Africa | Libya Analysis

Mar
2020

Could coronavirus lead to an ‘Arab Spring 2.0’ ?

On 25 March, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack published with Nate Mason an article for Middle East Institute on the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis in the Middle East/North Africa region. Pack and Mason ponder whether the health crisis induced by the spread of the virus could lead to an ‘Arab Spring 2.0’. For Pack and Mason, the health crisis is most likely to have ripple effects on the political, security and social situations in the MENA region, given the relative state fragility in the area. Pack and Mason also consider the role of the United States in such a context.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2020

Egypt’s concerns towards Libya

In an article published with Middle East Monitor (MEMO), Mustafa Fetouri discusses the influence of Egypt over the Libyan file. For Fetouri, Egypt’s concerned with developments in Libya is rooted in security issues and the need to contain threats along the shared Libyan-Egyptian border.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2020

Despite LNA and GNA ‘accepting’ international calls for ceasefire amid pandemic, fighting continues on frontlines

On 17 March, the embassies of Algeria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Turkey, the UK, the US and the EU delegation to Libya called on the Libyan parties to sustain a humanitarian ceasefire and spare the country more suffering in the light of the COVID-19 outbreak. On 21 March, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the “positive responses” by the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) to the ceasefire calls on 18 March and 21 March respectively and expressed the hope that that the parties “stop the fighting immediately on all fronts to allow national health authorities and health partners to respond to the potential threat of COVID-19 in the country”. This came after LNA spokesperson Brigadier Ahmed al-Mismari announced that the LNA General Command “welcomed” the calls for a truce and is committed to stopping fighting so long as the other parties abide by it.” However, fighting does not appear to have ceased on Tripoli’s southern frontlines. On 24 March, forces aligned to the LNA in Tarhouna reported grad rockets striking the town while anti-LNA forces near Tripoli claimed shells struck Mitiga airport, killing two and wounding one.

Both parties to the Libyan conflict remain keen to burnish their international reputations and be seen to be the “good guys” when the opportunity arises. Given that a humanitarian pause in fighting is nominally an apolitical move, and given the coordinated call from key international players, it is not surprising that both the GNA and LNA moved to “welcome” a truce and continue to pay lip service to a ceasefire. However, the continued fighting on the ground, the reiteration of the need for the other side to abide by the ceasefire (meaning each side has a ‘get out’ clause), and the lack of any tangible mechanisms or parameters for a humanitarian pause mean that a meaningful truce is unlikely to take effect in the immediate term. There may be a lull in the fighting in the coming days in recognition of the humanitarian situation, while it is possible that terms for a temporary truce may be agreed in the short term if COVID-19 cases are confirmed and escalate in the country. The ongoing military standoff in southern Tripoli is likely weaken the efforts of health workers to contain the disease and further undermine efforts to detect and quarantine the cases of COVID-19.

Mar
2020

GNA prepares against coronavirus pandemic

In an article published on 22 March, Middle East Eye (MEI) reports on measures adopted by the Government of National Accord (GNA) to limit the spread of the coronavirus pandemic to Libya. After declaring a state of emergency last week, the GNA has imposed a night-time curfew and the closure of public spaces. Similar measures have reportedly been take in Eastern Libya. Due to the fragile health situation, there have also been calls for a ceasefire between rival parties, the Daily Sabah reports.

Click here to read the MEI article and here to read the Daily Sabah article.

Mar
2020

US Stephanie Turco Williams designated as head of UNSMIL

On 11 March, Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced the designation of Stephanie Turco Williams of the United States to act as the UN Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until the appointment of a successor for Ghassan Salame. Salamé stepped down after acting for 3 years as the UN Special Envoy to Libya.

Click here to read the full article.

Mar
2020

Contemporary warfare in Libya

On 3 March, Wolfram Lacher published for War On the Rocks an analysis of the patterns of warfare in Libya as the conflict in Tripoli drags on, fuelled by the support of international powers. For Lacher, the three pillars of warfare in Libya are drones, deniability and disinformation.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2020

Oil production drops to 114,331, with losses of $2.93 billion and fuel shortages

As of 8 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said current oil production was 114,331 bpd, down from 119,867 bpd on 4 March, with cumulative losses of $2.93 billion since 17 January. The NOC stressed that while it continues to supply hydrocarbons to all regions in sufficient quantities to meet the transport and domestic needs of citizens ‘for now’, some fuel storage levels are running low and next week some areas are at risk of shortages.

The economic and logistical impacts of the oil blockade will be increasingly felt in Libya in the coming weeks, yet there are no immediate signs that these negative trends have affected popular support for the oil blockade in eastern Libya. The significant drop in the global price of oil in the last week, combined with increased supply and decreased demand, means that meaningful international pressure on Haftar to end the strike is unlikely to be forthcoming in the short term. In short, the oil blockade is likely to remain in place for at least the coming month, and may be in place for several months.

Mar
2020

Russian and Turkish interference in Libya draws connection with Syria

In an article published on 6 March with Al-Monitor, Fehim Tastekin analyses the connection between Turkey’s policy in Syria and its recent involvement in Libya, underlining the increasingly proxy nature of the Libyan crisis. This article echoes an article published by Arab News on 9 March, which ponders whether the cease-fire negotiated in Idlib, Syria by Turkey and Russia will have impacts on the situation in Libya. In that regards, in an article published on 4 March, French newspaper le Monde Afrique reported on the rapprochement between Khalifa Haftar and the Syrian regime.

Click here for the Al-Monitor article, here for the Arab News article and here for the Le Monde Afrique article.

Mar
2020

Libya’s fragmentation

In a podcast released by The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), Wolfram Lacher, who is Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), discussed his latest publication, a book entitled ‘Libya’s Fragmentation’. In this book, Lacher focuses on conflict dynamics in Libya, and most particularly on the tensions deriving from the fragmentation of the Libyan landscapes in a variety of competing forces.

Click here to access to the podcast.

Mar
2020

Why is the EU unable to enforce the UN arms embargo

In an article published with The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Markus Kaim and René Schulz argue that the EU will not be able to enforce the UN Arms Embargo in Libya, despite its commitment to do so following the Berlin Conference. Kaim and Schulz demonstrate the extent to which the issue of arms control is central to the Libyan crisis, and the limitations faced by the EU in its attempt to tackle the issue.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2020

Jason Pack on SMA AFRICOM Panel on Libya

On 28 February, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack took part in a panel of experts as part of the SMA AFRICOM Speaker Series. The panelists included LTG(R) Michael K. Nagata (Consolidated Analysis Center, Incorporated [CACI]) and Mr. Jonathan Winer (Middle East Institute). During the debate, Jason Pack demonstrated the strategic importance of Libya from a NATO perspective and highlighted the growing proxy nature of the conflict.

Click here to listen to the discussion.

Mar
2020

Europe and the Gulf

On 25 February, writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Cinzia Bianco published a policy brief on how Europe can gain influence with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Bianco highlights the increasing role the Gulf countries play in conflicts such as Libya and Yemen, and advocates for Europe to develop a common European foreign and security policy on the GCC. As such, she insists on the need for Europe to improve its coordination.

Click here to read the report

Mar
2020

Fuel smuggling in Libya

Public Eye and TRIAL International released on March 2020 an in-depth investigation : entitled “Libyan fuel smuggling: a Swiss trader sailing through troubled waters”, the report looks at the international criminal networks taking advantage of the complex situation in Libya to make profit through fuel smuggling. Public Eye and TRIAL International investigated over a year in Switzerland, Malta and Sicily.

Click here to download the report.

Mar
2020

UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé announces resignation

On 2 March, the French newspaper Libération reported that Ghassan Salamé, the UN Special Envoy to Libya since June 2017 announced his resignation. Salamé justified his decision due to the deterioration of his health. For Rhiannon Smith, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC, interviewed by Liberation, the timing of Salamé’s resignation also reflects the failure of the Berlin conference, and the deterioration of the situation in Libya. Despite numerous efforts by the international community under the auspices of the UN since January 2020, negotiations between Libyan rival parties have not been successful, fighting has continued, and the oil blockades persist, endangering the already fragile economic situation in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

Rhiannon Smith on Voice of America to discuss dialogue initiatives in Libya

On 27 February, Rhiannon Smith discussed with journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight” the undergoing UN initiatives to foster dialogue between the rival Libyan parties fighting in Tripoli since April 2019. Smith highlights the complexity of the UN efforts, given that the fighting continues in Tripoli and Libya is on the verge of an important economic crisis resulting from blockades on oil operated by the Libyan National Army (LNA). She also discusses the recent announcements regarding a US base in Libya , which stands as yet another illustration of the influence of foreign actors on the Libyan file.

Click here to listen to the interview (between Minutes 1 and 6:30):

Feb
2020

Oil production drops to 122,430 bpd and fuel shortages continue as financial losses reach over $2 billion

On 24 February, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said in its public information bulletin that oil outputs had dropped to 122,430 bpd, resulting in cumulative losses of $2.1 billion since the start of the oil blockade on 18 January 2020. This bulletin expanded the coverage of fuel storage facilities to include figures for western Libya (Tripoli, Zawiyya and Misrata), with Tripoli and Tubruq fuel supplies at the lowest across the country. NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah said that the attack on Tripoli port could have led to a humanitarian and environmental disaster. The NOC condemned the attack in the strongest possible terms and asked the international community to intervene rapidly to prevent a serious escalation in the conflict and to allow NOC to manage fuel supplies.

There are no indications that domestic support for the blockade in eastern Libya is waning, despite the growing logistical and economic toll on the country. At present, it is Tripoli and southern Libya that are suffering most from the fuel shortages and power cuts. While the East is experiencing some fuel shortages and power cuts, this seems unlikely to dampen support in the short term. However, as the economic impact of the blockade worsens, the Central Bank is likely to stop or delay the payment of state salaries as well as the payment of institutional and operational budgets. This economic decline is likely to affect the East more than the West given the eastern banking system has no access to central reserves. As such, that could be the tipping point at which domestic support begins to erode.

Feb
2020

Lawsuits against Haftar in VA and DC proceed

There appear to be two separate lawsuits against Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar in the US – a Virginia civil suit and a DC District Court suit – submitted by two Virginia-based Libyan-American complainants. On 10 February, a press release concerning lawsuits against Haftar was issued by Martin McMahon Law Associates. On 12 February, this press release was distributed by Mercury Public Affairs LLC – the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) lobbyists in the US – and included in Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) disclosures. On 21 February, it was included in the Al-Monitor Lobbying Tracking.

The lawsuits against Haftar are unlikely to result in him being punished or sanctioned by the US courts in the short term. Nevertheless, they remain quite significant because, as long as they are in still in progress, they effectively block Trump from pivoting towards Haftar, inviting him for a White House visit, or embracing him as Libya’s rightful leader – even if he were to take Tripoli or figure out how to effectively export oil. The lawsuits also create a counter narrative for the GNA to use to try and undermine Haftar’s legitimacy and credibility. Finally, if a default judgment were issued against Haftar, it could spur more Congressional action for sanctions against a range of Libyan individuals and entities.

Feb
2020

Interesting MME report on perception of LNA in overtaken Western areas

As the conflict intensifies in Tripoli between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA), Middle East Eye published on 23 February a report on the areas overtaken by the LNA in Western Libya. The report indicates that there is a perception among local residents that the control of the LNA on these areas has brought along stabilisation to some extent, event though they also denounce certain restrictions. MME’s report is interesting to read in comparison to David D. Kirkpatrick’s article for New York Times on the impact of Haftar on life in Benghazi.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

Jason Pack for Al Jazeera on Geneva talks on Libya

Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was quoted in an Al Jazeera article published on 18 February. Al Jazeera reports on the renewal of tensions in Tripoli resulting from airstrikes by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli port. The LNA reportedly targeted a Turkish cargo ship carrying ammunition and weapons, indicating its opposition to the Turkish support provided to the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA responded by accusing the LNA of targeting civilian infrastructure, and suspended its participation in the second round of negotiations with the UNSMIL-mediated 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission. For Pack, the ceasefire talks are not likely to succeed as long as the UN arms embargo is not successfully implemented in Libya.

Click here to read the full article.

Feb
2020

Al Jazeera documentary on Libya’s desert rallies

On 19 February, Al Jazeera published a documentary on Libya’s desert rallies for cars and motorcycles. Entitled ‘A Rally for Hope’, the documentary demonstrates the resilience of Libyans as the country continues to face instability and political chaos.

Click here to watch the full documentary.

Feb
2020

Production drops to 135,745bpd

On 17 February, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said that oil production had dropped to 135,745bd due to the ongoing oil blockade, with cumulative losses at 1.617 billion USD. This comes after the NOC said on 13 February that crude oil storage at Zueitina oil terminal is full, resulting in the shutdown of the Waha-operated Farigh field and the loss of around 100 million cubic feet of gas per day. The NOC stressed that fuel supplies to the eastern and central regions remain sufficient, although the southern and Tripoli regions still face supply shortages due to the poor security situations.

The availability of fuel and electricity is likely to decrease further over the coming weeks as a result of gas fields connected to Zueitina going offline and Zawiyya refinery remaining offline. Despite efforts by the NOC to distribute fuel as fairly as it can across the country and despite it not being responsible for the blockade, it is likely that efforts by those in the East who oppose the NOC (namely the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the parallel eastern institutions) and see it as aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and therefore with Turkey and ‘terrorists’ will seek to use the situation to undermine and attack the NOC. As such, although the logical conclusions of worsening fuel and power shortages in the East would seem to be a dwindling of support in the region for the oil blockade, it may be that the combination of a targeted anti-NOC narrative and the polarised nature of Libyan society means that easterners are convinced that these shortages are yet another example of why the oil blockade is necessary for Libya’s long term stability and security.

Feb
2020

EU agrees to naval and aerial mission to block arms supply to Libya

On 17 February, following an EU foreign minister meeting in Brussels, the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell announced that 27 European Union (EU) foreign ministers had agreed to establish a military mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya, though the legal text for the mission has yet to be drafted. The aerial and naval mission will be known as Operation EU Active Surveillance and it will involve naval ships, planes and satellites. The mission will operate in the eastern Mediterranean and will not be a part of the EU’s existing Operation Sophia, which has a search and rescue function. The EU leaders were keen to stress that this new mission has a clear and different mandate and is not connected to migrant smuggling. Borrell stated that the EU was not in a position to monitor the Libya-Egyptian land border, where military capabilities are being transported to the Libyan National Army (LNA).

At this time, both Turkey and the UAE are continuing to send military provisions to Libya via sea and air – with the UAE notably sending in large volumes to Benghazi – in violation of the UN arms embargo. The LNA is also receiving military goods by land from Egypt. Although the UN arms embargo on Libya has been in place since 2011, it has frequently and increasingly been openly flouted by various foreign actors, especially as the conflict in Libya has intensified in the last year. The UN Panel of Experts has documented these violations, but no action has been taken to enforce the embargo or sanction those responsible, in part due to divisions within the UNSC on this issue and in part because it is unclear who would be willing to take on the role of enforcing the embargo on the ground. This is a notable step by the EU to actively work to stop the trafficking of arms into Libya, and is a sign that the EU is willing to act, rather than just talk about acting, to help halt the drivers of conflict in Libya.

Feb
2020

UN Humanitarian coordinator for Libya denounces impacts of conflict on civilians

On 17 February, Yacoub El Hillo, the U.N humanitarian coordinator for Libya and deputy representative reported in a briefing to international media outlets on the dire humanitarian situation in Libya, the Daily Mail reports in an article published on 18 February. Addressing the press from Tripoli, El Hillo denounced the violence suffered by the Libyan population, and most particularly in Tripoli as the conflict drags on.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

Democrats call for sanctions on Khalifa Haftar

In the United States, democrats have demanded sanctions on Khalifa Haftar, Bryant Harris reported for Al-Monitor 12 February. According to the article, the democrats consider that the Trump administration has been too soft on Haftar and also denounce the Russian influence and support received by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The call for sanctions on Haftar by the democrats is based under the 2017 US sanctions on Russia and is articulated in the line of US efforts to counter influence in Libya. The Libya file is a subject of significant interest in Washington, as both rival sides, the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar, have commissioned Washington-based lobby firms to defend their interest and win US support.

Click here to read the article

Feb
2020

High rents and fear of bombing

On 16 February, Mathieu Galtier published for French-written newspaper Jeune Afrique a report on the reality of daily life in Tripoli as fighting continues to rage around the capital between forces allied with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and forces allied with the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the influence of Khalifa Haftar. The interviews give a certain sense of how the conflict has impacted civilian lives: higher rents, fear of bombings, garbage piling up and most notably a sense of despair as the conflict drags on. Galtier also highlights an anger against the meddling of foreign powers.

Click here to read the full article.

Feb
2020

UN Security Council Endorses Resolution for lasting ceasefire in Libya

On 12 February, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution calling for a lasting ceasefire in Libya, France 24 reports. Through this, the UNSC aims for a viable ceasefire to be implemented between the warring parties in Western Libya, the resolution comes to reaffirm the principles of the January Berlin Conference which had gathered the international community to discuss the Libya file. Reports indicate that the 55-point ‘ceasefire roadmap’ was drafted by Britain approved by 14 votes out of 15 with Russia abstaining. However it remains uncertain whether such an initiative will truly allow for stabilisation. As reported by Forces Network, it will depend on the parties on the ground and most importantly on their foreign backers.

