Africa | Libya Analysis

Apr
2019

GNA calls France out

In an interview for Radio France Internationale (RFI), Mohamed Ejrah comments on the critics made by the Government of National Accord (GNA) regarding the alleged support provided by France to General Khalifa Haftar. On 18 April, France denied the accusations, however for Ejrah, its support to General Haftar is evident and can be traced back to 2015. Ejrah analysis that by putting France on the spotlight, the GNA is attempting to gain an ally in Paris.

Click here to listen to the interview.

Apr
2019

Europe’s coalition on Libya

In his latest article with The European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR), Tarek Megerisi shares his analysis of the situation in Libya three weeks after the launch by General Haftar of his offensive on Tripoli and advocates for European member states to take a lead to find a solution to the crisis. If internal tensions continue to prevent the Europeans to formulate coherent policy for Libya, Megerisi analyse they risk becoming mere observers as the conflict escalates.

Prospects may look grim for either side’s ability to achieve a resounding victory, but that has not dampened anyone’s enthusiasm for a fight. Both sides still have forces in reserve, both feel existentially driven to continue the struggle, and both have friends abroad that are willing to help them continue. […] Unfortunately, the longer this civil war continues, the more it will destabilise the region. The morass of militias from Sudan and Chad that exploit Libya’s lawlessness to enrich themselves pose an increasing threat to the stability of their home countries. Meanwhile, the chaos of civil war allows extremist groups like the Islamic State group (ISIS) to return to the offensive. Finally, Europe’s own migration demons risk returning as space opens up for new smuggling gangs, and as the financial strain of prolonged warfare makes restarting Libya’s human conveyor belt an increasingly enticing enterprise.

Click here to read the full article.

Apr
2019

Short-term concerns by the international community in Libya lead to failure

In an article published with Arab Tyrant Manual on 17 April, Nadine Dahan and Ahmed Gatnash argue that what transpires from the latest crisis in Libya is that the international community has failed Libya. They identify that the international community chose to focus on short-term concerns about migration and counter-terrorism when dealing with Libya.

Click here to read the full article.

Apr
2019

Who sells weapons to Libya?

In an article published with Open Democracy on 18 April Paul Rogers denounces the alleged profit made by Western arm dealers out of the conflict in Libya. Rogers affirms that Western arm dealers have repeated in Libya their strategies of equipping with weapons opposing sides of a conflict and profiting off the fighting.

Click here to read the article.

Apr
2019

Analysis of Libya’s 2019 Municipal Elections – part 2

On 18 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections in Libya.

In Al-Khoms, the CCMCE decided to postpone the organisation of the municipal elections until further notice. No explanations were given.

The third round of municipal elections is to be held on 20 April. Below, the list of cities concerned by the deadline:

No	Municipality	البلدية	Region	Polling day
1	Brak Al Shati	براك الشاطي	South	20.04.2019
2	Al Gurda Al Shati	القرضة الشاطي	South	20.04.2019
3	Idri Al Shati	ادري الشاطي	South	20.04.2019
4	Ubari	اوباري	South	20.04.2019
5	Sbarata	صبراته	West	20.04.2019
6	Surman	صرمان	West	20.04.2019
7	Zoltin	زلطن	West	20.04.2019
8	Al Shuwayref	الشويرف	West	20.04.2019
9	Al Rehibat	الرحيبات	Nafosa mountain	20.04.2019

Dr Otman Gajiji also worked on the results of mayor elections, which took place on 16 April:

No	Municipality	البلدية	Mayor name	اسم العميد
1	Zowara	زوارة	–	–
2	Batin Al Jabal	باطن الجبل	–	–
3	Al Kalaa	القلعة	Walid Grada	وليد ابراهيم ساسي قرادة
4	Nalut	نالوت	Abdul Wahab Salem	–
5	Nisma	نسمة	–	–
6	Ghadames	غدامس	Kasem Manaa	قاسم المانع
7	Al Hawamed	الحوامد	Salah Masoud	صلاح امحمد مدلل مسعود

Regarding Sabha, the municipal elections will be held on 27 April. The CCMCE has set the limit on campaign spending to LD55K per list and LD27.5K for injured and women seats. The formula is based of the population of the city.

Apr
2019

On 16 April, Tim Eaton published with Chatham House a very interesting and well-articulated article investigating the economic model supporting General Haftar’s Libyan National army (LNA). His demonstration suggests that the financial matter could be decisive in the fight for Tripoli between the LNA and forces aligned with the Government of National Army (GNA). For Eaton, persisting fighting between could cause significant damages to the economy of Eastern Libya and undermine the funding model of LNA operations. Eaton highlights how securing the necessary financial resources for LNA operations has been key to Haftar’s military successes in Libya, as Eastern Libya has limited access to resources, compared to Western Libyan armed forces due to the presence of Libya’s main financial institution in Tripoli. Describing the economic model of Eastern Libya, Eaton also demonstrate the extent to which Eastern Libya depends on external support and the devastating economic consequences protracted fighting could potentially have on the population.

Mohamed Eljarh also contributed to the article.

Click here to read the article in full.

Apr
2019

Stalemate between armed actors on the ground

In Tripoli, the situation on the ground has reached a stalemate. Neither the Libyan National Army (LNA) nor anti-LNA forces have lost or gained any significant ground since last week’s reporting. Territorial control seemed to alternate continuously between LNA and anti-LNA forces. For example, on 14 April, Government of National Accord (GNA) forces managed to push LNA units further south of Tripoli retaking the Azizziyah and Qasr Ben Ghashir areas. However, by the following day (15 April), the LNA reclaimed the territory it lost. Overall, the number of armed clashes on the ground has decreased, though the operational tempo of aerial attacks has increased. The main areas of clashes are:

Ain Zara and Wadi al-Rabie: control of areas leading to Ain Zara fluctuates between GNA and LNA forces. On 15 April, reports suggested clashes broke out in the al-Sabea area of Ain Zara. Other reports suggested LNA forces took control of Salem Bashir, providing them routes linking al-Khliat to Ain Zara.
Al-Swani area: On 14 April, sources reported heavy armed clashes broke out in the area, but it remained unverified at the time of reporting.
Al-Khliat/Yarmouk: On 15 April, clashes continued in the al-Khalit area and in and around Yarmouk Military Camp. Reports suggested LNA forces advanced further along Airport road.
Qasr Bin Ghashir: Control of the area remained contested.
Tripoli International Airport (TIA)/TIA Bridge: Control over the non-functioning Tripoli airport alternated between LNA forces and GNA forces over the last week. At the time of writing sources indicated LNA had control over the airport.

Currently, the LNA has military forces in a number of western region towns including Tarhouna (45 km southeast of Tripoli) and Ghariyan (70km south of Tripoli). There is a serious risk of an escalation of clashes and violence in both towns in the near future as Government of National Accord (GNA) allied forces prepares for a counter-offensive to take back these towns.

The LNA continues to have control of the so-called “Three Bridges” – comprising: the TIA bridge, al-Swani bridge and Qasr Bin Ghashir bridge. However, control over the al-Swani bridge remains contested. The 3 bridges are critical choke points for the LNA’s assault. LNA control over them would secure their supply lines and allow them to push deeper into the city.

The stalemate suggests that a longer-term entrenchment and siege of the city is likely. Possible scenarios in the short-term include:

A solution is reached through political negotiations, which appears unlikely (see below);
The LNA is able to significantly bolster its reinforcements from the East. Reports suggest some forces have been re-deployed to the south of Tripoli. However, potential threats emerging in the South, closer to Benghazi and around the Oil Crescent could impact LNA operations in Tripoli and require its forces to be deployed to these regions instead;
Increased foreign support for either faction, which is unlikely in the immediate future. However, aerial support from the UAE and/or Egypt in support of the LNA is a possibility in the near to medium term.

The UN says over 9,500 people have been displaced by the fighting so far and over 50 people killed. Clashes and fighting continue in the south of Tripoli, with some sites changing hands several times. Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces have captured up to 200 Libyan National Army (LNA) fighters since the fighting began last week.

This arrest warrant by the LNA is pure provocation and indicates that the LNA is ramping up its narrative against the GNA and militias in Tripoli. The fact they have included the GNA leadership along with more hardline militia and jihadi leaders, as well as key GNA-aligned militia leaders such as Juwaili, highlights they are using the fact that UN-sanctioned hardliners such as Badi have joined the fight against the LNA to undermine the GNA. It is also likely a tactic to leave the door open to the militia leaders who are NOT mentioned, indicating the LNA would be willing to strike a deal with them. While this arrest warrant can’t be enforced by the LNA at present, it clearly stakes out the LNA’s political position and means that the chances of a negotiated solution to the current crisis, even a temporary ceasefire, looks increasing unlikely as polarisation increases on all sides.

In addition, there are reports of an LNA airstrike today against the Abd al-Samad military camp in southern Zuwara. It is unclear what the impact of the strike was. The Amazigh in Zuwara have so far remained out of the conflict, other than establishing sand barriers on the coastal road between Zuwara and Sabratha to prevent the LNA from moving on the town. However, Zuwara is located near to the LNA’s Watiya airbase and is the gate to the Tunisian border. This may be an attempt by the LNA to extend its supply lines west or ensure that an operation against Watiya cannot be launched from Zuwara. Zuwara port does not appear to have been impacted by the strike, but this move could pull Zuwaran forces into the fight against the LNA, making Zuwara more unstable.

Apr
2019

Fighting in Libya reignites tensions within European Union

On 11 April, the High Representative Federica Mogherini issued a statement on behalf of the European Union (EU) calling for an immediate ceasefire in Tripoli and the withdrawal of troops by the Libyan National Army (LNA) from the capital city. Fighting continued in Southern Tripoli all throughout the past week, resulting in dozens of casualties as well as the displacements of Tripoli residents. International media reports indicated that the drafting of the EU statement reignited tensions within European state members. Some state members, among which Italy, accused France of attempting to block the EU statement from calling on General Haftar to halt his affiliated forces. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini declared that Italy would not let international actors halt peace initiatives for Libya. French diplomatic representatives responded to the critics saying that France had not attempted to block he statement but had demanded some modifications to include the situation of migrants, he involvement in the fighting of certain groups and individuals under UN sanctions due to terrorist activities, and lastly, the need to find a political solution under UN authority in accordance with previous commitments.

