, Fayez al-Sarraj, announced a new peace plan initiative, under the auspices of the UN, to kick start a new political process, provided that it does not include Khalifa Haftar and his supporters. The initiative is a rehashing of the stalled UN peace plan – a national conference to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections with the added caveat of excluding Haftar and all Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated representatives. The UN Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the initiative calling it “constructive” and added that it welcomes any other initiatives from Libya’s major actors, signalling that it remains open for engagement and dialogue with the LNA.
The Sarraj peace plan is widely seen as political posturing to showcase the GNA’s good faith to the international community and embarrass Haftar and the LNA, as well as maintain the status quo in Tripoli with the GNA still at the helm of the anti-LNA forces. However, it is very unlikely to result in any significant change to the political situation in Libya or internationally, as Sarraj has made no concessions nor offered a way out of the current impasse. Any ceasefire or political process necessitates the participation of pro-LNA forces and LNA supporters, therefore excluding all LNA-affiliated officials will be a non-starter. As a result, the current military stalemate and political instability is likely to continue for at least the medium term, and likely for the longer term.
Over the last week, 5 members of the Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned Sirte General Security Forces, which is affiliated with the 604 Battalion, were arrested after Sirte tribal elders gave an ultimatum to the commander of the GNA Central Military Region, Mohammed al-Haddad, to address and recompense the overt brutality used by GNA-aligned Misratan forces against Sirte residents. During the week the GNA-aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) allegedly issued a high state of alert. Meanwhile, the SPF claimed on 12 June they established checkpoints in the south and east of the city and local reports on 17 June indicated an armed convoy moved within Sirte.
These events coincide with the Libya National Army (LNA) mobilising its forces to the south and east of Sirte and increased rhetoric warning they will launch an assault on the city. On 17 June, LNA forces bolstered their presence at Harawa east of Sirte. The LNA forces are reported to have closed down the Harawa Municipality under GNA-aligned Zidan bin Sharada. The LNA’s posturing in the area within the vicinity of Sirte serves to disrupt Misrata’s activity in the western region and Tripoli. While an immediate assault on Sirte by the LNA is unlikely – partly because family and tribal relatives of many LNA fighters reside in the city, and partly because of the limited capacity of LNA forces in the region due to the ongoing Tripoli campaign – it cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the LNA is likely planning to besiege the city on their own terms.
In an article for Middle East Eye on 18 June, Khalil al-Anani reviews the United Arab States’s foreign policy. For Al-Anani, it is characterized by the use of aggressiveness and force as a protection measure when faced with potential threats. Al-Anani demonstrates that the UAE’s support to General Haftar is part of their approach.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published with Petroleum Economist on 13 June, Libya-Analysis Founder Jason Pack and Managing Director Rhiannon Smith decrypt the politicisation of the oil sector in Libya. For Pack and Smith, there is an increasing risk that General Haftar and his affiliated force, the Libyan National Army (LNA), seize Libya’s oil revenues.
Noting that Haftar and his forces already controls key pipelines, fields, ports and terminals in Libya but cannot export the oil, Pack and Smith foresee that
If the fighting drags on in Tripoli, it becomes increasingly likely that the LNA will attempt to export oil illicitly through the parallel eastern NOC, allowing it to directly pocket the proceeds and feed its war machine. Attempts are already underway, with the UAE-based Sulaco Group reportedly signing a contract with the eastern NOC to lift 2mn bl from Hariga port. While such attempts have been made in the past, they have usually been unsuccessful due to US and UN intervention. In the current climate, it is less certain that international actors will be as robust in their condemnations and counter-efforts as they had been previously.
Click here to read the full article.
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) shared a podcast of its conference held in Paris on 5 June to discuss the current crisis in Libya. Tarek Megerisi, Mary Fitzgerald and Virginie Collombier participated in the event.
Click here to listen to the podcast.
Reuters reported on 14 June the renewal by foreign firms of their licenses to exploit Libyan oil. Total, the French oil firm, was among the firm demanding the renewal of its license after having been suspended by the Ministry of Economy in May because the licence had expired. Reuters notes that some diplomats and analysts saw the move as political pressure aimed at shoring up support abroad against an assault by Haftar’s Libya National Army (LNA), a claim denied by Government of National Accord (GNA) Minister of Economy, Ali Abdulaziz Issawi.
Click here to read the article.
On 12 June, George Mikhail published with Al-Monitor an interview with the Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, the Foreign Minister of the Interim Libyan government, based in Eastern Libya. Mikhail and Al-Hweil discussed the diplomatic conflict between Libya’s Eastern-based interim government and the Government of National Accord (GNA) which heightened along with the fighting in Tripoli. Al-Hweil explains the reasons behind his government’s support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA).
Click here to read the article.
The clashes between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and anti-LNA forces continue, with no significant changes in territorial control. Heavy clashes continue in Ain Zara, Khallet al-Farjan and around Airport road. The LNA continues to dominate aerial attacks, specifically targeting ammunition depots used by anti-LNA forces in Tripoli and along the coastal road up to the eastern entrances of Zawiyya. Of significant importance, the LNA appears to have shifted its focus away from air-to-surface support for LNA troops to targeting Government of National Accord (GNA) munition stores and air capabilities. The GNA-aligned forces and the Misrata Aerial College continue to focus on disrupting LNA supply routes. The increased number of LNA airstrikes targeting strategic locations in Tripoli, especially ammunition stores, suggest that the LNA is making a post-Eid push to advance towards the centre of Tripoli. Reports indicate anti-LNA forces are building defensive positions in the al-Swani area, signalling an LNA assault in that area is also likely. Likewise, unconfirmed reports suggest the GNA Western Military Region is planning to lead an assault towards Ghariyan.
However, significant territorial changes on the ground over the next week remain unlikely – unless there is a significant international intervention or statement of support from the US or Russia for either side. As it stands, with the anti-LNA and LNA forces locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli and the international community divided, the conflict is likely to be protracted for the foreseeable future. On 9 June, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported the deaths of 653 people as a result of the clashes in Tripoli, 41 of them civilians. Another 3,547 have been wounded, 126 of them civilians.
On 10 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously extended until June 2020 Resolution 2473 which authorises member states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from the country, if they have reasonable grounds to believe they are violating the arms embargo. Prior to the UNSC’ renewal of the maritime component of the arms embargo, UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, appealed to all countries to implement the embargo and prevent weapons reaching Libya by sea, air and land. Guterres stated that the UN efforts to monitor the embargo identified “illicit transfers of arms and related material” in and out of Libya. The EU’s Operation Sophia is the only naval operation that has been undertaking inspections of vessels traveling to or from Libya. In 2016, the UNSC authorised the operation to extend its human smuggling mandate to include inspections of vessels suspected of carrying weapons to or from Libya that could violate the arms embargo.
The conflict in Tripoli that began in April has seen multiple reports of arms shipments to both competing forces. However, there have been few recorded incidents of Operation Sophia vessels inspecting and seizing arms being transported to Libya. Additional arms entering Libya, especially aerial and naval military equipment, will likely exacerbate the conflict and ensure it continues for the foreseeable future. While the UNSC arms embargo nominally remains in place, measures to successfully implement it remain absent, particularly as the international community remains divided on how to address the conflict and engage with the different parties. Moreover, the renewal of Operation Sophia’s authority to conduct naval inspections is likely to have little tangible impact on arms shipments to Libya given it currently has no navel assets deployed off Libya. This indicates that the international intervention to stop arms shipments to Libyan ports remain unlikely until a consensus on how to resolve conflict is reached.
On 30 May, Al-Monitor published excerpts of an interview of UN Development Program administrator Achim Steiner by Ayala Jean Yackley. Steiner discussed with Al-Monitor the works of UNDP in conflict zones such as Syria and Libya. Steiner stated that in Libya, UNDP continued to work in parts not impacted by fighting, aiming at developing stabilization measure and hoping to promote democratic values as a way to counter violent extremism. The message delivered by the UNDP administrator regarding the zones severely afflicted by violence and chaos was that of a strong UN commitment and efforts to address the roots of instability.
Click here to read the interview.
In an interview, the CEO of the Oil Company Wintershall which operates the NC-96 (As-Sarah) and NC-97 concessions on-shore in Libya and has a share in the Al Jurf crude oil field off the Libyan coast, declared that Libya’s current instability posed a significant threat to Wintershall’s on-shore production.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 5 June for Mother Jones journalist Dan Friedman reports on the ties that have developed between various Libyan factions and Lobbying firms specialised in U.S politics over the course of the past year. His demonstration reveals a burgeoning of lobbying initiatives by Libyan political figures, and even international powers, to influence the US’s policy towards Libya. Among Libya’s main political figures, Friedman indicates that Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj contracted the lobby firm Mercury Public Affairs on April 2019, while General Haftar turned to to Linden Government Solutions and Ahmed Maiteeg, the GNA Deputy Prime Minister, entered in contract with The Prime Policy Group. Friedman denounces the profit made by lobby firms off Libya’s political and security instability. It remains unclear thus far to determine whether such attempts have had impacts on the administration’s policy given the lack of clarity of its policymakers.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 8 June The Guardian reports that sources within the U.S Trump administration suggested that the Trump administration is currently turning away from General Haftar, less than two months after President Trump exchanged on the phone with General Haftar and appeared to endorse his offensive on Tripoli. For The Guardian, the call was an independent manoeuvre of Trump, responding to a demand of the Egyptian president Al-Sisi, and did not indicate the administration’s willingness to engage with Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). According to sources, the administration is revising its Libya policy and could be considering options such as a US-enforced ceasefire. However, The Guardian warns, this seeming shift in policy could be subject to subsequent changes in the short term.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 10 June, Ulf Laessing reports for Reuters on the consequences of the tensions in Libya over Southern Tunisia, and most particularly in Ben -Guerdane where locals economically depend on the flow of products and people passing through the border. Laessing notes that Libya’s instability is likely to have damaging impacts on the Tunisian economy, already weakening since 2011. He says:
Libya used to act as a pressure valve for the Tunisian economy, a place where thousands of Tunisians went for work each year and a source of cheap goods they could sell back home. But the violence has damaged the flow of products and people.
Click here to read the article.
On 9 June, drawing on the launch of the 2019 FIFA Women’s World Cup, French Newspaper Libération reports on Libya’s FIFA Women team and the challenges it faces. For Liberation, the team fights to not be set aside and has become a symbol of the tension between Libya’s defensors of certain forms of freedom and Libya’s more conservative factions.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with The Libyan Report, the Government of National Accord (GNA) Minister of Economy of Libya Ali Abdulaziz Issawi alerts that Libya sits on the verge of full-scale economic devastation due to the escalation of violence between forces affiliated with General Haftar and forces affiliated with the GNA. Ali Abdulaziz Issawi was appointed at the GNA Ministry of Economy in October 2018 and was tasked with conducting the GNA’s reform program for Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 1 June, Hafed Al-Ghwell and Karim Mezran published with The Hill an op-ed in which they plead for the United States to intervene in Libya to put an end to the conflict and stop General Haftar’s advance on Tripoli. For Al-Ghwell and Mezran, the support of the United States to the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN efforts in Libya is vital and Washington should manifest it clearly. Mezran and Al-Ghwell move on to drawing several recommendations for actions to undertake. First they recommend for NATO under U.S leadership to declare a no fly zone over the Libyan territory to undermine external support to factions and protect lives. Following, they propose the re-establishment of a status quo between the two warring factions and the revitalization of the UN-led negotiation process. Lastly, they argue in favour of developing an effort towards supporting the emergence of a new leadership in Eastern Libya, instead of General Haftar and supporting the implementation of the UN embargo prohibiting arms to Libya. This call for a greater engagement of the United States on the Libyan matters echoes many other voices that have been petitioning over the past few months for the U.S to revise its Libya policy.
Click here to read the article.
On 4 June, French researcher and specialist of the Middle East François Burgat published an article with Middle East Eye in which he denounces the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France to General Haftar. For Burgat, Libya’s internal divisions are fuelled by external actors pursuing their onw national interests. Burget argues that in the Libyan case, under the pretense of the fight against terrorism, France follows the lead of the UAE and its allied Arab states hoping that it will benefit its weapon industry. Other analysts responded to Burgat’s analysis saying that it had to be nuanced, that France’s ideology came also has a factor explaining its positioning in Libya, with the choice to focus on a strong figure to contain instability and insecurity in a strategic geographical zone.
Click here to read the article.
On 31 May, Jason Pack, Founder of Libya-Analysis, published with the Italian Institute For Political Studies (ISPI) an in-depth analysis of the Libyan militia landscape. The research looks at the different groups and factions on the ground in Libya, to understand the current crisis which Pack labels as Libya’s second war of post-Qadhafi succession.
Drawing upon the Libya-Analysis proprietary real time militia mapping project, this paper examines the main armed groups involved in the war: ascertaining their strengths, weaknesses, command and control structures, motivations, alliances, military capacities, and financing. This paper illustrates that the balance of power persists in Libya due to its being sustained by the war economy. As such financial leverage, is the international community’s sharpest policy instrument. Should it wish to halt the fighting it should block the LNA’s funding streams, as well as those of other belligerents, and then facilitate a face-saving compromise.
Click here to read the research.
In an interview on 26 May General Haftar announced that his forces were to continue fighting until the defeat of the anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) in Tripoli, Voice of America (VOA) reports. This statement echoes the declaration made by Haftar during his meeting two weeks with French President Macron that he was not considering a cease-fire. Such statements suggest that tensions are likely to persist and could intensify within the coming weeks.
In an article published on 3 May and updated on 25 May with Middle East Eye (MEE) Mark Curtis demonstrates the extent to which the 2011 war in Libya and the Western intervention has created instability in Europe, Syria, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. For Curtis, terrorism has spurred in up to 14 countries as a direct product of the 2011 war in Libya. In the light of this analysis arises the question of the impact of the current crisis in Libya, which developed in early April 2019 following the offensive on Tripoli launched by General Haftar. This new period of chaos is most likely to further instability in the countries and regions affected by developments in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
DIVISIONS EMERGING AMONG LNA AND ANTI-LNA MILITIAS
On 23 May, the Libyan National Army (LNA)-aligned 7th Brigade (Kani militia) killed General Massoud al-Dawi and 2 of his associates in the Famalgha area south of Tripoli after they argued over the access and distribution of weapons and ammunition. Dawi, who belonged to the Warshefana tribe and fought under Qadhafi in 2011, was leading a militia from the Warshefana region under the LNA. The Warshefana Council of Elders released a statement claiming the incident was an assassination and holding the Tarhouna Social Council responsible. They called for the LNA to investigate the incident. Despite its claim to be Libya’s “national army”, the self-declared LNA is a collection of military/militia units and tribal/regional-based armed groups. In the lead up to its assault on Tripoli, and the weeks that followed, the LNA has progressively integrated multiple armed groups from the north-western region, including some from Surman, Sabratha, Ghariyan, Warshefana, and Tarhouna. All these militias and local communities have long running grievances connected to power sharing, tribal disputes, criminal activity and other factors. Their integration into the LNA did not end internal issues amongst themselves – this is likely to cause friction and fracture aspects of the LNA coalition.
Likewise, in regards to the anti-LNA coalition, clashes occurred between two Zawiyyan militias on 24 May over the procession of armed vehicles that arrived at Tripoli port from Turkey on 18 May. The Tripoli-based Special Deterrence Force (Rada) intervened to end the fighting and arrested two men allegedly responsible for Sharakas’ death. Likewise, there are increasing signs of division and tension amongst Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces. The majority of GNA-aligned militias are not loyal to the GNA but rather are opposed to Haftar and the LNA and want to defend their territory. This opposition has seen the formation of a loose “anti-LNA coalition.” However, this coalition seems to be increasingly under strain as the fighting drags on. The innate fragility of its military operations is coupled with the weakness of the coalition as a whole.
On 23 May 2019, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the conflict in Libya, providing a set of recommendations to move beyond the present stalemate. Their report insists on the importance for the two rival factions to compromise and come to an understanding through political dialogue. If not, ICG fears the escalation of the conflict which will plunge Libya in a more chaotic situation, in which external actors will also be embarked.
Click here to read the report.
In a recent article published with AFD and Yahoo on 20 May, Imed Lamloum reports that despite an embargo imposed by the UN relating to the supply or arms and military equipment to and from Libya since February 2011, weapons and military equipment still flow to Libya, fuelling the crisis. Lamloum indicates that foreign powers have been supplying both rival Libyan factions. Quoted in the article, Wolfram Lacher of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) noted that:
The more both sides receive arms and ammunition from their foreign backers, the longer the war will last, the more destructive it will be, and the more difficult it will be to resolve
Click here to read the article.
On 21 May, Middle East Institute (MEI) released a report by Jonathan M. Winer which looks at the origins of the Libyan conflict and proposes options for its resolution. Winer argues that Libya faces the threat of an extended war of attrition as a consequence of General Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, with dire humanitarian impacts for the Libyan population. For Winer, it is essential to convince Libyan actors that a political solution is the only way forward for the country. Well-articulated, the reports reviews Libya’s history and presents in clear manner the main domestics and international actors of the Libyan conflict in the fields of politics and security.
Click here to download and read the report.
On 14 May, the minister of interior of the eastern parallel government released a statement detailing the expansion of the operational area of its “Security Plan No. 01” into the desert region south of Ajdabiya through to eastern Sirte. The expansion is intended to confront any efforts to destabilise the region and support the Libyan National Army (LNA) forces already located there. On 13 and 15 May, the LNA conducted a series of operations from Ajdabiya to Bin Jawad (east of Sirte), with the assistance of a police helicopter. Last week, LNA forces operating under the LNA Gulf Operations Room were observed mobilising near Sirte, with air support from Jufra. The involvement of the parallel MoI is unlikely to make a significant difference to stability in the Oil Crescent, though may provide an additional defensive capacity at a local level. The MoI’s security plan is predominantly a tool to shore up the LNA’s narrative of ‘liberation,’ allowing the LNA to claim it is providing governance and security to the areas it controls.