Click here to read France 24 ‘s report and Forces Network ‘s.

Feb
2020

Peace, Security and Crisis Response in Libya: An EU Practitioner’s Perspective

On 24 February, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation will be hosting in London (King’s College) Edouard Belloncle for a talk on “Peace, Security and Crisis Response in Libya”. Belloncle has been working within the European Commission at political, policy and programming level on issues related to peace and security in regions including MENA, Africa, and Asia. He is currently based in Tunis where he directs EU-supported interventions funded under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) in the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia).

Click here to register.

Feb
2020

Human Rights Watch denounces the deterioration of the human rights situation in Libya

On 12 February, Human Rights Watch published a report on the conflict in Libya, addressing what the organisation identified as a “steady deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in Libya since the beginning of 2019”.

According to the report,

In addition to the conflict-related abuses, Human Rights Watch has documented other systematic violations, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture. Widespread abuses against migrants and asylum seekers by smugglers and the GNA-linked coast guard and prison authorities have reached horrifying levels of ill-treatment and inhumane detention conditions.

As a result, Human Rights Watch calls on the UN Human Rights Council to establish a Commission of Inquiry to research and document such violations and report on the human rights situation.

Click here to read the full report.

Feb
2020

Growing tensions between France and Turkey

Over the course of the past weeks, international media outlets have been reporting growing tensions between the international actors involved in the Libyan crisis, and most particularly between France and Turkey. The tensions transpired through a declaration by French President Macron against the deployment of Turkish forces in Libya. In an article published on 6 February for Al-Monitor, Fehim Tastekin analyses that Turkey’s growing influence in Africa, in the economic, diplomatic and military sectors is threatening France’s influence in the continent.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

«Lorsque vous avez un allié qui a besoin de votre soutien et qui n’a pas d’autre alternative, vous pouvez en tirer des concessions.»

Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was featured in an article by Ximena Sampson for Radio-Canada published on 8 February in French. The article analyses the role played by international powers in the Libyan crisis since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. In the article, Pack highlights the dependence of the Government of National Accord to Turkish support in the fight against Khalifa Haftar and its self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA).

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

AU member states left out of discussions about Libyan crisis

In an article published on 4 February, Farouk Chothia reports for BBC News on the African Union meeting which took place in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, last week. The AU discussed the Libyan file. According to BBC News, AU members are feeling increasingly left out of the discussion regarding the Libyan crisis but suffer directly from its consequences.

Click here to read the full article.

Feb
2020

5 + 5 Joint Military Commission meeting in Geneva underway

On 3 February, the UNSMIL-mediated 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission began in Geneva between the GNA and LNA military representatives. The meetings are being moderated by the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame. The Commission was established as one of the points of the communique agreed by the international community at the Berlin Conference on 19 January. On 4 February, Salame said the parties have agreed on the principle of turning transform the truce into a more solid one, less often violated by either side, but stressed that now the question is what the conditions will be. He added that so far the two delegations had not met, but that he hoped they would be willing to sit in the same room eventually.

Feb
2020

What prospects for Libya’s healthsector ?

On 24-25 March, London will be host to a conference on Libya’s healthcare system, Libya Herald reported on 1^st February. The event is organised by the Libyan British Business Council (LBBC), the UK International Healthcare Management Association (UKIHMA) and the UK Department for International Trade (DIT) and will address the urgent requirements and future prospects for the Libyan healthcare sector.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

Washington lobbying firms at the service of both Turkey and GNA

In an article published on 30 January with Ahval, Nicholas Morgan exposes the links between Turkish and Government of National Accord (GNA) lobbying actions in Washington. As reported on Libya-Analysis, it was publicly known that the GNA had signed contracts with prime lobbying firms in Washington to influence the Trump administration in its favour. Morgan writes for Ahval that Turkey is engaged in similar affairs in Washington and that the GNA and Turkey have in fact reached out to the same firms.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2020

Berlin Conference reveals UE’s weakness

On 30 January, The Guardian published in an editorial its view on Libya, drawing on the Berlin conference which gathered Libya’s main political and military actors as well as foreign powers involved in the Libyan file. For The Guardian, the conference’s outcomes lack substance and do not set the ground for the end of fighting. In their understanding, the Berlin conference did not only reveal the weakness of the European Union as a mediator, but also highlighted the growing importance of foreign actors, such as Turkey.

Click here to read the editorial.

Jan
2020

Oil blockades continue, production expected to drop to post-Qadhafi low of 72,000bpd soon

Force majeure remains in place on all four Oil Crescent ports ( Brega, Ras Lanuf, , Zueitina, and Sidra) and the eastern port of Hariga where all exports have been suspended. Separately force majeure is in effect on exports from Sharara and al-Feel in western Libya due to valve closures at Hamada. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has begun issuing ‘Public Information Bulletins’ on the situation. As of 24 January, the NOC confirmed that oil production had fallen to 284,153bpd from an average of 1.22 million bpd prior to the start of the blockade on 18 January and that losses in oil revenue amounted to 318 million USD so far. The NOC anticipates that oil output will drop to around only 72,000 bpd in the coming days as the remaining storage facilities are filled up, with the cumulative economic impact being a loss of $440m.

Given international pressure and condemnation of the blockades has been woefully limited, support in eastern and central Libya for the blockades remains strong – buoyed by the desire to see corruption in Tripoli definitively ended – and the truce has largely broken down, it seems likely that the blockade could last for another 1 – 2 months. Nevertheless, if the UNSC and other key actors are able to reach an agreement and bring their influence to bear on both the blockade and the enforcement of the arms embargo, or if local support starts to diminish as the economic and humanitarian consequences of the blockades compound over time, then it is possible that the blockade could be lifted sooner.

Jan
2020

UNSMIL, Germany criticise breaking of UN arms embargo

On 27 January, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya,” especially those conducted even after concerned countries made commitments to abide by the arms embargo during the Berlin conference held on 19 January 2020. UNSMIL said the fragile truce between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) is now threatened by the ongoing further transfer of foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition and advanced systems to the parties by member states, including several who participated in the Berlin Conference. The statement condemned these ongoing violations and called on the countries involved to live up to their commitments to the UN arms embargo. Yet, the statement lacked a mention of concrete penalties or enforcement mechanisms.

On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas met EU High Representative Josep Borrell in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya. Maas called for the UN Security Council to enforce sanctions against those who breach the UN arms embargo on Libya, and said he hopes that the 5+5 committee will meet this week to discuss the possibility of a UN-brokered truce. The continuing violations of the UN Arms embargo in the wake of the Berlin Conference should come as no surprise. That conference provided no concrete penalties to those nations caught violating the embargo. As such, UNSMIL’s and the EU’s follow on statements, meetings and conferences about how to finally give the arms embargo ‘teeth’ remain likely to fail unless a major state (like the US or UK) states that they will unilaterally or bilaterally sanction or impose other penalties on states seen to be in violation.

Jan
2020

An European tour of divisions

In an article published on 23 January, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) proposes a tour of European capitals, looking at perceptions from Berlin, Rome, Paris and London of the Berlin initiative, the Germany-led initiative to solve the Libyan crisis. This European tour of a sort allows for a better understanding of the different positions on the Libya file among EU member states, and the resulting difficult to implement concrete actions.

Click here to read the article.

Jan
2020

Turkey’s African strategy goes beyond Libya

Earlier this month, Turkey’s joint attempt with Russia to broker a cease-fire in Libya caught the international community’s attention on the ties between Turkey and the African countries. On 27 January, in an article published with Al-Monitor, Barin Kayaoglu analyses Turkey’s strategy towards Africa. The author demonstrates that Turkey’s interests towards the African continent are not limited to the Libyan file. Kayaoglu’s article reveals that Turkey has developed since 1998 a fully-formed, multidimensional strategy towards Africa, serving its military, political and commercial interests.

Click here to read the article.

Jan
2020

Berlin conference unlikely to give way to lasting truce

On 21 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC discussed the outcomes of the Berlin Conference with Voice of America’s Mohamed Elshinnawi for Africa News Tonight. In the discussion, Smith argues that the while the final statement of the conference conveys an impression of a comittment of the international community to avoid prevent Libya from descending into more chaos, there were no real actions or measures to be implemented in the short tterm put forward. Smith also highlights the conflicting agendas and attitudes of the international powers which participated to the event.

Click below to listen (between 5:00 and 10:00 minutes).

Jan
2020

LNA blockades Oil Crescent ports, shutting in 800 000 BDP of production

On 17 January, a meeting of influential tribal leaders from eastern Libya and the Oil Crescent region issued a call to close down all the oil ports under their control and by the end of the day, oil exports from Brega, Ras Lanuf, Hariga, Zueitina, and Sidra ports had been halted Kufra. On 18 January, the Supreme Council of the Oil, Gas and Water Basin (SCOGB) issued a statement confirming the closure of all oilfields in the area of Zilla, Marada, Awjila, Jalu, al-Jakherra, Tazirbou and Kufra. Although the tribes appeared to drive the closures, a blockade on this scale can only have taken place with express permission and support from the Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA likely encouraged the blockade to strengthen its leverage prior to the Berlin negotiations and to highlight its territorial dominance.

On 18 January, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on Brega, Ras Lanuf, Hariga, Zueitina, and Sidra ports saying that the blockade instructions were issued by Major General Nagi al-Moghrabi, the commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) appointed by the LNA, and Colonel Ali al-Jilani from the LNA’s Greater Sirte Operations Room. The NOC said the instructions were given directly to the NOC subsidiaries in LNA-controlled areas – Sirte Oil Company, Harouge Oil Operations, Waha Oil Company, Zueitina Oil Company and Arab Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO). This blockade in the Oil Crescent has shut in 800,000bpd of crude – a daily financial losses of approximately $55 million per day – and prevented tankers from lifting.

Due to the Berlin conference taking place on 19 January, the international response to the blockade has been very muted. The United Nation Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) condemned the oil disruption and warned against devastating economic consequences, and the final statement from Berlin reiterated that the NOC is Libya’s sole independent and legitimate oil company and rejected any attempt at damaging Libya’s oil infrastructure or any illicit exploitation of its energy resources. On 21 January, the US Embassy in Libya issued a statement saying they are deeply concerned that the suspension of NOC operations risks exacerbating the humanitarian emergency in Libya and that NOC operations should resume immediately.

Jan
2020

How long can the truce hold in Tripoli?

Although the fragile ceasefire is just about holding in Tripoli at the time of writing, Serraj and Haftar did not meet in Berlin and did not agree to formal ceasefire terms. Instead, both have agreed to nominate 5 military officials each to a commission to discuss the ceasefire in Geneva next week. However, there is a significant disconnect between Berlin and events on the ground, and there seems to be little appetite among the Libyan belligerent for real negotiations. As a result, it seems unlikely that the truce will be converted into a formal ceasefire in the coming weeks and that fighting will start once more.

There are indications that both sides are using the ceasefire as an opportunity to regroup and bed down, with Turkey and the UAE actively resupplying their allies on the ground even while participating in the Berlin conference. Turkey has continued to send Syrian mercenaries as well as air defence systems to the GNA-aligned forces, while the UAE also appears to have been flying in shipments. Once one side unequivocally breaks the truce, the other will be ready to respond, meaning renewed conflict remains likely in the short term.

Jan
2020

Is an International Financial Commission Libya’s Last Hope? – Conference

On 13 January 2020, during a public panel at the Middle East Institute, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack presented his latest research, a policy paper entitled “An International Financial Commission is Libya’s Last Hope”, which he designed as a tool for policy-makers working on Libya to advance towards stabilisation.

Click here to watch the video of Pack’s presentation and following discussions.

Jan
2020

What’s left of Libya’s sovereignty?

According to Daniel R. DePetris in his latest article published with The National Interest on 20 January “Libya is dead […], for the past nine years, Libya has ceased to be a sovereign country”. Through this strong, challenging statement, DePetris wants to shed light on the highly complex situation in Libya, which sees its future and fate discussed by foreign actors, in events such as the 19 January Berlin international conference.

Click here to read the article.

Jan
2020

Major powers commit to “peaceful resolution” in Libya

On 20 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC Rhiannon Smith was interviewed by Russell Padmore for World Business Report on BBC World Service Radio and Radio 4. Smith commented the conclusions of the international conference on Libya which took place in Berlin on 19 January, and most particularly the reaction of the international community to the pressure applied to the oil sector by forces aligned with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).

Click here to listen to the interview (between 1:00 and 06:32)

Jan
2020

Press Conference USA VoA Podcast: Overview of the Situation in Libya with Jason Pack

On 17 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Carol Castiel and Mohamed Elshinawi as part of Voice of America’s Press Conference USA for a special Libya update. In this detailed interview, Pack highlights the changing nature of the Libyan file, where external actors such as Russia and Turkey have gained significant influence. For Pack, these actors are progressively taken the place of traditional foreign actors such as the United States, or European countries such as France or Italy. In that regards, he reminds of the strategic importance of Libya, at both a regional and international levels, and urges the international community to implement the right solutions to help Libya out of its chaos. Drawing on his recent researches, Pack demonstrates Libya’s critical need for economic reform and how breaking the cycle of war economy could pave the way for stabilisation.

Click here to listen to the interview:

Jan
2020

Rhiannon Smith on CNN Newsroom on Berlin Conference

On 19 January, Managing Editor of Libya-Analysis LLC discussed the Berlin Conference with CNN Newsroom as the meeting was taking place in Berlin, gathering Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj as well as Khalifa Haftar and 12 countries and international as well as regional organizations. Smith highlighted the determination of the Berlin conference participants in the initial communiqué on the matter of the protection of oil infrastructure, following the news on 17 January of a blockade operated by forces aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) on most of Libya’s Eastern oil terminals.

Jan
2020

Jason Pack on Al Jazeera and VOA discussing Berlin conference and proxy conflict in Libya

On 17 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack was interviewed by Mohamed Elshinawi for Voice of America’s International Edition to discuss the situation in Libya as the international community prepared for the Berlin conference. In this interview, Pack insists on the extraordinary nature of the Libyan conflict, which witnesses foreign powers fighting directly against each other on the Libyan soil. For him, this confrontation is almost unprecedented and aggravates the Libyan crisis.

The same day, Pack also appeared on Al Jazeera, where he discussed the meeting of Khalifa Haftar with Greek government representatives on 17 January. For Pack, the meeting has to be understood as a reaction to the Turkey-Government of National Accord (GNA) MoU on maritime and military cooperation, which boosted the support of Turkey to the GNA and the threat posed by Turkey to Greece. Moving on, Pack also presented the aims of the Berlin conference set to take place on 19 January in Berlin.

Click here to listen to Pack’s discussion for VOA (between 04:40 and 10:08) and here to listen to the AJ interview.

Jan
2020

Al-Monitor reveals meetings between Haftar representatives and US officials

On 13 January, writing for Al-Monitor, Aaron Schaffer reports that during summer 2019, lobbyists associated with Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) met with US Republican lawmakers and officials in charge of energy policy. The meetings, which were revealed by the disclosing of lobbying filling, Al-Monitor indicates, stands as another demonstration of the double games played by international powers such as the US regarding the Libya file. While most of the international actors support officially the Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA), sole institution to be recognized by the UN, international actors have also been developing contacts and attempted to negotiate with Haftar and his aligned forces. According to experts, such initiatives tend to disrupts UN-led attempts to create of dialogue between the GNA and Haftar.

Click here to read the report.

Jan
2020

Haftar and Serraj in Moscow for peace deal but Haftar leaves without signing

Following a series of rapidly moving developments resulting in the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Serraj, and the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, agreeing to implement a ceasefire in Tripoli from 12 January, both visited Moscow with the aim of them signing the Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement on 13 January. According to media reports at the time of writing, Haftar declined to sign the ceasefire deal because it did not include a deadline for disbanding the GNA forces and nor several demands he had made to Russia such as Turkish forces being withdrawn from Libya and the cancellation of the recent GNA-Turkey security agreement.

Haftar has a long history of bowing to initial pressure from international allies with regards to ceasefire and peace deals, but then either completely disregarding the processes or failing to adhere to the terms of the agreement. However, it is less clear if his unwillingness to agree to the ceasefire was due to his own desire to continue the military operations, pressure from his Libyan support base, or pressure from Egypt and the UAE – or a combination of all three. Although the conflict is now into its tenth month and the LNA’s resources remain strained, Haftar has always stated his desire to achieve a military solution to the Libyan crisis and had made no recent claims that his stance or that of the LNA had changed. Furthermore, the LNA has made small advances in southern Tripoli recently and made a significant gain by seizing control of Sirte on 6 January.