Apr
2019

Instability in Libya to set the ground for IS breakthrough

In his latest publication with Voice of America published on 10 April, Rikar Hussein analyses how the renewed tensions in Libya could set the ground for a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) in Libya. Contributing to the article, Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack explains that overt the course of the past two years, the terrorist organization has had time to reorganize itself. For him,

IS and jihadism in Libya are now on the verge of making a huge breakthrough, just like they did in 2012-2015 after killing (U.S.) Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, and then jihadism flourished in many outlets in Libya.

The group is most likely to exploit Libya’s political vacuum and push further its war of attrition to prevent any future progress in Libyan state-building, Pack notes. As a matter of fact, just a few days after the re ignition of tensions in the Tripoli area between forces affiliated with Eastern Libyan General Haftar and forces, IS claimed an attack in Southern Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Apr
2019

Analysis of voter participation in Libya’s 2019 Municipal Elections

On 11 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections which took place in Libya at the end of March of this year. These elections were highly expected in Libya due to their importance as they constitute a step towards the restoration of the state’s legitimacy.

The second Libyan municipal elections started early this year. On 30^th Mar 2019 the first round of municipal elections concerned 9 municipalities. The preliminary results were later published by the Central Committee for Municipal Elections (CCMCE) . Voter registration was opened for all municipalities to allow for more voters to register and voters who had registered for the first round which took place in 2013-2016 did not need to register again. The second round took place on 6th April and concerned a group of 7 municipalities located in Western Libya. The preliminary participation rates were also later published by CCMCE.

The security situation in the western and southern regions was taken into consideration given the recent turn of events in Western Libya. CCMCE postponed Kikla elections (on the Nafusa mountain) before voting day, and both Al Asabia and South Zawia were stopped on the polling day.

The attached tables show voter and candidate registration for some municipalities. The last table of participation rates in this election also includes a comparison of participation with the first round of elections in 2014.

Municipal Elections Libya 2019

Apr
2019

Khalifa Haftar’s Miscalculated Attack on Tripoli Will Cost Him Dearly

In an well-articulated article published on 10 April with Foreign Policy, Libya-Analysis Founder Jason Pack and Libya-Analysis affiliated researcher Matthew Sinkez argue that General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli is likely to backfire and cost him his reputation and international backers. For the authors, Haftar’s decisions to attack Tripoli was rooted in delusions of grandeur and megalomania induced by his recent victories in Southern Libya and fuelled by the support he received from some actors of the international community. For Pack and Sinkez, Haftar, who was positioned as Libya’s dominant political force, is now at risk of alienating such supports as the recent events make him look like an aggressor or blockader. They point out:

Haftar’s stock rises—domestically and internationally—only when he is seen as a conciliator who is defending and unblocking oil fields, not when he is seen as an aggressor or blockader

Click here to read the full article.

Apr
2019

Libya’s present divisions can be overcome

On 8 April, Managing-editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith discussed the recent turns of events in Libya with France 24, highlighting the volatility and uncertainty of the situation in Libya since the launch of the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli by General Haftar. Smith gave a detailed account of the situation and outlined potential outcomes. She argues that in the immediate/short-term, a political solution is unlikely to be agreed upon and that LNA forces are unlikely to retreat from the Tripoli area. Drawing on the role of the international community in the resolution of the crisis, Smith insists on the importance for Libyans to formulate their own political solutions, with the support of the international community. For Smith, the present divisions in Libya are divisions that can be overcome.

Click here to watch the interview.

Apr
2019

Jason Pack on Chilean newspaper La Tercera

Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack contributed to an article by Alejandro Tapia published with Chilean newspaper La Tercera on 8 April. Pack comments on the tensions in Tripoli, noting that General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli highlights his disdain for the diplomatic initiatives that had been pushed forwards over the course of the past months by national, regional and international actors. However, for Pack, what General Haftar has engaged in is truly a media war, knowing that betting on the military solution to imposer himself as Libya’s strongman would not necessarily lead to success. More importantly, this solution could backfire.

Click here to read the article in Spanish.

Apr
2019

Salame postpones National Conference, Germany calls for UNSC consultations

On 9 April, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame said in a statement that he is postponing the National Conference that was due to take place on 14- 16 April. In addition, Germany has reportedly called for a UN Security Council briefing on Libya (UNSC), to take this afternoon. Salame will brief the UNSC members at this meeting on the situation in Libya. Salame concluded his lengthy statement saying:

I therefore reiterate that I am more determined than ever to hold the National Conference at the earliest possible opportunity, as we cannot allow the historic opportunity it presents to be lost. We also cannot ask Libyans to attend a Conference to the backdrop of artillery shelling and air raids as we must ensure that all of those who expressed willingness to respond to this historic and national event from all over the country are able to attend and are able to voice their opinions freely. I will work, to the fullest possible extent, to enable the Libyan National Conference to take place as soon as possible, once the conditions to enable it to be held are re-established. I will work day and night to put an end to the current military escalation, ensure that reason and national interest once again supersede force and mend the external differences to enable the resolution of the crisis in Libya.

Postponing the conference is not unexpected given the circumstances, but nevertheless reiterates that the UN and internationals have so far not had enough to leverage to even enforce a humanitarian ceasefire, let alone a return to dialogue. Salame remains in Tripoli but some UN staff have been evacuated to Tunis. Salame’s efforts will likely now be focused on finding at least a temporary halt to the fighting in Tripoli. Russia is likely to veto any UNSC movement to directly criticise Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar, so it is unclear how much pressure the UN will be able to apply to end the violence.

Apr
2019

In an op-ed published with the New-York Times on 5 April, Frederic Wehrey and Jeffrey Feltman call for the Trump administration to intervene in Libya to prevent further escalation of the ongoing tensions. Drawing on the offensive launched by General Haftar and his affiliated forces on Tripoli, Wehrey and Feltman demand that the United States take a stand against General Haftar and his political and military ambitions, arguing that the strongman does not serve American interest in the area and that he poses a threat to national and regional stability. For the two authors, the United States stand as a key international actor who could broker a deal between Libyan factions while other international actors have failed to do so. They note:

In our conversations over the years, it is clear that the United States still retains credibility in Libya as a relatively honest broker, especially when compared with the Europeans and Arabs pursuing competing and narrow interests.

Click here to read the article.

Apr
2019

General Haftar’s parade before the National Conference

In an article published on 8 April, Al Jazeera reported that military forces affiliated to the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) will launch a counteroffensive against the forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) headed by General Khalifa Haftar. The aim of the counteroffensive will be to reclaim all areas seized by the LNA around Tripoli. Fighting in Southern Tripoli between the LNA and Tripoli-based military forces begun on 4 April and has led thus far to 11 deaths and 23 wounded, according to the GNA Health Ministry. As a result of the ongoing tensions, the US military proceeded on 7 April to a temporary withdrawal of its forces from Libya. For Jason Pack, interviewed by Al Jazeera, Haftar’s intention is not to overtake Tripoli by force but to make a statement before the UN-led National Conference which will take place on 14-16 April. The National Conference could be a turning point of the Libyan crisis. Pack argues that the international community and the UN have a plan which will be unravelled at the National Conference. However, he warns about dissension and hidden agenda within international ranks. Most particularly, he denounces the attitude of France, who officially supports the UN-led initiative but has also provided support to Haftar and the LNA.

Click here to read the article.

Apr
2019

Haftar’s attempt at creating an alternative narrative

In an article published with Al-Monitor on 6 April, Jason Pack analyses General Haftar’s backstory, highlighting the steps which led to his decision to march on Tripoli. He notes :

What Hifter appears to be trying to do is create a popular groundswell of support for him as “Libya’s savior” and an alternative to the UN-backed political process.

Click here to read the analysis in full.

Apr
2019

Rhiannon Smith on VOA ‘Africa News Tonight’

On 5 April, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith discussed with Mohamme Elshinnawi of Voice of America the push of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) towards Tripoli, the Libyan capital, and the potential outcomes of such an operation. For Smith, ‘Libya is holding its breath to see what is going to happen next’. She notes that Haftar’s move was unexpected, as the country was preparing for the UN-led National Conference following high level meetings between Haftar and the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA). For Smith, while the operation is labelled an operation designed to fight against terrorism, it could be understood as a power play to impose Haftar and his affiliated forces to impose himself as a major player in Libya. According to Smith, it remains unclear so far whether the LNA will attempt to take Tripoli by force as it could be too risky. For Smith, the current situation can be understood as a result of the initiatives from the international community to engage with Haftar and include him in the political dialogue. Therefore, Smith questions what the international community’s response will be if Haftar breaches the terms of the UN-led agreement which opposed military actions as a solution. Their response could either Haftar’s attempts to seize power or reveal the limit of the international community’s power.

Click here to listen to the interview.

Apr
2019

Libya holds its breath as General Haftar advances towards Tripoli

Libya has been holding its breath since 4 April in fear of a new war which could engulf Tripoli and which could scupper prospects of a peace agreement that was supposed to be formalized at an upcoming National Conference only ten days from now. While the UN Secretary General was in Tripoli on 4 April giving a press conference to support Libyans in making the conference happen, Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar was declaring the beginning of ‘operation Tripoli’ in a highly emotive statement. Haftar’s statement came after LNA mobile forces moved from southern Libya to Ghariyan, a town south of Tripoli, earlier in the week and yesterday declared they had peacefully taken the town and had been welcomed by the residents.

In response, Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj put GNA forces on high alert, authorising airstrikes and the use of military force to defend citizens and critical facilities from terrorist groups, criminal gangs and those operating ‘outside legitimacy.’ Zintan’s Osama Juwaili, commander of the Presidency Council’s (PC) western military zone, spent the day in Misrata with Mohamed Haddad, commander of the central military zone, to oversee the action. Misrata, according to informed sources has taken a social decision to enter the war fully against Haftar as a city and a large force has already started to roll down to Tripoli. Fayez reportedly refused SRSG Ghassan Salame’s request for mediation with Haftar after his ‘treachery’. GNA Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha, after taking some time to denounce the international community for ‘betrayal’, issued strict orders to all security and police authorities to discipline any collaborators with the eastern parallel government.