Most of the nominally Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) and other armed groups in Sirte are from Misrata. Misrata deployed several powerful militias to support counter LNA operations in Tripoli and has launched several airstrikes against LNA supply lines in the Jufra region. As a result, tensions between these groups around Sirte, where their areas of influence converge, are high. While the LNA has several units based east of Sirte, it is unlikely to have the capacity to actively open a second front near Sirte while it continues fighting around Tripoli. These operations are likely aimed at securing supply lines (connecting Ras Lanuf to al-Shuwayrif and Bani Walid) and ensuring its positions are well defended against any potential assault, rather than seizing control of Sirte. Renewed focus on the Oil Crescent is indicative of the LNA increasing its overall presence in the Oil Crescent and slowly bolstering the number of troops east of Sirte – potentially as a defensive measure against any retaliatory incursion by GNA-aligned forces or insurgents/spoiler actors such as ISIS or Ibrahim Jadhran who may seek to take advantage of the growing security vacuum as the LNA continues to focus on Tripoli.
In the last week, reports suggest limited territorial changes between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces in Tripoli. Clashes continue in Ain Zara, al-Hira, Espiaa, al-Hadba al-Khadra, Abu Salim, al-Twaisha, Tripoli International Airport (TIA), and Wadi al-Rabia areas. The LNA made limited advances along its al-Khillat axis towards Abu Salim and Ain Zara. The LNA also took control of the Naqlaya Military Camp. On 17 and 18 May, the LNA successfully repelled a GNA advance on the Ramla area and the TIA respectively.
Meanwhile, General Haftar held talks with French President Macron in Paris about the crisis in Libya. International media outlets reported that Haftar claimed the “conditions were not met yet for a cease-fire”. As a result, fighting is most likely to persist in Tripoli in the short-time. On 21 May, Ghassan Salamé, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, alerted the UN Security Council that Libya risked “descending into a civil war which could lead to the permanent division of the country”.
According to the UN, at least 510 people have been killed in the Tripoli conflict so far, with at least 75,000 people displaced. Media outlets reported on 21 May that the water supplies which had been attacked by an armed group on 19 May have been restored, averting significant shortages.
There are increasing signs of division and tension amongst Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces. Reports indicated gunfire between the Abu Zuriba Zawiyya militia and Fursan Janzour Battalion, supported by the National Mobilise Force on 16 May. The incident resulted in the closure of the coastal road to Janzour. Likewise, local sources reported an ongoing dispute between an Amazigh and Zawiyya militia in the same area. Tensions extend to central Tripoli, with reports of a dispute between Misratan militias and the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) over access to military equipment delivered to Tripoli on 18 May.
The majority of GNA-aligned militias are not loyal to the GNA but rather are opposed to Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and want to defend their territory. This opposition has seen the formation of a loose “anti-LNA coalition.” The majority of these groups have never worked together in the past and have had little time to facilitate coordination amongst themselves. The defence of Tripoli is likely coordinated among leaders in the Tripoli Protection Forces (TPF), Zintani commander of the GNA Western Region Usama al-Juwaili, GNA Central Region commander Mohamed al-Haddad, and Minister of Interior and Defence Fathi Bashagha via informal commander-level discussions. Misratan dominance of the GNA/anti-LNA coalition is also a cause of internal friction. Sources report Misratan powerbrokers have effectively taken over the GNA and have reportedly received funding amounting to one billion Libyan dinars. Sources report that as much as 20 per cent of the available Misratan militias (Misrata has over 200 militias with some 18,000 men at their disposal) have deployed to support anti-Haftar forces in Tripoli.
The more protracted the conflict becomes, the more the underlying and long-standing differences, divisions, and points of contention will re-emerge – potentially seeing it splinter, fracture and break down. Fragmentation of the anti-LNA coalition is likely to happen even if it manages to defeat the LNA – once that shared enemy is gone, infighting will resume and new alliances and power structures will be fought over. In Tripoli, any significant change on the ground over the next week remains unlikely. The LNA may push to retake Aziziyya to help facilitate its push into central Tripoli while the GNA-aligned forces are likely to attempt to retake Espiaa and TIA through its “western flank.” With the GNA and LNA locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli, and the international community divided, conflict is likely to remain protracted for the foreseeable future.
In an article published with Gallup, Iman Berrached and RJ Reinhart analyse living conditions in Libya, arguing that economic conditions are in decline. For them, the current tensions are most likely to exacerbate the country’s economic decline.
Click here to read the article
In a recent article, The Financial Times discusses the intensification of tensions regarding the economic sector in Libya. The author reports that economy is becoming the new battlefront in the Libyan crisis which opposes the UN-led Government of National Accord (GNA) and factions aligned with Eastern-Libyan General Haftar. For analysts, Haftar could represent a significant threat to Libya’s oil resources given his military emprise through strategic Libyan National Army (LNA) positions. The article recalls that past attempts by General Haftar to seize oilfields and oil resources had been successfully blocked, thanks to the intervention of the United States. However, recent developments such as the seeming endorsement of Haftar by President Trump lead analysts to fear that further attempts to seize oil resources by Haftar could be successful.
Click here to read the article
A new poll of 15 municipalities in Libya, released on 15 May by the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research, indicates that municipal councils are well-regarded in comparison to national institutions, which tend to be negatively viewed across the board. Respondents from across the 15 municipalities identified poor government services as the single most important issue in their areas and were uncertain about councils’ roles and responsibilities within Libya’s turbulent political climate.
IRI indicated that respondents reported concerns about government’s inability to deliver basic needs, with pluralities in 14 out of 15 municipalities surveyed identifying poor government services – including transportation infrastructure, public service delivery or poor health care – as the single most important issue in their area. The economy and security rounded out the top three issues identified by most respondents in all municipalities surveyed.
This survey was conducted on behalf of the Center for Insights in Survey Research by Altai Consulting, under the supervision of Redstone Scientific. Data was collected between December 31, 2018 and January 31, 2019 through computer-assistance telephone interviews conducted from a call center in Tripoli. The sample consists of 4,636 respondents aged 18 and older with cell phone access from 15 municipalities across Libya, with a sample of approximately 300 per municipality. A gender quota and age category cap were used to enhance representativeness. The margin of error for the sample in each municipality does not exceed plus or minus 5.6 percent at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent. Figures in charts and tables may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. This poll was conducted with support from the United States Agency for International Development.
On 16 May, Dr. Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis a summary of the results of the Libyan Municipal elections which took place in Libyan municipalities on April 2019.
The results are listed on the table below:
| List of Elected Mayors
(second round) |
|||||
| No | Municipality | Mayor | Date | ||
| 1. | Zultn (زلطن) | Emhemed Rahuma Abdul Salam Al Anbat
امحمد رحومة عبد السلام الانبط |
13th May 19 | ||
| 2. | Edree Al Shati (ادري الشاطي) | Ibrahim Omar Ibrahim Abul Gasem | 13th May 19 | ||
| ابراهيم عمر ابراهيم ابوالقاسم | |||||
| 3. | Gurda Al Shati
(القرضة الشاطي) |
Majdi Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Hizam | 5th May 19 | ||
| 4. | Brak Al Sahti (براك الشاطي) | Al Jilani Ali AL Jilani Dau | 5th May 19 | ||
| 5. | Ubari (أوباري) | Ahmed Matako Nino Mustafa | 5th May 19 | ||
| 6. | Bent Baya (بنت بيًه) | Ashref Khalifa Emhemed Al Muslih | 5th May 19 | ||
| 7. | Al Bawanis (البوانـيس) | Ali Faraj Abdullah Mohamed Akasha | 5th May 19 | ||
| 8. | Wazin (وازن) | Ahmed Isaa Said Kurdi | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 9. | Wadi Itaba (وادي عتبة) | Abdul Rahman Mohamed Ahmed Al Salheen | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 10. | Zoltin (زلطن) | Emhemed Al Mabruk Emhemed Al Lijabani | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 11. | Al Gharifa (الغريفة) | Abdul Satar Al Sanusi Ali Musa | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 12. | Al Rehibat (الرحيبات) | Al Sifaw Soliman Al Sifaw Al AMlti | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 13. | Ragdalin (رقدلين) | Ali Mohemed Abdul Samad Salisel | 30th Apr 19 | ||
| 14. | Zuwara (زوارة) | Farhat Omran Abubaker Abu Al Shuwash | 16th Apr 19 | ||
| 15. | Baten Al Jabel (باطن الجبل) | Jamal Dau Khalifa Tameen | 16th Apr 19 | ||
| 16. | Al Galaa (القلعة) | Walid Ibrahim Sasi Grada | 16th Apr 19 | ||
| 17. | Nisma (نسمة) | Mahmoud Ali Al Mukhtar Al Ashtar | 16th Apr 19 | ||
| 18. | Ghadames (غدامس) | Kasem Mohamed Ali Al Manaa | 16th Apr 19 | ||
| 19. | Al Hawamed (الحوامد) | Salah Emhemed Mdalel Masoud
صالح امحمد امدلل مسعود |
16th Apr 19 | ||
| 20. | Nalut (نالوت) | Abdul Wahab Salem Ahmed Al Hajam
عبد الوهاب سالم علي الحجام |
16th Apr 19 | ||
| MC completed elections,
But NO mayor selection took place |
|||||
| 21. | Al Riwawna (الرياينة) | Polling 30th Mar 2019 | |||
| MC Elections under way | |||||
| 22. | Sabrata (صبراته) | Voter registretation restarted on 5th May 2019 | |||
| 23. | Misrata (مصراته) | Voter registretation restarted on 5th May 2019 | |||
| 24. | Surman (صرمان) | Voter registretation restarted on 5th May 2019 | |||
| 25. | Al Khomes (الخمس) | Voter registretation restarted on 5th May 2019 | |||
| 26. | Al Asabia (الاصابعة) | Voter registretation restarted on 6th May 2019 | |||
| 27. | South Zawia
(جنوب الزاوية) |
Voter registretation restarted on 6th May 2019 | |||
| 28. | Al Haraba (الحرابة) | Voter registretation restarted on 6th May 2019 | |||
| 29. | Kikla (ككلة) | Voter registretation restarted on 6th May 2019 | |||
| 30. | Mislata (مسلاته) | Voter registretation restarted on 7th May 2019 | |||
| 31. | Al Jufra (الجفرة) | Voter registretation restarted on 7th May 2019 | |||
| 32. | Kabao (كاباو) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019,
An Amazigh town in Jabal Nafusa. |
|||
| 33. | Tarhuna (ترهونة) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019,
Armed forces are taking place in the Tripoli invation. |
|||
| 34. | AL Kufra (الكفرة) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019 | |||
| 35. | Ejkhera (إجخرة) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019 | |||
| 36. | Daher Al Jabl
(ظاهر الجبل) |
Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019 | |||
| 37. | Ghat (غات) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019
A Tawareg town in the west of Libya, by the Algiries border. |
|||
| 38. | Jadu (جادو) | Voter registretation restarted on 14th May 2019,
An Amazigh town in Jabal Nafusa. |
|||
| Thinni Government appointed Mayors | |||||
| 1. | Sabrata | Mr Moftah Khalifa Salem Al Bernishini (مفتاح خليفة سشمثة البرنيشني) appointed mayor by Al Baida Government, 11th April 2019, Link | |||
| 2. | Gharian | Mr Ak Saed Al Gaod (الصيد القعود) Link | |||
| 3. | Kufra | Mr Abdul Rahman Agoob was appointed on 21/3/2019, as head of Kufra Steering Commitee to replace the mayor. Link | |||
In his latest article published with Al-Monitor on 15 May, Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack argues that outside support by international powers is likely key to the battle for Tripoli.
Given the propensity for stalemate in the Libyan way of war, foreign powers’ decisions vis-a-vis promoting a mediated solution or offering certain levels of support for different sides and factions are likely to be decisive in determining which actors emerge victorious. Since Libya is a penetrated system with an enduring internal balance of power, outside actors can tip the otherwise-balanced scales between warring coalitions.
Pack demonstrates the extent to which General Haftar’s international backers seem to be forced into maintaining their support to the Libyan National Army (LNA) even though they might not have agreed with General Haftar’s strategy as it still serves their interests.
These backers are likely to disagree with the timing and tactics of Haftar’s offensive and to have reserved some choice words for him in their private conversations. But they still seem forced to back him. A decisive defeat for the LNA at the gates of Tripoli, and the ensuing collapse of his influence throughout Libya, would mean a resurgence of exactly those Libyan actors to which Haftar’s backers are ideologically anathema.
He also advocates for the international community to try to look past such interests in order to find a common interest and allow for the stabilisation of Libya.
If the main international players would look past their sunk costs and find a common interest in a stable Libya, they might see a fairly simple way out of the seemingly endless wars of post-Gadhafi succession: denying all sides access to external sources of funding and arms, while also forcing the Libyan central bank and the internationally recognized government to eliminate subsidies and cut salaries to militiamen on all sides.
Click here to read the full article.
On 15 May, Frederic Wehrey and Emadeddin Badi published with War On The Rocks an in-depth analysis of the current situation in Libya resulting from the offensive launched by Eastern-Libyan General Haftar on Tripoli. Wehrey and Badi aim at correcting misunderstandings regarding Haftar’s intentions and capacities and argue that international powers should not support Haftar with the idea that he can be a game-changing figure enabling unity and institutionalization in Libya. They write:
One of the truths of post-revolutionary Libya is that no single military or political actor has been able to exert a preponderance of control and sovereignty. Libya’s militia bosses and factional elites, including Haftar, have long had a mutual economic and political interest in keeping conflict simmering, eschewing both decisive outcomes on the battlefield and outside attempts to end the fighting.
Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On 15 May, Wehrey testified before the United States Congress on the situation in Libya to present his views on U.S policy towards Libya. Wehrey is a strong advocate of a renewed involvement of the U.S in Libya in support of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN-led efforts towards stabilisation.
Click here to read the article in full.
In an op-ed published with Libya Observer on 15 May, Professor Jamal S. Ellafi calls out to the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) to focus on improving the capacity of Libya’s oil fields instead of trying to attract further international companies to invest in Libya. For Ellafi, the current political and security environment will not allow for further international investments.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Middle East Eye on 14 May Arnaud Delalande analyses General Haftar’s firepower. The article highlights the importance of the international support provided to Haftar, and points out the different international powers who supposedly supplied the Libyan National Army (LNA) with weaponry. The article is highly relevant to understand the constitution of the LNA as well as the scope of its military equipment. Delalande indicates that the LNA is composed of several groups of militias rotating around a regular army nucleus representing a force of about 25,000 men. The regular army itself regroups around 7000 members. There are also foreign units in the LNA, mostly from neighbouring countries such as Sudan and Chad).
Click here to read the article
On 11 May, the spokesperson for the Sirte Protection Force (SPF), Taha Hadid, asserted that the SPF was ready to repel any Libyan National Army Forces (LNA) attack on the city. This follows local sources reporting the deployment of LNA units in the outskirts of the city in the early evening, waiting for orders to advance on the city. Sources on the ground report that residents in Sirte are on high alert and many are preparing to leave the city in anticipation of looming conflict. The SPF has also reported Islamic State (ISIS) forces moving in the area south of Sirte in recent days, though details are limited.
The LNA has failed to make the inroads it expected into the capital, and needs to secure its supply lines in order to maintain its positions. Controlling Sirte and/ or the area around the city would allow it to better protect these routes. Any major assault or provocation on Sirte would likely see a swift response from Misratan forces based there or from Misrata itself. If mobilized, Misratan forces would likely be able to deflect the LNA forces given the limited number of LNA troops available to support such an attack. However, a significant Misratan mobilization to Sirte may result in Misratan forces being pulled away from Tripoli, leaving the capital’s defenses vulnerable. On the other hand, Misratans fighting in Tripoli may be reluctant to leave the city for fear they would lose their advantage to other western militias. Either way, a significant LNA move on Sirte could expose existing divisions within Misrata and the anti-LNA forces more generally, even if the LNA cannot take the city.
The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) “Operation Flood of Dignity” against Government of National Accord (GNA) -aligned forces in southern Tripoli continued throughout the first week of Ramadan, with no significant changes in territorial control. The number of incidents and resulting casualties has slightly decreased compared to the previous week. Ground clashes continue around the Tripoli International Airport, al-Twaisha, Hay Funduq al-Sharef, al-Hira, Wadi al-Rabea, Ain Zara, Zatarna and Khallet Furjan. LNA airstrikes, predominantly at nighttime, targeting GNA-aligned forces’ alleged arms and weapons caches continue, with significant targets including Janzour Knights positions in western Tripoli. The LNA continues to operate from bases in Ghariyan, Tarhouna, Bani Walid and Sabratha, with the parallel government Minister of Interior, Ibrahim Bushnaf, restructuring security arrangements in these towns to consolidate LNA control. Reports continue to suggest that GNA militias are preparing a counter offensive, including an assault on Tarhouna, Ghariyan and possibly Bani Walid, but it is unclear when it will be launched.
With the GNA and LNA locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli, and the international community divided, the conflict is likely to remain protracted for the foreseeable future. Military action in and around Tripoli is likely to persist throughout Ramadan, despite calls by the international community for a ceasefire. Night-time airstrikes by the LNA are likely to increase throughout the month. The GNA Western Military Region will pursue its attempts to severe the LNA’s supply lines and continue to defend against the LNA’s offensive.
On 13 May, the European Union Council released a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire and reiterated that there was no military solution to the Libyan crisis. It urged all parties to stop any actions threatening the political process and to recommit to a political solution. The statement called the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s assault on Tripoli a “threat to international peace and security.”