Despite Russia’s claims that Haftar is taking more time to consider the ceasefire deal and that mediation to this end will continue, it seems unlikely that Haftar will agree to sign the deal having made such a dramatic exit. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the current fragile ceasefire will automatically end and it may be that it continues up until the Berlin conference planned for 19 January. However, if the Berlin conference fails to take place or offers little in the way of tangible outcomes, then fighting is likely to resume.

Jan
2020

German Chancelor announces Berlin Conference on 19 January

On 14 January, German Chancelor Angela Merkel announced the organisation on 19 January of the international conference dedicated to the Libyan crisis referred to as the “Berlin Conference”. Germany had announced its intention hold the conference in September 2019, but the event was delayed. The precise cause for the delay remains unclear, most likely due to divisions between the international community and local actors on how to proceed with such an event. Since September 2019, in the context of the persisting tensions in Tripoli between Government of National Accord (GNA) forces and Libyan National Army (LNA) forces, the Libyan crisis has been a subject of deep divisions within the international community as international actors took sides in the conflict. The announcement by Chancelor Merkel follows the news that the attempt by Turkey and Russia to foster a cease-fire agreement between the GNA and the LNA fell through on 13 January. Indeed, Turkey and Russia had issued a joint call for a cease-fire, and invited both GNA Al-Sarraj and LNA Haftar in Moscow to discuss and sign the deal. However, reports suggest that Khalifa Haftar walked away from the deal as it did not encompass certain conditions he regards as non-negotiable.

Jan
2020

What’s at the heart of Turkey-Libya relationships?

On 27 December, Dr. Tankut Öztas and Ferhat Polat released with TRT World a report entitled “Turkey – Libya Relations: Economic and Strategic Imperatives”. The report aims at analyzing the multilayered dynamics which have bound Turkey and Libya over the past decades, in order to bring light on the recent rapprochement between Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). For the authors, Trukey’s involvement in Libya resulted of the instability created by Libya’s long standing power vacuum.

Click here to download the report.

Jan
2020

Are rival factions willing to engage in negotiations ?

Interviewed on 9 Jan by journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight”, Managing editor of Libya-Analysis Rhiannon Smith commented on Russia and Turkey’ joint call for a cease-fire between rival factions in Libya. For Smith, there are no clear indications that the factions are willing to negotiate even if they respond positively to the call for a cease-fire. Given the proxy nature of the conflict, Smith advocates for the international community to enforce and respect the UN arms embargo on Libya to pave the way for a political solution to the conflict in Libya.

Click here to listen (between 2:10 and 6:30):

Jan
2020

An International Financial Commission is Libya’s Last Hope

On 9 January, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack published with Middle East Institute a policy paper untitled “An International Financial Commission is Libya’s Last Hope”. The paper will be presented on 13 January 2020 from 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm during a public panel at the Middle East Institute’s new building at 1763 N Street NW. Pack’s latest research provides an in-depth analysis of the roots of Libya’s unique forms of dysfunction and seeks to examine how the Berlin Conference process and pending Congressional legislation (the 2019 Libya Stabilization Act) can be used as correctives and incentives to move towards an economic-based approach to peacemaking in Libya. This policy paper echoes Pack’s It’s the Economy Stupid: How Libya’s Civil War Is Rooted in Its Economic Structures, published in September 2019 with Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

Click here to download the report.

Jan
2020

LNA forces launch assault and capture Sirte, Misratan forces withdraw

On 6 January, the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an assault on the city of Sirte, resulting in the withdrawal of local anti-LNA forces and Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Misratan forces stationed there and the LNA gaining effective control of most of the city‘s suburbs, airport, and seaport. Following their withdrawal, the anti-LNA forces are reported to be planning a counter-attack. Brigadier General Ibrahim Bait al-Mal, GNN Central Military Region and Misrata Military Council member, has been assigned as the head of a new Sirte and Jufra Operations Room. Misratan forces are reported to have already started a counter-attack.

The timing of the capture of Sirte is critical as it comes in the wake of Turkey stating it will be deploying troops to assist the GNA in southern Tripoli and after the LNA issued an ultimatum to Misratan fighters to withdraw from Tripoli. The LNA likely wanted to “get the jump” on the anti-LNA forces by quickly gaining then consolidating territorial control prior to Turkey providing the anti-LNA forces with new aerial capabilities and ground forces. Strategically, Sirte marks the boundary between eastern and western Libya and has been controlled by Misratan forces since they drove Islamic State (ISIS) fighters out of the city in late 2016.

The LNA’s capture of Sirte is the most significant development in the LNA’s campaign to control Tripoli, both strategically and symbolically, since it lost control of Ghariyan mid-2019. The event is also the most overt ground encroachment by the LNA towards Misrata itself. As such, it is likely to boost the morale of the LNA forces and supporters, and allow them to continue to project an image of military dominance. It also allows LNA forces to push closer to Misrata, though they are unlikely to be able to make much headway in this direction. The LNA’s takeover of Sirte is likely to force Misrata to deploy forces away from Sirte in the immediate term to protect its own city from a potential ground assault and draw away troops from defending the capital. The LNA is likely to hold Sirte until the Misratan forces gain additional aerial support – both to defend their forces from the LNA drones and to attack the LNA positions in the city. It is unclear if and when this is to occur. Even with aerial support, the Misratan forces may struggle to re-take Sirte without significant ground fighting if the LNA are able to bed down and secure support from the local population. However, if aerial capabilities become more balanced, then Misrata is likely to have the upper hand in any drawn out ground fighting in the city due to the LNA’s manpower constraints.

Jan
2020

Turkey and Russia call for a truce in Tripoli

Following talks between presidents Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin in Istanbul, on 8 Jan Turkey and Russia called on Libyan factions to end hostilities and declare a cease-fire as of 12 Jan, midnight. The call for a cease-fire happens at a pivotal moment as Turkey had recently pledged to send troops to Libya to support the GNA against Libyan National Army (LNA) advances in the Tripoli area. This joint statement by Russia and Turkey could stand as a turning point in the conflict that has prevailed in Libya since April 2019 between factions aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and with Eastern Libya-based General Haftar. Thus far, Libyan actors have not responded to the call.

Click here to read the article.

Jan
2020

HoR members annul LPA and rename themselves the “Libyan Government”

On 4 January, 50 members of the Tubruq-based House of Representatives (HoR) held an emergency meeting in Benghazi and 38 members voted to annul the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), cut relations with Turkey, cancel the maritime agreement between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA), and bring GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj to justice for high treason. The HoR asked the international community to withdraw its recognition of the GNA, and renamed itself the “Libyan Government.” The HoR also called upon Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces to disrupt all ports and airports under control of the GNA to prevent the influx of mercenaries and arms to groups in Tripoli.

The GNA rebuffed the HoR emergency meeting, claiming the session was illegal, and reaffirmed its MoU with Turkey. The High Council of State (HSC) head Khalid al-Mishri said the HoR decisions are meaningless and are a result of pressures exercised by the “military oligarch who seized power in eastern Libya”. The HoR is seeking to use the current international division and chaos over Libya to undermine the GNA and reinforce its own position. While this decision has no legal standing and does not appear to have much wider support in Libya either at this time, it does highlight the HoR’s current strategy to influence the international landscape. Although nullifying the LPA would also technically undermine the HoR’s current legal standing, the HoR would likely say it is reverting to its mandate from the 2014 elections and use this to try and leverage international support. This development is indicative of the broken and polarised state of Libya’s political institutions.

Jan
2020

Conflict threatens Libyan oil sector’s long-term stability

On 27 December, Manager of Libya-Analysis LLC Rhiannon Smith was featured in Petroleum Economics exposéwith an on the current situation of the Libyan oil sector. For Smith, despite the worsening conflict, on the surface, Libya’s oil sector appears to be weathering the storm. However, she notes that:

The NOC remains chronically underfunded and the ongoing conflict has diverted further monies away from its budget. In addition, since the conflict started, the GNA has suspended much needed economic reforms—meaning Libya’s economy is likely to remain under strain, even if the conflict ends soon. As a result, the NOC will likely struggle to fund all the maintenance works required to keep production steady in 2020, let alone begin new expansion projects. As long as the conflict continues, and even if a ceasefire is agreed, it is likely that meaningful reengagement and investment from IOCs will be delayed until longer-term stability looks more assured.

Click here to read the analysis.

Jan
2020

Influence and energy: Russia’s various interests in Libya

On 25 December 2019, writing for Oil Price, Viktor Katona analyses the resumption of operations in Libya’s Oil Crescent by Russian oil company Tafnet. The company resumed operations in early December in its Block 04 acreage within the Ghadames Basin, with hopes that the investments will lead to tangible results. In the context of the tensions between Russia and Turkey on the Libyan crisis, such findings suggest that these tensions are likely to increase given Russia’s various interests in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Jan
2020

US to pullout troops from West Africa as part as review of deployment strategy

In an article published on 24 December 2019 with the New York Times, Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage and Eric Schmit report that the Trump administration is considering a reduction or potential pullout of American Forces from West Africa. This maneuver would be the first phase of a review of the global deployment of US troops around the globe, suggesting a shift in the US’s foreign affairs, breaking from the post 9/11 strategies deployed to fight against terrorism.

Click here to read the full article.

Dec
2019

Jason Pack on Turkey-Libya relationship

On 27 December, Jason Pack, Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC, was interviewed by Voice of America (VOA)’s Mohamed Elshinawi about the recent developments in Libya. Pack provides an insightful analysis of the stakes of the Turkey-Libya rapprochement and regarding the motivations of foreign actors.

Click here to listen to the interview between minutes 9:02 and 13:40.

Dec
2019

Turkey, Russia: the new actors of the Libyan crisis ?

Writing on 18 December for The Moscow Times, Emadeddin Badi commented on Russia’s increased involvement in Libya, while on 17 December, Tarek Megerisi and Asli Aydıntaşbaş published with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) an analysis of Turkey’s rapprochement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). Whether for Turkey or Russia, Badi, Megerisi and Aydıntaşbaş reach a similar conclusion, which is that these countries are filling up a void left by traditional Western actors such as European countries or the United States.

Click here to read Badi’s article on Russia, and here to read Megerisi and Aydıntaşbaş’ article on Turkey.

Dec
2019

Wintershall’s Sirte Basin concessions converted to EPSA IV format

On 12 December, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that it had signed two exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA VI) with the German energy company Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft for Areas 91 (previously named Area 96) and 107 (previously named Area 97) in the Sirte Basin. Under the agreement, Wintershall is to carry out exploration activities at its own cost and bear half the development cost, as well as provide 150 million USD for corporate social responsibility and sustainable development programmes and projects.

This agreement between the NOC and Wintershall marks the end of several years of dispute between the two organisations, which had led Wintershall to consider exiting the country in September 2019. Wintershall operates 8 fields near the Jakherra and Jalu oases in the Sirte Basin, most notably the Sarah field, and has been in Libya since 1966. Wintershall’s production in Libya had averaged around 160,000 bpd but by August 2017 it had dropped to 65,000 bpd and hasn’t risen much above that since. This agreement comes just days after the NOC approved Total’s acquisition of Marathon Oil Libya Limited’s shares (16.33%) in the Waha Concessions, a process initiated in March 2018 by Total and hotly contested by the NOC ever since. The NOC has now solved its main outstanding disputes with IOCs in Libya.

The NOC’s agreement with Wintershall is a positive development which is likely to improve investor confidence in Libya’s oil sector and the wider operating environment. The NOC’s decision has likely been driven by the increasing need to secure international investment and expertise to be able to deliver its ambitious 2.1bpd by 2024 plan, coupled with the deteriorating financial and operational conditions in the oil sector due to the ongoing conflict in Tripoli. It is unlikely that this new arrangement with Wintershall will lead to an immediate increase in production but it is possible that production from these fields will increase in the short- medium term.

Dec
2019

Stalemate persists in fighting for the control of Tripoli

On 12 December, in a brief televised video on the pro-LNA al-Hadath TV channel, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar announced a new ‘Zero Hour‘ for all his units stationed in southern Tripoli. Haftar told his troops that “today we begin the decisive advancement to the heart of the capital.” In his speech Haftar said that his forces’ victory was inevitably and urged all those who had joined the militias and terrorist groups in Tripoli to withdraw immediately.

In response, Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj called Haftar’s speech the ”zero of illusions” and urged his forces and what he called the “17^thFebruary Revolution” fighters to stand against the LNA. The LNA has announced at least four “Zero Hours” since the conflict began on 4 April 2019, with none leading to any notable gains or changes in strategy by the LNA. So far, this latest announcement seems to be following the same pattern. The timing of the speech was likely motivated by Turkey’s strengthening relationship with the GNA and its announced intentions to make a partial deployment of forces and/or provision of advanced weapons to the anti-LNA coalition forces in Tripoli.

As the conflict drags on and resources, manpower and morale come under strain, it is becoming increasing vital for the LNA to make a quick entry to Tripoli. Haftar’s speech is likely intended to serve as an attempted catalyst for a renewed push but also as a way to retake control of the narrative in Tripoli and posture to its international backers, domestic supporters and opponents in Tripoli that it is on the brink of making significant gains. While it is possible that the LNA may succeed in advancing into Tripoli, this is unlikely to signal an ‘end’ to the conflict – there is likely to be persistent street fighting with extreme deterioration in security, in addition to significant cost in human casualties and severe damages to infrastructure.

Dec
2019

Intensification of tensions in Tripoli likely to result from Turkey/Libya deal

In an article published with Al-Monitor on 16 December, Amberin Zaman discussed Turkey’s reaffirmed commitment of Turkey to protect the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in the wake of the controversial maritime deal between the two countries. For Zaman, this could likely lead to a Turkish intervention in Libya against the forces aligned with Eastern Libya-based General Haftar which have been fighting GNA forces for the control of Tripoli. For Kirill Semenov, also writing for Al-Monitor, Turkey’s renewed involvement in the Libyan conflict on the GNA’s side could also spark tensions between Turkey and Russia, who unofficially provides support to General Haftar.

Click here and here to read the articles.

Dec
2019

Haftar announces ‘decisive’ battle for Tripoli

On 12 December, Khalifa Haftar announced a “decisive battle” for Tripoli, international media report. The conflict opposing forces aligned with Haftar and forces aligned with the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) entered this December its tenth month as mediation efforts were not able to be pursued. Both rival sides are receiving important military support from foreign actors and have mobilised significant fighting resources. In a briefing paper published in August 2019 with Small Arms Survey/Security Assessment in North Africa, analyst Wolfram Larcher examines the identities and interests of the forces fighting each other over control of Tripoli. For Larcher, the 2019 conflict for Tripoli is not only deeply disrupting prospects for peace in Libya but also transforming the country’s military landscape.

Click here to read the report and here to consult the briefing paper.

Dec
2019

Turkey doubles down on Libya

In his latest article published on 10 December published with The Middle East Institute, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack discusses the proxy nature of the Libyan conflict, and focuses on explaining Turkey’s renewed interest in Libyan affairs which manifested itself through the controversial MoU with the Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea. Recounting the political and economic ties between Libya and Turkey, Pack explains this reinforced cooperation in the context of the current conflict, which opposes the GNA to the forces mobilized by Khalifa Haftar. For Pack, the GNA is likely to have agreed to the deal in order to receive from the Turkey the increased military support it needs to counter the Haftar offensive. As Pack demonstrates, in doing so, the GNA is risking its credibility as Libya’s sole legitimate government power.

Click here to read the full analysis.

Dec
2019

Nothing is set in stone for Libya’s future

In an article published on 10 December with The Global Observatory, Nate Mason highlights that despite efforts at international levels to push forward a solution to the Libyan crisis, the situation in Libya is not likely to get better any time soon. Mason explores different outcomes and demonstrates that while some solutions have been identified as a way out of the crisis, the exact contrary could still happen. As an example, Mason explores what could happen if the military solution did take over the Libyan conflict. Mason argues that to prevent the military solution to prevail, the United States should work to limit the influence of actors such as Egypt and Russia in Libya as they tend to favour General Haftar and his resort to violence.

Click here to read the article.

Dec
2019

NOC declares force majeure on Mellitah loadings after pipeline valve closed

On 9 December, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on crude loadings from Mellitah port after the 73,000bpd al-Feel oilfield went offline on 5 December due to “an unlawful valve closure” on the export pipeline from al-Feel field to Mellitah complex. This incident comes just days after operations at the Mellitah-operated al-Feel field were temporarily suspended on 27 November following clashes at the facility when the local Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Southern Protection Forces (SPF) attempted to take control of the field from the Libyan National Army (LNA)-aligned forces securing it.

The fact that the NOC has been forced to declare force majeure, despite waiting several days to do so, indicates initial attempts to strike a deal to reopen the valve have stalled. Despite the NOC’s zero tolerance stance towards blockaders, Sanallah will want to do everything he can to ensure that the pipeline reopens as soon as possible, especially given he is currently on an international investment drive for the Libyan oil sector and this force majeure, coming so soon after the attack on al-Feel, is likely to make IOCs and investors nervous. In the past, similar pipeline closures have tended to last 1 – 2 weeks, though the ongoing conflict in Tripoli and intensifying proxy warfare dynamics could mean that reopening the valve is less of a priority for actors other than the NOC, possibly hampering or slowing efforts to increase the pressure on those responsible. Nevertheless, the NOC is likely to apply maximum pressure to reopen the pipeline as soon as possible.