Misrata, Zintan and all the key Tripoli brigades (except Rada) appear to be in active coordination to mobilize and deploy forces to secure the capital and western region. On 4 April, some LNA units based west of Tripoli briefly reached the 27km checkpoint on the coastal highway west of Tripoli, before it was retaken by fighters from Janzour and Zawiyya fighters. On 4 April, members of the international community, the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany and interestingly the UA, addressed the situation with a joint statement. Also interestingly Egypt issued its own statement calling all sides to ceasefire and maximum restraint. On 5 April, the UNSC had an extraordinary meeting on Libya.

The reality of the situation remains very volatile and opaque at present, with Tripoli residents, Libyan actors and international actors waiting to see what will happen next. The timing of the LNA moves has taken many people by surprise given the National Conference is only days away. While the LNA has been significantly ramping up its rhetoric of military power projection in western Libya in recent days and has been moving forces around in the Jufra area, it lacks the capacity to be able to launch a full scale military assault on Tripoli. It would likely lose a great deal of its recently gained legitimacy and support in the western region if it were to do so unless it has deals and understandings in place with local actors. As a result, the assumption has been that the LNA has been ramping up its intimidation techniques in order to increases its political leverage and force more local groups into capitulating, rather than as a precursor for a serious attempt to take the capital by force. This assumption now appears it could be misplaced.

Some communities supporting the LNA are elated, with high expectations of a quick victory and easy handover and/or sure escape of militias from the capital or defection of their leaders. High expectations have built up over time due to a semi-successful operation in South Libya, comforting rhetoric of peaceful bloodless entry and swift decisive victory, as well as a publicly perceived international ‘green-light’ for Haftar to enter Tripoli (the UAE agreement between Haftar and Serraj that is supposed to form the basis of the upcoming UN conference).

On the opposite side, there is a large segment of the population which has been divided and fragmented for years now, but lately has been openly in fear of the recent groundswell of social support for Haftar and the LNA. It seems that yesterday’s open threat, and the state of fear and panic it triggered, was the trigger to unify these western factions in a real way for the first time in many years.

So Libya is now at the precipice of its third civil war in 8 years, a rude awakening that is engulfing much of the population as we speak. The country is currently psychologically split between a population that supports the LNA expecting Tripoli to fall quickly and without much blood, prepared for a full ‘military’ solution to Libyan politics… and another population mostly in the western region, that is now vehemently opposed to any kind of peace deal with Haftar and the LNA, and see no other choice than to support Fayez Serraj’s leadership as Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army and fall in under the military region commanders he appointed.

We don’t know so far what the developments of the last two days mean for the UN’s upcoming National Conference plan. Will the UNSC sanction only one party, Haftar, thereby scuppering the conference? Will the UNSC throw its weight fully behind the GNA and Serraj’s leadership openly supporting one Libyan party over another in the conflict? This would mean that the UNSC would be unanimous in ultimately outlawing Haftar, delegitimizing the entire institutional apparatus of the LNA and its social support base. Would this help the reconciliation and reunification of Libya or add more fuel to the fire? Will the UNSC only issue a standard statement demanding ‘all’ sides deescalate but leave the matter as is without any real interventions? Wouldn’t this be deemed as more ‘green-light’ for Haftar to continue and conflict to proceed? Or will the UNSC be concretely split this time over which direction to take on Libya or which government to legitimize? Can the National Conference still happen, potentially if the LNA’s campaign demobilize and retreat thereby levelling the playing field and setting the groundwork for a more stable agreement? Is retreat an option for the LNA and what are the possible consequences of retreat? Can the LNA win by military blitzkrieg in coordination with cells inside Tripoli and control the city? At present, there are far more questions than answers, and so many different permutations of how the situation could develop that trying to predict the most likely outcome at this point feels like an exercise in futility.

Apr
2019

‘Pushing the limits without going beyond them’

Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was interviewed on 4 March by Al Jazeera and commented the advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Western Libya, near Tripoli. Pack analyses that Haftar’s decision to advance his position is most likely linked to the upcoming National Conference and does not necessarily indicate that there will be a military offensive targeting Tripoli. For Pack, Haftar is most likely to “push the limits without going beyond” and remain along the lines of the UN-led agreement which opposes a military solution in Libya.

Apr
2019

On 27 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) reported that revenues from sales of crude and derived productions amounted to 1.26 billion USD for February 2019. This is a reduction of over 330 million US dollars from January – a 21 percent month-on-month decrease. The NOC attributes the reduction to poor weather conditions which disrupted loadings from Sidra port, in addition to the closure of Sharara oilfield during that period. Libya’s oil production and subsequent revenue remains vulnerable to disruption by insecurity, blockades and facility closures.

Apr
2019

Haftar’s negotiated rise to power

In an article published with Foreign Policy on 1 April, Tarek Megerisi advocates against the official integration of Eastern-Libyan General Haftar into Libya’s politics and criticizes the recent trend which has seen a widespread push for a deal between General Haftar and Fayez Al-Sarraj, the Head of the UN-sponsored Government of National Accord (GNA).

Click here to read the article.

Apr
2019

Libya’s Central Bank at the heart of political disputes

In his latest article published on 1 April with War On the Rocks, Jalel Harchaoui argues that Libya’s most important financial institution, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), is increasingly at risk of becoming the target of maneuvers by Libyan factions to gain power. Harchaoui demonstrates that while a military offensive on Tripoli would be too risky, General Haftar’s strategy to increase his control over Libya could be to focus on the CBL. The institution, chaired by Sadiq al-Kabir, reportedly holds more than $70 billion of foreign-exchange reserves. The article presents the different national, regional and international actors which have attempted in a way or another to influence the control of Libya’s CBL. He notes that the lessened involvement of the United States in Libya puts at a greater risk Libya’s resources.

Click here to read the full article.

Apr
2019

Is Libya becoming the next Arab proxy war?

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman hosted Libyan General Khalifa Haftar for talks at the al-Yamamah Royal Palace in Riyadh on March 27. The Libyan General also met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Haftar reportedly discussed the latest developments in Libya. While the details of their conversation have not been disclosed, Karasik and Cafiero suppose in an article published with Gulf State Analytics that Haftar traveled to Saudi Arabia to secure further support from the kingdom for the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s operations. The authors highlight that Saudi Arabia’s influence over Libya mostly transpires through the development in Libya of the fundamentalist movement of Madkhalis, which opposes Islamist groups and more particularly, the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement has found common grounds with General Haftar on his strong anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance. Karasik and Cafiero argue that Saudi-inspired Salafists have heavily influenced Libya’s conflict and will most likely be decisive factors for the establishment of a political balance in Libya. Furthermore, they question the extent to which Libya could become another Arab proxy conflict, deepening the divide between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2019

In an article published with Politico on 19 March, Andrew Glass revisits US President Obama’s decision to approve airstrikes against Libya on 19 March 2011. Glass presents the narrative supporting President Obama’s decision, a narrative based on the urgency to intervene to protect Libyan pro-democracy protesters against the violence of Libyan leader Gaddafi. Citing Alan J. Kuperman, an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Glass moves on to criticizing the consequences of the international intervention in Libya, noting:

In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya was an abject failure, judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights abuses have increased severalfold.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2019

Tensions in Southern Libya risk further marginalisation of ethnic groups

In an article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published on 15 March, Umberto Profazio argues that tensions between Libyan rival administrations risk reigniting ethnic tensions and jeopardise fragile agreements. The author refers to the campaign launched by Eastern-Libyan General Haftar in Southern Libya in early 2019, noting that both General Haftar and rival administration the Government of National Accord (GNA) are attempting to court ethnic groups for political or territorial advantages. Profazio analyses that the result of such upheavals could be the further marginalisation of Southern communities. In conclusion of his article, he highlights the increasing isolation of Fayez Al-Sarraj, head of the GNA, and warns about potential shifts in international alliances:

In comparison to France’s assertive support for Haftar, the US stance could be interpreted as extremely cautious, but it does seem to be a reflection of changes on the ground. Haftar’s advances have certainly raised doubts in Washington, which is reconsidering its relationship with Sarraj. He is a weakened partner who is not only losing the confidence of his major foreign allies, but also the support of militias in the capital and finds himself increasingly undermined by his own colleagues in Tripoli.

Click here to read the analysis.

Mar
2019

The fight for freedom of press in Libya

French newspaper Le Point reports about freedom on press in Libya. On 17 March, French NGO “Reporters sans Frontières” (RSF), which is dedicated to the fight for the freedom of press, alerted in a communique about the absence of such rights in Libya. Deploring the death of at least 19 reporters since 2011, RSF denounces a strong hostility against journalists in Libya. According to the communique, there have also been several cases of journalists disappearing, being kidnapped or tortured over the past year. RSF’s communique was co-signed by the Libyan Center for Freedom of Press. Committed to protect and maintain freedom of press in Libya, this Center actively fights for the protection of journalists, addressing cases of disappearance and assaults on members of the press in the country.

Click here to read the report.

Mar
2019

Médecins Sans Frontières in Libya denounces European migration policies

On 14 March, Julien Raickman, Head of missions for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Libya published with Le Monde an open letter addressed to French president Emmanuel Macron in which he denounces intolerable living conditions for migrants in Libya and the migration policies of the EU. The open letter echoes a report published by the UNCHR published in December 2018 alerting on the physical and mental abuse experienced by migrants in Libya.

Click here to read the letter.

Mar
2019

Libya’s wake-up call

Over the course of the week, Al-Ahram Weekly published an editorial relating to current events in Libya. For the Egyptian newspaper, the deployment of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Southern Libya is the latest ‘wake-up call on the urgent need to reach a political settlement among Libyan factions’. The recent events also demonstrate Libya’s need for a strong government and a strong army, according to the editorial. As a result, it reports that Egyptian efforts to find a solution to the Libyan crisis will continue, given the threat instability in Libya poses to Egypt.

Click here to read the editorial.

Mar
2019

Sarraj and Salame Clarify Abu Dhabi Dialogue, Say National Conference Is Still On

On 6 March, Mohamed Sallak, the spokesperson for the Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, held a press conference to give further details about the so-called ‘Abu Dhabi Dialogue’ which occurred between Sarraj and Khalifa Haftar on 27 February. Sallak stated that the event was a consultative meeting, with no official binding agreements or statements. On 10 March, UN envoy Ghassan Salame appeared on a Libyan TV station and confirmed that during the meeting, both Sarrajand Haftar reaffirmed their commitment to a civilian state and civilian oversight over the army. He also clarified that the UN roadmap and National Conference was delayed but still on track and will hopefully be held by the end of March in a Libyan city yet to be decided.