The Government of National Accord (GNA)’s efforts to apply pressure on European powers to provide it with support and legitimacy appear to be backfiring and rather than nurturing its relationships, it instead appears to be actively antagonising them. Moreover, the GNA’s longstanding inability to control militias aligned with it or even identify those acting on its behalf has been a significant factor hampering the international community’s willingness to unite behind it. A UN staff member indicated that during the emergency United Nations Security Council (UNSC) session, it was “difficult” to identify the armed groups acting under the GNA and “the extent of their subordination to political authority.” The GNA’s international support base is becoming increasingly limited. While countries such as the UK, Italy and Germany continue to call for an end to the conflict and have previously tried to name Khalifa Haftar as the main aggressor in the escalating conflict, explicit international support for the GNA seems to be limited to Qatar and Turkey. The LNA’s offensive benefitted from direct regional and international support from Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. In Libya, the GNA is perceived to be purchasing its allies. Its reliance on money to buy loyalty is drying up liquidity in some banks, which is resulting in social discontent. While Serraj remains the GNA figurehead, in practice anti-Haftar military figures, predominantly from Misrata, have taken over GNA politics in Tripoli and this dynamic is likely to negatively impact the GNA’s legitimacy in the future.
Click here to read the statement.
In his latest article published with Reuters on 10 May, journalist Ulf Laessing describes the stalemate reached in Southern Tripoli, with fighting factions taking and losing positions day after day.
Click here to read the article.
A Wall Street Journal article published on 12 May reported that the United States were influenced by Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the matter of the crisis in Libya, and this lobby led to the conversation between US President Trump and Eastern Libyan General Khalifa Haftar in which the US President seemed to endorse Haftar’s action plan and offensive on Tripoli. Such an interference could be a significant game changer for the resolution of the Libyan crisis as for Jalel Harchaoui writing for L’Orient Le Jour Washington holds the key to putting an end to the crisis and stalemate in Libya.
Click here to read the report on the WSJ article and here to read Harchaoui’s article.
As conflict in Libya opens lucrative opportunities in Libya in the field of reconstruction and civil works for business, Ahmed Fouad reports for Al-Monitor on 12 May the worry of Egyptian business people. Fouad reports that Egyptian business-people fear Egypt’s strong support for General Haftar in the Tripoli fighting could jeopardize the chances of Egyptian businesses to be awarded with reconstruction contracts and current exchanges. Fouad notes that
Egyptian exports to Libya, especially construction materials, are considered one of the main pillars of the private sector’s participation in Libya’s reconstruction
Click here to read the article.
On 6 May, Yury Barmin analysed in an article published with Al-Monitor Russia’s positions towards Libya in the light of the recent events. Barmin argues that the offensive launched by General Haftar on Tripoli has not pushed Moscow to revise its policy towards Libya, which he analyses as mostly reactionary and driven by Russia’s will to impose itself as a relevant actor in Libya. However, Barmin highlights Russia’s lack of centralized policy planning and a complex web of alliances as obstacles to Russia’s predominance in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 8 May, Voice of America published the second article of a four parts series on the Islamic State (ISIS). In this piece, Jeff Seldin reports that, in spite of the defeats experienced over the past months, the number of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State continues to expand. The article looks at several countries, among which Libya. Quoting Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack, Seldin warns of the resurgence of the terrorist group in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
The Independent reported on 9 May about the meeting between Fayez Sarraj, the head of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), and UK Prime Minister Theresa May. During the meeting which was also attened by UK Foreign Secretary Hunt, Sarraj shared his concerns regarding the situation in Libya, the chaos provoked by the attack on Tripoli by forces affiliated with Eastern Libyan General Haftar. The UK representatives affirmed their support to Sarraj and the UN efforts, however, the article highlights the UK’s limited influence in Libya. Over the past week, GNA head Sarraj undertook an European tour during which he met with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, French President Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Angela Merkel to rally international support. The Independent reports that a trip to the United States of Sarraj could follow. As The stalemate on the ground in Tripoli continues, and these initiatives could pave the way for talks according to the article.
Click here to read the article.
Libyan media outlets reported on 10 May that over the course of the past week, Mustafa Sanalla, the chairman of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) held a series of meetings in Houston, United States, as part of a $60-billion NOC procurement drive. The NOC is exploring solutions to achieve a stated production target of 2.1 million barrels per day by 2023.
Click here to read the article.
On 8 May, Mustafa Sanallah the Chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) published an op-ed with Bloomberg in which he advocates for a ceasefire between the factions of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the UN-backed Governmen of National Accord (GNA) fighting in Southern Tripoli. Sanalla argues that a cease-fire is the only solution to protect Libya’s oil production which is a vital asset for the country and has already been impacted in various ways since the eruption of violence in early April. For Sanalla, a dual-key system for the oil sector must be maintained in Libya for the country to reach stability, meaning a system in which both GNA and LNA factions participate in the control of the sector, which is admnistrated by a third, neutral organisation such as the NOC.
Only a ceasefire and a return to the dual-key system will return stability to Libya’s oil sector. Libya’s civil conflict has raged for too long, and it is tempting to seek to break the deadlock once and for all. However, a violent swing of the pendulum, one way or the other, threatens to take offline much of Libya’s oil production – and along with it, Libya’s prospects for a peaceful and prosperous future.
Click here to read the full statement.
In an article published on 3 May with Atlantic Council, Karim Mezran analyses the implication of General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli. For Mezran, the future for Libya is likely to take the shape of a partition of a sort. He states:
After the battle sorts itself out there will be an opportunity for peace talks, but these must happen on a different level than the discussions that produced the Skhirat agreement of December 2015. The difference will consist in understanding the mutated situation on the ground and accepting that to obtain a degree of peace and stability the two parts of the country will have to be ruled according to the conditions that have evolved in the last few weeks.
Click here to read the article.
In this article published on 6 May, Voice of America (VOA) looks at breakfasts in Tripoli and what dishes can tell on political divisions within the country. For Mary Fitzgerald, the choice between “baryoush” or “fasouliyah” symbolizes the battle lines in the country.
Click here to read the article.
In his latest article published on 6 May with The Council on Foreign Relations, Steven A. Cook demonstrates the tendency of United States to endorse authoritarian rulers as an attempt to protect national interests. His demonstration draws on the recent exchange between U S President Trump and Eastern Libyan General Haftar that transpired as an endorsement of the offensive by the U.S.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published on 5 May by WRAL.COM, Tim Lister summarizes the ongoing tensions and developments which have taken place in Libya over the course of the past month. Lister points out that, as exposed in Libya-Analysis Jason Pack and Lachlan Wilson’s article for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the current chaos in Libya provides opportunities for a significant resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya. Since the beginning of tensions around Tripoli, ISIS claimed two attacks in Southern Libya.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 1 May with The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Youssef Tobi highlights the French tendency to use force to address tensions in Africa and how it comes in contradiction with president Macron’s foreign policy declarations advocating for soft approaches. For Tobi, such a contradiction can be clearly perceived in France’s strategy towards Libya, where it officially supports the UN-led plan for stabilisation while supporting General Haftar in the hope that placing a strongman in Libya would put an end to chaos.
Click here to read the article.
On 25 April, International Crisis Group (ICG) released its latest report on Libya, in which the rise of Madkhali-Safalis in Libya is examined. The report identifies the ways in which the Madkhali movement (an ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim doctrine) has spread its influence across Libya and the extents to which it impacts already existing divisions. For ICG, the Madkhali poses a threat to stability in Libya. The report also addresses the support provided by Madkhali to General Haftar, which is interesting in the light of the current conflict between forces affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Eastern Libyan forces.
Click here to read or download the report.
On 1 May, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections in Libya. Below are the lists of the mayors elected in Libyan municipalities as a result of the elections.
| List of Elected Mayors
(second round)
30th April 2019 |
|||
| No | Municipality | Mayor | Date |
| 1. | Zuwara (زوارة) | Farhat Omran Abubaker Abu Al Shuwash | 16th Apr 19 |
| 2. | Baten Al Jabel (باطن الجبل) | Jamal Dau Khalifa Tameen | 16th Apr 19 |
| 3. | Al Galaa (القلعة) | Walid Ibrahim Sasi Grada | 16th Apr 19 |
| 4. | Nisma (نسمة) | Mahmoud Ali Al Mukhtar Al Ashtar | 16th Apr 19 |
| 5. | Ghadames (غدامس) | Kasem Mohamed Ali Al Manaa | 16th Apr 19 |
| 6. | Al Hawamed (الحوامد) | Salah Emhemed Mdalel Masoud | 16th Apr 19 |
| 7. | Nalut (نالوت) | Abdul Wahab Salem Ahmed Al Hajam | 16th Apr 19 |
| 8. | Wazin (وازن) | Ahmed Isaa Said Kurdi | 30th Apr 19 |
| 9. | Wadi Itaba (وادي عتبة) | Abdul Rahman Mohamed Ahmed Al Salheen | 30th Apr 19 |
| 10. | Zoltin (زلطن) | Emhemed Al Mabruk Emhemed Al Lijabani | 30th Apr 19 |
| 11. | Al Gharifa (الغريفة) | Abdul Satar Al Sanusi Ali Musa | 30th Apr 19 |
| 12. | Al Rehibat (الرحيبات) | Al Sifaw Soliman Al Sifaw Al AMlti | 30th Apr 19 |
| 13. | Ragdalin (رقدلين) | Ali Mohemed Abdul Samad Salisel | 30th Apr 19 |
| List of Elected Mayors
(second round)
5th May 2019 |
||||
| No | Municipality | Mayor | Date | |
| 1. | Gurda Al Shati (القرضة الشاطي) | Majdi Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Hizam | 5th May 19 | |
| 2. | Brak Al Sahti (براك الشاطي) | Al Jilani Ali AL Jilani Dau | 5th May 19 | |
| 3. | Ubari (أوباري) | Ahmed Matako Nino Mustafa | 5th May 19 | |
| 4. | Bent Baya (بنت بيًه) | Ashref Khalifa Emhemed Al Muslih | 5th May 19 | |
| 5. | Al Bawanis (البوانـيس) | Ali Faraj Abdullah Mohamed Akasha | 5th May 19 | |
| 6. | Wazin (وازن) | Ahmed Isaa Said Kurdi | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 7. | Wadi Itaba (وادي عتبة) | Abdul Rahman Mohamed Ahmed Al Salheen | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 8. | Zoltin (زلطن) | Emhemed Al Mabruk Emhemed Al Lijabani | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 9. | Al Gharifa (الغريفة) | Abdul Satar Al Sanusi Ali Musa | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 10. | Al Rehibat (الرحيبات) | Al Sifaw Soliman Al Sifaw Al AMlti | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 11. | Ragdalin (رقدلين) | Ali Mohemed Abdul Samad Salisel | 30th Apr 19 | |
| 12. | Zuwara (زوارة) | Farhat Omran Abubaker Abu Al Shuwash | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 13. | Baten Al Jabel (باطن الجبل) | Jamal Dau Khalifa Tameen | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 14. | Al Galaa (القلعة) | Walid Ibrahim Sasi Grada | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 15. | Nisma (نسمة) | Mahmoud Ali Al Mukhtar Al Ashtar | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 16. | Ghadames (غدامس) | Kasem Mohamed Ali Al Manaa | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 17. | Al Hawamed (الحوامد) | Salah Emhemed Mdalel Masoud | 16th Apr 19 | |
| 18. | Nalut (نالوت) | Abdul Wahab Salem Ahmed Al Hajam | 16th Apr 19 | |
| MC completed elections,
But NO mayor selection took place |
||||
| 19. | Al Riwawna (الرياينة) | Polling 30th Mar 2019 | ||
| 20. | Al Zawia Siuth (الزاوية الجنوب) | Polling 6th April 2019 | ||
International media outlets published photo reports of the fighting in Tripoli, such as CNN on 24 April and The Guardian on 30 April. The latest media reports suggest an intensification of the fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and anti-LNA factions aligned with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Southern Tripoli. Reuters indicated on 28 April that anti-LNA factions had engaged in house-to-house fighting. Media outlets also reported airstrikes over the week-end.
On 29 April, Moutaz Ali reported for Development and Cooperation about the rise of hate speech and fake news in the local media coverage of the escalation of fighting in Tripoli. For Ali, fake news and hate speech incite violence in an already violent environment.
Click here to read the article.
In his latest article published on 26 April with Orient XXI, Jalel Harchaoui recounts the context in which General Haftar decided to launch his offensive on Tripoli and the international dimension of the current crisis. For Harchaoui, the stalemate that has developed in Tripoli between the warring factions has still not led international backers of Haftar to revise their policy.
Khalifa Haftar likely led his various foreign patrons to believe he could deliver a swift, decisive takeover of Tripoli. The reality he has since delivered is more akin to a quagmire that could last years. Yet, despite his failure, none of his outsiders seem willing to change direction just yet. Regardless of whether or not it worsens the situation in Libya, Abu Dhabi, Paris and Riyadh have so far remained more or less committed to pursuing the same policy as before April 4, especially knowing that the Marshal has made sure he is difficult to replace.
Click here to read the article in full.
In an article published on 26 April, French newspaper Le Point Afrique reported about the support of international backers such as Turkey or Qatar to the militias aligned with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in the fight against General Haftar and Eastern Libya forces. The article comes as a counter argument to critics formulated by many voices denouncing the support provided to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) by international powers, among which France.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with The Atlantic on 24 April, Kathy Gilsinan alerts about the confusion in Libya resulting from what appeared to be an endorsement by U.S President Trump of General Haftar and also evokes the confusion within the Trump administration. Many voices were raised, in Libya and the international community, to denounce the support granted by Trump to Haftar as it contradicts national and international efforts for a successful political solution to Libya’s crisis. For many analysts, further endorsement of Haftar by international powers are likely to fuel the tensions in Libya as the country is already on the verge of a civil war.
Click here to read the article.
As fighting continues in Tripoli between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and anti-LNA factions in the southern suburbs of Tripoli, BBC Sounds Newsday’s Christophe Farah discusses day to day life in the Libyan capital with a Tripoli resident. The interview is a testify to the resilience of Libyan civilians amid persisting tensions and chaos.
Click here to listen to the podcast.
Sources report that anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) Misratan powerbrokers have effectively taken over the Government of National Accord (GNA) and have reportedly received one billion Libya dinars of funds, more than half of the emergency funds Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj made available to the war effort, in exchange for their political and military support. The conflict has already drawn in large forces from Misrata, including under GNA’s Central Region Military Command headed by Lieutenant General Mohammed al-Haddad. Sources report that as much as 20 per cent of the available Misratan militias (Misrata has over 200 militias with some 18,000 men at their disposal) have deployed to support anti-Haftar forces in Tripoli including Misrata’s Joint Security Operations Room’s “Special Task Force,” the Halbous Brigade, the Marsa Brigade, the 166th Brigade, and the 301st Battalion.
However, divisions have started to emerge within the anti-LNA coalition with reports suggesting the Misrata Joint Security Force withdrew its troops from Tripoli following a breakdown in relations with Tajoura’s 33 Infantry Brigade led by Bashir Khalfalla (aka al-Bograh). The point of contention was the alleged presence of Benghazi and Derna Shura Council members within their forces
For the majority of GNA-aligned militias, it is not loyalty to the GNA that constitutes a group’s primary allegiance, but rather their fierce opposition to Haftar and the LNA and defence of their territory. This opposition has seen the formation of a loose “anti-LNA coalition.” Within a few days of the assault, the GNA attempted to co-opt this coalition, started referring to this group as “their” forces, dubbed it “al-Jaysh al-Libi” (the Libyan Army) and appointed a spokesperson for it. Nevertheless, these groups have often not worked together before and have had little time to facilitate coordination amongst themselves. As for efforts to coordinate military actions, the defence of Tripoli is likely being coordinated among leaders in the TPF, Zintani commander of the GNA Western Region Usama al-Juwaili, GNA Central Region commander Mohamed al-Haddad, and Minister of Interior and Defence Fathi Bashagha via informal commander-level discussions.
There is not only an innate fragility in the operational aspects of the anti-LNA coalition, but the strength of the coalition as a whole. The more protracted the conflict becomes the more the underlying and long-standing differences, divisions, and points of contention will re-emerge – potentially seeing it splinter, fracture and break down. The same is likely to happen if the anti-LNA alliance manages to secure a resounding defeat of the LNA – once that shared enemy is gone, infighting will resume and new alliances and power structures will be fought over.
Carnegie Middle East Centre published on 25 April an article questioning whether General Haftar has the capacity to become a new Gaddafi for Libya. Libya experts Emadeddin Badi, Elham Saudi, Arturo Varvelli and Frederic Wehrey contributed to the article, sharing their analysis of General Haftar and their thoughts on potential outcomes for the fighting in Tripoli. The authors share the belief that Haftar’s intentions represent a threat for the stability of the country and that the warlord may not have the capacity to fully take control of Libya.
Click here to read the article.
While the country is at the precipice of a full civil war, the UN political process in tatters, and the stability and unity of its government at grave threat, oil production and exports are at their highest levels since 2013, topping 1.2 million bpd and expected to increase as long as conflict does not spread to oil fields and ports. The price of Libyan currency returned back to near normal pre-war levels after a quick dip in the first few days of the conflict, indicating strengthened confidence in local stability and limited demand for USD. However, such indicators remain highly volatile and a rapid decline in both is possible if dynamics change suddenly in favour of one or the other. The Islamic State (IS) has already exploited this opportunity by publishing video on its affiliated social media channels of its attacks on Libyan National Army (LNA) posts in south Libya, particularly in Ghudduwa and Sebha. If the LNA manages to stay in the western region and does not withdraw or the conflict becomes too protracted, pressure will increase in the eastern and central regions to blockade oil ports or attempt to divert oil sales to the eastern region.
On 23 April, Rhiannon Smtih, Managing editor of Libya-Analysis, spoke with Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s Africa News Tonight. Smith’s analysis of the current state of events is that of a stalemate situation in which a military victory of the Libyan National Army (LNA) over Tripoli is unlikely. Smith adds that a military victory of the anti-LNA coalition which is constituted of various regional militias is also unlikely due to the divisions within its ranks.