Dec
2019

Conflict in Tripoli enters tenth month as tensions persist

As the conflict enters its tenth month, tensions and disputes between the Government of National Accord (GNA) ministries and various armed groups continue to grow, with the coup of downing a Libyan National Army (LNA) jet being undermined because the anti-LNA forces involved have arrest warrants against them for possible ISIS links. The LNA continues to try and expand its support base in western Libya and maintain its posturing, gaining a controversial pledge of support from some Amazigh elders, while ICC-wanted Warfalli has reportedly deployed to the frontlines. The conflict shows no signs of abating and there have been no major territorial shifts, but the LNA does appear to maintain the upper hand at present. However, Turkey has pledged to send troops to Libya if requested by the GNA, which could shift the balance if this were to happen.

Dec
2019

UN accused of starving refugees in Libya

Libya-Analysis has taken this information from our colleagues and friends at Giver Me Your Tired Newsletter

The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, faces accusations it is deliberately denying food to some refugees and migrants in order to force them out of a housing facility.The Gathering and Departure Facility in Tripoli was intended to temporarily accommodate migrants selected for evacuation from Libya. But other refugees, fearing street violence, have gathered there, and the facility is now at twice its capacity. Meanwhile, evacuations from Libya continue 117 refugees and migrants were flown out to Rwanda in late November. UNHCR denies the charges.

In a leaked report, the European Union admitted it cannot effectively monitor the Libyan coast guard — which has been involved in repeated human rights abuses. Moreover, the EU report claimed that the detention of migrants is “a profitable business model” for the Libyan government. In October, the EU and Italy renewed a deal to support the coast guard, but the French defense ministry — under pressure from NGOs and facing a legal challenge — cancelled its plan to donate six boats to the Libyan coast guard for its operations.

Dec
2019

Is Libya NATO’s future?

As NATO members are currently gathered in London to discuss NATO’s future, Ethan Chorin argues in an article published with Forbes on 3 December that the Libyan crisis should be at the heart of NATO’s agenda. For Chorin,

“what happens next in Libya is immediately relevant to core NATO interests including combatting terrorism, addressing Europe’s migrant crisis, curbing Russian opportunism in the Middle East”

For Chorin, NATO may be the only organization with the capacity to push forward a solution to the persisting Libyan crisis. Chorin puts forward a controversial view, given the numerous critics NATO received following its initial intervention in Libya in response to Gaddafi, which led to the dictator’s fall and the subsequent period of chaos and tensions.

Click here to read the article.

Dec
2019

LNA strengthens aerial dominance and launches attack on Tripoli peripheries

Over the course of the last week, the Libyan National Army (LNA) maintained its aerial dominance over Tripoli, while the Government of National Accord (GNA) did not launch any aerial attacks. The LNA undertook aerial attacks on the southern Tripoli frontlines, particularly in and around Ghariyan, Aziziya, and Swani. Both the GNA and the UN condemned these attacks which caused civilian casualties. This coincides with reports that the LNA is now utilizing attack helicopters in Tripoli. The LNA also launched air attacks on Tripoli’s western and southern periphery. On 30 November, the LNA undertook aerial attacks targeting the National Mobile Force based along the Coast Road near the Tripoli West Power Station.

The LNA has successfully degraded the anti-LNA’s drone and aerial capabilities. Over the course of the last few months, the LNA destroyed at least 15 Baykar Bayraktar TB-2 drones. The GNA’s new military and security agreement with Turkey is thought to include the replacement of these lost capabilities, though a timeframe for their delivery remains unknown (as are the reasons for Turkey’s reasons for not providing them sooner). While the LNA has dominated the skies over Tripoli for the last few months, this has not resulted in a change in territorial control on the ground nor led to a successful decimation of the anti-LNA armed group leadership. As such, the LNA’s recent attacks on the Tripoli peripheries may hint at a new strategy or approach in its use of aerial capabilities.

Dec
2019

GNA signs maritime MoU with Turkey causing international controversy

On 27 November, the Government of National Accord (GNA) signed an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey, along with a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to expand security and military cooperation. The maritime agreement seeks to extend Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction in the eastern Mediterranean, though neither the GNA nor Turkish officials have provided details about the geographical boundaries or terms covered. This maritime MoU has led to rebukes and criticism from Greece, Egypt and Cyprus. Turkey is pushing to become the main natural gas hub for Europe and is competing with Cyprus and Greece for naval sovereignty over waters in the eastern Mediterranean in order to secure for access to and rights over oil and natural gas reserves in these waters by declaring an “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) where they have the right to explore and exploit natural resources. However, because of the concave shape of the Eastern Mediterranean, there is an overlap between the areas that each country can claim.

With regards to Libya, the agreement with the GNA will likely permit Turkey to expand and share its maritime jurisdiction with Libya, allowing it to exploit any hydrocarbon reserves in the swathe of territory between north-eastern Libya and south-western Turkey. Turkey has been in discussions with the GNA over the terms of this deal for several months. In the longer term, it is likely that Turkey will see greater benefit from this maritime deal than Libya if it is upheld, but the GNA is in dire need of short-term military support.

As such, it is likely that Turkey has been able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in return for continued or possibly increased provision of military and security support for the GNA-aligned forces currently fighting against the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Tripoli. This is vital given the LNA has been making some gains along the Tripoli frontlines in the past few weeks and the LNA’s aerial capacities, supported by the UAE, have dominated that of the GNA-aligned forces, supported by Turkey. Turkey also has broader strategic and economic interests in Libya, with over $19 billion-worth of contracts in progress in Libya. The GNA-Turkey maritime agreement is likely to deepen international fault lines and divisions with regards to Libya in multiple arenas, including NATO, the EU and the UN Security Council. This is likely to increase the proxy warfare dynamics of the Libyan conflict in the short term.

Dec
2019

U.S Libyan policy shift focused on keeping external actors out

Interviewed by journalist Mohamed Elshinnawi for Voice of America’s “Africa News Tonight” on 2 December, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack discussed the renewed interest of the United States in Libya. Pack notes that over the course of the past weeks, the U.S demonstrated a renewed willingness to engage in Libyan affairs. For Pack, the U.S renewed intention to play a role in the resolution of the Libya crisis can be understood as Washington’s reaction to reports about growing Russian presence and influence in Libya.

Click here to listen to the interview (between 13:55 and 17):

Nov
2019

Tales of Libya

In an article published in the New York Review of Books, Libya specialist Frederic Wehrey discusses the Desert Encounter, a book recounting the travels and thoughts of Knud Holmboe in 1930’s Libya. Holmboe has often been compared to the mythic Lawrence of Arabia, though the two characters differ. Wehrey recounts Holmboe’s story as he travels through the Italian colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in a compelling manner, and also draws parallel between Holmboe’s experience of Libya and the current times, deploring the persisting chaos in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

Economy at the heart of tensions in Libya

In his latest article published on 20 November with The Chatham House, Tim Eaton highlights the key role of economic matters in the tensions between Libyan factions. As a result, Eaton advocates for the creation of an economic commission as a tool to ensure transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances. For Eaton, the economic aspect should be included in the negotiations for a political solution that are expected to take place within the coming months with the Germany pushed initiative for the resolution of the crisis.

In his latest research, Jason Pack, founder of Libya-Analysis LLC, has also demonstrated the central role of economy in the Libyan crisis and drawn recommendations for an economy-driven approach to mediating the Libyan conflict.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

LNA declare no fly zone over Tripoli as US and Italian drones shot down

On 23 November, Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced a “No Fly Zone” (NFZ) over most of the greater Tripoli airspace. The LNA informed the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), civilian air transport companies, and all parties that utilize the Libyan airspace not to use the designated area due to it being a military operation zone. This decision intervenes after two drones, an Italian and a US military drone, were taken down over Tripoli.

The LNA’s increasing aerial dominance over Tripoli is giving it additional political leverage within some domestic and international audiences by projecting an image of dominance. It is likely to take credit for any downing of enemy drones (or those linked to the opposing side in the case of Italy), even if it is not actually responsible, as this strengthens this image. Likewise, it is likely that the LNA’s announcement about a NFZ is a move to project power and reinforce the message that it was the LNA which brought down the foreign drones last week, rather than marking a significant ramping up in efforts to shoot down drones or any efforts to target civilian aircraft in the airspace. Nevertheless, the LNA is the dominant aerial power in Tripoli and western Libya at present, and it is possible that it is receiving advanced military support for its current aerial operations from external supporters or foreign mercenaries on the ground.

Nov
2019

US Senators introduce bill in support of diplomatic solution to the Libya crisis

On 21 November, members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Chris Coons, Lindsey Graham, Chris Murphy, and Marco Rubio – introduced a piece of legislation called ‘the Libya Stabilization Act’ which attempts to clarify and enhance US policy in support of a diplomatic resolution to the Libyan crisis. The proposed bill would see the creation of a report on foreign government involvement in the crisis, require a strategy to counter Russian influence, see sanctions placed on individuals considered to be furthering the conflict, and marshal humanitarian assistance and economic reform to support the Libyan people. The document also calls for the appointment of ‘US Special Envoy for Libya’ to coordinate with other foreign governments and international entities to advance ‘a sustainable diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya.’

This bipartisan bill has been introduced in both the House (this took place in October) and the Senate, but it has not yet been debated or passed in either. If it is passed, most of the provisions within the bill will likely require several months to be implemented, likely longer for the process of sanctioning specific actors. This Senate version of the bill is very similar to the House version, and both are in lock step with UNSMIL’s approach of late. It has bipartisan support and may be passed without debate.

This bill is likely to be a negative blow for the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s hopes of winning the US over to its side of the conflict and its push for a military solution to the crisis. However, it should not necessarily be seen as an overt political move in favour of the GNA as many of the sanctionable actions identified in the bill will also apply to forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as GNA officials and their international allies. In addition, while this bill clearly advocates a political approach to solving the Libya crisis and will likely strengthen the perception among Libyans and internationals that the US is more willing to seriously engage on Libya in the coming months, the bill is primarily symbolic and meant to deter Russia rather than to compel any specific US action. This bill should be seen more as a step towards consolidating and clarifying misperceptions about US policy towards Libya.

Nov
2019

U.S military drone taken down by LNA in Tripoli

On 22 November, U.S military reported having lost an unmanned drone aircraft over Tripoli. According to official reports, the drone was lost while assessing the security situation and monitoring extremist activity. On 25 November, a senior of the Libyan National Army (LNA) declared that the LNA was responsible for the destruction of the drone, which was reportedly mistaken by LNA forces for a Turkish drone. LNA officials apologized for taking down the drone and agreed to coordinate operations over Tripoli with U.S military. The complex situation in Libya, and most particularly in Tripoli over the course of the past months, has seen the growing use of technological items such as drones.

Click here and here to read the reports.

Nov
2019

Husni Bey analyses the results of the economic measures implemented by the GNA in 2018

On November 14, Husni Bey published an op-ed with Libya Herald in which he analysed the results of the economic reforms implemented by the Government of National Accord (GNA), marking the first anniversary of their implementation. For Bey, these fiscal policy reforms which were designed to address Libya’s monetary policy failures have been met with success. Among other things, Bey highlights that these measures allowed for the strengthening of the Libyan dinars. In his conclusion, Bey draws recommendation for the GNA on how to pursue these efforts.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

LNA Military Prosecutor Office turns down the ICC appeal

On 17 November, the Libyan National Army (LNA) Military Prosecutor, Gen. Faraj al-Sousa, refused the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) appeal to apprehend the al-Saiqa Special Forces unit commander, Maj Mahmoud al-Warfalli, to stand trial for alleged war crimes. Al-Sousa said they have already cooperated with the ICC concerning a number of alleged war crimes and human rights violations in Libya, and that al-Warfalli was already under domestic investigation in Libya.

On 6 November, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, renewed her call upon relevant authorities in Libya to apprehend Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli and Al-Tuhami Mohammed Khalid (Qadhafi Libya head of the Internal Security Directorate) Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli. Bensouda stated the current cycle of violence and impunity provided a breeding ground for atrocities in Libya. Referencing ”reliable information” Bensouda made known the ICC’s view on the whereabouts of all three suspects: Saif is in Zintan, Al-Tuhami is in Cairo, while al-Waraflli is in Benghazi where he still in command of a Saiqa unit. Bensouda deplored the promotion of al-Warfalli twice since the ICC issued a first arrest warrant against him in August 2017, a second arrest warrant in July 2018.

The LNA Military Prosecutor issued an investigation order of Al-Warfalli in August 2017 following the ICC arrest warrant. However, the court proceedings were never publicized nor ever reached a final verdict. Later in July 2018, Hafter was pressured by the ICC into ordering an immediate arrest of al-Warfalli. However, al-Warfalli resisted the arrest order, leading his fellow soldiers to stage a protest across Benghazi. Despite this, he was apprehended. The LNA is likely to continue in declining the ICC calls of surrendering al-Warfalli. Al-Warfalli remains popular in Benghazi and the LNA’s extradition would likely cause schisms within the local population, as well as outrage on behalf of Madkhalist Salafists within the LNA’s rank and file.

Nov
2019

United States willing to boost economic cooperation with Libya

On 18 November, Libya Observer reported the appointment of US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland as Honorary President of the US-Libyan Chamber of Commerce. The mission of the organization is to facilitate the entry of US companies in the Libyan market, hence the appointment of Norland as Honorary President suggests a willingness to boost economic cooperation between Libya and the US.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

As Russia’s influence grows in Libya, the U.S should revise its Libyan strategy

In an article published on 18 November with National Interest, Emily Estelle looks at Russia’s growing presence and influence in Libya, arguing that Russia is currently capitalizing on the void left by the U.S in Libya. For Estelle, the U.S should react to Russia’s Libyan policy by revising its own strategy for the country.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

Peace pact signed in Ubari to adress inter tribe violence

In an article published with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on 13 November 2019, Nate Wilson and Abigail Corey report on the peace pact signed in Ubari in September 2019 to address violence and retaliation between communities such as the Tebu and the Tuareg. In partnership with a local association, the Azgar Association, USIP worked with local actors and communities to address Ubari’s history of inter tribe violence. The peace pact stands as a result of this community-based initiative for dialogue.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

France 24 series report on complex Libyan crisis

Over the course of the past week, France 24 has released a series of video reports on the conflict in Libya. In short videos, journalists Julie Dungelhoeff, Abdallah Malkawi and Catherine Norris Trent explore different aspects of the crisis, whether the militia fighting in the Tripoli area, or the fate of migrants or Benghazi’s slow reconstruction. The series interestingly presents the multiple aspects of Libya’s protracted conflict.

Click here to listen to Julie Dungelhoeff’s presentation of the series and access the different videos.

Nov
2019

U.S and GNA joint statement warns against Russian influence in Libya

Following a meeting in Washington D.C between the U.S Department of State and a delegation of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) represented by Foreign Minister Mohamed Siala and Minister of Interior Fathi Bashaga, the Department of State issued on 14 November a joint statement on U.S.-Libya Security Dialogue. In the statement, the U.S Department of State calls for the Libyan National Army (LNA) to end its offensive on Tripoli and warns against Russia’s « attempts to exploit the conflict » in support to Libya’s territorial integrity. This declaration follows a thread of reports about Russia’s alleged undercover activities in Africa in general, and in Libya in particular. The statement can be interpreted as a sign of the U.S’s renewed interest in the Libyan crisis and willingness to be involved.

Click here to read the report.

Nov
2019

Qatar-Turkey relationship at the heart of Turkey’s involvement in Libya, according to Avhal

In an article published on 13 November with Avhal, David Lepeska looks at Turkey’s involvement in Libya, noting that since May 2019, Ankara has imposed itself as a key player of the Libyan crisis by openly supporting the forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and its allies through weapon deliveries and trainings. For Lepeska, the reason behind Turkey’s involvement in Libya has to do with Turkey’s close relationship with Qatar.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

Security and economics as the drivers of Italy’s Libya policy

On 7 November, Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud published with Al Jazeera an article in which they expose Italy’s controversial policies in Libya, and most particularly its policies relating to the refugee crisis. For the two journalists, Italy’s policies in Libya are driven by security and economic interests, which contribute to the complexity of the situation.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

Facebook takes down social accounts interfering with African political affairs

On 31 October, Voice of America (VOA) reported on Facebook’s decision to take down social media accounts that were allegedly used by Russian entities to interfere with African political affairs. Facebook allows the publication of paid political adds on its platforms and according to the reports, this solution was used by Russian entities to influence public opinion in some countries, among which Libya. The article reports that in Libya this campaign was in support of Khalifa Haftar and Saif Al-Islam. For experts, this is an example of what Russia is capable to do to increase its influence over new territories.

Click here to read the article.