This panicked reaction in Libya to the Sarraj-Haftar meeting is indicative of the mistrust and division that continue to run deep within Libyan society. The fact that it was Serraj and Salame who were forced to issue these clarifications and sooth fears in western Libya highlights the continued fragility of their positions and the political framework from which they both draw their legitimacy – the UN road map. In comparison, Haftar has still not issued a statement on the meeting, letting people assume he was the one to gain most from the meeting, which is likely true given his upper hand on the ground at the moment. As a result, political volatility is likely to persist and could potentially increase in the coming days and weeks, particularly in Tripoli. This could lead to sudden bouts of insecurity or alliance shifts which could undermine security or political stability with little warning.

Mar
2019

Gang connected to ISIS arrested in Tripoli

On 7 March, a gang of five men suspected of having connections to Islamic State (ISIS) were arrested as they reportedly attempted in to ‘infiltrate’ Tripoli. Reports suggest three of those arrested were dressed as women. Throughout the last three weeks, reputable sources have warned of an impending ISIS attack in Tripoli. No attack has materialised so far, with suggestions that local security forces thwarted an attempt recently. However, the potential for an attack remains moderately high. The Government of National Accord (GNA) does not control a single consolidated security force in western Libya. The militias aligned to the GNA do not directly follow its directions and in many cases actively work to undermine security governance. This has created a fractured security landscape, allowing ISIS to operate in the gaps and launch successful attacks on key institutions. Based on ISIS’s previous attacks in Tripoli, any potential attack is likely to target the headquarters of key state institutions. The Central Bank of Libya, High Council of State and the United Nations headquarters could be the focus of ISIS attacks in Tripoli in the near future given the ease of attack and attractiveness as high impact symbolic targets.

Mar
2019

Is the UN-led political process in Libya at risk?

On 7 March, Emadeddin Badi published with Middle East Institute an analysis of General Haftar’s Southern strategy and its potential repercussions. Along with other analysis that have been published over the past weeks, Badi alerts on the potential subversion and derailing of the UN process that could result from Haftar’s southern advances. Such reports contribute to demonstrate the growing concerns among scholars and analysts about the current turn of events in Libya.

Click here to read the analysis.

Mar
2019

Libya-Analysis Founder to be guest speaker at ISPI international lecture on 18 March (Milan, IT)

On 18 March, Jason Pack, President and founder of Libya-Analysis, will be the guest speaker at the lecture untitled “Kingdom of Militias? Mapping the Libyan Security Challenge” organized by the Italian Institute for Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan, Palazzo Clerici. The chairman of the event will be Arturo Varvelli, Co-Head MENA Center at ISPI and the discussions will also involve Virginie Collombier, Scientific Coordinator for the Middle East Directions Programme, European University Institute and Otman Gajiji, Former Chairman of HNEC and Municipal Elections of Libya CCMCE; Elections and Local Governance expert.

Experts are to discuss the issue of militias in the Libyan context.

Militias remain fundamental to understand the evolution of the Libyan crisis. This is especially true if we look at the failure of national reconciliation efforts that were based on political or civil figures who have little leverage over those groups able to exert real territorial control in the country. Militias’ role is also pivotal to assess the internal political and military landscape as they directly manage security according to varying – and often conflicting – political interests which emanate from powerful leaders but are also subject to external influences. What kind of interactions do Libyan militias and armed groups have with the country’s institutions and society? What is their ideology? How do they get their funding? What do they really want? Can these groups be integrated in a Libyan national reconciliation effort? If so, then under which conditions?

The group of experts articulate the reports around two key notions. First, they advocate for a renewed involvement of the United States of America in the Libyan crisis, arguing that the current situation on the ground presents an opportunity for Washington to make a substantial difference. They also highlight Libya’s key geographical position and insist on the fact that it should be considered by the US as an important interest.

Furthermore, the experts propose a new concept for the U.S approach in Libya, a bottom-up approach focusing on key cities in terms of politics, economy and security instead of the traditional top-down approach. The authors argue that a bottom-up strategy would be more coherent with Libyan issues and needs and believe that national-level institutions could emerge from the metropolitan entities, if the approach is successfully implemented. Their proposal for such a strategy is rooted in the observation that in Libya the international community has in general focused excessively upon the national political process at the expense of other issues and such an approach has thus far not been met with results. They write:

Significant economic, political, and security activity would then center on the country’s dozen to 15 major cities. Criteria would be established for how local entities could qualify for their fair-share allotment of oil revenues and international aid. An oversight board composed of Libyan technocrats and foreign experts would assess eligibility based on the actual behavior of the local actors. They would have the power to dock militias and other local actors a percentage of their monthly allocation of funds in the event of serious misbehavior such as abuse of human rights, interference with normal economic activity, theft, or violence.

Click here to read the full report.

Feb
2019

NOC to lift force majeure at El Sharara oil field in exchange for workers’ security

On 11 February, Libyan National Army (LNA) Chief of Staff Abdurrazak al-Nathouri announced that dialogue was under way between the LNA and the 30th Brigade regarding the latter’s requirements to provide effective security in order to lift force majeure on the El Sharara oil field. The 30th Brigade is the Tuareg Petroleum Facilities Guard unit which currently guards Sharara and is aligned with Ali Kanna. Nathouri also said that the LNA had no intention of moving on al-Feel as the field is operating without security issues at present.

The security situation in the South is likely to remain extremely volatile in the short term. The positive implications of the LNA apparently taking control of Sharara could be a more secure and stable base for the restart of production from Sharara field, particularly given the LNA has stated it intends to allow the NOC to export the crude. However, this will depend on whether the NOC agrees to restart the field. Sanallah has already reiterated his stance this week that production will not restart until staff safety can be guaranteed. The negative implications are that with LNA units and nominally LNA-aligned local forces at Sharara, the oilfield will become a target for local forces who oppose the LNA’s presence in the region, destabilising the oilfield further and potentially putting infrastructure at risk.

Feb
2019

Tebu and Tuareg tribes unite under GNA umbrella to curb LNA advances in Southern Libya

In his latest article published with Middle East Eye on 10 February, Tom Wescott discusses shifts of alliances and strategies in Southern Libya to counter the advances of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in region. Wescott reports that indigenous Tebu and Tuareg tribes from Southern Libya are forging an alliance under the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to curb advances of forces loyal to eastern-Libya based General Haftar in the South. The threat posed by the advances of the LNA is pushing Tebu and Tuareg independent militias to move belong their long-standing divisions as they are military weak on their own but could defend their areas united. This shift in alliance is supervised by Ali Kanna, the new military commander for the south appointed by the GNA, who is a Tuareg. Wescott’s article provides an excellent and well-balanced overview of the historic context of Southern Libya and the alliances between local actors.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2019

The Islamic Group’s progressive development in the Sahel

On 10 February, Baria Alamuddin discussed in an article published with Arab News the threat posed by the terrorist organisation Daesh (IS) in Africa. Alamuddin notes that while some voices are proclaiming the end of Daesh following the defeats of the terrorist organisation in Iraq and Syria, segments of the organisation are progressively conquering terrorities across Africa. For Alamuddin :

Across a huge swath of the Sahel states — from Mali and Libya through Nigeria and Chad to Egypt, Somalia and Kenya — vast desert and rural regions are either in extremist hands or vulnerable to depredations by these groups.

For the journalist, Daesh groups in Africa are developing a strategy enriched by the Iraqi and Syrian experciences which is based on progressive state building, the integration of local people and avoiding international attention. Regarding Libya, Alamuddin notes that failure to address the crisis has allowed the terrorist group to disperse and take root across the country.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2019

LNA operation in Southern Libya puts oil infrastructure at risk

On 7 February, François d’Alançon published with French newspaper La Croix an analysis of the operation launched by General Khalifa Haftar in Southern Libya and its potential impacts on the political and security situation in Libya. For d’Alançon, movements of the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated with General Haftar in Southern Libya are rekindling political and ethnic tensions in the country. D’Alançon highlights that the success of the operation would increase Haftar’s influence in Libya and open the door for a push of the LNA towards Western Libya and Tripoli and could put oil infrastructures at risk. The journalist notes that General Haftar’s operation has received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France, as well from Russia and Italy. Jalel Harchaoui, quoted in the article, explains that France has pushed General Haftar to launch the operation due to its involvement in Chad against rebel groups.

Click here to read the report.

Feb
2019

LNA takes control of El Sharara Oilfield

On 7 February, media sources reported that the Libyan National Army (LNA) has taken control of El Sharara oilfield located in Southern Libya on 6 February. The oilfield has been closed since 8 December by groups of tribesmen, armed protesters and state guards demanding salary payments and development funds. Rreports suggest that they handed out the control of the site to the LNA without violence. Thus far, the National Oil Company and the Governement of National Accord (GNA) have not commented on the situation. Such a maneuver by the LNA is likely to raise concerns in Western Libya as to whether General Haftar is attempting to defy the authority of the GNA.

Click here to read the report.

Update 08/02: Following the initial reports that the LNA had seized El Sharara Oilfield, further reports on 7 February indicated that General Haftar’s armed forces took control of a substation of El Sharara Oilfield, but not the main field. Moreover, complementary reports suggest that LNA forces clashed with forces under the control of the newly-appointed commander of Sabha military zone Ali Kanna affiliated with the GNA.

Feb
2019

LNA Campaign In South Libya Wins Support Despite Reports Of Atrocities Against The Tebu

The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) advance into south Libya, launched two weeks ago, has won support among a large swath of the population in the region. In Sebha, the LNA struck social agreements and tribal guarantees with various powerbrokers from the mix of Arab, Tuareg and Tebu tribes in the city. This ensured a peaceful handover of key locations and arms depots, previously controlled by Awlad Suliman and Tebu tribal fighters, to new commanders appointed by the LNA, under the Sebha Operations Room. However, there have been a flurry of media reports accusing the LNA of committing war crimes and violations against Tebu communities in the South. Some Tebu members of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the parallel eastern government resigned from their positions last week in response to the LNA campaign

The longer-term implications of the LNA’s operation remain unpredictable at present. On the positive side, the LNA’s operation has had some success in winning over a large segment of the Libyan population, including some formerly opposed to Haftar, in a manner akin to what happened after the LNA’s takeover of the Oil Crescent and resumption of exports from that region in September 2016. This is likely to be a major boost for GNA and LNA reconciliation, especially in terms of military and security unification. It could also improve security and stability in the South, helping to normalise oil production from this region. On the negative side, the LNA’s operation runs a serious risk of triggering an ethnic war between the South’s tribal components, primarily between the Arabs and the Tebu.