Click here to listen to the interview (between 3.40 and 8.55)
On 22 April, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesman, Ahmed al-Mismari, claimed the Libyan National Army (LNA) would intensify its assault on Tripoli. This statement comes as Government of National Accord (GNA) forces drove LNA forces back from Ain Zara, a district in south Tripoli which has been at the heart of the fighting in the last few days. Military activity over the last 48 hours has been limited, with an overall stalemate between two forces emerging as the death toll rose to 254.
The LNA spokesman denied its forces retreated and called upon reservists to open new fronts on the capital. Indeed, LNA forces stationed in Tarhouna, south east of Tripoli, and in Ghariyan, south of Tripoli, are reportedly large and likely to be deployed shortly. Additional forces from Zintan have recently moved to the frontlines in support of the LNA, though other Zintani forces are fighting against the LNA. On the evening of 16-17 April, indiscriminate shelling hit the Abu Salim neighbourhood, leading to 54 casualties, with 14 dead and 40 wounded. The incident saw wide condemnation from the international community and UN. On 20 April, sources reported drone strikes on anti-LNA and civilian locations within Tripoli. Sources indicated these reports were consistent with UAE deployment of AT-802 Archangel UAV’s from the LNA’s al-Khadim airbase in eastern Libya – highlighting the first direct and overt deployment of force by a foreign country in support of the LNA. Al-Khadim airbase has previously been used by the UAE.
The LNA, under the command of Khalifa Haftar launched their offensive against Tripoli with the assumption the city would fall within a few weeks. However, the current stalemate suggests the current crisis is likely to continue for months. Reports suggest LNA forces are attempting to adapt their tactical approach to avoid being bogged down as they were in Derna. LNA’s use of UAV drones appears to be a direct response to their territory loss in the city and marked the first overt use of force by a foreign country supporting the LNA. While significant increased foreign support for either faction is unlikely in the immediate future, UAE’s and/or Egypt’s aerial support to the LNA appears likely to ramp up in the near term.
In an article published with Middle East Online, John C.K. Daly discusses Russia’s interest in Libya, highlighting that the North African country presents an opportunity to increase its political influence. Moreover, Libya also offers significant business opportunities for Russia through its hydrocarbon industry.
Click here to read the article.
On 18 April, Russia and the United States announced that they could not support a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Libya. For James Dorsey writing for Lobelog, this common attitude towards Libya for Russia and the US is a rare instance of US-Russian cooperation. At a time where the two powers have been at odds, such an agreement comes as a surprise. For him,
It reveals much of how presidents Donald J. Trump and Vladimir Putin see the crafting of a new world order. It also says a great deal about Russian objectives in the Middle East and North Africa. […] Moscow’s support for Haftar serves Russia’s broader vision of the Middle East and North Africa as an arena in which Russia can successfully challenge the United States even if Trump and Putin agree on what side to support in a Libyan civil war that is aggravated by the interference of foreign powers.
Click here to read the article.
On 19 April, France 24 reported that the President of the United States, Donald Trump, discussed the situation in Libya with General Haftar on 15 April by phone. According to a White House statement, the US president “recognized Field Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources, and the two discussed a shared vision for Libya’s transition to a stable, democratic political system”.
For Karim Mezran, interviewed by Ashish Kumar Sen in an article for The Atlantic Council published on 22 April, the apparent US support to Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli is paradoxical as it contrasts with earlier declarations by the US opposing the military solution in Libya. Mezran analyses Trump’s declaration to Haftar as an impulsive action which does not necessarily suggest a shift in the US position.
However, for other analysts such as Jalel Harchaoui or Frederic Wehrey, such a conversation between Haftar and Trump could signify an endorsement by the US of the military strongman and his strategy for Libya. Furthermore, for Harchaoui, it creates “an environment where a military intervention by foreign states, like Egypt, is likelier”.
Fighting persist in Tripoli, causing significant casualties amid the civilian population. However, both Russia and the US announced on 18 April that they could not support a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Libya at this time.
On 17 April, Al Jazeera reported two separate incidents involving European armed groups attempting to cross the border from Libya to Tunisia. Further reports suggest that the individuals crossing the border were armed French diplomats. The French government claims they were part of a security protocol. For Ibrahim Fraihat, it demonstrates the involvement of France in the Libyan crisis, and the ambiguous role it plays. Fraihat also highlights that despite external support, General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli is losing momentum.
Click here to watch the interview.
In an interview for Radio France Internationale (RFI), Mohamed Ejrah comments on the critics made by the Government of National Accord (GNA) regarding the alleged support provided by France to General Khalifa Haftar. On 18 April, France denied the accusations, however for Ejrah, its support to General Haftar is evident and can be traced back to 2015. Ejrah analysis that by putting France on the spotlight, the GNA is attempting to gain an ally in Paris.
Click here to listen to the interview.
In his latest article with The European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR), Tarek Megerisi shares his analysis of the situation in Libya three weeks after the launch by General Haftar of his offensive on Tripoli and advocates for European member states to take a lead to find a solution to the crisis. If internal tensions continue to prevent the Europeans to formulate coherent policy for Libya, Megerisi analyse they risk becoming mere observers as the conflict escalates.
Prospects may look grim for either side’s ability to achieve a resounding victory, but that has not dampened anyone’s enthusiasm for a fight. Both sides still have forces in reserve, both feel existentially driven to continue the struggle, and both have friends abroad that are willing to help them continue. […] Unfortunately, the longer this civil war continues, the more it will destabilise the region. The morass of militias from Sudan and Chad that exploit Libya’s lawlessness to enrich themselves pose an increasing threat to the stability of their home countries. Meanwhile, the chaos of civil war allows extremist groups like the Islamic State group (ISIS) to return to the offensive. Finally, Europe’s own migration demons risk returning as space opens up for new smuggling gangs, and as the financial strain of prolonged warfare makes restarting Libya’s human conveyor belt an increasingly enticing enterprise.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published with Arab Tyrant Manual on 17 April, Nadine Dahan and Ahmed Gatnash argue that what transpires from the latest crisis in Libya is that the international community has failed Libya. They identify that the international community chose to focus on short-term concerns about migration and counter-terrorism when dealing with Libya.
Click here to read the full article.
In an article published with Open Democracy on 18 April Paul Rogers denounces the alleged profit made by Western arm dealers out of the conflict in Libya. Rogers affirms that Western arm dealers have repeated in Libya their strategies of equipping with weapons opposing sides of a conflict and profiting off the fighting.
Click here to read the article.
On 18 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections in Libya.
In Al-Khoms, the CCMCE decided to postpone the organisation of the municipal elections until further notice. No explanations were given.
The third round of municipal elections is to be held on 20 April. Below, the list of cities concerned by the deadline:
| No | Municipality | البلدية | Region | Polling day |
| 1 | Brak Al Shati | براك الشاطي | South | 20.04.2019 |
| 2 | Al Gurda Al Shati | القرضة الشاطي | South | 20.04.2019 |
| 3 | Idri Al Shati | ادري الشاطي | South | 20.04.2019 |
| 4 | Ubari | اوباري | South | 20.04.2019 |
| 5 | Sbarata | صبراته | West | 20.04.2019 |
| 6 | Surman | صرمان | West | 20.04.2019 |
| 7 | Zoltin | زلطن | West | 20.04.2019 |
| 8 | Al Shuwayref | الشويرف | West | 20.04.2019 |
| 9 | Al Rehibat | الرحيبات | Nafosa mountain | 20.04.2019 |
Dr Otman Gajiji also worked on the results of mayor elections, which took place on 16 April:
| No | Municipality | البلدية | Mayor name | اسم العميد |
| 1 | Zowara | زوارة | – | – |
| 2 | Batin Al Jabal | باطن الجبل | – | – |
| 3 | Al Kalaa | القلعة | Walid Grada | وليد ابراهيم ساسي قرادة |
| 4 | Nalut | نالوت | Abdul Wahab Salem | – |
| 5 | Nisma | نسمة | – | – |
| 6 | Ghadames | غدامس | Kasem Manaa | قاسم المانع |
| 7 | Al Hawamed | الحوامد | Salah Masoud | صلاح امحمد مدلل مسعود |
Regarding Sabha, the municipal elections will be held on 27 April. The CCMCE has set the limit on campaign spending to LD55K per list and LD27.5K for injured and women seats. The formula is based of the population of the city.
On 17 April, Voice of America reported an intensification of fighting in Tripoli in the night between 16 and 17 April, marked by random shelling in residential areas which resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, according to local media outlets. UN Special Envoy of Libya Ghassan Salamé condemned in a statement the shelling, calling it a war crime and demanded a halt in fighting. The UN also alerted about the living conditions of Tripoli residents trapped in conflict zones during a press conference held at the UN headquarters on 15 April reporting an increase of the number of displaced people in Tripoli and surrounding areas to 18 000 people. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council has so far failed to agree on a joint call for a ceasefire. Earlier this week, a resolution drafted by the United Kingdom was circulated by Security Council members but internal tensions appear to block an agreement.
In an article published with Politico EU, Paul Taylor denounces France’s double game in Libya. The article recalls that while France officially supports the UN-led political process for Libya and the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), it has also developed strong connections with Eastern Libyan General Haftar and allegedly provided support to the Libyan National Army (LNA). For critics of France, France’s double game is motivated by national interests in reconstruction contracts in Libya and oil.
Click here to read the article.
In his latest article published with TRT World, Mustafa Fetouri draws a portrait of General Haftar’s character, ideology and rationale, comparing it with Libya’s Former Dictator Mouamar Gaddafi. Fetouri demonstrates some resemblances between Gaddafi and Haftar, as for example the use of similar terminologies and the emphasis on security and stability. However, he points out important dissimilarities, such as Gaddafi’s defiance of regional and international powers while Haftar has been known for seeking out external support.
Click here to read the analysis.
On 16 April, Tim Eaton published with Chatham House a very interesting and well-articulated article investigating the economic model supporting General Haftar’s Libyan National army (LNA). His demonstration suggests that the financial matter could be decisive in the fight for Tripoli between the LNA and forces aligned with the Government of National Army (GNA). For Eaton, persisting fighting between could cause significant damages to the economy of Eastern Libya and undermine the funding model of LNA operations. Eaton highlights how securing the necessary financial resources for LNA operations has been key to Haftar’s military successes in Libya, as Eastern Libya has limited access to resources, compared to Western Libyan armed forces due to the presence of Libya’s main financial institution in Tripoli. Describing the economic model of Eastern Libya, Eaton also demonstrate the extent to which Eastern Libya depends on external support and the devastating economic consequences protracted fighting could potentially have on the population.
Mohamed Eljarh also contributed to the article.
Click here to read the article in full.
In Tripoli, the situation on the ground has reached a stalemate. Neither the Libyan National Army (LNA) nor anti-LNA forces have lost or gained any significant ground since last week’s reporting. Territorial control seemed to alternate continuously between LNA and anti-LNA forces. For example, on 14 April, Government of National Accord (GNA) forces managed to push LNA units further south of Tripoli retaking the Azizziyah and Qasr Ben Ghashir areas. However, by the following day (15 April), the LNA reclaimed the territory it lost. Overall, the number of armed clashes on the ground has decreased, though the operational tempo of aerial attacks has increased. The main areas of clashes are:
Currently, the LNA has military forces in a number of western region towns including Tarhouna (45 km southeast of Tripoli) and Ghariyan (70km south of Tripoli). There is a serious risk of an escalation of clashes and violence in both towns in the near future as Government of National Accord (GNA) allied forces prepares for a counter-offensive to take back these towns.
The LNA continues to have control of the so-called “Three Bridges” – comprising: the TIA bridge, al-Swani bridge and Qasr Bin Ghashir bridge. However, control over the al-Swani bridge remains contested. The 3 bridges are critical choke points for the LNA’s assault. LNA control over them would secure their supply lines and allow them to push deeper into the city.
The stalemate suggests that a longer-term entrenchment and siege of the city is likely. Possible scenarios in the short-term include:
GNA forces, primarily those under the command of Usama al-Juwaili (GNA Western Military Region) and Mohammed al-Haddad (GNA Central Military Region), are likely to make a push to take control of Azizziya. This would effectively provide a route to lead an assault towards Ghariyan and also cut off LNA supply lines to al-Swani, challenging its control of one of the 3 bridges.
On 11 April, Hart Energy published a short article on the potential consequences of the fighting in Tripoli on Libyan oil resources. Ahmad Ghaddar and Aidan Lewis also point out that control of oil resources has been for several years one of the main contentious subjects between Eastern and Western institutions. According to the article, oil prices have risen above $70 per barrel on fears of new losses to Libyan production.
Click here to read the article.
On 15 April, French newspaper Le Monde published an interview of Ghassan Salame, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, with journalist Frédéric Bobin. Discussing Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, Salamé says that the attack has caused significant damages to the UN-led political process, undermining the progresses that had been made. Moreover, he also admits that the reaction of the international community to the fighting has revealed the dissensions within the international community. Salame reasserted the importance of political dialogue, insisting that stabilisation in Libya cannot be fostered through the military solution.
Click here to read the interview in full.
In his latest article, which was published in French with The Conversation and in English with The Washington Post, Wolfram Lacher argues that General Haftar’s initial plan to overtake Tripoli has failed. For Lacher, General Haftar expected that the launch of an offensive by the Libyan National Army (LNA) would divide Western Libyan armed groups. Lacher notes that in the contrary, the offensive mobilised the armed groups to form an alliance against the LNA.
Click here to read the article.
On 12 April, Jared Malsin and Summer Said reported in an article with the Wall Street Journal that prior to the launch of the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli, Saudi Arabia allegedly promised tens millions of dollars to Eastern Libyan General Haftar to support his operations. The article describes the support received by General Haftar and the LNA from foreign actors, such as the United States and some European members state over the past few months. Jonathan M. Winer, the former U.S. special envoy to Libya, argues that such support was granted as foreign actors believed Haftar’s commitment to the UN-led political process. For Wolfram Lacher, such support has enable Haftar to become the player he currently is on the Libyan political scene.
Click here to read the article.
On 10 April, International Crisis Group (ICG) published an analysis of the turmoil in Western Libya which resulted from the launch of an offensive of the Libyan National Army (LNA) by General Haftar. For ICG, the outcomes of the fight in Tripoli largely depends on the response of outside actors and the need for more explicit support to the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Drawing on this statement, ICG provides several recommendations to the international community in order to avoid the escalation of tensions. The recommendations insist on the fact that new negotiations would need three components reflecting what ICG identifies as Libya’s three-tiered nature: political, financial and military tracks.
Click here to read the article in full.
The LNA military prosecutor has issued an arrest warrant, dated 11 April, for a raft of high profile Tripoli and Misratan political and security figures including PM Fayez al-Serraj and deputy PMs Ahmed Maiteeq, Musa Kuni and Abdussalam Kajman, Misratan militia leaders Abdurrahman al-Swehli and Salah Badi, GNA military commander Usama Juwaili and Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariyani, among many others.
The UN says over 9,500 people have been displaced by the fighting so far and over 50 people killed. Clashes and fighting continue in the south of Tripoli, with some sites changing hands several times. Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces have captured up to 200 Libyan National Army (LNA) fighters since the fighting began last week.
This arrest warrant by the LNA is pure provocation and indicates that the LNA is ramping up its narrative against the GNA and militias in Tripoli. The fact they have included the GNA leadership along with more hardline militia and jihadi leaders, as well as key GNA-aligned militia leaders such as Juwaili, highlights they are using the fact that UN-sanctioned hardliners such as Badi have joined the fight against the LNA to undermine the GNA. It is also likely a tactic to leave the door open to the militia leaders who are NOT mentioned, indicating the LNA would be willing to strike a deal with them. While this arrest warrant can’t be enforced by the LNA at present, it clearly stakes out the LNA’s political position and means that the chances of a negotiated solution to the current crisis, even a temporary ceasefire, looks increasing unlikely as polarisation increases on all sides.
In addition, there are reports of an LNA airstrike today against the Abd al-Samad military camp in southern Zuwara. It is unclear what the impact of the strike was. The Amazigh in Zuwara have so far remained out of the conflict, other than establishing sand barriers on the coastal road between Zuwara and Sabratha to prevent the LNA from moving on the town. However, Zuwara is located near to the LNA’s Watiya airbase and is the gate to the Tunisian border. This may be an attempt by the LNA to extend its supply lines west or ensure that an operation against Watiya cannot be launched from Zuwara. Zuwara port does not appear to have been impacted by the strike, but this move could pull Zuwaran forces into the fight against the LNA, making Zuwara more unstable.
On 11 April, the High Representative Federica Mogherini issued a statement on behalf of the European Union (EU) calling for an immediate ceasefire in Tripoli and the withdrawal of troops by the Libyan National Army (LNA) from the capital city. Fighting continued in Southern Tripoli all throughout the past week, resulting in dozens of casualties as well as the displacements of Tripoli residents. International media reports indicated that the drafting of the EU statement reignited tensions within European state members. Some state members, among which Italy, accused France of attempting to block the EU statement from calling on General Haftar to halt his affiliated forces. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini declared that Italy would not let international actors halt peace initiatives for Libya. French diplomatic representatives responded to the critics saying that France had not attempted to block he statement but had demanded some modifications to include the situation of migrants, he involvement in the fighting of certain groups and individuals under UN sanctions due to terrorist activities, and lastly, the need to find a political solution under UN authority in accordance with previous commitments.
In his latest publication with Voice of America published on 10 April, Rikar Hussein analyses how the renewed tensions in Libya could set the ground for a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) in Libya. Contributing to the article, Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack explains that overt the course of the past two years, the terrorist organization has had time to reorganize itself. For him,
IS and jihadism in Libya are now on the verge of making a huge breakthrough, just like they did in 2012-2015 after killing (U.S.) Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, and then jihadism flourished in many outlets in Libya.
The group is most likely to exploit Libya’s political vacuum and push further its war of attrition to prevent any future progress in Libyan state-building, Pack notes. As a matter of fact, just a few days after the re ignition of tensions in the Tripoli area between forces affiliated with Eastern Libyan General Haftar and forces, IS claimed an attack in Southern Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 11 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections which took place in Libya at the end of March of this year. These elections were highly expected in Libya due to their importance as they constitute a step towards the restoration of the state’s legitimacy.