Nov
2019

LNA continues with airstrikes in Tripoli and Misrata, including Mitiga airport

On 3 November, a spokesperson for the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Volcano of Rage Operation said that the Libyan National Army (LNA) had conducted four airstrikes against Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, forcing a passenger plane flying from Tunisia to nearby Misrata airport to be rerouted. It is not clear whether any damage was caused by the attack. The LNA confirmed the strike on the “military parts” of Mitiga airport, targeting “storage facilities used to prepare unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and store ammunition”. This comes after the GNA formally reopened Mitiga airport on 29 October and said that they planned to resume flights in the next two weeks

The LNA appears to be pushing for territorial advances on the ground in Tripoli and as such LNA airstrikes against strategic targets in Tripoli, Misrata and locations west of Tripoli are likely to continue in the short term. Likewise, LNA forces are likely to continue to attempt to gain ground along the Tripoli frontlines, in particular along the southwestern and central axes. However, unless it receives a major influx of foreign support or additional manpower, it remains unlikely that the LNA will succeed in taking control of Tripoli in the short term.

Nov
2019

Malta impounds Russian-produced Libyan banknotes bound for parallel CBL

On 1 November, reports emerged that, at the end of September, Maltese authorities seized and impounded two 2,000 cubic feet containers packed with Russian-printed Libyan currency destined for eastern Libya as the shipment docked in Malta. Maltese authorities have allegedly informed the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Foreign Ministry that they will temporarily hold on to the banknotes and proceed in coordination with the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL)

Russian customs data published by Reuters on 29 October shows an increase in the amount of Russian-printed Libyan bank notes delivered to the parallel CBL in eastern Libya this year – both prior to and after the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched its assault on Tripoli. From February to June, four shipments with around 4.5 billion Libyan dinars in total were shipped to the East.

Aside from concerns about the influx of cash undermining confidence in Libya’s currency and disrupting efforts to address the country’s monetary policy, these revelations highlight what appears to be the LNA’s dependence on cash deliveries to finance its military machine and campaign in Tripoli. It is unclear whether the diversion of this cash delivery will directly undermine the LNA’s ability to fund its military activities in the short term or whether it will simply look to access funds from elsewhere. In the longer term, the LNA will either need to access more of Tripoli’s financial resources (by force or through a political agreement) or find alternative ways to maintain the funds it needs to keep operating (through predatory economic behaviour, international support or de facto partition). Russia’s willingness to supply the cash and Malta’s move to impound the shipment clearly highlight the growing proxy nature of Libya’s conflict, a destabilizing factor which is unlikely to disappear in the short term.

Nov
2019

Third Annual NUCSLR Conference to be held on 15 November

On 15 November, the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NUCSLR) will host its third annual conference in Washington D.C. The subject of the conference is “Re-engineering Libya: economic, institutional and security requirements” and will gather a dozen of scholars, analysts and activists who focus on Libyan matters. Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack will take part in the event and present his latest research “It’s All About the Economy, Stupid” which focuses on how to integrating transparency and accountability in Libya’s political agenda.

NCUSLR Conference Program 2019 Final (1)

Nov
2019

The Libyan crisis must not be reduced to the fight with Khalifa Haftar

On 02 November, Wolfgang Pusztai Chairman of the Advisory Board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NUCSLR) published with the German journal Orient a note on the key factors of instability in Libya. Pusztai presents and analyses the different factors which make the complexity of the Libyan crisis and insists on the idea that the current conflict should not be reduced to the fight against Khalifa Haftar or Islamist factions.

Orient IV-19 Key factors of Instability in Libya

Oct
2019

Jason Pack on Al-Jazeera on Russian supply of Libyan Dinars to Eastern institutions

On October 29, Reuters reported as an exclusive information that supplies of bank notes from Russia to parallel Eastern Libyan institutions accelerated over the course of the past year. Reuters collected the data from Russian customs, which indicates that between February to June 2019, Russia sent these parallel institutions nearly 4.5 billion Libyan dinars ($3.22 billion). Both Western and Eastern Libya face a severe liquidity crisis. Founder of Libya-Analysis LLC Jason Pack commented the event in an interview with Al-Jazeera on 29 October. He explains how this support by Russia undermines the legitimacy and authority of the Western-Libya based Central Bank of Libya (CBL) which supposedly holds the prerogative of controlling the amont of currency in circulation in the country. For Pack, this event underlines the war on economy taking place in Libya as the same time than the war for territory and political legitimacy between rival military and political factions.

Click here to read the Reuters report and here to listen to J. Pack.

Oct
2019

Gas outputs from Farigh Field to increase to quarter billion cubic feet per day

On 23 October, the Waha Oil Company announced the beginning of operating tests of phase 2 at the Farigh field. Farigh field’s gas production capacity is set to increase by 180 MMSCFD in the next two weeks – bringing the total quantity of gas to be pumped from Farigh field to approximately 250,000 MMSCFD by November 2019, in addition to the production of 15,000 barrels of condensates. This development is seen as part of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) five-year strategy to increase oil and gas production. The NOC said that Farigh’s gas will be used to increase the efficiency of crude oil production at the Intisar 103 field and could supply power plants in the eastern region such as the Benghazi North power station, replacing subsidized liquid fuel. The project will also increase gas supply to methanol plants and the Libya Norwegian Fertilizer (LifeCo) at Brega port [O-A1]. The NOC is awaiting the General Company for Gas Transmission & Distribution’s completion of gas pipeline installations to connect the Farigh field with the Sarir power plant, carried out in collaboration with Petrojet, an Egyptian company.

The development of the Farigh field is an important baby step towards achieving the longer-term production targets of the NOC. Apart from the potential revenues generated by increased gas exports, light-fuel fed power stations in eastern and central Libya could ultimately be replaced with gas supplies. This, however, requires financing of a modern downstream infrastructure which is less costly to operate and guarantees safer and steady supplies to power stations. However, that goal is likely to be unattainable currently amid serious shortages in NOC development financing and the on-going division of state’s financial institutions.

Oct
2019

Russia divided over Libya policy

In his latest article with Al-Monitor, Kirill Semenov argues that Government of National Accord (GNA) PM Fayez Al-Sarraj’s recent visit to Sochi, Russia, exposed the internal Russian divisions on Russia’s Libya policy. On 23-24 October, Russia hosted the first Africa-Russia summit and Economic Forum in Sochi, an event which was designed by Russia as a way to expand its influence in the African continent. For Semenov, Sarraj’s visit to Sochi can be interpreted as a gesture of recognition of Sarraj’s political legitimacy and compensate for the alleged strong links between Russia and Libya’s Eastern-based armed forces and parallel institutions. According to Semenov’s sources, Russia had objected to the presence of Libyan parallel factions at the forum. Over the past months, there have been growing controversies regarding Russia’s involvement in the Libyan crisis.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

What options for Khalifa Haftar?

In an article published with Global Risk Insights on 20 October, Ibrahim Sowan assesses Khalifa Haftar’s options in regards to the persisting stalemate resulting from the launch of an armed offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. For Sowan, Haftar’s options heavily depend on the material and financial support provided to the Libyan National Army (LNA) by foreign powers.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Berlin Conference delayed until April 2020, increasing pressure on GNA PM Sarraj

On 21 October, the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Ambassador to Italy, Omar Tarhouni, stated that the planned international conference on Libya to be held in Berlin will occur in April 2020. The precise cause for the delay is unclear, but it does not come as a surprise as international actors and their Libyan allies have been setting competing trajectories for peace, insisting on uncompromising and often unachievable conditions for their attendance, and in some cases seeking new approaches – often requiring the exclusion of others.

In the meantime, Libyan politics are likely to be marked by the development of international tensions within the GNA. Indeed, the main aim of the international conference is to establish a new political process which would likely see the whole GNA structure dismantled, removing Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj source of authority and legitimacy. Internal tensions have already surfaced, with reports that the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashagha, is pushing for a reshuffle of the GNA’s ministerial positions in order to include more Misratan powerbrokers and allies in the international recognised government – and possibly to even supplant PM Sarraj himself.

The delay to the Berlin conference reinforces the assessment that momentum for a peace process in Libya appears to be stalling. This delay is likely to increase pressure on Serraj and his inner circle in the short term, and he will likely be scrambling to find other avenues to retain his hold on power in the coming weeks. Other actors within the GNA and broader anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) coalition are likely to seek to turn this delay to their advantage by using the time to better position themselves politically and strategically in anticipation of the eventual mediation.

Oct
2019

Erratic governance could result in NOC partition

In his latest article published on 22 October with Petroleum Economist, Chris Stephen argues that political and security instability in Libya is derailing attempts by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to convince international oil companies (IOCs) to resume activities in Libya. Explorations by Italian oil company ENI were expected to resume in 2019, with the hope to boost Libya’s oil output, however the project was slowed down by the escalation of tensions between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and rival forces aligned with General Haftar. For Stephens, the system is plagued by an erratic governance, which could result in a partition of the institution, as warned by NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah in a visit to Washington this month.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Richard Norland’s first days in Libya

On 14 October, the US Embassy in Libya released on its website a report on the activities of US new ambassador to Libya Richard Norland during his first 60 days in Libya. The report aims at demonstrating the renewed involvement of the United States in Libyan affairs and most especially the support provided by the US to key institutions such as the National Oil Corporation.

Click here to read the report.

Oct
2019

Analysts call for the Trump administration to rethink its Libya policy

On 15 October Michael O’Hanlon and Federica Saini Fasanotti wrote for The Hill an article untitled “What is the future of Libya” in which they present recommendation on solutions to rebuild the Libyan state through decentralization. Their analysis is supported by a report initially published in February 2019.

This new article by O’Hanlon and Fritz echoes a previous publication earlier this week on The National, in which they present the crisis in Libya as an opportunity fo the Trump administration to demonstrate its foreign policy abilities.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Sputnik interviews Khalifa Haftar as fighting rages in Tripoli

On 15 October, Russian media Sputnik released an interview of Eastern Libyan Khalifa Haftar, discussing the fighting in Tripoli between Haftar’s allied Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and the factions aligned with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) as well Haftar’s ambitions regarding elections in Libya.

In the interview, Haftar claims to be defending Tripoli, and not attacking it and deplores the impact the conflict has had on civilians. Haftar provides Sputnik with a lengthy explanation of his ambitions regarding Libya, advocating that the international community should support the LNA and the offensive on Tripoli as a measure to restore stability in Libya, and denouncing the weakness of the GNA.

This interview by Russian-media Sputnik seems to stand as an attempt to portray Haftar under a different light, countering the mainstream representation of Haftar as a renegade war lord.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Berlin Conference on Libya delayed as UN Special Envoy Salame calls for action not words

The planned “Berlin Conference” on Libya will be delayed until at least November, or even as late as early 2020 according to some reports, despite originally being slated for this October. Germany is now looking to hold a pre conference meeting with international states involved with the Libya crisis, excluding Libyan actors. The precise cause for the delay is unclear, though both domestic and international actors have been digging in their heels and setting uncompromising conditions for their attendance – often requiring the exclusion of others.

On 11 October, the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, said he remained hopeful that the Berlin Conference would lead to a UN Security Council resolution preventing foreign countries from escalating the crisis in Libya through a proxy war, as well as the implementation of mechanisms to enforce the arms embargo. In an interview he added that the countries where those weapons are produced or bought should commit publicly to stop any transfer of arms to Libya

International momentum towards a peace process in Libya appears to have stalled as a result of international actors and their domestic clients insisting on setting unhelpful and often unachievable terms for their participation. In addition, while the international drivers of the Libyan conflict are significant and justify an international focus to the talks, the prospect of holding a Libya conference without the presence of any Libyan actors could undermine the conference’s integrity, particularly among Libyans. This in turn would undermine the chances of converting any international agreement into a political agreement on the ground in Libya. While Salame and other actors are undoubtedly working as best they can to bring about productive talks, there is little indication at present that the actors (foreign and Libyan) responsible for the worst of the destructive, partisan behaviour in Libya are serious about changing their approaches.

Oct
2019

Is Libya becoming a case study of the privatisation of war?

In an article for Al Bawaba published on 9 October, Sebastian Rees comments the reports of Russia’s involvement in Libya through the presence of mercenaries. For Rees,

The increased privatisation of Libya’s war through the involvement of Private Military Contractors augurs badly for an end to hostilities in the country

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Seizing the opportunity of Haftar’s gradual collapse

On 4 October, Tarek Megerisi argues in an article for Middle East Eye that General Haftar is gradually losing terrain and power since the launch of his Tripoli offensive in April. For Megerisi, the gradual collapse of Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) has manifested itself through the escalation of air strikes by Haftar’s foreign backers over the course of September. As such, Megerisi advocates for its opponents to seize the opportunity to impose their conditions.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Libya – Rich in Oil, Leaking Fuel

Tim Eaton published with Chatham House a compelling research on Libya’s oil sector untitled “Libya – Rich in Oil, Leaking Fuel” in which he presents how up to one-third of Libya’s oil resource is stolen from the official supply chains supposedly controlled by state institutions, depriving Libya’s population. He recounts the persisting issue of fuel shortages experienced by Libyan citizens and the significant increase of illegal activities linked to the fuel sector. For Eaton, this phenomenon is a direct result of the governance and security crisis in Libya, he notes:

“Libya’s governance crisis exacerbates flawed governance structures within state-run and -owned institutions, providing ample opportunity to mask the diversion of fuels into the black market and for the individuals involved to make major profits while defrauding the state”.

In his conclusion, he advises against economic policies solely focused on the removal of subsidies to bring a halt to smuggling and theft but on a greater emphasis on transparency within the system and its institutions.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

LNA airstrikes and clashes continue in Tripoli but stalemate persists

Despite another week of intense clashes and airstrikes, there have been no notable territorial changes along the southern Tripoli frontlines. However, on 6 October, fierce fighting occurred on al-Khalat Street as the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) 128 Infantry Battalion claimed control of the al-Wadi building. The also LNA claimed to have made advances along Airport Road as they push towards Aziziyah and Swani.

Airstrikes continue to dominate reporting, with civilian casualties on the rise. On 6 October, aerial attacks injured civilians at the Equestrian Club in Tripoli’s western suburb of Janzour, leading to widespread international condemnation. On 7 October, paramedic Dr Samir Sibai was killed by an air strike at a field hospital in southern Tripoli.

The overall military stalemate in southern Tripoli is likely to remain in place in the short term. The LNA’s aerial targeting of locations deeper into central Tripoli is likely to continue given the ongoing stalemate on the frontlines in southern Tripoli. This increases the risk of collateral damage and deaths in residential areas, as well as displacement of residents from central Tripoli. It also makes it more likely that the LNA will start to target more political targets, such as institutional headquarters.

Oct
2019

Foreign support has transformed the Libyan conflict into a tech battlefront

In an article published on 8 October on the All Africa website, Matthew Herbert of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argues that the conflict in Libya has transformed into a tech battlefront with drones airstrikes, cyber-attacks and social media propaganda. For Herbert, this evolution of the Libyan conflict likely demonstrates the future of armed conflicts. In the case of Libya, such a transformation would not have been possible without the support provided by foreign powers to the rival sides.

Click here to read the full article.

Oct
2019

Reports suggest Qatar excluded from upcoming Berlin conference by Egypt and UAE

Over the course of the past week, reports suggested that the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashagha, has been having secret meetings with French officials in order to reach a settlement to the Tripoli conflict. Through mediators, Bashagha has allegedly been working with significant figures in the East in order to find common ground to end the fighting. On 3 October, several reports emerged claiming that Egypt and the UAE have successfully lobbied to have Qatar excluded from the Berlin conference on Libya, slated for November. No date for the conference has been publically released, and it remains unclear who will make up the international and domestic delegations.

International allies of the Libyan National Army (LNA) – namely France, Egypt and the UAE – appear to be pre-cooking the Berlin conference on Libya to ensure that it proceeds on the terms that best serves the LNA’s interests. While constructive dialogue between rival Libyan parties is key to the Berlin conference achieving a tangible outcome, how those talks are organised, who participates in them and who mediates them are all very important. If international and Libyan actors perceive that the parameters of the talks have already been pre-arranged by the pro-LNA alliance in their favour, this is likely to significantly undermine the chances of the talks achieving an end to the fighting and a way forward.

For the LNA General Command, they may interpret this stacking of the deck in their favour as support for their demands that Tripoli must be ‘liberated’ before a new political process can be agreed. For Sarraj and the GNA, the exclusion of Qatar and secret French-mediated talks between Bashagha and the East is indicative of the GNA losing international traction and becoming increasingly isolated. As the Berlin conference draws near, the GNA is likely to push harder for conditions which swing greater negotiating leverage back to its side. This is likely to an intensification of conflict, at least in Tripoli, in the lead up to the conference and could undermine the longer-term chances of success for the Berlin talks.

Oct
2019

British-Libyan Director releases movie about women, soccer and Tripoli

Libya Abroad reports that the movie “Freedom Fields” by British Libya Director Naziha Arebi screened UK cinemas in July 2019. The movie depicts the life of three Libyan women passionate about soccer in Tripoli.

Click here to read Libya Abroad’s interview of Arebi.