Feb
2019

Lobbying efforts in Washington to push US to revise its Libyan strategy

In an article published with Al-Monitor on 4 February, Jack Detsch reported that Libyan business man Hassan Tatanaki, has recently registered a new political party, the « Libyan United Democratic Party », to lobby the Donald Trump administration to get more involved in the efforts to address the Libyan crisis. According to the article, Tatanaki, who also serves as the chairman of the oilfield drilling company Challenger Limited, has ties to both the Gaddafi family and Eastern Libya based General Haftar and as such poses as an influential figure in Libyan affairs. For Detsch, Tatanaki’s lobbying efforts fit into a wider initiative to influence the United States to revise its Libyan strategy, at a time when there have been many voices criticizing the lack of results of the UN Special Mission to Libya headed by Special Envoy Ghassan Salame. For Jason Pack, founder of Libya-Analysis cited by Detsch,

Every top Libyan player, even obscure deputy ministers come to Washington. They somehow think that telling a low-level commerce official that Libya is open for business will trickle into policymaking.

On 18 January, UN Special Envoy to Libya presented a comprehensive briefing to the UN Security Council, announcing that the UNSMIL is working on organising its National Conference for Libya within the coming weeks. During his briefing to the Security Council, Salamé insisted on the need for Libyan representatives to agree on “the essential ingredients for a new consensus on a national agenda” prior to the Conference. Ghassan Salamé also reportedly announced that the ceasefire brokered by the UN to put a halt to militia fighting in September 2018 was still in place, despite the recent fighting which took place in Southern Tripoli between the Seventh Brigade, a Tarhuna-based militia, and the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF), a coalition of militias aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA). According to the Libya Herald, fighting broke out between the militia coalitions due to issues of territory control, with the Seventh Brigade accusing the TPF of unauthorised movements on their positions. In respective statements, both coalitiond blamed the resumption of fighting on the GNA and the UNSMIL and their failed governance. According to Sami Zaptia for Libya Herald, the TPF went even further in its statement by declaring that it no longer recognized decisions by GNA head Fayez Al-Sarraj unless they were reached unanimously, as specified in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). For Zaptia, such a declaration from the TPF is an attempt to exploit the already existing divisions within the GNA Presidential Council (PC) and undermine the power of Fayez Al-Serraj.

Jan
2019

LNA Launches Military Operation In The South

On 15 January, a Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesman confirmed that an LNA operation to liberate southern Libya from “terrorist” groups is underway. He added that the operation was also intended to “ensure the public’s continued ability to maintain and control Libya’s oil and gas sector”. The spokesman advised civilians to avoid known militant bases, such as Sebha, and urged local hospitals to declare states of emergencies. LNA forces are reportedly grouping at Tamanhint Airbase in Sebha in advance of operations in the border regions with Chad, Niger and Sudan.

The LNA mobilisation to the southern region is being implemented on a much greater scale than previous times where the LNA has said it will undertake operations to remove militant and extremist groups from the region. A large armed campaign to remove these groups appears imminent. Haftar has previously met with regional leaders and discussed border security, as well as the security vacuum in the southern regions. The reported coordination with Chadian forces indicates that the LNA is making its greatest effort yet in the south in order to ensure Haftar’s image as the main military and security guarantor for Libya and its neighbours. Securing Sharara oil field is also likely to be a key strategic aim of this operation.

Jan
2019

In an article published with Middle East Institute on 4 January 2019, researcher Emadeddin Badi reviewed the recent events which took place in Tripoli regarding security. On 18 December, Tripoli’s four main armed groups, namely the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade (TRB); Abu Salim’s Special Deterrence Force; the Nawasi Battalion; and the Bab Tajoura Brigade announced the formation of the Tripoli Protection Force. For the author,

the announcement of the new joint Tripoli Protection Force not only epitomizes the exploitative behavior of armed groups in Libya but also the challenges facing both UNSMIL and the GNA’s new minister of interior.

For Badi, such an organisation could compromise the UNSMIL-brokered ceasefire and the implementation of long-term, efficient security arrangements, as militia continue to hold control over the capital city.

Click here to read the article.

Dec
2018

Ban on olive oil exports impact Libya’s “green gold” industry

An article by Arab News published on 27 December highlighted the tensions surrounding olive oil production in Libya. Libyan authorites have decided to halt exports of the “green gold” since 2017, and it remains unclear when exports are to resume. Libya is the 11th largest olive producer in the world, growing around 150 000 tons of the crop annually, but only 20% is turned into oil.

Click here to read the report.

Dec
2018

ISIS attack targets Tripoli-based Foreign Ministry

On 25 December, four ISIS fighters undertook a suicide attack on Libya’s foreign ministry in Tripoli, killing three people and wounding at least 21 more. The assault began when a white Hyundai sedan exploded outside the ministry’s back gate, killing the driver. Two attackers died when they detonated their suicide vests on the building’s second floor while another was shot dead by security guards. ISIS’s Amaq website claimed responsibility for the attack on 26 December.

The three victims have been identified as: Abdulrahman Mazoughi, the spokesperson for the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade; Ibrahim Sheiby, director of the ministry’s Islamic Affairs Department; and Hend Arnaouti, a ministry employee.

Despite national and international efforts, tensions resulting from the lingering presence of the terrorist organisation persist in Libya. For analysts, the internal chaos in Libya creates the environment for terrorist organisations to strive.

Click here to read the report.

Dec
2018

Tripoli militias unite into “Tripoli Protection Force”

On 18 December, four of the key militias in Tripoli announced that they had merged into a new group dubbed the “Tripoli Protection Force” (TPF). This new militia force is composed of: The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), Abu Salim Deterrence and Rapid Intervention Force, the Nawasi militia (8th Force), and the Bab Tajura Brigade. In the statement, the TPF stated that they had formed in response to military movements in the western region and rejected the use of power for political gains. The statement also supported efforts by UNSMIL and its envoy Ghassan Salame, adding that it endorsed the Libyan National Conference in January. The creation of the TPF appears to be an effort by the Tripoli-based militias to rebrand and insert themselves into the new security arrangements of the GNA, thwarting the attempts by the Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha to increase the involvement and influence of Misratan and Zintan forces.

The statement announcing the TPF establishment was released by the TRB; however, it did not contain the usual signatures or stamps of approval by any of the brigades, bringing into question how unanimous or genuine the decision is within and amongst militia group members to establish this new “force”. Moreover, the initiative seems to be led by the TRB leader Haithem Tajouri, who upon his return to Libya following the clashes in August and September of this year, has been actively removing dissidence within the ranks of his own forces (through a series of assassinations) and attempting to position himself in the new security arrangements. It is worth noting that the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) are not members of this new force. The creation of the TPF appears to be an effort by the Tripoli-based militias to rebrand and insert themselves into the new security arrangements of the GNA, thwarting the attempts by the Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha to increase the involvement and influence of Misratan and Zintan forces.

Dec
2018

‘The international community did not understand how Libya functioned’

Drawing on the France 24 report published in early December entitled ‘Tripoli : on the brink of stability’, France 24 hosted on 19 December a debate on the Libyan crisis. James Andre, France 24 reporter, Céline Bardet, international Human Rights Lawyer and Jalel Harchaoui, Researcher from University Paris VIII participated in the debate, which focused on Europe’s role in Libya.

For Céline Bardet, the international community did not understand how Libya functioned and tried to implement models which did not correspond, pushing for example for a centralized state model which does not match Libya’s tribal structure.

Click here to watch the debate.

Dec
2018

‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’

On 19 December, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi published for Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) in co-production with Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) and Conflict Armament Research a very interesting report on Southern Libya. Entitled ‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’, the report builds on ‘Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle’, written by the same authors and published by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research in June 2017 (Tubiana and Gramizzi, 2017). The report explores the issue of lawlessness in Southern Libya and provides an analysis of the different groups evolving in this area and their strategies. It is based on field research carried out in Niger in February–March 2017 and April 2018, as well as interviews conducted in Chad in May–June 2017 and January 2018, and in Europe in 2017–18.

The relevance of the report is high given the increasing tensions and violence in Southern Libya and the difficulty to understand the motives of the different actors and the issues at stake in the area. For the authors, Southern Libya is characterized by its ‘lawlessness’ and the presence of ‘autonomous, yet fragmented ethnic militias in control of southern Libya’s border’. The strategic nature of the area then ‘prompts northern Libyan forces as well as the governments of neighboring and European states to pursue alliances with them’, analyse Tubiana and Gramizzi. Among their main findings, the authors note that :

By pressuring Niger to criminalize migrant smuggling and block migrants in or on their way to southern Libya, European states have contributed to a series of destabilizing dynamics. Specifically, their policies have:

aggravated risks for migrants, as trafficking is now concentrated among fewer, more abusive actors, especially in Libya, where migrants from West Africa and elsewhere are systematically kidnapped for ransom, or forced into debt bondage, labour, or prostitution;

caused migrant smugglers to ply more treacherous routes or engage in more dangerous activities, such as drug trafficking, jihadism, and insurgency;

fuelled corruption among Nigerien forces and exacerbated tensions between Niger’s government and its northern communities, which are largely dependent on migrant smuggling for their livelihoods; and empowered Libyan and Sudanese militias.

The authors develop their argument in four sections. First, the authors build the profile of the Tubu militias, situating the Tubu within the broader international political context as well as in Libya’s complex politics and history. Then, the authors focus on Libya’s southern neighbors and the strategies they have developed in the area. Drawing on, they provide an analysis of the strategic area of the Agadez-Fezzan corridor, the route between the Sahel and Libya and a place of important illegal trade and migration. Lastly, the fourth section presents data and analysis of regional weapons flows to support some of the findings discussed in the previous sections.