The second Libyan municipal elections started early this year. On 30th Mar 2019 the first round of municipal elections concerned 9 municipalities. The preliminary results were later published by the Central Committee for Municipal Elections (CCMCE) . Voter registration was opened for all municipalities to allow for more voters to register and voters who had registered for the first round which took place in 2013-2016 did not need to register again. The second round took place on 6th April and concerned a group of 7 municipalities located in Western Libya. The preliminary participation rates were also later published by CCMCE.
The security situation in the western and southern regions was taken into consideration given the recent turn of events in Western Libya. CCMCE postponed Kikla elections (on the Nafusa mountain) before voting day, and both Al Asabia and South Zawia were stopped on the polling day.
The attached tables show voter and candidate registration for some municipalities. The last table of participation rates in this election also includes a comparison of participation with the first round of elections in 2014.
Municipal Elections Libya 2019
In an well-articulated article published on 10 April with Foreign Policy, Libya-Analysis Founder Jason Pack and Libya-Analysis affiliated researcher Matthew Sinkez argue that General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli is likely to backfire and cost him his reputation and international backers. For the authors, Haftar’s decisions to attack Tripoli was rooted in delusions of grandeur and megalomania induced by his recent victories in Southern Libya and fuelled by the support he received from some actors of the international community. For Pack and Sinkez, Haftar, who was positioned as Libya’s dominant political force, is now at risk of alienating such supports as the recent events make him look like an aggressor or blockader. They point out:
Haftar’s stock rises—domestically and internationally—only when he is seen as a conciliator who is defending and unblocking oil fields, not when he is seen as an aggressor or blockader
Click here to read the full article.
On 8 April, Managing-editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith discussed the recent turns of events in Libya with France 24, highlighting the volatility and uncertainty of the situation in Libya since the launch of the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli by General Haftar. Smith gave a detailed account of the situation and outlined potential outcomes. She argues that in the immediate/short-term, a political solution is unlikely to be agreed upon and that LNA forces are unlikely to retreat from the Tripoli area. Drawing on the role of the international community in the resolution of the crisis, Smith insists on the importance for Libyans to formulate their own political solutions, with the support of the international community. For Smith, the present divisions in Libya are divisions that can be overcome.
Click here to watch the interview.
Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack contributed to an article by Alejandro Tapia published with Chilean newspaper La Tercera on 8 April. Pack comments on the tensions in Tripoli, noting that General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli highlights his disdain for the diplomatic initiatives that had been pushed forwards over the course of the past months by national, regional and international actors. However, for Pack, what General Haftar has engaged in is truly a media war, knowing that betting on the military solution to imposer himself as Libya’s strongman would not necessarily lead to success. More importantly, this solution could backfire.
Click here to read the article in Spanish.
On 9 April, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame said in a statement that he is postponing the National Conference that was due to take place on 14- 16 April. In addition, Germany has reportedly called for a UN Security Council briefing on Libya (UNSC), to take this afternoon. Salame will brief the UNSC members at this meeting on the situation in Libya. Salame concluded his lengthy statement saying:
I therefore reiterate that I am more determined than ever to hold the National Conference at the earliest possible opportunity, as we cannot allow the historic opportunity it presents to be lost. We also cannot ask Libyans to attend a Conference to the backdrop of artillery shelling and air raids as we must ensure that all of those who expressed willingness to respond to this historic and national event from all over the country are able to attend and are able to voice their opinions freely. I will work, to the fullest possible extent, to enable the Libyan National Conference to take place as soon as possible, once the conditions to enable it to be held are re-established. I will work day and night to put an end to the current military escalation, ensure that reason and national interest once again supersede force and mend the external differences to enable the resolution of the crisis in Libya.
Postponing the conference is not unexpected given the circumstances, but nevertheless reiterates that the UN and internationals have so far not had enough to leverage to even enforce a humanitarian ceasefire, let alone a return to dialogue. Salame remains in Tripoli but some UN staff have been evacuated to Tunis. Salame’s efforts will likely now be focused on finding at least a temporary halt to the fighting in Tripoli. Russia is likely to veto any UNSC movement to directly criticise Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar, so it is unclear how much pressure the UN will be able to apply to end the violence.
The involvement of Misratan militias in defending Tripoli and attacking Libyan National Army (LNA) supply lines is crucial, especially in terms of air power. However, Misrata have mobilised to deter a specific, active threat. If fighting is drawn out or if Misrata or its neighbouring territories are attacked, then its forces may withdraw to Misrata and Sirte to reinforce positions there. This would leave Tripoli more vulnerable. In addition, the myriad militias currently fighting against the LNA are often bitterly divided among themselves, and are only working together because Haftar poses such a symbolic and potentially game-changing threat. If fighting is prolonged, it is more likely that this alliance will start to fracture and break down. The same is likely to happen if the Government of National Accord (GNA) alliance manages to secure a resounding defeat of the LNA – once that shared enemy is gone, infighting will resume and new alliances and power structures will be fought over.
Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was quoted by David Gilbert in an article published with Vice on 9 April. Gilbert reports the launch of the counteroffensive by forces affiliated with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) against Libyan National Army (LNA) forces. The aim of the operation called ‘Volcano of Anger’ is to retake the positions overtaken by LNA fighters in Tripoli, such as the defunct Tripoli International Airport (TIA) in the South of the city. For Pack, the LNA offensive does not indicate that General Haftar intends to overtake Tripoli by force but interprets it as a communication strategy ahead of the UN-led National Conference.
Click here to read the article.
Reuters reported on 9 April that fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS) conducted an attack in Southern Libya. The attack targeted the town of Fuqaha in Jufrah and reportedly resulted in the killing of 3 people and one kidnapping. Analysts alert that the present state of tensions and violence in Libya following the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli could make the ground for a resurgence of ISIS in Libya.
Click here to read the article.
Jalel Harchaoui, Tarek Megerisi, Ahmad al-Messallati, Kaouthar Hassan and Farhat Asseid commented on the renewed tensions in Western Libya in an article published by Le Nouvel Observateur on 6 April. The article questions General Haftar’s plan following the launch of a Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive in Western Libya, presenting different perspectives through the comments of Harchaoui, Megerisi, Al-Messallati, Hassan and Asseid. The overall analysis is that the offensive was launched as part as a strategy to impose Haftar as Libya’s strongman as Libya prepares for the UN-led National Conference, as an attempt to influence the outcomes of the political negotiations. They also question Haftar’s ability to conquer Tripoli by force, suggesting that the General is not as strong as he claims to be. For Al-Messallati, his success will depend on whether he manages to form strong alliances in Western Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 8 April, Jalel Harchaoui discussed with Xavier Martinet for France Culture‘s Enjeux Internationaux the situation in Libya since the aggravation of tensions resulting from the advance of the Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli. For Harchaoui, the offensive will have longlasting consequences on Libya, and could also potentially backfire against Haftar as it is uncertain whether the LNA holds the capacity to seize Tripoli by force and what the reaction of national and international actors will be.
Click here to listen to the podcast.
In an article published on 8 April with the Italian Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Megerisi argues that General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli was most likely thought as a strategy to cement elite support for the upcoming UN-led National Conference. Such a strategy, which was also put in perspective by Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack, is to be linked with his latest diplomatic initiatives with international actors, such his meetings in Saudi Arabia with the royal family. However, for Megerisi, Haftar misdjuged Tripoli’s response to his move. Megerisi claims that the Libyan National Army (LNA) attack triggered the largest mobilisation in Western Libya since 2011. In an earlier article published on 5 April with the European Council on Foreign Relations, Megerisi urged European actors to stand in Haftar’s way and reevaluate their approach to the strongman.
Click here to read the article.
On 8 April, France 24 reported that Russia demanded on 7 April that the UN Security Council statement on Libya should be reformulated. According to reports, the statement initially called on forces affiliated with Eastern Libyan General Haftar to halt their advance on the Libyan capital. On Russia’s demand, the statement was rewritten to be addressed to all Libyan factors to halt fighting. This reveals the dissension within international ranks regarding political actors in Libya. While supporting officially the UN-led initiatives for political reconciliation in Libya, Russia has also been providing support to General Haftar and his affiliated forces. For many analysts, the current situation is a direct result of the ambiguous policies of international actors towards Libya, driven by competing interests.
Click here to read the report.
In an op-ed published with the New-York Times on 5 April, Frederic Wehrey and Jeffrey Feltman call for the Trump administration to intervene in Libya to prevent further escalation of the ongoing tensions. Drawing on the offensive launched by General Haftar and his affiliated forces on Tripoli, Wehrey and Feltman demand that the United States take a stand against General Haftar and his political and military ambitions, arguing that the strongman does not serve American interest in the area and that he poses a threat to national and regional stability. For the two authors, the United States stand as a key international actor who could broker a deal between Libyan factions while other international actors have failed to do so. They note:
In our conversations over the years, it is clear that the United States still retains credibility in Libya as a relatively honest broker, especially when compared with the Europeans and Arabs pursuing competing and narrow interests.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published on 8 April, Al Jazeera reported that military forces affiliated to the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) will launch a counteroffensive against the forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) headed by General Khalifa Haftar. The aim of the counteroffensive will be to reclaim all areas seized by the LNA around Tripoli. Fighting in Southern Tripoli between the LNA and Tripoli-based military forces begun on 4 April and has led thus far to 11 deaths and 23 wounded, according to the GNA Health Ministry. As a result of the ongoing tensions, the US military proceeded on 7 April to a temporary withdrawal of its forces from Libya. For Jason Pack, interviewed by Al Jazeera, Haftar’s intention is not to overtake Tripoli by force but to make a statement before the UN-led National Conference which will take place on 14-16 April. The National Conference could be a turning point of the Libyan crisis. Pack argues that the international community and the UN have a plan which will be unravelled at the National Conference. However, he warns about dissension and hidden agenda within international ranks. Most particularly, he denounces the attitude of France, who officially supports the UN-led initiative but has also provided support to Haftar and the LNA.
Click here to read the article.
In an article published with Al-Monitor on 6 April, Jason Pack analyses General Haftar’s backstory, highlighting the steps which led to his decision to march on Tripoli. He notes :
What Hifter appears to be trying to do is create a popular groundswell of support for him as “Libya’s savior” and an alternative to the UN-backed political process.
Click here to read the analysis in full.
On 5 April, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith discussed with Mohamme Elshinnawi of Voice of America the push of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) towards Tripoli, the Libyan capital, and the potential outcomes of such an operation. For Smith, ‘Libya is holding its breath to see what is going to happen next’. She notes that Haftar’s move was unexpected, as the country was preparing for the UN-led National Conference following high level meetings between Haftar and the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA). For Smith, while the operation is labelled an operation designed to fight against terrorism, it could be understood as a power play to impose Haftar and his affiliated forces to impose himself as a major player in Libya. According to Smith, it remains unclear so far whether the LNA will attempt to take Tripoli by force as it could be too risky. For Smith, the current situation can be understood as a result of the initiatives from the international community to engage with Haftar and include him in the political dialogue. Therefore, Smith questions what the international community’s response will be if Haftar breaches the terms of the UN-led agreement which opposed military actions as a solution. Their response could either Haftar’s attempts to seize power or reveal the limit of the international community’s power.
Click here to listen to the interview.
Libya has been holding its breath since 4 April in fear of a new war which could engulf Tripoli and which could scupper prospects of a peace agreement that was supposed to be formalized at an upcoming National Conference only ten days from now. While the UN Secretary General was in Tripoli on 4 April giving a press conference to support Libyans in making the conference happen, Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar was declaring the beginning of ‘operation Tripoli’ in a highly emotive statement. Haftar’s statement came after LNA mobile forces moved from southern Libya to Ghariyan, a town south of Tripoli, earlier in the week and yesterday declared they had peacefully taken the town and had been welcomed by the residents.
In response, Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj put GNA forces on high alert, authorising airstrikes and the use of military force to defend citizens and critical facilities from terrorist groups, criminal gangs and those operating ‘outside legitimacy.’ Zintan’s Osama Juwaili, commander of the Presidency Council’s (PC) western military zone, spent the day in Misrata with Mohamed Haddad, commander of the central military zone, to oversee the action. Misrata, according to informed sources has taken a social decision to enter the war fully against Haftar as a city and a large force has already started to roll down to Tripoli. Fayez reportedly refused SRSG Ghassan Salame’s request for mediation with Haftar after his ‘treachery’. GNA Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha, after taking some time to denounce the international community for ‘betrayal’, issued strict orders to all security and police authorities to discipline any collaborators with the eastern parallel government.
Misrata, Zintan and all the key Tripoli brigades (except Rada) appear to be in active coordination to mobilize and deploy forces to secure the capital and western region. On 4 April, some LNA units based west of Tripoli briefly reached the 27km checkpoint on the coastal highway west of Tripoli, before it was retaken by fighters from Janzour and Zawiyya fighters. On 4 April, members of the international community, the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany and interestingly the UA, addressed the situation with a joint statement. Also interestingly Egypt issued its own statement calling all sides to ceasefire and maximum restraint. On 5 April, the UNSC had an extraordinary meeting on Libya.
The reality of the situation remains very volatile and opaque at present, with Tripoli residents, Libyan actors and international actors waiting to see what will happen next. The timing of the LNA moves has taken many people by surprise given the National Conference is only days away. While the LNA has been significantly ramping up its rhetoric of military power projection in western Libya in recent days and has been moving forces around in the Jufra area, it lacks the capacity to be able to launch a full scale military assault on Tripoli. It would likely lose a great deal of its recently gained legitimacy and support in the western region if it were to do so unless it has deals and understandings in place with local actors. As a result, the assumption has been that the LNA has been ramping up its intimidation techniques in order to increases its political leverage and force more local groups into capitulating, rather than as a precursor for a serious attempt to take the capital by force. This assumption now appears it could be misplaced.
Some communities supporting the LNA are elated, with high expectations of a quick victory and easy handover and/or sure escape of militias from the capital or defection of their leaders. High expectations have built up over time due to a semi-successful operation in South Libya, comforting rhetoric of peaceful bloodless entry and swift decisive victory, as well as a publicly perceived international ‘green-light’ for Haftar to enter Tripoli (the UAE agreement between Haftar and Serraj that is supposed to form the basis of the upcoming UN conference).
On the opposite side, there is a large segment of the population which has been divided and fragmented for years now, but lately has been openly in fear of the recent groundswell of social support for Haftar and the LNA. It seems that yesterday’s open threat, and the state of fear and panic it triggered, was the trigger to unify these western factions in a real way for the first time in many years.
So Libya is now at the precipice of its third civil war in 8 years, a rude awakening that is engulfing much of the population as we speak. The country is currently psychologically split between a population that supports the LNA expecting Tripoli to fall quickly and without much blood, prepared for a full ‘military’ solution to Libyan politics… and another population mostly in the western region, that is now vehemently opposed to any kind of peace deal with Haftar and the LNA, and see no other choice than to support Fayez Serraj’s leadership as Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army and fall in under the military region commanders he appointed.
We don’t know so far what the developments of the last two days mean for the UN’s upcoming National Conference plan. Will the UNSC sanction only one party, Haftar, thereby scuppering the conference? Will the UNSC throw its weight fully behind the GNA and Serraj’s leadership openly supporting one Libyan party over another in the conflict? This would mean that the UNSC would be unanimous in ultimately outlawing Haftar, delegitimizing the entire institutional apparatus of the LNA and its social support base. Would this help the reconciliation and reunification of Libya or add more fuel to the fire? Will the UNSC only issue a standard statement demanding ‘all’ sides deescalate but leave the matter as is without any real interventions? Wouldn’t this be deemed as more ‘green-light’ for Haftar to continue and conflict to proceed? Or will the UNSC be concretely split this time over which direction to take on Libya or which government to legitimize? Can the National Conference still happen, potentially if the LNA’s campaign demobilize and retreat thereby levelling the playing field and setting the groundwork for a more stable agreement? Is retreat an option for the LNA and what are the possible consequences of retreat? Can the LNA win by military blitzkrieg in coordination with cells inside Tripoli and control the city? At present, there are far more questions than answers, and so many different permutations of how the situation could develop that trying to predict the most likely outcome at this point feels like an exercise in futility.
Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was interviewed on 4 March by Al Jazeera and commented the advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Western Libya, near Tripoli. Pack analyses that Haftar’s decision to advance his position is most likely linked to the upcoming National Conference and does not necessarily indicate that there will be a military offensive targeting Tripoli. For Pack, Haftar is most likely to “push the limits without going beyond” and remain along the lines of the UN-led agreement which opposes a military solution in Libya.
International and national reports suggest an intensification of tensions in Western Libya, and more specifically in the Tripoli area due to advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). According to Voice of America, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) put on 3 April Tripoli under ‘military alert’. Media reports indicate that a brief fighting erupted between LNA forces and a military force based South of Tripoli the same day. The sudden advance of Eastern-Libyan armed forces comes as a surprise given the recent positive political developments which had taken place over the past few days. The confrontation, which occurred at the same time than the visit to Western Libya of UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, could undermine mediation efforts in Libya.
As one of Libyan National Army head Khalifa Haftar’s lesser known sons inaugurated a youth political platform in Benghazi on 29 March, Haftar made some key remarks. He announced that within two weeks there will be a unified government in Libya and that sovereign institutions will be unified to support the process towards elections in the country. These remarks contrast widely with the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) public perception campaign of imminent military victory in Tripoli.
While many sources indicate that the National Conference process has not matured yet, and the prospect of a major unravelling is high, there are indicators that compromises may have been reached – with the brokering of the UN and the international community – between Haftar, the Misratans and the GNA to facilitate a new unified government and a new political roadmap to be endorsed. It is likely that the LNA is focusing on projecting its military power in western Libya not because it is about to launch an imminent move on Tripoli, but because it wants factions in this region to believe that the LNA will eventually become a significant or even dominant power player in this region, making it more likely they will strike political deals or accommodations before, during or after the National Conference.