Oct
2019

Russian investigative media reveals 35 Russian mercenaries have been killed in Tripoli fighting

International media outlets, among which the Russian investigative media Meduza, The Moscow Times and The Times, report that dozens of Russian mercenaries are believed to have been killed in Libya since fitghing erupted in April 2019 between forces allied with the internationally backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) troops aligned with Khalifa Haftar. According to Meduza, the Russian casualties were fighters affiliated with the Wagner PMX, a Russian private military which enjoys strong connections to the Russian government. Meduza’s investigation highlights the relationship Russia has developed with Eastern-Libya Khalifa Haftar since 2015 and the support that has been provided by the Kremlin as it tries to increase its influence in the region.

Click here to read the report.

Oct
2019

Foreign Backing Brings Militias in Libya to a Stalemate—and No Further

In an article published on 1^st October, The Wall Street Journal addresses the issue of the support supplied by foreign powers to Libyan factions fighting for Tripoli since last April. The article argues that by supplying weapons to armed forces, foreign powers have fueled the conflict and consequently share responsibility for the persisting stalemate.

Click here to read the article.

Oct
2019

Sarraj says won’t negotiate with Haftar; LNA says open to dialogue once ‘terrorists’ out of Tripoli

On 25 September, the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Sarraj, gave a speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York. Sarraj stated he would never sit at the negotiating table with Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), whom he described as a “war criminal” and not a “partner for peace”.

On 25 September, a few hours after Sarraj’s address, the Libyan National Army (LNA) – in its own English translation calling itself the “Libyan Arab Armed Forces” – General Command released a statement claiming the LNA “always called for peace” and democratic process and saying “we need dialogue”. It claimed to have called for presidential and parliamentary elections and responded positively to any initiative that would implement this, citing both high level meeting in Abu Dhabi, Paris and Palermo. However, the statement stressed that dialogue was “not possible so long as terrorist groups and criminal militias control Tripoli.” It also said Haftar hoped the special session to be co-chaired by France and Italy would come up with “proposals that serve Libya’s interests and at the same time restore security and stability”.

Both Sarraj’s and Haftar’s statements indicate that despite some international momentum towards a peace process at present, the rival Libyan factions are not currently willing to engage in dialogue. However, given the significant international proxy element of Libya’s current conflict, the GNA and LNA positions and approaches to peace talks may shift if their international supporters can be prevented from supplying the arms, drones, and funds that are fuelling and sustaining the fighting on the ground.

Oct
2019

US Launches 4 airstrikes in 10 days killing 43 ISIS fighters in southern Libya

US Africa Command (AFRICOM) launched 4 aerial attacks over the course of 10 days in southern Libya, killing 43 ISIS fighters in total. Below are details of each of the aerial attacks.

On 29 September, AFRICOM conducted an airstrike in southern Libya killing 7 ISIS fighters.
On 27 September, AFRICOM conducted an airstrike targeting a fleeing ISIS group in the Indian Complex in Sebha southern suburb, killing 17 people.
On 24 September, AFRICOM conducted an airstrike against Libya-ISIS group at a farm hideout southern Jizzawo village, 30 kilometres east of Murzuq, killing 11 fighters.
On 19 September, AFRICOM claimed to have killed 8 ISIS-Libya fighters in the vicinity of Murzuq.

After several months of no aerial attacks on ISIS in Libya, US AFRICOM has launched multiple strikes in quick succession at several locations in southern Libya. The airstrikes suggest the group has either recently grown in size and capabilities, or has gained notable personnel to warrant these operations. The number of fighters allegedly killed in these airstrikes suggests that this will represent a setback to ISIS-Libya in the region. However, the instability and absence of functioning security apparatus in the region is likely to persist, not only allowing ISIS-linked groups to continue to compete for a foothold in the region, but also fuelling local recruitment in the medium-long term.

At a strategic level, AFRICOM’s recent airstrikes could strengthen and legitimise Libyan National Army (LNA) rhetoric about fighting terrorist groups in the South, which it has used to justify its presence and military activity in the region. On the flipside, AFRICOM’s statements that it is coordinating with the Government of National Accord (GNA) to carry out the aerial attacks, and likely gaining the intelligence needed to do so from GNA-linked sources, could strengthen the GNA’s position in the region as the only legitimate authority in Libya with whom the US will coordinate.

Oct
2019

Drone war in Libya highlights the proxy dimension of the Libyan conflict, India Times reports

In an article published on 30 September, the economic edition of India Time analyses the use of drones in the fighting between Libya’s rival factions which erupted in April 2019. As the confrontation between forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and forces aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Khalifa Haftar reached a stalemate, both sides engaged in an air war and turned to sophisticated weaponry, India Times notes. The article highlights how the proxy dimension of conflict has consequently been reinforced by the fact that such weaponry is supplied by foreign backers.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

Shift in Italian policy towards Libya to protect oil interests

In an article published on 27 September on Energy Voice, Bloomberg reports on the difficulties faced by the oil company ENI in Libya since 2011 and the political and security tensions which ensued. It is noted that ENI has attempted to maintain its presence and operations throughout the different phases of Libya’s difficult transition and was most notably impacted by the rivalry between Libyan institutions. The article also identifies a recent shift in Italy’s policy, with the Italian government taking equal distance between rival Libyan factions in order to protect ENI and Italian oil interests in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

International divisions on Libya crisis openly voiced at UN General Assembly

Interventions by foreign powers involved in the Libyan crisis at the UN General Assembly revealed their conflicting positions regarding the Libyan crisis, John Irish reports for Reuters on 24 September. At the session of the General Assembly on 24 September, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi indirectly reiterated Egypt’s support to General Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) as well as for the attempt by the LNA to take control of Tripoli. This intervention was then followed by a speech by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani denouncing alleged violations by Haftar and his armed forces and the support provided by foreign powers to Haftar. As efforts are underway by Germany to provided Libyan factions with a mediation platform to address their issues, these discussions at the UN General Assembly highlight the difficulties faced by the international community to unify its voice and lead a concerted action.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

US Ambassador meets with Haftar in Dubai

On 19 September, US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland met with the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, in Dubai. Both the US and LNA released contradictory details about the meeting. However, it is thought that Norland stressed to Haftar that the US will be putting its full support behind the planned German-hosted international conference and is eager to see momentum on a negotiated political settlement to the Libyan crisis.

The meeting between Haftar and Norland was the first meeting between the US and Haftar since the LNA launched their assault on Tripoli in April of this year. It is also the first official meeting between the LNA and the US this year, the last being in December 2018 when Haftar met with a series of US officials. Such a meeting suggests US policy towards Libya has entered a new (and more active) phase with the US more willing to make its policy positions clear to Libyan actors. The US appears to be actively supporting the current international status quo on Libya, namely pushing for a UN-backed political process to end the conflict, but it is unclear whether the US would be willing to take more direct action at this stage. While the LNA will want to keep the US on side, it can likely do this by nominally agreeing to participate in a peace process while continuing with its current tactics – strong words alone from the US are unlikely to be enough to incentivise a change in the LNA’s military-driven tactics given it has so far avoided punitive action or international sanctions despite continuing its attempts to seize Tripoli.

Sep
2019

International efforts likely to fail unless critical events happen on the ground

For Atlantic Council, Karim Mezran reviews in an article published on 19 September the conditions under which international efforts could influence positively the political stalemate in Libya. Indeed, it has been announced earlier this month that international efforts to reach an agreement in Libya were to resume with two events. First, a meeting organized by France of the main international actors at the margins of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late September. This meeting would be then followed by a high-level international conference organized by Germany for the second half of the month of October in which Libyan actors will be invited to participated. However, for Mezran, unless a critical event happens on the ground, these international meetings are unlikely to reach their objectives as international actors will have no incentive to rethink their strategies.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

Could the US influence the UAE’s Libya policy ?

In an article published on 17 September with Middle East Eye, Bill Law provides an analysis of the foreign policy articulated with Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi crown prince and de faco ruler of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the article, Law ponders whether the UAE could withdraw its support to Eastern-Libya based Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) if the United States were to pressure the UAE to do so.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

Germany to host post-UNGA Conference on Libya

On 11 September, Germany’s ambassador to Libya announced that Germany would host a major conference on Libya in conjunction with the UN as a follow on to this year’s UN General Assembly (UNGA) discussions (to be held next week in New York City). Details about the proposed conference have not been released, with media speculating that it will be held in either October or November in Berlin. The announcement of the conference followed shortly after German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed earlier in the day to the Bundestag that the Libya Crisis threatened to destabilize all of Africa and that Germany would work to avoid a proxy war in Libya.

It is worth noting that while in recent weeks there has been an uptick in US engagement on Libya, with major meetings in both DC and Tunis. There are genuine concerns that the momentum might stall as the Administration looks to find a replacement for national security adviser John Bolton. Conversely, it could be that Bolton was a drag on State Department engagement with the GNA as Bolton was widely believed to have been pro-LNA and a critic of State Department attempts to resist a pivot of President Trump towards Haftar.

The planned conference will be the first major international event on Libya since the LNA launched its assault on the capital on 4 April this year. The UN believes that Germany can be an effective mediator in the conflict. While Germany has close links with regional players with influence on the ground in Libya, including Egypt and Turkey, it is likely going to have trouble bringing some of these major regional players to the table or exerting leverage over them. The conference could be a game-changer only if it articulates concrete plans about petrol smuggling, the economy, transparency, changing the central bank governor or other low-hanging fruit. If no indications emerge that these achievable subjects will be discussed, its outcome is likely to be like that of Palermo and Paris before it.

Sep
2019

Reporting in conflict-torn Libya

In an article published on 16 September, Middle East Monitor (MEMO) looks the difficult situation of journalists in Libya, often threatened by acts of intimidations and attempts of arbitrary arrests. Quoting Mohamed Al-Najem, Executive Director of the Libyan Centre for Press Freedom (AFP) and Al-Wasat journalist Jihan Al-Jazawi, MEMO stresses the importance of political neutrality in journalism in contexts such as Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

Despite economic measures, lines persist at Tripoli banks

In their latest article published on 16 September with The Daily Sabah – Finance, Elif Binici and Mustafa Kirikçioglu recount the persisting lack of liquidity in Libya, manifesting itself through the long lines of citizens in front of Tripoli banks, waiting to withdraw cash. Thus far, Binici and Kirikçioglu note, the measures implemented by the internationally-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) have fallen short and the situation is exacerbated by Libya’s political and security instability. However, as illustrated by Jason Pack in his latest article, economics is key to understanding and addressing the roots of the Libyan civil war.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

General Haftar negotiates withdrawal of LNA forces from Tripoli area

In an interview published on 09 September by French Newspaper Liberation, UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé stated that General Haftar is considering a possible withdrawal from the Tripoli area and demanded guarantees, Middle East Monitor reports on 10 September. According to Salamé’s declaration, Haftar is reportedly negotiating the withdrawal of Libyan National Army (LNA) forces in exchange for appointments in important state posts. It remains unclear to which extent Haftar’s demands can be met and whether it will lead to the effective withdrawal of LNA forces from the Tripoli area.

Click here to read the article.

Sep
2019

UN report notes polarisation in Libya and reduction of UN presence

On 29 August, the UN published a report outlining the UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) overview of the Libyan crisis as presented to the UN Security Council on 26 August. The report detailed the political, economic and security developments in Libya. Notably it stated that the conflict in southern Tripoli has “further polarised an already fragmented political landscape” with both sides “engaged in efforts to garner international support.” The report called for a one-year extension to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) mandate in Libya strengthen the UN stance that there is no military solution to the current conflict. Additionally, the report called for UN members states to observe the arms embargo on Libya.

The report will likely serve to establish an agenda for the excepted side-line meetings between the international community on Libya at the UN General Assembly in New York on 17 September. Moreover, the statements coincided with the conclusion of the G7 summit, where the latter called for an international conference with local, regional and international actors involved in the conflict. This conference is expected to be take place in Berlin in the coming months. However, it remains unclear how the UN intends to establish and implement tangible mechanisms for building international consensus and ensuring UN member states actually abide by their commitments regarding Libya.

Aug
2019

GNA and LNA agree to temporary Eid ceasefire but violations occur

On 12 August, Jason Pack spoke to the BBC’s World Service to discuss the UN-brokered ceasefire in Libya, the significance of some actors on the ground in Tripoli violating the ceasefire, and what impact this partial, temporary truce might have on longer term peace efforts. Listen to his interview here https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w172wn2ss82h53z

Jul
2019

HOR in US to push LNA’s “legitimacy” as divisions deepens within the HOR

On 24 July, a delegation from the pro-Libyan National Army (LNA) faction of the House of Representative (HoR) in eastern Libya was reported to be in Washington DC on a mission to gain US support for the LNA’s campaign to take control of Tripoli. The delegation held a series of meeting with US State Department, Defence Department and White House officials. The meetings reportedly involved the delegates promoting the LNA’s legitimacy by saying its actions in Tripoli have been sanctioned by the HoR, which they claim is a democratically elected political entity, unlike the Government of National Accord (GNA), which they deem illegitimate. The HoR delegation is being assisted by Linden Government Solutions, a lobbying firm employed by LNA head Khalifa Haftar to lobby US officials on his behalf.

Meanwhile, on 26 July, another delegation from the HoR which is established in Tripoli undertook an ‘official’ visit to Moscow to meet with Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov to discuss the current state of affairs in Libya. Bogdanov is reported to have reaffirmed Russia’s commitment to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), and that there can be no military solution to the Libya crisis. This meeting highlights the deepening of divisions within the HOR. Indeed, when the LNA attacked Tripoli in April, the HoR membership split down pro-LNA/ anti-LNA lines, with a group of mainly western-based HoR members setting up breakaway entity in Tripoli in May.

As the US position on the conflict in Libya remains ambiguous, Libyan factions to lobby the country for support. The internal division with the HoR is indicative of broader political fragmentation within Libya, with the polarisation increasingly going along east-west lines. While the HoR has not been an effective or cohesive parliament and has frequently undermined or derailed previous political processes, this trend towards a formal division between Tubruq and Tripoli increases the threat of deeper de facto or even de jure political partition between the eastern and western regions in the longer term.

Jul
2019

UN report highlights persisting activity of the Islamic State in Libya

On 29 July, the United Nations (UN) made available online the the twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The report assesses the threat posed by terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in the light of recent developments such as the fall of the Islamic State caliphate in March 2019. Regarding Libya, the report notes that Islamic State related activities gained momentum over the course of the past months as the political and security crisis deepened in Libya.

Click here to read the full report.

Jul
2019

Proxy War Dynamics in Libya

On 23 July, Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaïd Lazib published with Proxy War Project (PWP) Conflict Studies a report on Libya untitled Proxy War Dynamics in Libya. PWP is an initiative funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York focusing on the wars in the Arab world. In the report, Harchaoui and Lazib propose a review of the actors of the Libyan conflict and the history of the conflict since the fall of Qaddafi. They also illustrate the links between national actors and regional and international powers, reaching the conclusion that “conflicts are often both hyperlocal and closely linked to foreign states”. Harchaoui and Lazib argue that in the midst of these tensions, the United States appears as the only actor who could play the role of peace broker. However, they note:

Given that Washington is unlikely to make a genuine comeback in Libyan affairs as a peace broker, a more probable scenario is perpet-uation of the civil war.

Click here to download the report.

Jul
2019

Tripoli clashes continue as death toll reaches 1100

On 15 July, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that since the clashes began in Tripoli at the start of April, over 1 093 people have been killed, including 106 civilians, with as many as 5 752 people injured. More than 100 000 people have been displaced. Fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces continued in southern Tripoli last week, with notable clashes in Wadi al-Rabea, Ain Zara, Salahuddin and Khallat Furjan. On 10 July, the LNA claimed control of the latter after intense clashes.

The LNA has continued to conduct aerial assaults over Tripoli, apparently gaining aerial superiority over the GNA-aligned forces over the reporting period. The LNA also undertook a series of air strikes in the Fezzan region last week (See Murzuq and Sharara reports further below). The frontlines in southern Tripoli are likely to remain relatively static in the short term, though the threat of collateral damage, revenge attacks and massacres will only increase as the conflict continues and the stakes rise.

Jul
2019

Egypt & UAE push for political track as fatigue over military campaign grows

On 9 July, reports began emerging of a new political movement in eastern Libya, backed by the UAE, that will see a new ‘national government’ formed, with former Tripoli-based ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Aref Ali Nayed, as its head. There have reportedly been multiple meetings between Nayed and the head of the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tubruq, Aqeela Saleh.

The UAE, which is a long-time supporter of Libya’s eastern political and military factions, is allegedly keen to consolidate the HOR’s political standing in the wake of wavering military progress in Tripoli. It is thought to be exerting pressure on LNA leader Khalifa Haftar to submit to a civilian government. The UAE’s push for Nayed to become either the president or prime minister of a new government effectively complements Egypt’s new political initiative, the aim of which appears to be to facilitate a viable agreement amongst HoR members for a new unity government.