Click here to read the report.

Dec
2018

Rising insecurity in Eastern Libya due to weakening of Eastern institutions

Armed violence against civilians and rivals is rapidly rising in the eastern region. The security environment in Benghazi particularly is gradually worsening as lawlessness expands and local authorities are increasingly unable to enforce law and order or control legitimate force instruments. The incident and temporary closure of Tubruq port also demonstrates that this lawlessness is starting to impact other cities in the region. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and parallel government is trying to take decisive measures to address this issue. On 16 December, the Minister of Interior in the parallel government, Ibrahim Bushnaf, led a large shakeup of security architecture in the eastern region, replacing the local Security Directorate chiefs in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, al-Marj, Sulug Geminis and Awjla al-Jkherra. Bushnaf also replaced the heads of the Border Security Directorate, Interpol Coordination office and the General Administrator of the Ministry. The increasing insecurity in the East is being driven in part by a perception that the nexus of authority and credibility created over the last few years between LNA head Khalifa Haftar, the House of Representatives (HoR) and the parallel Eastern government, is weakening. The political bodies are losing legitimacy and international clout, while Haftar’s domestic legitimacy seems to be diminishing as his international influence increases. The LNA seems increasingly unable to control the behaviour of its own fighters, as exemplified by the video* threatening Misrata.

*The video is visible on Twitter, posted around 15 December.

Dec
2018

The European approach to the MENA

On 16 December, Gulf Times reported about a session of the Doha Forum held on 15 December during which was debated the role of the European Union in the Middle East and North Africa area. at the Doha Forum. The session entitled « « Polarisation in the Middle East and North Africa: What is the European role? » gathered Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office & Minister of State at the Department for International Development, H.E. Sigmar Gabriel, Member of the Bundestag (Parliament), Former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E Dr. Mutlaq Al-Qahtani, Special Envoy of the Foreign Minister of the State of Qatar for Counter terrorism and Mediation of Conflict Resolution, Ibrahim Kalin, Special adviser to President Erdogan and the Presidential Spokesperson and Julien Barnes-Dacey (moderator), Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations . according to the report, the opinion conveyed by panellists was that the European Union was not doing enough in these geographical areas. Most particularly, H.E Dr. Mutlaq Al-Qahtani criticized the volatile position of the European Union in the Middle East and North Africa, which varied from one situation to another according to its interests. He also added that the EU could not evade its responsibilities on the issues of migration, refugees and armed conflicts in the Middle East.

Click here to read the report.

Dec
2018

‘No genuine breakthrough in Libya is possible without U.S involvement’

On 17 December, Anna Borshchevskaya, Ben Fishman, and Barbara A. Leaf published an article with The Washington Institute. The authors analyse the results of the Palermo Conference held in November 2018, an Italian initiative which aimed at gathering Libyan and international actors to push forward a solution to the persisting crisis in Libya. The authors argue that while the conference produced some positive outcomes, a US involvement would be required for a genuine breakthrough. In the absence of US leadership, the authors also highlight the emergence of Russia as partner for Libya. For the authors,

Now is the time for Washington to reengage—UNSMIL’s efforts are gaining momentum, and only the United States can give the mission the political space required to advance the next stages of Libya’s long-overdue transition.

Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced on 6 December they will end search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean. Their ship, the Aquarius, has saved the lives of tens of thousands of people crossing from Libya to Italy, the world’s deadliest migration route, reports indicate. (The Guardian). This comes after a host of challenges: the ship has been forced to stay in the port of Marseilles since the end of September when Panama revoked its flag registration, and Italy ordered seizure of the vessel last month on charges of “illegal waste disposal” . MSF called these actions “smear campaigns” Related: How the debate over flags sidelined Europe’s migrant-rescue ships.

Credit to Lolita Brayman.

Dec
2018

Report by Center for Humanitarian Dialogue to set path for stabilisation in Libya

In an article published with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) on 5 December, Tarek Megerisi argues that Libya has experienced last month the most important development in its recent history. Megerisi notes ironically that this « new current » in the « stagnant waters » of Libyan politics is not the Palermo Conference, but a report issued by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue for the UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue conducted 77 consultations across Libya, and the report outlines « popular » opinions from Libyan citizens on the issues faced by Libya. According to Megerisi :

The findings repeatedly emphasise consultees’ view that Libya should remain unified; specifically, that a unified and effective government should be a prerequisite to unfreezing Libya’s state assets and lifting the UN arms embargo on Libya. The report also sets out what government priorities should be at local and national levels; addresses the security situation by highlighting the need for the country’s various forces to unify in a process “free from regional interference”; and even proposes core tenets for distributing power and resources.

UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé will use the findings of the report for the National Conference which will be organized in 2019, Megerisi reports.

Click here to read the full article.

Dec
2018

WHO to oversee national vaccine campaign to compensate for vaccine shortage

On 6 December, the Libyan Health Minister announced the launch on 8 December the launch of a vaccine campaign overseen by the World Health Organization (WHO). Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) recently faced a serous shortage of vaccines.

Click here to read the press report.

Dec
2018

The Operational Revival of ISIS in Libya

On 3 December, Dario Cristiano published for The Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Volume 16/Issue 23 an analysis of ISIS’s operations and presence in Libya. Cristiano identifies an operational revival of ISIS in Libya, as demonstrated by the recent attack in Tazirbu which targeted a police station, killing at least eight civilians. In terms of operational trends, Cristiano’s research indicate that IS reorganized itself into small groups and dispersed throughout Libya, allowing the group to strike in different areas of the country.

Click here to read the article.

Dec
2018

Tripoli’s Dissidents Oppose Militia Rule

On 1 December, Francesca Mannochi recounts for The Guardian her meeting in Tripoli with what she identifies as ‘dissidents’. The term dissident refers here to people opposing the overbearing presence and control of militia and armed groups over Tripoli, state institutions and resources. In the article, Mannochi provides an insightful picture of the situation in Tripoli and the power and influence of the militias.

Click here to read the article

Dec
2018

For ordinary Libyan citizens, ‘GNA economic measures serve the rich’

On 4 december, Voice of America published an article on the impacts of the economic reforms designed by the Government of National Accord (GNA), interviewing residents of Tripoli, outlining the difficulties faced by ordinary Libyan citizens. A Libyan quoted in the article argues that the measure implemented by the GNA in September which planned a devaluation of the exchange rate for Libyan Dinars did not do much for the middle and lower class and only served wealthy citizens. The dire economic situation experienced by ordinary citizens in Libya, and most particularly in Tripoli, contrasts with the wealth of the militia and armed groups, which continue to have power over state institutions and authorities and take advantage of the country’s resources.

Click here to read the article.

Dec
2018

Protestors storm GNA headquarters in Tripoli

On 2 December, Libyan protesters stormed the Tripoli headquarters of Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) demanding their unpaid salaries and medical treatment.The event is to be considered in the framework of wider Tripoli tensions – GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj continues to consolidate his power through a series of political, economic and security moves ahead of the UN’s planned National Conference next year. Yet the growing power of militia leader Haithem Tajouri, who has become Sarraj’s primary enforcer of the new security architecture in the capital, is creating fresh tensions. It also shows that any positive economic developments are only a tiny step towards solving the country’s deeper economic issues.

Dec
2018

On 26 November, the House of Representatives (HoR) passed a constitutional amendment that effectively validates the HoR’s recently passed law for the referendum on the draft constitution. It now reflects article 6 of the Referendum Law, dividing Libya into three voting districts – Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Before the amendment, Libya was considered one voting district. Under the referendum law, the draft constitution must receive an approval of 50% +1 in each region and two-thirds national approval. The HoR also approved a new structure for the Presidential Council (PC), comprising a president and two deputies, as well as a separate prime minister as the head of the government.

The constitutional amendment theoretically removes a legal barrier that could have prevented the referendum on the draft constitution from taking place under the terms of the existing legislation. This could pave the way for a referendum on the constitution to be held in the coming months, although the process is still likely to face challenges and will likely be subservient to the new national reconciliation conference planned for next year.

Nicola Pedde published on 7 November an article with Atlantic Council on the upcoming Palermo Conference organized by the Italian government on 12-13 November. In the article, Pedde insists on the necessity for all actors to be represented at the event, both the Libyan factions and international actors. He also highlights the changing narrative of the Libyan political narrative and the failure by external actors to integrate this evolution. Pedde also adds :

It is perceived by locals in Libya that the opening up of Italy’s approach to various political actors is a weakness of the Italian position. It is seen as a desperate move rather than an ability to satisfy both sides.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2018

UN Security Council votes renewal of Libyan sanctions regime.

On 5 November, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) voted the renewal of the Libyan sanctions regime until 2020. UK Political Coordinator to the UN Stephen Hickey issued a statement welcoming the vote of the Security Council and most particularly the inclusion of gender-based violence among the criteria. Hickey highlights the importance of the sanctions as a tool for the UN and its member states to support the efforts of the Government of National Accord (GNA). He also salutes the work of the UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé.

Click here to read the statement.

Nov
2018

‘Libya is ready for elections’, says Libyan presidential candidate

On 1 November, Sputnik published an interview with Dr. Aref Ali Nayed, the sole declared candidate to presidential elections in Libya. Nayed discusses prospects for the Palermo conference, insisting on the importance for the conference to draw the promises of the Paris agreement to organise elections in Libya. According to him, Libya is reading for elections.

Click here to read the interview.

Nov
2018

Mixed prospects for Italy’s Palermo Conference

On 31 October, Foreign Affairs published an article by Federica Saini Fasanottu and Ben Fishman on the prospects of the Palermo Conference. This initiative set up by the Italian government aims at gathering Libyan factions and key international actors on 12-13 November to discuss solutions to the crisis in Libya. The authors argue that the Palermo Conference is an opportunity for Italy to make a contribution to Libya’s peace process, but only if Italy manages to minimize its competition with France and support the UN and its efforts in Libya. In that regard, Saini Fasanottu and Fishman encourage Italy and the participants of the Palermo Conference to propose measures which build up on the positive developments which have taken place in Libya recently, such as the cease-fire brokered in Tripoli between rival militias.