In an article published with Middle East Eye on 31 March, Tom Wescott discusses the growing tensions surrounding Tripoli due to the advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) towards Wester Libya. Wescott reports that support for the LNA is growing in Western Libya, causing increasing tensions in the Libyan capital. For him, uncertainty prevails in Western Libya, and it could lead to instability in the short, medium-term.
Click here to read the article.
On 27 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) reported that revenues from sales of crude and derived productions amounted to 1.26 billion USD for February 2019. This is a reduction of over 330 million US dollars from January – a 21 percent month-on-month decrease. The NOC attributes the reduction to poor weather conditions which disrupted loadings from Sidra port, in addition to the closure of Sharara oilfield during that period. Libya’s oil production and subsequent revenue remains vulnerable to disruption by insecurity, blockades and facility closures.
In an article published with Foreign Policy on 1 April, Tarek Megerisi advocates against the official integration of Eastern-Libyan General Haftar into Libya’s politics and criticizes the recent trend which has seen a widespread push for a deal between General Haftar and Fayez Al-Sarraj, the Head of the UN-sponsored Government of National Accord (GNA).
Click here to read the article.
In his latest article published on 1 April with War On the Rocks, Jalel Harchaoui argues that Libya’s most important financial institution, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), is increasingly at risk of becoming the target of maneuvers by Libyan factions to gain power. Harchaoui demonstrates that while a military offensive on Tripoli would be too risky, General Haftar’s strategy to increase his control over Libya could be to focus on the CBL. The institution, chaired by Sadiq al-Kabir, reportedly holds more than $70 billion of foreign-exchange reserves. The article presents the different national, regional and international actors which have attempted in a way or another to influence the control of Libya’s CBL. He notes that the lessened involvement of the United States in Libya puts at a greater risk Libya’s resources.
Click here to read the full article.
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman hosted Libyan General Khalifa Haftar for talks at the al-Yamamah Royal Palace in Riyadh on March 27. The Libyan General also met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Haftar reportedly discussed the latest developments in Libya. While the details of their conversation have not been disclosed, Karasik and Cafiero suppose in an article published with Gulf State Analytics that Haftar traveled to Saudi Arabia to secure further support from the kingdom for the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s operations. The authors highlight that Saudi Arabia’s influence over Libya mostly transpires through the development in Libya of the fundamentalist movement of Madkhalis, which opposes Islamist groups and more particularly, the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement has found common grounds with General Haftar on his strong anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance. Karasik and Cafiero argue that Saudi-inspired Salafists have heavily influenced Libya’s conflict and will most likely be decisive factors for the establishment of a political balance in Libya. Furthermore, they question the extent to which Libya could become another Arab proxy conflict, deepening the divide between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Click here to read the article.
International media outlets reported that on 27 March, migrants hijacked a cargo ship in Libya waters, forcing the crew to redirect the ship towards European. Reports suggest that the crew had rescued the migrants who had attempted the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea. On 28 March, Maltese special forces seized control of the merchant ship and arrested five of the migrants on board. The rest of the group accordingly disembarked at Boiler Wharf in Senglea, near Valletta. This situation reignited tensions amid the international community regarding the migration issue. Both Malta and Italy alerted about the situation and communicated their refusal to let the ship enter their national waters. Over the past months, many NGOs have alerted about the tragic situation of migrants departing from North Africa, and most particularly about the living conditions of migrants in Libya.
In an article entitled ‘Libya, what after the National Conference’ published on 28 March, Libya Prospects questions the UN-led initiative to organize a National Conference to draw a roadmap for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. Highly critical of the UN initiative, the article argues that ‘the same story’ from 2015 which saw the UN supervise the Skhirat Agreement is ‘repeating itself’ and that the aims of the Conference and how it will be organised remain unclear for Libyans.
Click here to read the article.
On 28 March, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith was interviewed by Mohammed Elshinnawi for Voice of America, ‘Africa News Tonight’. Smith discussed the stakes of the National Conference organised by the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). Smith explains that the stakes of the event are high, as the UN intends to gather Libya’s political actors to draw a roadmap towards the end of the crisis. The participants, which have not been announced yet, will be gathered to reach a consensus on controversial issues such as the drafting of the Constitution and the organisation of democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in Libya. Smith argues that in order to be bear results, the Conference needs the participation of a wide range of Libyan actors. She also adds that it is imperative for such discussions to be followed by actions on the ground.
Click here to listen to Rhiannon Smith on VOA (between minutes 13:25 and 18:45)
On 20 March, the Government of National Accord (GNA) officially endorsed the new 2019 budget – otherwise called the ‘financial arrangements’ as it has technically not been approved by the legislature, the House of Representatives (HoR) – totalling 46.8 billion Libyan dinars (LYD). Though the total wage bill increased by 3 billion LYD from 2018 to 25.2 billion (more than half the total budget), the National Oil Corporation (NOC) received no share of the wage increases. This is despite GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj reportedly assuring NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah that oil workers would receive the 67% wage increase.
In response, an oil sector labour movement called the “67%” movement or “Sabaa Wa Siteen” appeared to be gaining momentum throughout last week, demanding an immediate salary increase. The issue of pay rises has been a long-standing source of grievance among oil workers for several years. Despite Sanallah’s documented efforts to persuade the GNA to grant the funds, many oil workers feel he and the board have not done enough. As a result, protests and strikes are possible at various ports and fields across the country in the short-medium term. Locations that are likely to be most vulnerable (based on previously strained relations between staff and management and involvement in the “67%” movement) include Sharara, Mellitah complex, and fields in the Jalu oasis.
On 22 March, Kirill Semenov discussed in article published with Al-Monitor Russia’s positioning in the Libyan political landscape, following critics claiming that Russia only supports General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA). For Semenov, the evidence of Russia maintaining a balanced policy on Libya was demonstrated by the visit of Khaled Al-Mishri, president of Libya’s High Council of State (HCS) to Russia’s Federal Council in Moscow on 17 March, Al-Mishri being a longstanding opponent of Haftar. According to the author, Al-Mishri’s visit to Moscow aimed at securing assurances from Russia in the case of an offensive on Tripoli by Haftar and his armed forces.
Click here to read the full article.
An article published with Channel NewsAsia on 25 March revealed an unexpected side of the Libyan landscape, the white truffles which are harvested for their delicate taste. The article follows Milad Mohammed, a retired civil servant from Zintan, who harvests white truffles through the desert region of Al-Hamada al-Hamra, southwest of Tripoli. Locally called “terfas”, white truffles can be found in the Libyan desert before springtime and have seen their price per kilo tripling to 130 dinars (US$33). The delicacy is also in great demand in Gulf markets.
Click here to read the article.
On 21 march, in an article published with Real Clear World, Nathan Vest warns about potential conflict between General Haftar’s forces and powerful Western militias, such as Misrata militias, highlighting that such a confrontation could have dire security and migration ramifications for Libya’s neighboring countries and Europe. Vest calls for an intervention of the United States as a neutral mediator to avoid violent escalation between Libyan factions.
Click here to read the full article.
In a report published on 19 March with the New York Review of Books (NYR) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Frederic Wehrey argues that Khalifa Haftar’s offensive in Southern Libya has caused a major shift in the balance of power in Libya. Wehrey recalls in this article recent interviews conducted with Libyan actors, among which Fathi Bashagha, who acts as Interior Minister for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) since late 2018.
Click here to read the article.
On 21 March, the U.S Department of State released an interview of Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Chris Mitchell and David Brody of Christian Broadcasting Network. Interviewed after a trip to Israel where Pompeo met in Jerusalem with the Israeli Prime Minister and ambassador to the United States to Israel, the Secretary of State reasserted the commitment of the United States to continue to the fight against Islamic State (ISIS) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. On that subject, Pompeo referred to the and exactions committed in Libya by the organisation.
Click here to read the interview.
On 20 March, the UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé announced during a news conference that the UN National Conference for Libya is going to be held on April 14-16 in the central city of Ghadames, international media outlets, such as The Daily Mail, report. According to Salamé, between 120 and 150 delegates are expected to take part in the forum. Salamé declared that the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez al-Sarraj and military strongman Khalifa Haftar agreed during their meeting in Abu Dhabi last month to work toward organizing elections. Insisting on the significance of the forum to unify the divided Libyan factions, Salamé also declared that if the initiative failed, Libya would then ‘be faced with only two possible options: prolonged stalemate or conflict’.
Click here to read the report.
On 12 March, Adam Ghallab published an op-ed with The Libya Times in which he advocates for the return to monarchy in Libya, urging UNSMIL to facilitate the reintegration of monarchy into Libya’s current political process. For Ghallab, only two political systems manged to keep Libya’s tribally fragmented society together: the monarchy era constitution which was established in 1959 and the authoritarian regime established by Muammar Gaddafi in 1969.
Click here to read the report.
On 17 March, clashes occurred in the same area between the Janzour Knights and General Security Service forces. On 18 March, clashes took place in the early hours of the morning between the Janzour-based National Mobile Force (NMF) and the General Security Service in the Ghayiran Brigade area in west Tripoli. A convoy of twenty NMF vehicles entered the neighbouring al-Siyahiyya area without coordinating their movements with the Hay al-Andalus Joint Security Room, leading to an exchange of gunfire with the forces at the Ghayran Brigade checkpoint. The General Security Service released a statement denying that they were involved in the event.
Tensions are emerging within and between Tripoli-based militias as a result of growing support among some armed groups for the Libyan National Army (LNA). Zintan has a long-standing relationship with the LNA and hence Zintani forces are likely to be a source of friction for Tripoli groups concerned about militias sympathetic to the LNA forming a fifth column in the capital. Moreover, the shuffling and removal of Trabelsi’s forces indicate an increasing desire by forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA) to remove any LNA-affiliated forces from strategic positions in the capital.
On 15 March, international media outlets reported that the UN’s much delayed National Conference will occur prior to the Arab League Summit at the end of March, likely on 31 March, and if not, then at least no later than the start of Ramadan on 5 May. Reports suggest that the south-western town of Ghadames will be the likely venue of the conference. The UN has not publicly confirmed any information about the date, location or format of the conference. Throughout last week, UN staff and international diplomatic missions engaged in fast-paced shuttle diplomacy between various Libyan political and security actors in preparation for the meeting. On 13 March, several ambassadors met with Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and members of the High Council of State (HCS), on 16 March, Deputy UN Envoy Stephanie Williams made a landmark visit to the electoral district of Aziziyya, south-west of Tripoli and on 18 March, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Tripoli and praised the “significant progress” made by Haftar in southern Libya,
While the actual details of the political arrangement being discussed remain unverified, the flurry of UN and international activity last week suggests that some of political breakthrough has been achieved between Haftar and Sarraj and that some sort of high-level political restructuring is possible in the coming weeks. However, the lack of clarity and information about what this breakthrough might be or what power-sharing deals or security arrangements might have been agreed is driving tensions and fears among Tripoli militias, as well as other groups in western Libya. This could be the verge of a golden moment where international and national pressure align to force Tripoli’s militias and Haftar to compromise to form a new government and power structure. However, if mismanaged, it could lead to an escalation of hostilities and conflict across western Libya, especially if militias in the region perceive the only way to hold onto power is by force.
In an article published with Politico on 19 March, Andrew Glass revisits US President Obama’s decision to approve airstrikes against Libya on 19 March 2011. Glass presents the narrative supporting President Obama’s decision, a narrative based on the urgency to intervene to protect Libyan pro-democracy protesters against the violence of Libyan leader Gaddafi. Citing Alan J. Kuperman, an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Glass moves on to criticizing the consequences of the international intervention in Libya, noting:
In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya was an abject failure, judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights abuses have increased severalfold.
Click here to read the article.
In an article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published on 15 March, Umberto Profazio argues that tensions between Libyan rival administrations risk reigniting ethnic tensions and jeopardise fragile agreements. The author refers to the campaign launched by Eastern-Libyan General Haftar in Southern Libya in early 2019, noting that both General Haftar and rival administration the Government of National Accord (GNA) are attempting to court ethnic groups for political or territorial advantages. Profazio analyses that the result of such upheavals could be the further marginalisation of Southern communities. In conclusion of his article, he highlights the increasing isolation of Fayez Al-Sarraj, head of the GNA, and warns about potential shifts in international alliances:
In comparison to France’s assertive support for Haftar, the US stance could be interpreted as extremely cautious, but it does seem to be a reflection of changes on the ground. Haftar’s advances have certainly raised doubts in Washington, which is reconsidering its relationship with Sarraj. He is a weakened partner who is not only losing the confidence of his major foreign allies, but also the support of militias in the capital and finds himself increasingly undermined by his own colleagues in Tripoli.
Click here to read the analysis.
French newspaper Le Point reports about freedom on press in Libya. On 17 March, French NGO “Reporters sans Frontières” (RSF), which is dedicated to the fight for the freedom of press, alerted in a communique about the absence of such rights in Libya. Deploring the death of at least 19 reporters since 2011, RSF denounces a strong hostility against journalists in Libya. According to the communique, there have also been several cases of journalists disappearing, being kidnapped or tortured over the past year. RSF’s communique was co-signed by the Libyan Center for Freedom of Press. Committed to protect and maintain freedom of press in Libya, this Center actively fights for the protection of journalists, addressing cases of disappearance and assaults on members of the press in the country.
Click here to read the report.
On 14 March, Julien Raickman, Head of missions for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Libya published with Le Monde an open letter addressed to French president Emmanuel Macron in which he denounces intolerable living conditions for migrants in Libya and the migration policies of the EU. The open letter echoes a report published by the UNCHR published in December 2018 alerting on the physical and mental abuse experienced by migrants in Libya.
Click here to read the letter.
Over the course of the week, Al-Ahram Weekly published an editorial relating to current events in Libya. For the Egyptian newspaper, the deployment of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Southern Libya is the latest ‘wake-up call on the urgent need to reach a political settlement among Libyan factions’. The recent events also demonstrate Libya’s need for a strong government and a strong army, according to the editorial. As a result, it reports that Egyptian efforts to find a solution to the Libyan crisis will continue, given the threat instability in Libya poses to Egypt.
Click here to read the editorial.
On 6 March, Mohamed Sallak, the spokesperson for the Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, held a press conference to give further details about the so-called ‘Abu Dhabi Dialogue’ which occurred between Sarraj and Khalifa Haftar on 27 February. Sallak stated that the event was a consultative meeting, with no official binding agreements or statements. On 10 March, UN envoy Ghassan Salame appeared on a Libyan TV station and confirmed that during the meeting, both Sarrajand Haftar reaffirmed their commitment to a civilian state and civilian oversight over the army. He also clarified that the UN roadmap and National Conference was delayed but still on track and will hopefully be held by the end of March in a Libyan city yet to be decided.
This panicked reaction in Libya to the Sarraj-Haftar meeting is indicative of the mistrust and division that continue to run deep within Libyan society. The fact that it was Serraj and Salame who were forced to issue these clarifications and sooth fears in western Libya highlights the continued fragility of their positions and the political framework from which they both draw their legitimacy – the UN road map. In comparison, Haftar has still not issued a statement on the meeting, letting people assume he was the one to gain most from the meeting, which is likely true given his upper hand on the ground at the moment. As a result, political volatility is likely to persist and could potentially increase in the coming days and weeks, particularly in Tripoli. This could lead to sudden bouts of insecurity or alliance shifts which could undermine security or political stability with little warning.
On 7 March, a gang of five men suspected of having connections to Islamic State (ISIS) were arrested as they reportedly attempted in to ‘infiltrate’ Tripoli. Reports suggest three of those arrested were dressed as women. Throughout the last three weeks, reputable sources have warned of an impending ISIS attack in Tripoli. No attack has materialised so far, with suggestions that local security forces thwarted an attempt recently. However, the potential for an attack remains moderately high. The Government of National Accord (GNA) does not control a single consolidated security force in western Libya. The militias aligned to the GNA do not directly follow its directions and in many cases actively work to undermine security governance. This has created a fractured security landscape, allowing ISIS to operate in the gaps and launch successful attacks on key institutions. Based on ISIS’s previous attacks in Tripoli, any potential attack is likely to target the headquarters of key state institutions. The Central Bank of Libya, High Council of State and the United Nations headquarters could be the focus of ISIS attacks in Tripoli in the near future given the ease of attack and attractiveness as high impact symbolic targets.
On 7 March, Emadeddin Badi published with Middle East Institute an analysis of General Haftar’s Southern strategy and its potential repercussions. Along with other analysis that have been published over the past weeks, Badi alerts on the potential subversion and derailing of the UN process that could result from Haftar’s southern advances. Such reports contribute to demonstrate the growing concerns among scholars and analysts about the current turn of events in Libya.
Click here to read the analysis.
On 18 March, Jason Pack, President and founder of Libya-Analysis, will be the guest speaker at the lecture untitled “Kingdom of Militias? Mapping the Libyan Security Challenge” organized by the Italian Institute for Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan, Palazzo Clerici. The chairman of the event will be Arturo Varvelli, Co-Head MENA Center at ISPI and the discussions will also involve Virginie Collombier, Scientific Coordinator for the Middle East Directions Programme, European University Institute and Otman Gajiji, Former Chairman of HNEC and Municipal Elections of Libya CCMCE; Elections and Local Governance expert.
Experts are to discuss the issue of militias in the Libyan context.
Militias remain fundamental to understand the evolution of the Libyan crisis. This is especially true if we look at the failure of national reconciliation efforts that were based on political or civil figures who have little leverage over those groups able to exert real territorial control in the country. Militias’ role is also pivotal to assess the internal political and military landscape as they directly manage security according to varying – and often conflicting – political interests which emanate from powerful leaders but are also subject to external influences. What kind of interactions do Libyan militias and armed groups have with the country’s institutions and society? What is their ideology? How do they get their funding? What do they really want? Can these groups be integrated in a Libyan national reconciliation effort? If so, then under which conditions?