However, this remains an eastern initiative, with little evidence of any buy-in or dialogue with any representatives of the western or anti-LNA factions. Egypt and the UAE’s shift towards a political track is indicative of their increased fatigue and possible doubt about the LNA’s capacity to resolve the current crisis through military means. The conflict in Tripoli has become protracted and appears to have become more entrenched following the LNA’s loss of its base in Ghariyan at the end of last month. Given a quick victory seems highly unlikely and international appetite for backing the LNA may be waning, the LNA’s regional backers are looking for an alternative (plus cheaper and more controllable) track. At present, this ‘plan b’ political track is running in parallel to the military track, but if it gains momentum, the LNA may find its military provisions, training and fiscal reimbursements curtailed and come under pressure to submit to the new government.

Jul
2019

Understanding Israel’s involvement in Libya

For Consortium News, Giorgio Cafiero discusses Israel’s involvement in Libya. He highlights that Israel’s policy towards Libya joins the policies adopted by several Arab states through support to Eastern-Libya based Khalifa Haftar

Click here to read the article.

Jul
2019

Tripoli’s cash market

In an article published with the Los Angeles Times on 11 July, Nabih Bulos gives an account of what happens in Tripoli’s black-market, and what it says of the severe economic crisis the country is experiencing. Bulos depicts the business of unlicensed traders selling various amounts of different currencies to citizens who try to navigate Libya’s cash shortage.

Click here to read the article.

Jul
2019

Is Libya in a civil war?

In a piece for War on The Rocks published on 11 July, Anas El Gomati analyses the evolution of the conflict in Tripoli between forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA). Interestingly, El Gomati uses the term “civil war” to address the current conflict in Tripoli, adding that

The transformation of the conflict from a localized battle in Tripoli’s suburbs and low intensity civil war into a large-scale, foreign-led air campaign seems more likely now than it ever has been before.

Click here to read the article.

Jul
2019

Founder of Libya-Analysis discusses airstrike on Tajoura Detention Centre

Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was interviewed by A News. Jason discussed the airstrike by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on the Tajoura Detention Center. For Pack, the strike can be understood as a gesture of active desperation and revenge on Khalifa Haftar’s part, in response to the loss of Gharyan. Pack also discusses the divisions among the international community regarding Libya and how it influences the situation in Libya.

Click here to listen to the interview.

Jul
2019

Rising concerns regarding oil and water in Libya as fighting continues

On 2 July, the Libya Herald reported the latest comments by Mustafa Sanalla, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the oil sector in Libya. Speaking at the OPEC Summit in Vienna on 1 July, Sanalla warned against the threat posed by fighting to oil production and attempts by parallel Eastern Libyan institutions to export oil illegally. Tensions regarding the control of oil resources and their distribution are most likely to persist over the course of the coming months. Meanwhile, on the same day, Reuters reported that finding clean, drinkable water was also becoming a concerning issue in Libya. In Western Libya, both the power grid and water control system have been damaged during the fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and the anti-LNA coalition, Reuters reports. Experts fear that the situation could escalate in a humanitarian crisis.

Click here for The Libya Herald article and here to read Reuters’ article.

Jul
2019

Egypt’s role in the Libyan conflict

In an article published with Al-Monitor on 1 July, Hagar Hosny looks at the support provided by Egypt to Khalifa Haftar and his armed forces, the Libyan National Army (LNA).

Click here to read the article.

Jul
2019

Predatory economies in eastern Libya and the LNA’s involvement

In June 2019, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime published a report by Noria Research untitled “Predatory Economies in Eastern Libya – The Dominant role of the Libyan National Army (LNA)”. Drawing on the fighting in South Tripoli between the LNA headed by Khalifa Haftar and forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA), the report analyses the LNA’s strategy to gain control of streams of revenue to sustain its military advances. For the authors, the LNA has adopted a predatory behaviour in the territories it has overtaken since the breakthrough in Benghazi in July 2017.

Click here to read the report.

Jun
2019

Sarraj’s peace proposal sets scene for renewed diplomatic push

Khalifa Haftar’s sudden willingness to engage with the UN and equivocally set out his political position in an interview, which is a rare event in itself, follows Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s launch of a new peace initiative on 16 June, which inside sources indicate was pre-planned with the US.

According to insiders, Sarraj’s initiative revolves around 3 key points:

It completely disregards Khalifa Haftar and the leadership of the Libyan National Army (LNA). It also abandons the Sarraj-Haftar peace ticket started by France during the La Celle Saint-Cloud meeting in 2017 and pursued in the Abu Dhabi meeting in 2019 – days before Haftar launched his offensive on the capital.
It purposefully fails to provide specific details and instead highlights a general political process which will include a national conference and elections. The peace initiative avoids politicising any actor or dictating the content of such a process because it would undermine the current cohesion of the anti-LNA coalition.
It stresses Libya’s role as a key ally of the US in combating terrorism, adding that this role is a source of international legitimacy and credibility. This stance is a direct challenge to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s current monopoly over US patronage and influence to countries in the region.

Sarraj’s effort to push for a ceasefire and new political negotiations appears to be a high-level strategic move designed to ensure his political survival and that of the GNA rather than reflecting a genuine attempt to reach a ceasefire or enter political negotiations. While both Sarraj and Haftar appear to be going through the motions of diplomatic engagement in response to this international shift, the conditions laid out by both are predicated on their forces winning the conflict, not on finding a negotiated end to it. In reality, the depth and vitriol of political polarisation in Libya at present mean neither Haftar nor Sarraj could agree to grant the concessions that would be required to reach a ceasefire, otherwise they would lose their support base and their leadership positions, while their loosely aligned forces carried on fighting.

Jun
2019

Renewed international push for a ceasefire in Libya as Haftar appears to engage

On 21 June, Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated media outlets conducted an interview with Khalifa Haftar. Much of the interview was repetition of Haftar’s previously stated positions including that military operations will only stop once the LNA has achieved its objectives and the need to disband all militias and all the political bodies created by the Libyan Political Agreement. However, a new element was Haftar’s assertion that in the transitional phase, once the LNA’s objectives have been met, a national unity government would be formed but may not be based in Tripoli (but in a different Libyan city) if there are any “temporary logistical and security reasons” that prevent it operating from there.

President Trump’s call to Haftar shortly after his forces launched their assault on Tripoli in April created confusion around US policy towards Libya and was read by many as tacit US endorsement for Haftar’s offensive. However, Trump’s nomination of Norland as the U.S ambassador to Libya and the latter’s clear support for a ceasefire indicates a clearer a US position against the conflict in Libya is emerging. The renewed international push for a ceasefire in Libya signals the first serious attempt by international actors to end the stalemated conflict. It also appears that this renewed engagement is being driven by a clearer US position in support of a ceasefire and a new peace process. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to halt the conflict in the short term and could even lead to intensified clashes in the coming weeks as the LNA tries to push more forcefully to gain ground in the capital.

Jun
2019

U.S State Department releases 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report for Libya

On 20 June, the United States Department of State released the “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report”, in which a section focuses on the issue of people trafficking in Libya. There have been significant records of trafficking in persons in Libya during the reporting year, according to the report, which also draws the link between this serious issue and the political and security vacuum in Libya. As a matter of fact, the report states:

During the reporting year, there were continued reports that criminal networks, militia groups, government officials, and private employers exploited migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in sex and labor trafficking. Endemic government corruption and militias’ influence over government ministries contributed to the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) inability to effectively address trafficking.

Click here to read the report.

Jun
2019

Meeting between UNSMIL Representative and East Libya General Haftar

Media outlets reported that on 22 June, the head of the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) Ghassan Salamé met with General Haftar in Eastern Libya. The meeting occurs as Tripoli enters in its third month of fighting between Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Since the eruption of fighting in April, neither side has been able to make significant progress in Tripoli. As the situation stalls the meeting appears as an attempt by UNSMIL to relaunch the political dialogue in Libya. However, it remains unlikely that Haftar will be willing to engage in negotiations.

Jun
2019

New U.S ambassador to Libya nominated

Last week, Richard B. Norland was officially nominated by U.S President Trump as the next U.S Ambassador to Libya, replacing Peter Bodde. In his opening statement before the SFRC Confirmation Hearing, Norland announced three key priorities as the U.S new representative in Libya, namely the resolution of the ongoing fighting, the re-launch of a political agreement and supporting the economic development of the oil-rich country. For analysts, the Trump administration has been sending mixed signals regarding its policy towards Libya since fighting erupted in Tripoli in early April revealing an apparent uncertainty on whether the U.S should get more involved in the efforts to stabilize Libya and under which conditions.

Jun
2019

Libya’s digital battlefield

In an article published on 17 June with the Los Angeles Times, Nabih Bulos demonstrates that the tensions on the ground between rival Libyan factions also reveal themselves in the media and social networks, and most particularly on Facebook. Facebook, Bulos reports, which is the primary communication mode for more than two-thirds of the country, has become another battlefield for armed factions, political figures and civil society activists. For Bulos, the platform is used as a channel to communicate rival factions’ narratives and as such generates additional confusion and chaos to the already complex situation.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Lexicon of Hate-Speech in Libya

This month, Development Transformations (DT) with Elbiro Media Foundation released a report elaborated in partnership with consultants from PeaceTech Lab on the hate-speech Lexicon in Libya. They identified, studied and explain the hate speech terms used by Libyan in media and social networks. In its introduction, the report accurately points out the tensions and issues at stakes in Libya, and their analysis contextualises the use of the terms identified on networks.

Click here to consult the lexicon.

Jun
2019

Tripoli firms that dare to provide service amid fighting

In an article published on 9 June, Libyan Express listed the companies that are still operating in Tripoli in spite of the persisting tensions, such as Giga Firm, a Telecommunication firm.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Persisting instability in Libya

On 20 June, in an op-ed published with Middle East Eye, Barah Mikaïl provides an overview of the situation in Libya and potential outcomes of the crisis. Mikhail evokes a defiance regarding France in Western Libya since the eruption of fighting between General Haftar and forces affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA) and denounces the tensions resulting from international interference.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Sarraj’s peace proposal unlikely to bear fruit

On 16 June, the Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister, Fayez al-Sarraj, announced a new peace plan initiative, under the auspices of the UN, to kick start a new political process, provided that it does not include Khalifa Haftar and his supporters. The initiative is a rehashing of the stalled UN peace plan – a national conference to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections with the added caveat of excluding Haftar and all Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated representatives. The UN Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the initiative calling it “constructive” and added that it welcomes any other initiatives from Libya’s major actors, signalling that it remains open for engagement and dialogue with the LNA.

The Sarraj peace plan is widely seen as political posturing to showcase the GNA’s good faith to the international community and embarrass Haftar and the LNA, as well as maintain the status quo in Tripoli with the GNA still at the helm of the anti-LNA forces. However, it is very unlikely to result in any significant change to the political situation in Libya or internationally, as Sarraj has made no concessions nor offered a way out of the current impasse. Any ceasefire or political process necessitates the participation of pro-LNA forces and LNA supporters, therefore excluding all LNA-affiliated officials will be a non-starter. As a result, the current military stalemate and political instability is likely to continue for at least the medium term, and likely for the longer term.

Jun
2019

Tensions increase in Sirte as LNA positions itself for potential siege

Over the last week, 5 members of the Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned Sirte General Security Forces, which is affiliated with the 604 Battalion, were arrested after Sirte tribal elders gave an ultimatum to the commander of the GNA Central Military Region, Mohammed al-Haddad, to address and recompense the overt brutality used by GNA-aligned Misratan forces against Sirte residents. During the week the GNA-aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) allegedly issued a high state of alert. Meanwhile, the SPF claimed on 12 June they established checkpoints in the south and east of the city and local reports on 17 June indicated an armed convoy moved within Sirte.

These events coincide with the Libya National Army (LNA) mobilising its forces to the south and east of Sirte and increased rhetoric warning they will launch an assault on the city. On 17 June, LNA forces bolstered their presence at Harawa east of Sirte. The LNA forces are reported to have closed down the Harawa Municipality under GNA-aligned Zidan bin Sharada. The LNA’s posturing in the area within the vicinity of Sirte serves to disrupt Misrata’s activity in the western region and Tripoli. While an immediate assault on Sirte by the LNA is unlikely – partly because family and tribal relatives of many LNA fighters reside in the city, and partly because of the limited capacity of LNA forces in the region due to the ongoing Tripoli campaign – it cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the LNA is likely planning to besiege the city on their own terms.

Jun
2019

Understanding the UAE’s foreign policy and its application in Libya

In an article for Middle East Eye on 18 June, Khalil al-Anani reviews the United Arab States’s foreign policy. For Al-Anani, it is characterized by the use of aggressiveness and force as a protection measure when faced with potential threats. Al-Anani demonstrates that the UAE’s support to General Haftar is part of their approach.

Click here to read the full article.

Jun
2019

Oil revenue access drives conflict

In an article published with Petroleum Economist on 13 June, Libya-Analysis Founder Jason Pack and Managing Director Rhiannon Smith decrypt the politicisation of the oil sector in Libya. For Pack and Smith, there is an increasing risk that General Haftar and his affiliated force, the Libyan National Army (LNA), seize Libya’s oil revenues.

Noting that Haftar and his forces already controls key pipelines, fields, ports and terminals in Libya but cannot export the oil, Pack and Smith foresee that

If the fighting drags on in Tripoli, it becomes increasingly likely that the LNA will attempt to export oil illicitly through the parallel eastern NOC, allowing it to directly pocket the proceeds and feed its war machine. Attempts are already underway, with the UAE-based Sulaco Group reportedly signing a contract with the eastern NOC to lift 2mn bl from Hariga port. While such attempts have been made in the past, they have usually been unsuccessful due to US and UN intervention. In the current climate, it is less certain that international actors will be as robust in their condemnations and counter-efforts as they had been previously.

Click here to read the full article.

Jun
2019

Podcast of ECFR Paris-held conference on Libya released

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) shared a podcast of its conference held in Paris on 5 June to discuss the current crisis in Libya. Tarek Megerisi, Mary Fitzgerald and Virginie Collombier participated in the event.

Click here to listen to the podcast.

Jun
2019

Foreign oil firms demand new licenses to exploit Libyan oil

Reuters reported on 14 June the renewal by foreign firms of their licenses to exploit Libyan oil. Total, the French oil firm, was among the firm demanding the renewal of its license after having been suspended by the Ministry of Economy in May because the licence had expired. Reuters notes that some diplomats and analysts saw the move as political pressure aimed at shoring up support abroad against an assault by Haftar’s Libya National Army (LNA), a claim denied by Government of National Accord (GNA) Minister of Economy, Ali Abdulaziz Issawi.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, the Foreign Minister of the Interim Libyan government, explains support for LNA

On 12 June, George Mikhail published with Al-Monitor an interview with the Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, the Foreign Minister of the Interim Libyan government, based in Eastern Libya. Mikhail and Al-Hweil discussed the diplomatic conflict between Libya’s Eastern-based interim government and the Government of National Accord (GNA) which heightened along with the fighting in Tripoli. Al-Hweil explains the reasons behind his government’s support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA).

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Aerial war emerging in Tripoli as neither side gains ground

The clashes between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and anti-LNA forces continue, with no significant changes in territorial control. Heavy clashes continue in Ain Zara, Khallet al-Farjan and around Airport road. The LNA continues to dominate aerial attacks, specifically targeting ammunition depots used by anti-LNA forces in Tripoli and along the coastal road up to the eastern entrances of Zawiyya. Of significant importance, the LNA appears to have shifted its focus away from air-to-surface support for LNA troops to targeting Government of National Accord (GNA) munition stores and air capabilities. The GNA-aligned forces and the Misrata Aerial College continue to focus on disrupting LNA supply routes. The increased number of LNA airstrikes targeting strategic locations in Tripoli, especially ammunition stores, suggest that the LNA is making a post-Eid push to advance towards the centre of Tripoli. Reports indicate anti-LNA forces are building defensive positions in the al-Swani area, signalling an LNA assault in that area is also likely. Likewise, unconfirmed reports suggest the GNA Western Military Region is planning to lead an assault towards Ghariyan.

However, significant territorial changes on the ground over the next week remain unlikely – unless there is a significant international intervention or statement of support from the US or Russia for either side. As it stands, with the anti-LNA and LNA forces locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli and the international community divided, the conflict is likely to be protracted for the foreseeable future. On 9 June, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported the deaths of 653 people as a result of the clashes in Tripoli, 41 of them civilians. Another 3,547 have been wounded, 126 of them civilians.

Jun
2019

UNSC Renews Authorisation to Intercept Vessels Carrying Arms to Libya

On 10 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously extended until June 2020 Resolution 2473 which authorises member states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from the country, if they have reasonable grounds to believe they are violating the arms embargo. Prior to the UNSC’ renewal of the maritime component of the arms embargo, UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, appealed to all countries to implement the embargo and prevent weapons reaching Libya by sea, air and land. Guterres stated that the UN efforts to monitor the embargo identified “illicit transfers of arms and related material” in and out of Libya. The EU’s Operation Sophia is the only naval operation that has been undertaking inspections of vessels traveling to or from Libya. In 2016, the UNSC authorised the operation to extend its human smuggling mandate to include inspections of vessels suspected of carrying weapons to or from Libya that could violate the arms embargo.