For Libya-Analysis, prospects for success of the Palermo conference are low. First, on 1 November, a leak of the invite list for the Italian led Palermo conference on 12-13 November to Libyan media caused a public outcry regarding the non-representation of the invitees and the way they were invited. Furthermore, ambiguity surrounding the goals and mechanisms of the event persists, undermining the chances of success of the event. The official legislative bodies of the Libyan Political Agreement (the House of Representatives and the High Council of State), which are supposed to make the agreement happen, remain swamped, gridlocked and ineffective despite media efforts by some of their members to showcase an agreement. As such hopes that Palermo may be the final stage of reconciliation and unification before planned elections are now low, and the event may not even happen at all. This could open doors for worse instability security wise.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2018

Salame’s “Plan B” for Libya

In an article for Middle East Institute published on 30 October, Jonathan M. Winer reviews the UN’s « Plan B » for Libya and proposes a complementary solution to address Libya’s militia issue. The « Plan B » proposition is an alternative proposition of the UN Special Representative to Libya Ghassan Salame’s to address Libya’s political stalemate if it persists. Plan B would come after the initial roadmap set up by the UN, which has not proved successful thus far. Salame’s alternative roadmap plans for the organisation of a nation-wide assembly gathering Libyans factions, from which would emerge a Libyan National Council. This Council would ask the UN Security Council to withdraw recognition of all Libyan institutions and pass a resolution regarding the organisation of elections within six months. For the author, Salame’s Plan B constitutes a real alternative to the current situation. However, Winer argues that the proposition falls short of a solution regarding militias. To address this issue, Winer proposes a complementary plan, which would be the implementation of what he calls an « economic-military-political package » focused on the revaluation of the Libyan currency in order to reduce the value of the militia’s revenues. In parallel, he advocates for the creation of a new national force, in which the militias could be integrated.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2018

Pushing further economic reforms in Libya

On 25 October, International Crisis Group published an excerpt of its Watch List 2018 focusing on the economic situation in Libya. Libya saw in September the implementation of the first economic reform package since the Gaddafi regime fell in 2011. Pushed by the Government of National Accord (GNA), this reform package focuses on lowering the black-market exchange rate and increasing liquidity. According to Crisis Group, it constitutes a good first step towards economic stabilization in Libya. However, it is not sufficient under its current form to fully address Libya’s deteriorating economic situation. As a result, Crisis Group encourages the European Union (UE) and its member states to work with Libya’s government and economic institutions to push forward more thorough reforms and presents a set of recommendations.

Click here to read the commentary.

Oct
2018

On 2 October, Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi stated that Italy will hold an international conference on Libya in the Sicilian capital of Palermo on 12 and 13 November. The meeting intends to gather key Libyan and international figures in an effort to bring together opposing forces and forge dialogue. The Foreign Minister said the meeting is aimed at restoring peace and facilitating an inclusive political process in the lead up to potential elections, and stated that ‘no deadlines will be imposed or tasks set for the Libyans’. This statement is likely to be in response to France imposing a fixed date of 10 December for holding national elections, a move which Italy has widely criticised.

Unconfirmed sources suggest that Moavero has received interest from the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar to attend the conference. The conference also reportedly has the support of US President Donald Trump. In addition, Moavero met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavro in Moscow on 8 October to discuss ways in which the two nations could cooperate on addressing the crisis in Libya.

The conference, along with Moavero’s meeting with Russia, transpires as a part of an effort by the Italian government to gain a greater and broader influence in mediating the Libyan peace process, aiming to sideline France in the process. Italy’s right-wing government also seeks greater involvement in Libyan national stability efforts in order to curb the migration flow.

The conference is unlikely to set dates for elections and may work to revive the unified Libyan military talks that occurred in Cairo. The military talks became stalled as a result of the attacks by Ibrahim Jadhran in the Oil Crescent in June which reignited the debate over the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) complicity with the Tripoli militia’s predatory behavior over national economic institutions and distribution of oil revenue. Should Italy successfully engage with Egypt re-organizing the military talks then it is likely to also secure Haftar’s presence at the general discussions.

Oct
2018

Foreign companies’ renewed interest in Libyan oil

On 8 October, Benoit Faucon reported in The Wall Street Journal ENI SpA’s intention to acquire a controlling stake in BP PLC’s assets in Libya and its plans to resume oil exploration in the country. Libya Analysis’s Founder Jason Pack explains that several foreign oil firms, among which the French Total and Russia’s Tatneft and Gazprom are looking to increase their presence in Libya, noting that this renewal of interest is possible because ‘oil prices are high and the political situation is reasonably stable’.

Click here to read more.

Oct
2018

Fragile Tripoli security arrangements continue to hold

On 6 October, the Government of National Accord (GNA) and its UN-backed committee announced new security arrangements in the capital Tripoli. Some of the Tripoli militia leaders and their armed groups have handed over either positions or checkpoints under their control to units within the Ministry of Interior, while most others either handed over nominal control or recycled their roles in different forms. The Nawasi brigade nominally left Tripoli port while the Special Deterrence Force (RADA) nominally left Mitiga airport, leaving security to regular units within a new department called the Vital Facilities Protection Department. Other armed groups of the Tripoli Protection Force coalition have handed over locations to the Public Security and Checkpoints Department led by Imad Trabilsi in the western region of Tripoli, while others like the 301 Brigade have retaken control of previously held areas in southern Tripoli. The security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Liwa 7th Brigade forces from Tarhuna and the Liwa Sumoud forces from Misrata is yet unfilled by the GNA’s Joint Protection force, and sources on the ground report preparations by these withdrawing forces to retake their positions and renter Tripoli again if security arrangements and associated political efforts fail.

This fragility is now being compounded with controversial and unilateral political moves by the head of the Government of National Accord, Fayze al-Serraj, that could unwind the security arrangements and collapse the GNA itself. On 7th October, Serraj announced a cabinet reshuffle, appointing Misrata powerbroker Fathi Bashagha as Minister of Interior and Ali Essawi as Minister of Economy amongst other changes. Fathi Bashagha, a House of Representatives (HoR) boycotting member from Misrata, went on air on the same day and rejected the appointment outright.

Oct
2018

How a New Political Process Could Help Tackle Security Challenges

In his latest article published in SWP’s October report, Wolfram Lacher proposes a new negotiating framework to address Libya’s political and security issues in the aftermath of two major crises. First, Eastern-based General Haftar’s move towards oil resources in June 2018, and the violent militia fighting in Tripoli in September 2018. According to Lacher, Libya’s latest crises highlight the urgent need for renegotiating the current dysfunctional power sharing agreement to enable progress towards elections. Lacher writes :

Taken together, the current situation offers an opportunity to shed an institutional framework that has prevented political progress for too long, and to design a new negotiating process that closely links talks over power-sharing with efforts to reunify economic and security institutions.

Lacher describes his proposition for a new power-sharing framework, advocating that in order to be more functional, such an agreement should lay on Libya’s actual political and military forces rather than on the country’s defunct institutions. The aim of such a framework would be to create a new executive authority with detailed security arrangements, along with the provisions for the reunification of the sovereign economic institutions. Lacher argues :

New security arrangements for Tripoli should take the form of a roadmap, starting with immediately feasible steps and moving towards the gradual integration of rival local forces into common command structures and units. For the implementation of such a roadmap to succeed, it will be critical that Western and regional governments strongly support UNSMIL by exerting pressure on violators. […]This requires a departure from the approach that prevailed over the past two years, during which wary Western governments and the UN avoided challenging the status quo so that they could operate in Tripoli and have an official interlocutor in the GNA. The events over the past months have shown that this approach has now reached its limits.

In this article, Wolfram Lacher presents a well-thought argument for a viable solution to tackle Libya’s political, security and economic issues, inspired from the realities of the ground.

Click here to read the article

Oct
2018

Fragile security situation in Tripoli

The clashes in Tripoli over last month subsided 25 September. A set of side agreements between Government of National Accord (GNA) officials and Tripoli-based militias on one hand and elders/armed groups from neighbouring towns on the other halted the fighting and led to a fast withdrawal of Tarhuna and Salah Badi forces from southern Tripoli. This helped to solidify the UN brokered security arrangements and buy time for the GNA to secure the capital. However, the security situation remains highly fragile. On 27 September, clashes broke out west of the capital and continue intermittently, with security expected to unravel further should the GNA not move quickly on promised security reforms. The appeal by the GNA foreign minister to the UN General Assembly to change the mandate of UNSMIL from a political to a ‘security’ support mandate was met with criticism, provoking condemnations against international peacekeeping forces. While the GNA’s Presidency Council continues to entrench its power, the UN, House of Representatives (HoR) and High Council of State (HCS) have entered new negotiations last week for a new three member Presidency Council reflecting the three regions of Libya, in tandem with a constitutional referendum which is supposed to happen mid October. Meanwhile, on 29 September, the UN Special Envoy to Libya declared that Libya may not be in position to hold the elections scheduled for December 2018.

Oct
2018

NOC looks to boost oil output

On September 26, S&P Global published a report on oil production in Libya, monitoring the recovery of the sector in the midst of the security political turmoil. According to the article, the Tripoli-based National Oil Company (NOC) is looking to attract foreign investments in Libya. Such efforts have already been successful, as French Total announced in March its intention to increase its presence in Libya, the article reports. According to a Rapidan report, the insecurity is unlikely to impact Libya’s oil output :

The reshuffling of alliances around Tripoli in the past few weeks may lead to temporary and occasional blockades and armed clashes around oil infrastructure, but it will not be jarring enough” to stop output averaging at levels of around 1 million barrels per day.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2018

ISIS’s progressive resurgence in Libya

On Sept 29, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) issued for News Hour a video report on Libya. In the report, journalist Christopher Livesay investigates the resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya. He interviews members of Libya’s counter-terrorism forces in Sirte, as well as analyst Frederic Wehrey and UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame. The conclusions of the report are that ISIS continues to exist in Libya despite the 2016 intervention by Libyan and allied forces. The terrorist group has regrouped in desert areas and has perpetrated several violent attacks this year. However, according to experts, it still lacks the ability to control majorities.

Click here to watch the documentary.