Click here to access the ISPI website.
On 8 March, Tarek Megerisi and Andrew Lebovich published with The European Council on Foreign Relations an analysis of France’s strategy in the Sahel drawing on the French intervention in Chad last February. They argue that interventions of foreign powers in the region, and of France in particular, could likely cause an escalation of risks in the region. According to them, the intervention showed both the lengths to which France is willing to go to protects regional partners such as Chad and also how European countries continue to focus on short-term solutions to the regional issues of security and migration. The two authors also demonstrate that the intervention also reveals France’s dependency on auxiliaries and partners to control issues of national interests, and that such partnerships can have damaging consequences. On that note, they refer to Libya and the French support to General Haftar and his armed forces since 2014 which contributed to Haftar’s rise. In this context, the French intervention in Chad appears connected to Haftar’s movements in South Libya. For the authors, these actions are largely contributing to disrupting the regional situation.
Click here to read the report.
On 6 March, Mathieu Galtier published with The Washington Times a report on living conditions in Benghazi. The past weeks have seen several reports on Benghazi, as the security situation has been progressively stabilizing in the city. For Galtier, Benghazi residents have been faced firsthand with the consequences of the Libyan revolution, and he reports their testimonies. Residents speak of the pain inspired by the destruction of the city and of their hope to come back with their families, as well of the lack of support from local authorities. Their testimonies also highlight the perceptions of General Haftar in Benghazi as a liberator in that part of the country, echoing the growing popularity of the strongman since the launch of a Libyan National Army (LNA) operation in Southern Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 4 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) officially lifted force majeure on Sharara oilfield after it said the armed militia who had blockaded the field had been removed. According to the NOC, its subsidiary Akakus, which operates the field, had received assurances from the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Petroleum Facilities Guards commander, Brigadier General al-Rifi Kennah Ahmed Ali, that all the individuals listed by the Attorney General (26 members of the Fezzan Anger Movement) for arrest have been expelled from the field and would not be allowed to re-enter. Production of around 80,000bpd is expected to resume on 5 March, with regular output of up to 300,000bpd to be reached over the coming days. Plans are also in place to repair the 20,000bpd lost production capacity destroyed by looting and vandalism during the blockade.
The manner of the lifting of force majeure is a victory for both Sanallah and the LNA. For Sanallah, he maintained his zero-tolerance, non-partisan approach to blockaders, willing to engage with either of the national actor who was genuinely able to fulfill the demands to ensure the safety of oil facility staff and neutrality of the field. For the LNA, they have now succeeded in securing and, crucially, opening the majority of Libya’s main oilfields, which will provide Haftar with additional leverage over national political, security and public domains.
On 26 February, The Ricochet published a Q&A hosted by Jay Nordlinger in which he interviews Libyan human-rights activist and democracy leader Asma Khalifa. Through this interview, we discover the profile of the Libyan activist, who volunteered as a field nurse during the Libyan Civil War, along with the rebels. She speaks of division, of Libya under Muammar Qaddafi and of perspectives for Libya. She provides a fascinating description of Libya and the divisions which have paralyzed the country since the fall of the Qaddafi regime.
Click here to listen to the podcast.
On 26 February, Faraj Aljarih published an article with The Address on Fayez Al-Sarraj, the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA). The article resonates as critical of the political figure, as it reviews with an ironic tone the different titles and positions Al-Sarraj has granted himself as head of the GNA. The article illustrates the growing skepticism in Libya regarding Al-Sarraj, which results from the GNA’s failed efforts to bring stability to Libya as well as to the increasing support to General Haftar since the launch of its military operation in Southern Libya.
Click here to read the article.
On 24 February, a convoy of fifty armed vehicles under the command of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Western Military Region deployed to the al-Qaryat-Mizdat area in response to concerns of the Libyan National Army (LNA) advancing in that direction. Moreover, at the weekend the GNA’s Western Military Region media office released a statement declaring that “all official military units in the western region” remain under their command, “except auxiliary forces in the Sabratha area, operating under the LNA”. The GNA’s deployment of armed vehicles and its statement stressing its control over western security forces comes amid signs of the LNA’s growing support in north-western Libya. For example, on 19 February the LNA’s 155 Battalion released a video showing four of its members somewhere in Tripoli, declaring their support for the LNA’s General Command. On 19 February, a Chadian national was arrested for having false identification close to Tiji, in south-western Libya. Tiji has been notably supportive of the LNA as it combats Chadian opposition groups in the south.
Such movements indicate that the LNA is attempting to assert its authority and counter the LNA’s narrative (and public perception) of its growing influence in the region. The LNA’s success in the South is leading to shifting alliances and allowing it to build new relationships in north-western Libya. The LNA’s Operation Cordon of Hamada (a security zone between south-west and north-west Libya, between Ghadames, Hamada and al-Qaryah) along with pledges of support from some groups in north-western towns, is also seeing an increase in the LNA’s military presence in this region. However, at present there are still far more militias and security forces in the western region who reject the LNA’s presence therefore a widespread ‘flip’ of allegiances to the LNA is not expected in the short term, though cannot be ruled out in the longer term.
Wolfram Larcher published with Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) a report in which he argues that Haftar’s advances in Southern Libya are changing power relations in Libya. Larcher supposes that continued progress by Haftar in the South would have major consequences in Western Libya and further destabilize the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN’s ongoing attempts at brokering a political solution. He advocates for a renewed unity between Western governments on Libya to reinforce efforts for a negotiating process.
Click here to read the report.
In the February 2019 issue of Clingendael CRU Policy Brief, researchers Al-Hamzeh Al-Shadeedi and Nancy Ezzedine discuss the notion of tribal structures in Libya. They provide recommendations on how to effectively engage with tribal actors and traditional authorities within the state-building process. The report demonstrates the importance of tribes in the Libyan context and argues that these structures should be integrated and represented in political initiatives.
Click here to read the full report.
In his latest article for Reuters published on 21 February, Ulf Laessing shares local perceptions from Benghazi, illustrating the political narratives that have emerged in Libya along the divisions between West and East. Interviewing residents from the city, Laessing reports the growing disbelief in the solutions put forward by the international community and the UN, such as the forthcoming National Conference, and the increasing belief that Libya needs a strong political figure, such as General Haftar.
Click here to read the article.
On 14 February, the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha gave an interview with al-Hurra television where he stated that the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, “played a role” in the military activities in Libya’s south and that it was “acceptable from the national point of view,” in the context of removing organised crime emerging from the region. However, Bashagha qualified his statement by saying that he hoped Haftar would play his role in national efforts, but not use the operation for political gain or to increase division.
Bashagha’s statements recognizing Haftar has a role to play are indicative of increasing rapprochement between LNA and key western figures, particularly Misrata. While such statements should not be taken to indicate the beginning of a hard and fast LNA-Misrata alliance, they nevertheless represent a willingness to tolerate one another which is at odds with Serraj’s stance towards the LNA since the start of the southern operations. This internal division within the GNA, combined with other factors, continues to drive political fragility within Libya and could lead to sudden escalations of instability.
In an article for Orient XXI published on 18 February, Ali Bensaad argues that while militias have imposed themselves as major political actors in Libya as well as the main sources of instability, their power largely depends on their local and international alliances. In his article, Bensaad demonstrates how alliances and networks have allowed for militias to strive in post-revolution Libya and the resource collection system they have developed.
Click here to read the article.
As Libya prepared for the celebrations of the 8th anniversary of the Libyan revolution, Voice of America published on 15 February a critical review of the situation in the country. For VOA, much still needs to be done to achieve the goals of the revolution as the country experiences persisting political, security and economic turmoil and international and national actors struggle to propose a viable road-map for the country. VOA also cited in its article the U.S.-based Brookings Institution report which advocates for a city-based strategy in Libya as a potential way forward and a renewed involvement of the U.S in Libya
Click here to read the article.
On 13 February 2019 Aska News published a report on the situation in Southern Libya, marked by the advances of forces loyal to Eastern-Libya based General Haftar. The article quoted analyst Claudia Gazzini from International Crisis Group, who stated that General Haftar’s advances in Southern Libya could become a « game changer » in the Libyan political process. For Gazzini, the latest developments have seen France more involved on the ground, through its strikes targeting rebel groups in Chad whereas Italy does not seem to have formulated a political strategy regarding Libya.
Click here to read the report.
On 11 February, Brookings Institution published a new report entitled « Empowered decentralization : a city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya ». Experts and researchers John R. Allen, Hady Amr, Daniel L. Byman, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jeffrey Feltman, Alice Friend, Jason Fritz, Adel Abdel Ghafar, Bruce Jones, Mara Karlin, Karim Mezran, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Federica Saini Fasanotti, Landry Signé, Arturo Varvelli, and Frederic Wehrey contributed to the report.
The group of experts articulate the reports around two key notions. First, they advocate for a renewed involvement of the United States of America in the Libyan crisis, arguing that the current situation on the ground presents an opportunity for Washington to make a substantial difference. They also highlight Libya’s key geographical position and insist on the fact that it should be considered by the US as an important interest.
Furthermore, the experts propose a new concept for the U.S approach in Libya, a bottom-up approach focusing on key cities in terms of politics, economy and security instead of the traditional top-down approach. The authors argue that a bottom-up strategy would be more coherent with Libyan issues and needs and believe that national-level institutions could emerge from the metropolitan entities, if the approach is successfully implemented. Their proposal for such a strategy is rooted in the observation that in Libya the international community has in general focused excessively upon the national political process at the expense of other issues and such an approach has thus far not been met with results. They write:
Significant economic, political, and security activity would then center on the country’s dozen to 15 major cities. Criteria would be established for how local entities could qualify for their fair-share allotment of oil revenues and international aid. An oversight board composed of Libyan technocrats and foreign experts would assess eligibility based on the actual behavior of the local actors. They would have the power to dock militias and other local actors a percentage of their monthly allocation of funds in the event of serious misbehavior such as abuse of human rights, interference with normal economic activity, theft, or violence.
Click here to read the full report.
On 11 February, Libyan National Army (LNA) Chief of Staff Abdurrazak al-Nathouri announced that dialogue was under way between the LNA and the 30th Brigade regarding the latter’s requirements to provide effective security in order to lift force majeure on the El Sharara oil field. The 30th Brigade is the Tuareg Petroleum Facilities Guard unit which currently guards Sharara and is aligned with Ali Kanna. Nathouri also said that the LNA had no intention of moving on al-Feel as the field is operating without security issues at present.
The security situation in the South is likely to remain extremely volatile in the short term. The positive implications of the LNA apparently taking control of Sharara could be a more secure and stable base for the restart of production from Sharara field, particularly given the LNA has stated it intends to allow the NOC to export the crude. However, this will depend on whether the NOC agrees to restart the field. Sanallah has already reiterated his stance this week that production will not restart until staff safety can be guaranteed. The negative implications are that with LNA units and nominally LNA-aligned local forces at Sharara, the oilfield will become a target for local forces who oppose the LNA’s presence in the region, destabilising the oilfield further and potentially putting infrastructure at risk.
In his latest article published with Middle East Eye on 10 February, Tom Wescott discusses shifts of alliances and strategies in Southern Libya to counter the advances of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in region. Wescott reports that indigenous Tebu and Tuareg tribes from Southern Libya are forging an alliance under the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to curb advances of forces loyal to eastern-Libya based General Haftar in the South. The threat posed by the advances of the LNA is pushing Tebu and Tuareg independent militias to move belong their long-standing divisions as they are military weak on their own but could defend their areas united. This shift in alliance is supervised by Ali Kanna, the new military commander for the south appointed by the GNA, who is a Tuareg. Wescott’s article provides an excellent and well-balanced overview of the historic context of Southern Libya and the alliances between local actors.
Click here to read the article.
On 10 February, Baria Alamuddin discussed in an article published with Arab News the threat posed by the terrorist organisation Daesh (IS) in Africa. Alamuddin notes that while some voices are proclaiming the end of Daesh following the defeats of the terrorist organisation in Iraq and Syria, segments of the organisation are progressively conquering terrorities across Africa. For Alamuddin :
Across a huge swath of the Sahel states — from Mali and Libya through Nigeria and Chad to Egypt, Somalia and Kenya — vast desert and rural regions are either in extremist hands or vulnerable to depredations by these groups.
For the journalist, Daesh groups in Africa are developing a strategy enriched by the Iraqi and Syrian experciences which is based on progressive state building, the integration of local people and avoiding international attention. Regarding Libya, Alamuddin notes that failure to address the crisis has allowed the terrorist group to disperse and take root across the country.
Click here to read the article.
On 7 February, François d’Alançon published with French newspaper La Croix an analysis of the operation launched by General Khalifa Haftar in Southern Libya and its potential impacts on the political and security situation in Libya. For d’Alançon, movements of the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated with General Haftar in Southern Libya are rekindling political and ethnic tensions in the country. D’Alançon highlights that the success of the operation would increase Haftar’s influence in Libya and open the door for a push of the LNA towards Western Libya and Tripoli and could put oil infrastructures at risk. The journalist notes that General Haftar’s operation has received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France, as well from Russia and Italy. Jalel Harchaoui, quoted in the article, explains that France has pushed General Haftar to launch the operation due to its involvement in Chad against rebel groups.
Click here to read the report.
On 7 February, media sources reported that the Libyan National Army (LNA) has taken control of El Sharara oilfield located in Southern Libya on 6 February. The oilfield has been closed since 8 December by groups of tribesmen, armed protesters and state guards demanding salary payments and development funds. Rreports suggest that they handed out the control of the site to the LNA without violence. Thus far, the National Oil Company and the Governement of National Accord (GNA) have not commented on the situation. Such a maneuver by the LNA is likely to raise concerns in Western Libya as to whether General Haftar is attempting to defy the authority of the GNA.
Click here to read the report.
Update 08/02: Following the initial reports that the LNA had seized El Sharara Oilfield, further reports on 7 February indicated that General Haftar’s armed forces took control of a substation of El Sharara Oilfield, but not the main field. Moreover, complementary reports suggest that LNA forces clashed with forces under the control of the newly-appointed commander of Sabha military zone Ali Kanna affiliated with the GNA.
The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) advance into south Libya, launched two weeks ago, has won support among a large swath of the population in the region. In Sebha, the LNA struck social agreements and tribal guarantees with various powerbrokers from the mix of Arab, Tuareg and Tebu tribes in the city. This ensured a peaceful handover of key locations and arms depots, previously controlled by Awlad Suliman and Tebu tribal fighters, to new commanders appointed by the LNA, under the Sebha Operations Room. However, there have been a flurry of media reports accusing the LNA of committing war crimes and violations against Tebu communities in the South. Some Tebu members of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the parallel eastern government resigned from their positions last week in response to the LNA campaign
The longer-term implications of the LNA’s operation remain unpredictable at present. On the positive side, the LNA’s operation has had some success in winning over a large segment of the Libyan population, including some formerly opposed to Haftar, in a manner akin to what happened after the LNA’s takeover of the Oil Crescent and resumption of exports from that region in September 2016. This is likely to be a major boost for GNA and LNA reconciliation, especially in terms of military and security unification. It could also improve security and stability in the South, helping to normalise oil production from this region. On the negative side, the LNA’s operation runs a serious risk of triggering an ethnic war between the South’s tribal components, primarily between the Arabs and the Tebu.
In an article published with Al-Monitor on 4 February, Jack Detsch reported that Libyan business man Hassan Tatanaki, has recently registered a new political party, the « Libyan United Democratic Party », to lobby the Donald Trump administration to get more involved in the efforts to address the Libyan crisis. According to the article, Tatanaki, who also serves as the chairman of the oilfield drilling company Challenger Limited, has ties to both the Gaddafi family and Eastern Libya based General Haftar and as such poses as an influential figure in Libyan affairs. For Detsch, Tatanaki’s lobbying efforts fit into a wider initiative to influence the United States to revise its Libyan strategy, at a time when there have been many voices criticizing the lack of results of the UN Special Mission to Libya headed by Special Envoy Ghassan Salame. For Jason Pack, founder of Libya-Analysis cited by Detsch,
Every top Libyan player, even obscure deputy ministers come to Washington. They somehow think that telling a low-level commerce official that Libya is open for business will trickle into policymaking.
Last week, reports indicated that Salame intended to postpone the organisation of a National Conference in Libya and consequently the organisation of elections as well. Detsch reports that in 2017, expenses related to lobbying for a greater US intervention in Libya amounted to $590,000. Among the lobbyists, General Haftar himself, who reportedly retained the services of Washington-based lobby Grassroots Political Consulting in 2017.
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On 31 January, a report from Arab News based on a Reuters news report indicated that the UN is likely to delay the organisation of the National Conference for Libya. The conference is a key tool of the UN’s roadmap for Libya as it aims at gathering Libyan factions to reach a consensus on Libyan issues prior to holding elections. Initially, the UN had planned for the conference to held in the first weeks of 2019, and elections in June 2019. Sources suggest that the UN will delay the organisation of the national meeting until there is more support within Libya for the event. However, the delay in the organisation of the National conference will cause delays in the organisation of actual elections in Libya as well. As a consequence, it is likely to aggravate the climate of critics and scepticism towards the UN in Libya. Over the past days, numerous voices rose to criticize the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé, who is blamed for failing to meet expectations since his appointment in 2017.
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On 28 January, analyst Leonid Isaev published an article with Riddle in which it analysed the position of Russia in Libya. For Isaev, there has been a marked evolution of the Russian policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the past year, characterized by Russia looking for alternatives to military means to mark its presence in this strategic geographical area. Isaev argues that Libya is a key priority for Moscow, because imposing itself among the actors of Libya’s post-crisis transition could grant Russia leverage over key international or regional players. According to Isaev, presence in Libya could ensure Russia dividends from cooperation with regional and international players. As an example, he demonstrates that Russia does not have immediate interests in Libya’s resources but is interested in being accounted for in Libya as such a position could grant it control over the access of other powers, such as France or Italy, to these resources.
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In an article published with Arab News on 26 January, Hafed Al-Ghwell discusses political stagnation in Libya and the role of the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). Al-Ghwell argues that despite being present in the country since 2011, the UN and its special mission have failed to bring Libya closer to complete its transition. The current Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame, who was appointed in 2017 amid hopes that he would be able to push forward solutions to the crisis, appears to repeat the usual UN modus operandi which the author characterizes as « piecemeal efforts ». For Al-Ghwell, the solutions pushed forward by the UN, and the international community, do not allow for significant progress. According to the author, one of the main issue is that the initiatives continue to target the same political elite who is responsible for the political deadlock.
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For The Arab Weekly, the ongoing conflict between France and Italy on the question of migration issues are most likely to complicate the lingering conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) zone, and most particularly in Libya. In an editorial published on 27 January, the newspaper notes that the feud between France and Italy reveals the deepening of the divide in Europe on the matter of migration. The article deplores the fact that while the subject has been taken hostage by politics, the reality of the human tragedy is not being addressed.
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In his latest article for The Arab Weekly published on 28 January, Karim Mezran, a resident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, raises concerns about the current initiatives implemented in Libya to move beyond the political deadlock and bring forward solutions to the security and economic crisis. For the author, the UN roadmap which focuses on the organisation of a National Conference and on a referendum on the constitution, remains too vague. Mezran rightly points out that there should not be elections without a constitution and that Libya is in need of a robust constitutional framework to allow for the development of functioning state institutions.
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Since 2014, General Haftar has imposed himself as Eastern Libya’s strongman through the military successes of his so-called Libyan National Army and has managed to gain political influence. As Libya prepares for elections, supported by the UN and the international community, it remains unclear how General Haftar is to fit within the political landscape. In an article published with Middle East Monitor (MEMO), Mustafa Fetouri questions General Haftar’s political ambitions and perspectives in the forecoming Libyan elections.
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On 24 January, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued an alert regarding the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Libya. HRW sought to draw attention on the situation of the former residents of the Libyan town of Tawergha, displaced by conflicts. An estimated 48,000 Tawerghans have been dispersed since 2011, according to HRW. HRW notes that persisting insecurity and lacks of of infrastructure make it impossible for Tawergha IDPs to return to Tawergha despite reconciliation agreements brokered by the Government of National Accord (GNA) with the support of the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL).
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On 21 January, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the Tripoli Protection Force (TPR) and the 7th Brigade (aka Kani militia) from Tarhouna following a series of clashes in southern Tripoli that began on 16 January, leaving at least 13 people dead and over 52 injured. The exact cause of the clashes remains unclear. The 7th Bridge have claimed that the clashes began after the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Interior Ministry (MoI), led by Fathi Bashaaga, handed over control of the defunct Tripoli International Airport (TIA) to them. In contrast, the Presidential Council’s Chairman of the Committee on Communication and Security Arrangements, Ramdan Zermuh, suggested the clashes were a result of the MoI handing over the TIA to the Department of Ports, with the 7th Brigade trying to take advantage of the handover to seize the airport. As for the TPF, they accuse Bashaaga of inciting tensions between Tripoli and Tarhouna in order to gain control over the TIA.
On 20 January, the GNA staged a visit to TIA in order to appease tensions and demonstrate the GNA’s control over the situation. Tensions over control over the TIA have been simmering between the Tripoli-based militias and Tarhouna-based forces since the groups brokered a ceasefire in September 2018. The Tarhouna-based forces maintain that the so-called “Tripoli cartel” militias, most of which have rebranded themselves as the Tripoli Protection Forces, retain leverage over state institutions for financial gain, despite efforts by the GNA’s MoI to reduce their influence in the city. Further clashes are likely. Indeed, while the 7th Brigade is unlikely to succeed in seizing territory in central Tripoli or driving out the Tripoli militias without significant external support, they could act as a catalyst for deeper divisions and conflict among Tripoli-based militias and political actors. Indeed, local sources say the situation remains extremely fragile and an outbreak of fresh conflict is to be expected. These developments are also complicating tensions within the GNA itself, accentuating the splits within the PC.
The controversy on the political and security rivalry between France and Italy over Libya has rekindled, following declarations made by Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi di Maio on 21 January. The Deputy Prime Minister has accused France of focusing solely on its energy interests in its approach to the Libyan crisis. Thus far, there has not been an official response from the French administration. According to Middle East Monitor report from 22 January, an article from the Tribune de Genève shed some light on the tensions between France and Italy and their impacts on the situation in Libya, denouncing a ‘real war for influence between France and Italy’. Anaysts argue that both European countries are pursuing their own agendas in Libya, with Italy focusing on the migration issue while France has chosen to focus its actions on the fight against terrorist groups.
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On 18 January, UN Special Envoy to Libya presented a comprehensive briefing to the UN Security Council, announcing that the UNSMIL is working on organising its National Conference for Libya within the coming weeks. During his briefing to the Security Council, Salamé insisted on the need for Libyan representatives to agree on “the essential ingredients for a new consensus on a national agenda” prior to the Conference. Ghassan Salamé also reportedly announced that the ceasefire brokered by the UN to put a halt to militia fighting in September 2018 was still in place, despite the recent fighting which took place in Southern Tripoli between the Seventh Brigade, a Tarhuna-based militia, and the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF), a coalition of militias aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA). According to the Libya Herald, fighting broke out between the militia coalitions due to issues of territory control, with the Seventh Brigade accusing the TPF of unauthorised movements on their positions. In respective statements, both coalitiond blamed the resumption of fighting on the GNA and the UNSMIL and their failed governance. According to Sami Zaptia for Libya Herald, the TPF went even further in its statement by declaring that it no longer recognized decisions by GNA head Fayez Al-Sarraj unless they were reached unanimously, as specified in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). For Zaptia, such a declaration from the TPF is an attempt to exploit the already existing divisions within the GNA Presidential Council (PC) and undermine the power of Fayez Al-Serraj.
On 15 January, a Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesman confirmed that an LNA operation to liberate southern Libya from “terrorist” groups is underway. He added that the operation was also intended to “ensure the public’s continued ability to maintain and control Libya’s oil and gas sector”. The spokesman advised civilians to avoid known militant bases, such as Sebha, and urged local hospitals to declare states of emergencies. LNA forces are reportedly grouping at Tamanhint Airbase in Sebha in advance of operations in the border regions with Chad, Niger and Sudan.
The LNA mobilisation to the southern region is being implemented on a much greater scale than previous times where the LNA has said it will undertake operations to remove militant and extremist groups from the region. A large armed campaign to remove these groups appears imminent. Haftar has previously met with regional leaders and discussed border security, as well as the security vacuum in the southern regions. The reported coordination with Chadian forces indicates that the LNA is making its greatest effort yet in the south in order to ensure Haftar’s image as the main military and security guarantor for Libya and its neighbours. Securing Sharara oil field is also likely to be a key strategic aim of this operation.
The implementation of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) “Security Plan 2019-One” is set to occurring within a matter of days. Led by GNA Minister of Interior Fathi Bashaaga, the initiative is set to bring the broader Tripoli area under the supervision of the Central Security Agency and Security Directorate. The initiative will see the multiple security forces united under a singular Security Room that will include the General Intelligence Service, Ministry of Public Investigation, and the military police. Bashaaga aims to address the incoherent, decentralised administrative and operational structure of city’s security forces, as well as unravel overlapping operational mandates of the multiple local militias and armed groups. It is worth noting that on 8 January, Bashaga confirmed the main funding for local armed groups acting under the Government of National Accord is from the state budget. Administrative and top down political efforts to implement the long-promised security sector reforms continue, yet it is unclear if they will change the security instability in Tripoli. On 16 January, new clashes broke in the Qasr Bin Gashir district of the city, opposing the Seventh Infantry Brigade to the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF). Initial reports indicate that at least one person was killed, and 17 were wounded. Until reforms are applied, lapses in security measures, through a lack of coordination or neglect, will leave key infrastructure and civilians vulnerable to terrorist attacks and see increasing lawlessness in the capital. As the Tripoli-based militias continue to resist the reforms, actively circumventing its implementation, militia groups on the fringes of the city, such as the Kani militia, will continue to agitate for their expulsion and may move on the city (as they did in August and September last year) to facilitate this.
On 9 January, a film documentary was released on DW on the men working in Benghazi to clean the city from the hundreds of mines planted by ISIS during its occupation of the city. Libyan journalist and cameraman Osama Al-Fitori accompanied the mine clearers going about their dangerous work for two years, documenting how the men searched for, found and neutralized explosives without metal detectors and wearing no protective clothing. The documentary insightfully portrays the challenges by ordinary citizens in Benghazi as they try to reclaim the city territory.
Click here to watch the documentary.
On 7 January, Middle East Institute published a preview of key challenges and issues at stake in the Middle East in the coming year. Researcher Jonathan M.Winer reviews the upcoming challenges for Libya in 2019, forecasting that the new year is likely to test whether Libya will be able to transition from its limited institutions to a more stable form of government. As early as March, there will be concrete markers, such as the UN-sponsored National Conference, indicating whether the long-awaited transition is likely to start.
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In an article published with Middle East Institute on 4 January 2019, researcher Emadeddin Badi reviewed the recent events which took place in Tripoli regarding security. On 18 December, Tripoli’s four main armed groups, namely the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade (TRB); Abu Salim’s Special Deterrence Force; the Nawasi Battalion; and the Bab Tajoura Brigade announced the formation of the Tripoli Protection Force. For the author,
the announcement of the new joint Tripoli Protection Force not only epitomizes the exploitative behavior of armed groups in Libya but also the challenges facing both UNSMIL and the GNA’s new minister of interior.
For Badi, such an organisation could compromise the UNSMIL-brokered ceasefire and the implementation of long-term, efficient security arrangements, as militia continue to hold control over the capital city.
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An article by Arab News published on 27 December highlighted the tensions surrounding olive oil production in Libya. Libyan authorites have decided to halt exports of the “green gold” since 2017, and it remains unclear when exports are to resume. Libya is the 11th largest olive producer in the world, growing around 150 000 tons of the crop annually, but only 20% is turned into oil.
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On 25 December, four ISIS fighters undertook a suicide attack on Libya’s foreign ministry in Tripoli, killing three people and wounding at least 21 more. The assault began when a white Hyundai sedan exploded outside the ministry’s back gate, killing the driver. Two attackers died when they detonated their suicide vests on the building’s second floor while another was shot dead by security guards. ISIS’s Amaq website claimed responsibility for the attack on 26 December.
The three victims have been identified as: Abdulrahman Mazoughi, the spokesperson for the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade; Ibrahim Sheiby, director of the ministry’s Islamic Affairs Department; and Hend Arnaouti, a ministry employee.
Despite national and international efforts, tensions resulting from the lingering presence of the terrorist organisation persist in Libya. For analysts, the internal chaos in Libya creates the environment for terrorist organisations to strive.
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On 18 December, four of the key militias in Tripoli announced that they had merged into a new group dubbed the “Tripoli Protection Force” (TPF). This new militia force is composed of: The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), Abu Salim Deterrence and Rapid Intervention Force, the Nawasi militia (8th Force), and the Bab Tajura Brigade. In the statement, the TPF stated that they had formed in response to military movements in the western region and rejected the use of power for political gains. The statement also supported efforts by UNSMIL and its envoy Ghassan Salame, adding that it endorsed the Libyan National Conference in January. The creation of the TPF appears to be an effort by the Tripoli-based militias to rebrand and insert themselves into the new security arrangements of the GNA, thwarting the attempts by the Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha to increase the involvement and influence of Misratan and Zintan forces.
The statement announcing the TPF establishment was released by the TRB; however, it did not contain the usual signatures or stamps of approval by any of the brigades, bringing into question how unanimous or genuine the decision is within and amongst militia group members to establish this new “force”. Moreover, the initiative seems to be led by the TRB leader Haithem Tajouri, who upon his return to Libya following the clashes in August and September of this year, has been actively removing dissidence within the ranks of his own forces (through a series of assassinations) and attempting to position himself in the new security arrangements. It is worth noting that the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) are not members of this new force. The creation of the TPF appears to be an effort by the Tripoli-based militias to rebrand and insert themselves into the new security arrangements of the GNA, thwarting the attempts by the Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha to increase the involvement and influence of Misratan and Zintan forces.
Drawing on the France 24 report published in early December entitled ‘Tripoli : on the brink of stability’, France 24 hosted on 19 December a debate on the Libyan crisis. James Andre, France 24 reporter, Céline Bardet, international Human Rights Lawyer and Jalel Harchaoui, Researcher from University Paris VIII participated in the debate, which focused on Europe’s role in Libya.
For Céline Bardet, the international community did not understand how Libya functioned and tried to implement models which did not correspond, pushing for example for a centralized state model which does not match Libya’s tribal structure.
Click here to watch the debate.
On 19 December, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi published for Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) in co-production with Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) and Conflict Armament Research a very interesting report on Southern Libya. Entitled ‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’, the report builds on ‘Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle’, written by the same authors and published by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research in June 2017 (Tubiana and Gramizzi, 2017). The report explores the issue of lawlessness in Southern Libya and provides an analysis of the different groups evolving in this area and their strategies. It is based on field research carried out in Niger in February–March 2017 and April 2018, as well as interviews conducted in Chad in May–June 2017 and January 2018, and in Europe in 2017–18.
The relevance of the report is high given the increasing tensions and violence in Southern Libya and the difficulty to understand the motives of the different actors and the issues at stake in the area. For the authors, Southern Libya is characterized by its ‘lawlessness’ and the presence of ‘autonomous, yet fragmented ethnic militias in control of southern Libya’s border’. The strategic nature of the area then ‘prompts northern Libyan forces as well as the governments of neighboring and European states to pursue alliances with them’, analyse Tubiana and Gramizzi. Among their main findings, the authors note that :
By pressuring Niger to criminalize migrant smuggling and block migrants in or on their way to southern Libya, European states have contributed to a series of destabilizing dynamics. Specifically, their policies have:
- aggravated risks for migrants, as trafficking is now concentrated among fewer, more abusive actors, especially in Libya, where migrants from West Africa and elsewhere are systematically kidnapped for ransom, or forced into debt bondage, labour, or prostitution;
- caused migrant smugglers to ply more treacherous routes or engage in more dangerous activities, such as drug trafficking, jihadism, and insurgency;
- fuelled corruption among Nigerien forces and exacerbated tensions between Niger’s government and its northern communities, which are largely dependent on migrant smuggling for their livelihoods; and empowered Libyan and Sudanese militias.
The authors develop their argument in four sections. First, the authors build the profile of the Tubu militias, situating the Tubu within the broader international political context as well as in Libya’s complex politics and history. Then, the authors focus on Libya’s southern neighbors and the strategies they have developed in the area. Drawing on, they provide an analysis of the strategic area of the Agadez-Fezzan corridor, the route between the Sahel and Libya and a place of important illegal trade and migration. Lastly, the fourth section presents data and analysis of regional weapons flows to support some of the findings discussed in the previous sections.
Click here to read the report.
Armed violence against civilians and rivals is rapidly rising in the eastern region. The security environment in Benghazi particularly is gradually worsening as lawlessness expands and local authorities are increasingly unable to enforce law and order or control legitimate force instruments. The incident and temporary closure of Tubruq port also demonstrates that this lawlessness is starting to impact other cities in the region. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and parallel government is trying to take decisive measures to address this issue. On 16 December, the Minister of Interior in the parallel government, Ibrahim Bushnaf, led a large shakeup of security architecture in the eastern region, replacing the local Security Directorate chiefs in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, al-Marj, Sulug Geminis and Awjla al-Jkherra. Bushnaf also replaced the heads of the Border Security Directorate, Interpol Coordination office and the General Administrator of the Ministry. The increasing insecurity in the East is being driven in part by a perception that the nexus of authority and credibility created over the last few years between LNA head Khalifa Haftar, the House of Representatives (HoR) and the parallel Eastern government, is weakening. The political bodies are losing legitimacy and international clout, while Haftar’s domestic legitimacy seems to be diminishing as his international influence increases. The LNA seems increasingly unable to control the behaviour of its own fighters, as exemplified by the video* threatening Misrata.
*The video is visible on Twitter, posted around 15 December.
On 16 December, Gulf Times reported about a session of the Doha Forum held on 15 December during which was debated the role of the European Union in the Middle East and North Africa area. at the Doha Forum. The session entitled « « Polarisation in the Middle East and North Africa: What is the European role? » gathered Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office & Minister of State at the Department for International Development, H.E. Sigmar Gabriel, Member of the Bundestag (Parliament), Former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E Dr. Mutlaq Al-Qahtani, Special Envoy of the Foreign Minister of the State of Qatar for Counter terrorism and Mediation of Conflict Resolution, Ibrahim Kalin, Special adviser to President Erdogan and the Presidential Spokesperson and Julien Barnes-Dacey (moderator), Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations . according to the report, the opinion conveyed by panellists was that the European Union was not doing enough in these geographical areas. Most particularly, H.E Dr. Mutlaq Al-Qahtani criticized the volatile position of the European Union in the Middle East and North Africa, which varied from one situation to another according to its interests. He also added that the EU could not evade its responsibilities on the issues of migration, refugees and armed conflicts in the Middle East.
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On 17 December, Anna Borshchevskaya, Ben Fishman, and Barbara A. Leaf published an article with The Washington Institute. The authors analyse the results of the Palermo Conference held in November 2018, an Italian initiative which aimed at gathering Libyan and international actors to push forward a solution to the persisting crisis in Libya. The authors argue that while the conference produced some positive outcomes, a US involvement would be required for a genuine breakthrough. In the absence of US leadership, the authors also highlight the emergence of Russia as partner for Libya. For the authors,
Now is the time for Washington to reengage—UNSMIL’s efforts are gaining momentum, and only the United States can give the mission the political space required to advance the next stages of Libya’s long-overdue transition.
On that matter, recent reports suggest that plans could be underway for the return of a US diplomatic mission to Libya.
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