Sep
2018

Perspectives for Libya

In an article published with Carnegie Middle East Center on 24 September, Michael Young interviews Emaddin Badi, Libyan activist and development practitioner, about the situation in Libya and perspectives for the future. Badi portrays a deeply unstable country which presents features of both civil war and state collapse due to persisting fighting and divisions between rival factions. Badi argues that unless major reform of the state, Libya’s governance issues are likely persist, and perhaps to the point of partition. Regarding the resurgence of Islamic State (IS) in Libya, Badi responds that the terrorist group continues to represent a threat as the same causes that gave rise to the Islamic State still exist in the country.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2018

On 10 September, Libya-Analysis Founder Jason Pack was on TRT WORLD, where he discussed the recent militia tensions in Tripoli and the attack by gunmen on the Tripoli National Oil Corporation (NOC) headquarters.

Sep
2018

Will the December elections in Libya contribute to the stabilization of the country?

On 10 September, the Italian Center for International Studies (Centro Studi Internazionali – Ce.S.I) published a report entitled ‘The Libyan Maze: the Path to Elections and the Future of the Reconciliation Process’. Seven authors, among which Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith participated in the report, exploring in different articles Libya’s issues on the path to stabilization.

Smith’s article focuses on the December elections and whether such elections could succeed in bringing together a divided country like Libya. Smith argues that the elections planned in December by the Government of National Accord (GNA) backed by the United-Nations and most of the international community are very unlikely to heal the underlying social, political and economic rifts that are driving division and conflict in Libya. She points out the lack of a broader democratic structure and coherent institutional framework in Libya to support democratic elections.

Click here to download the report.

Sep
2018

France and Italy at odds in Libya

On 5 September, Stratfor published an article on the persisting rivalry between France and Italy in Libya and the impact of the division between the two powers on Libyan affairs. The author argues that France and Italy have conflicting views on what solutions should be implemented in Libya due to the different goals they pursue in Libya. This argument is supported by maps representing the interests of the two powers. On the one hand, a map illustrates France’s intention to reassert its international role and contain insecurity in North Africa and neighbor countries. On the other hand, another map shows Italy’s attempt to protect its economic interests in Libya and contain migrant routes. According to the author, the division between France and Italy is likely to continue constituting an obstacle to the formulation of an international approach to Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2018

Understanding the Militia Tensions in Tripoli

On 4 September Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith spoke on Voice of America’s ‘Africa News Tonight’ about the recent militia tensions in Tripoli. According to Smith, thus far there are no indications of a direct implication of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the Tripoli tensions. The conflict focuses on an attempt by an alliance of militias from the cities surrounding Tripoli to defeat the powerful Tripoli-based militias, she analyses.

Click here to hear the interview.

Sep
2018

Economy and Industry Minister Nasser al-Dersi discusses the GNA’s Economic Programme for Libya

On 2 September Al Monitor published a phone interview with Libya’s Economy and Industry Minister Nasser al-Dersi in which journalist George Mikhail discussed the Government of National Accord (GNA)’s plan to reform Libya’s economy. The minister describes the different measures envisaged by the GNA, such as amendments to the subsidies system and the reform of the commodity price system. Talking about the obstacles to Libya’s economic reform, al-Dersi notes:

The economic program … is facing obstacles, mainly the division of the Central Bank into two branches: one in Tripoli and one in al-Bayda. In addition, the presence of a parallel interim government in eastern Libya is not helping because it spends out of [a separate] budget and is not transparent about its financial policy. Meanwhile, the internationally recognized GNA [is authorized to deal] with the whole Libyan market without discrimination between east and west. Therefore, the difference in opinion between the GNA and the parallel bodies impedes a financial economic policy that applies to all Libyan territories. We need one government and one central bank to implement comprehensive reform.

Click here to read more.

Sep
2018

Dissolving militias, the solution for stability in Libya?

On 31 August, Guma El-Gamaty published an article with Al Jazeera addressing the issue of the stabilization of Libya. He identifies that Libya’s instability is fueled by numerous causes, both internal and external. El-Gamaty insists on the impact of external interference in Libya, and how it aggravates the weakness of Libyan institutions. He then presents several recommendations to address this core issue, such as protecting Libya from external influences by regional or international power, pursuing the current efforts to draft a new constitution and also dissolving the militias. The recent events in Tripoli highlight the importance of this last step, as the capital city has been experiencing violent militia clashes for the past week.

Click here to read more.

In his latest article with Global Risk Insight published on 26 August, Nicolo Donà dalle Rose reviews Italy’s foreign policy in the Middle East. The author focuses on the appointment of Italy’s new Minister of Defense, Elisabetta Trenta, and its impact on Italian involvement in Libya. According to Dona dalle Rose, the new Minister of Defense has demonstrated a certain independance from her administration. He states that Trenta’s views on the migration issue contrast with those of the Italian government. However, he argues that the minister is unlikely to redirect Italy’s position on that matter. As a result, Donà dalle Rose expects Italy’s involvement in Libya to continue focusing on the control of the migration flow.

Aug
2018

Exploring the alternatives to Migrant Detention Centers in Libya

Othman Belbeisi, the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Chief of Mission in Libya published on 22 August an op-ed with The New Arab. Belbeisi proposes four practical solutions that can be implemented in Libya as an alternative to the detention centers. In Libya, the IOM is opposed to the criminalisation of migration and aims at improving the conditions of live of the migrants rescued on the Libyan coast.

Aug
2018

On 30 July, Jalel Harchaoui published a Briefing paper on the response of Algeria to the Libyan crisis, in collaboration with Small Survey Report. The paper studies the evolution of the Algerian strategy towards its unstable neighbour. The research points out Algeria’s key role in international efforts towards the stabilization of Libya through the development of a stable democracy and its commitment to dialogue. He writes:

Algiers’ current Libya policy consists in working with, and exerting leverage on, various non-jihadi Libyan factions in order to help foster compromise. It favours a soft-landing transition into a unified Libya, preferring this to a scenario where one camp attempts to impose ‘stability’ by force and gives rise to the concomitant risk of unintended consequences.

Rhiannon Smith spoke to Radio Sputnik to discuss reports that Erik Prince, the founder of notorious private security firm Blackwater, is pitching for his new firm, Frontiers Services Group, to intervene in the migrant crisis in Libya. Smith discusses the many flaws in such a plan, questioning the practical, logistical and ethical basis of Prince’s claims that his firm could, “create a Libyan border police along the southern border,” and that his approach would be more “humane and professional” than current programmes. She also highlights that discussion around Prince’s firm is redundant anyway as Libya is a sovereign country and it is highly unlikely that any of Libya’s competing political powers would give the green light to such a notorious actor to intervene.

Click here to listen to the interview, or listen below.

Nov
2017

Who is to blame for the abuses of migrants in Libya?

Rhiannon Smith appeared on Al-Jazeera’s Inside Story yesterday to discuss the issue of human rights violations against migrants in Libya, who has the responsibility and capacity to deal with the crisis, and what practical solutions might help to solve it. She also highlights the dire situation being faced by many Libyans currently and discusses the impact of Europe’s recent policy to turn migrants back to Libya on the welfare of migrants in the country.

Watch the video below or click here to follow the link.

Nov
2017

Evidence of people being sold in slave auctions near Tripoli

In a shocking and truly disturbing CNN report, CNN reporters travel to what appears to be a town or suburb near Tripoli and film a real-life slave auction taking place where sub-Saharan Africans are being sold for as little as $400 to buyers who want to use these people for building or farm work without pay and against their will.

Carrying concealed cameras into a property outside the capital of Tripoli last month, we witness a dozen people go “under the hammer” in the space of six or seven minutes.

“Does anybody need a digger? This is a digger, a big strong man, he’ll dig,” the salesman, dressed in camouflage gear, says. “What am I bid, what am I bid?”

Buyers raise their hands as the price rises, “500, 550, 600, 650 …” Within minutes it is all over and the men, utterly resigned to their fate, are being handed over to their new “masters.”

After the auction, we met two of the men who had been sold. They were so traumatized by what they’d been through that they could not speak, and so scared that they were suspicious of everyone they met.

Click here to watch the full video report.

Nov
2017

Defusing the Ticking ‘Jihadist’ Timebomb: Can Transitional Justice Help Counter the Trend of Radicalisation in Tunisia?

In a new working paper published by Hate Speech International, Houda Mzioudet and Rhiannon Smith discuss radicalization in Tunisia and whether the country’s Transitional Justice process can help diffusing a ‘jihadist’ timebomb in the country. The 29-page report offers insight into radicalisation and violent extremism in Tunisia, looks at its root causes and gives an overview of the Transitional Justice process and its role in the struggle against radicalization in the country. Its key findings are:

Transitional Justice Allows Grievances To Be Aired, But Justice Must Also Be Seen To Be Done: If the perpetrators of human rights violations made public through the TDC hearings are not prosecuted or held accountable in some form, there is a risk that the process of publically airing human rights abuses and grievances will actually reinvigorate public anger and frustration, potentially radicalising a new cohort of disenfranchised Tunisians.

Transitional Justice Can Help Redress Past Abuses Against Islamists But Not At The Cost Of Justice For Other Victims: By introducing reforms and establishing justice mechanism which appear to favour one section of society over another, the legitimacy and effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms is likely to be undermined and could create a backlash which reignites tensions. There is a danger that a zero-sum approach to justice will lead to a cycle of repression and retribution which is likely to facilitate further radicalisation rather than preventing it.

Transitional Justice Mechanisms Can Help Seek Justice For Terrorism But Should Not Be Used As An Excuse For An Arbitrary Crackdown On Islamists: Excessive use of violence by the state legitimises the use of violence by those opposed to it, facilitating radicalisation. Transitional justice mechanisms should aim to create wide reaching institutional and systemic reforms which can tackle the root causes of the systemic grievances that led to the 2011 revolution and have also contributed to elevated levels of radicalisation among Tunisian youth.

Transitional Justice Mechanisms Can Help Bridge The Gap Between The Citizen And The State But Face Challenges in Implementation: Many of the grievances that sparked both the Tunisian revolution and the apparent acceleration of young Tunisians joining jihadist groups have their roots in the corruption and inequality that is endemic at an institutional level in Tunisia. Institutional change is by its very nature both excruciatingly slow and difficult to achieve. Transitional justice mechanisms have the potential to begin the process of reforming institutions and bridging the gap between the citizen and the state thereby treating, or at the very least recognising, the underlying cause of some of the country’s current problems. However, this is dependent on the state not obstructing or undermining the transitional justice process.

Click here to download the full report.

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