The conflict in Tripoli that began in April has seen multiple reports of arms shipments to both competing forces. However, there have been few recorded incidents of Operation Sophia vessels inspecting and seizing arms being transported to Libya. Additional arms entering Libya, especially aerial and naval military equipment, will likely exacerbate the conflict and ensure it continues for the foreseeable future. While the UNSC arms embargo nominally remains in place, measures to successfully implement it remain absent, particularly as the international community remains divided on how to address the conflict and engage with the different parties. Moreover, the renewal of Operation Sophia’s authority to conduct naval inspections is likely to have little tangible impact on arms shipments to Libya given it currently has no navel assets deployed off Libya. This indicates that the international intervention to stop arms shipments to Libyan ports remain unlikely until a consensus on how to resolve conflict is reached.

Jun
2019

UNDP administrator reaffirms UN commitment to Libya, among other zones

On 30 May, Al-Monitor published excerpts of an interview of UN Development Program administrator Achim Steiner by Ayala Jean Yackley. Steiner discussed with Al-Monitor the works of UNDP in conflict zones such as Syria and Libya. Steiner stated that in Libya, UNDP continued to work in parts not impacted by fighting, aiming at developing stabilization measure and hoping to promote democratic values as a way to counter violent extremism. The message delivered by the UNDP administrator regarding the zones severely afflicted by violence and chaos was that of a strong UN commitment and efforts to address the roots of instability.

Click here to read the interview.

Jun
2019

Wintershall alerts on risks on oil production due to instability

In an interview, the CEO of the Oil Company Wintershall which operates the NC-96 (As-Sarah) and NC-97 concessions on-shore in Libya and has a share in the Al Jurf crude oil field off the Libyan coast, declared that Libya’s current instability posed a significant threat to Wintershall’s on-shore production.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Burgeoning ties between Libyan political figures and U.S Lobby firms

In an article published on 5 June for Mother Jones journalist Dan Friedman reports on the ties that have developed between various Libyan factions and Lobbying firms specialised in U.S politics over the course of the past year. His demonstration reveals a burgeoning of lobbying initiatives by Libyan political figures, and even international powers, to influence the US’s policy towards Libya. Among Libya’s main political figures, Friedman indicates that Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj contracted the lobby firm Mercury Public Affairs on April 2019, while General Haftar turned to to Linden Government Solutions and Ahmed Maiteeg, the GNA Deputy Prime Minister, entered in contract with The Prime Policy Group. Friedman denounces the profit made by lobby firms off Libya’s political and security instability. It remains unclear thus far to determine whether such attempts have had impacts on the administration’s policy given the lack of clarity of its policymakers.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

The Trump administration revises its Libya policy

In an article published on 8 June The Guardian reports that sources within the U.S Trump administration suggested that the Trump administration is currently turning away from General Haftar, less than two months after President Trump exchanged on the phone with General Haftar and appeared to endorse his offensive on Tripoli. For The Guardian, the call was an independent manoeuvre of Trump, responding to a demand of the Egyptian president Al-Sisi, and did not indicate the administration’s willingness to engage with Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). According to sources, the administration is revising its Libya policy and could be considering options such as a US-enforced ceasefire. However, The Guardian warns, this seeming shift in policy could be subject to subsequent changes in the short term.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Libya’s instability puts Southern Tunisia under pressure

In an article published on 10 June, Ulf Laessing reports for Reuters on the consequences of the tensions in Libya over Southern Tunisia, and most particularly in Ben -Guerdane where locals economically depend on the flow of products and people passing through the border. Laessing notes that Libya’s instability is likely to have damaging impacts on the Tunisian economy, already weakening since 2011. He says:

Libya used to act as a pressure valve for the Tunisian economy, a place where thousands of Tunisians went for work each year and a source of cheap goods they could sell back home. But the violence has damaged the flow of products and people.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Libya FIFA Women Team struggles to exist

On 9 June, drawing on the launch of the 2019 FIFA Women’s World Cup, French Newspaper Libération reports on Libya’s FIFA Women team and the challenges it faces. For Liberation, the team fights to not be set aside and has become a symbol of the tension between Libya’s defensors of certain forms of freedom and Libya’s more conservative factions.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

GNA Minister of Economy denounces economic consequences of conflict escalation

In an article published with The Libyan Report, the Government of National Accord (GNA) Minister of Economy of Libya Ali Abdulaziz Issawi alerts that Libya sits on the verge of full-scale economic devastation due to the escalation of violence between forces affiliated with General Haftar and forces affiliated with the GNA. Ali Abdulaziz Issawi was appointed at the GNA Ministry of Economy in October 2018 and was tasked with conducting the GNA’s reform program for Libya.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Is the United States the way forward for Libya?

On 1 June, Hafed Al-Ghwell and Karim Mezran published with The Hill an op-ed in which they plead for the United States to intervene in Libya to put an end to the conflict and stop General Haftar’s advance on Tripoli. For Al-Ghwell and Mezran, the support of the United States to the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN efforts in Libya is vital and Washington should manifest it clearly. Mezran and Al-Ghwell move on to drawing several recommendations for actions to undertake. First they recommend for NATO under U.S leadership to declare a no fly zone over the Libyan territory to undermine external support to factions and protect lives. Following, they propose the re-establishment of a status quo between the two warring factions and the revitalization of the UN-led negotiation process. Lastly, they argue in favour of developing an effort towards supporting the emergence of a new leadership in Eastern Libya, instead of General Haftar and supporting the implementation of the UN embargo prohibiting arms to Libya. This call for a greater engagement of the United States on the Libyan matters echoes many other voices that have been petitioning over the past few months for the U.S to revise its Libya policy.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

International support to Haftar aimed at imposing authoritarian regime in Libya

On 4 June, French researcher and specialist of the Middle East François Burgat published an article with Middle East Eye in which he denounces the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France to General Haftar. For Burgat, Libya’s internal divisions are fuelled by external actors pursuing their onw national interests. Burget argues that in the Libyan case, under the pretense of the fight against terrorism, France follows the lead of the UAE and its allied Arab states hoping that it will benefit its weapon industry. Other analysts responded to Burgat’s analysis saying that it had to be nuanced, that France’s ideology came also has a factor explaining its positioning in Libya, with the choice to focus on a strong figure to contain instability and insecurity in a strategic geographical zone.

Click here to read the article.

Jun
2019

Analysis Kingdom of Militias: Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession

On 31 May, Jason Pack, Founder of Libya-Analysis, published with the Italian Institute For Political Studies (ISPI) an in-depth analysis of the Libyan militia landscape. The research looks at the different groups and factions on the ground in Libya, to understand the current crisis which Pack labels as Libya’s second war of post-Qadhafi succession.

Drawing upon the Libya-Analysis proprietary real time militia mapping project, this paper examines the main armed groups involved in the war: ascertaining their strengths, weaknesses, command and control structures, motivations, alliances, military capacities, and financing. This paper illustrates that the balance of power persists in Libya due to its being sustained by the war economy. As such financial leverage, is the international community’s sharpest policy instrument. Should it wish to halt the fighting it should block the LNA’s funding streams, as well as those of other belligerents, and then facilitate a face-saving compromise.

Click here to read the research.

May
2019

Haftar’s LNA to continue fighting in Tripoli

In an interview on 26 May General Haftar announced that his forces were to continue fighting until the defeat of the anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) in Tripoli, Voice of America (VOA) reports. This statement echoes the declaration made by Haftar during his meeting two weeks with French President Macron that he was not considering a cease-fire. Such statements suggest that tensions are likely to persist and could intensify within the coming weeks.

May
2019

The ramifications of the 2011 war in Libya

In an article published on 3 May and updated on 25 May with Middle East Eye (MEE) Mark Curtis demonstrates the extent to which the 2011 war in Libya and the Western intervention has created instability in Europe, Syria, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. For Curtis, terrorism has spurred in up to 14 countries as a direct product of the 2011 war in Libya. In the light of this analysis arises the question of the impact of the current crisis in Libya, which developed in early April 2019 following the offensive on Tripoli launched by General Haftar. This new period of chaos is most likely to further instability in the countries and regions affected by developments in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

Persisting tensions among LNA and anti-LNA militias

DIVISIONS EMERGING AMONG LNA AND ANTI-LNA MILITIAS

On 23 May, the Libyan National Army (LNA)-aligned 7th Brigade (Kani militia) killed General Massoud al-Dawi and 2 of his associates in the Famalgha area south of Tripoli after they argued over the access and distribution of weapons and ammunition. Dawi, who belonged to the Warshefana tribe and fought under Qadhafi in 2011, was leading a militia from the Warshefana region under the LNA. The Warshefana Council of Elders released a statement claiming the incident was an assassination and holding the Tarhouna Social Council responsible. They called for the LNA to investigate the incident. Despite its claim to be Libya’s “national army”, the self-declared LNA is a collection of military/militia units and tribal/regional-based armed groups. In the lead up to its assault on Tripoli, and the weeks that followed, the LNA has progressively integrated multiple armed groups from the north-western region, including some from Surman, Sabratha, Ghariyan, Warshefana, and Tarhouna. All these militias and local communities have long running grievances connected to power sharing, tribal disputes, criminal activity and other factors. Their integration into the LNA did not end internal issues amongst themselves – this is likely to cause friction and fracture aspects of the LNA coalition.

Likewise, in regards to the anti-LNA coalition, clashes occurred between two Zawiyyan militias on 24 May over the procession of armed vehicles that arrived at Tripoli port from Turkey on 18 May. The Tripoli-based Special Deterrence Force (Rada) intervened to end the fighting and arrested two men allegedly responsible for Sharakas’ death. Likewise, there are increasing signs of division and tension amongst Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces. The majority of GNA-aligned militias are not loyal to the GNA but rather are opposed to Haftar and the LNA and want to defend their territory. This opposition has seen the formation of a loose “anti-LNA coalition.” However, this coalition seems to be increasingly under strain as the fighting drags on. The innate fragility of its military operations is coupled with the weakness of the coalition as a whole.

May
2019

ICG report advocates for political dialogue between Libyan factions

On 23 May 2019, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the conflict in Libya, providing a set of recommendations to move beyond the present stalemate. Their report insists on the importance for the two rival factions to compromise and come to an understanding through political dialogue. If not, ICG fears the escalation of the conflict which will plunge Libya in a more chaotic situation, in which external actors will also be embarked.

Click here to read the report.

May
2019

Weapon continue to enter Libya despite UN embargo

In a recent article published with AFD and Yahoo on 20 May, Imed Lamloum reports that despite an embargo imposed by the UN relating to the supply or arms and military equipment to and from Libya since February 2011, weapons and military equipment still flow to Libya, fuelling the crisis. Lamloum indicates that foreign powers have been supplying both rival Libyan factions. Quoted in the article, Wolfram Lacher of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) noted that:

The more both sides receive arms and ammunition from their foreign backers, the longer the war will last, the more destructive it will be, and the more difficult it will be to resolve

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

Political solution as the way forward for Libya

On 21 May, Middle East Institute (MEI) released a report by Jonathan M. Winer which looks at the origins of the Libyan conflict and proposes options for its resolution. Winer argues that Libya faces the threat of an extended war of attrition as a consequence of General Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, with dire humanitarian impacts for the Libyan population. For Winer, it is essential to convince Libyan actors that a political solution is the only way forward for the country. Well-articulated, the reports reviews Libya’s history and presents in clear manner the main domestics and international actors of the Libyan conflict in the fields of politics and security.

Click here to download and read the report.

May
2019

LNA bolsters security in Oil Crescent with forces pushing closer to Sirte

On 14 May, the minister of interior of the eastern parallel government released a statement detailing the expansion of the operational area of its “Security Plan No. 01” into the desert region south of Ajdabiya through to eastern Sirte. The expansion is intended to confront any efforts to destabilise the region and support the Libyan National Army (LNA) forces already located there. On 13 and 15 May, the LNA conducted a series of operations from Ajdabiya to Bin Jawad (east of Sirte), with the assistance of a police helicopter. Last week, LNA forces operating under the LNA Gulf Operations Room were observed mobilising near Sirte, with air support from Jufra. The involvement of the parallel MoI is unlikely to make a significant difference to stability in the Oil Crescent, though may provide an additional defensive capacity at a local level. The MoI’s security plan is predominantly a tool to shore up the LNA’s narrative of ‘liberation,’ allowing the LNA to claim it is providing governance and security to the areas it controls.

Most of the nominally Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) and other armed groups in Sirte are from Misrata. Misrata deployed several powerful militias to support counter LNA operations in Tripoli and has launched several airstrikes against LNA supply lines in the Jufra region. As a result, tensions between these groups around Sirte, where their areas of influence converge, are high. While the LNA has several units based east of Sirte, it is unlikely to have the capacity to actively open a second front near Sirte while it continues fighting around Tripoli. These operations are likely aimed at securing supply lines (connecting Ras Lanuf to al-Shuwayrif and Bani Walid) and ensuring its positions are well defended against any potential assault, rather than seizing control of Sirte. Renewed focus on the Oil Crescent is indicative of the LNA increasing its overall presence in the Oil Crescent and slowly bolstering the number of troops east of Sirte – potentially as a defensive measure against any retaliatory incursion by GNA-aligned forces or insurgents/spoiler actors such as ISIS or Ibrahim Jadhran who may seek to take advantage of the growing security vacuum as the LNA continues to focus on Tripoli.

May
2019

Stalemate persists in Tripoli

In the last week, reports suggest limited territorial changes between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces in Tripoli. Clashes continue in Ain Zara, al-Hira, Espiaa, al-Hadba al-Khadra, Abu Salim, al-Twaisha, Tripoli International Airport (TIA), and Wadi al-Rabia areas. The LNA made limited advances along its al-Khillat axis towards Abu Salim and Ain Zara. The LNA also took control of the Naqlaya Military Camp. On 17 and 18 May, the LNA successfully repelled a GNA advance on the Ramla area and the TIA respectively.

Meanwhile, General Haftar held talks with French President Macron in Paris about the crisis in Libya. International media outlets reported that Haftar claimed the “conditions were not met yet for a cease-fire”. As a result, fighting is most likely to persist in Tripoli in the short-time. On 21 May, Ghassan Salamé, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, alerted the UN Security Council that Libya risked “descending into a civil war which could lead to the permanent division of the country”.

According to the UN, at least 510 people have been killed in the Tripoli conflict so far, with at least 75,000 people displaced. Media outlets reported on 21 May that the water supplies which had been attacked by an armed group on 19 May have been restored, averting significant shortages.

May
2019

Fractures appear between GNA and its forces as stalemates continues in Tripoli

There are increasing signs of division and tension amongst Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces. Reports indicated gunfire between the Abu Zuriba Zawiyya militia and Fursan Janzour Battalion, supported by the National Mobilise Force on 16 May. The incident resulted in the closure of the coastal road to Janzour. Likewise, local sources reported an ongoing dispute between an Amazigh and Zawiyya militia in the same area. Tensions extend to central Tripoli, with reports of a dispute between Misratan militias and the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) over access to military equipment delivered to Tripoli on 18 May.

The majority of GNA-aligned militias are not loyal to the GNA but rather are opposed to Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and want to defend their territory. This opposition has seen the formation of a loose “anti-LNA coalition.” The majority of these groups have never worked together in the past and have had little time to facilitate coordination amongst themselves. The defence of Tripoli is likely coordinated among leaders in the Tripoli Protection Forces (TPF), Zintani commander of the GNA Western Region Usama al-Juwaili, GNA Central Region commander Mohamed al-Haddad, and Minister of Interior and Defence Fathi Bashagha via informal commander-level discussions. Misratan dominance of the GNA/anti-LNA coalition is also a cause of internal friction. Sources report Misratan powerbrokers have effectively taken over the GNA and have reportedly received funding amounting to one billion Libyan dinars. Sources report that as much as 20 per cent of the available Misratan militias (Misrata has over 200 militias with some 18,000 men at their disposal) have deployed to support anti-Haftar forces in Tripoli.

The more protracted the conflict becomes, the more the underlying and long-standing differences, divisions, and points of contention will re-emerge – potentially seeing it splinter, fracture and break down. Fragmentation of the anti-LNA coalition is likely to happen even if it manages to defeat the LNA – once that shared enemy is gone, infighting will resume and new alliances and power structures will be fought over. In Tripoli, any significant change on the ground over the next week remains unlikely. The LNA may push to retake Aziziyya to help facilitate its push into central Tripoli while the GNA-aligned forces are likely to attempt to retake Espiaa and TIA through its “western flank.” With the GNA and LNA locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli, and the international community divided, conflict is likely to remain protracted for the foreseeable future.

May
2019

Declining economic conditions to be worsened by tensions

In an article published with Gallup, Iman Berrached and RJ Reinhart analyse living conditions in Libya, arguing that economic conditions are in decline. For them, the current tensions are most likely to exacerbate the country’s economic decline.

Click here to read the article

May
2019

The economic battlefront

In a recent article, The Financial Times discusses the intensification of tensions regarding the economic sector in Libya. The author reports that economy is becoming the new battlefront in the Libyan crisis which opposes the UN-led Government of National Accord (GNA) and factions aligned with Eastern-Libyan General Haftar. For analysts, Haftar could represent a significant threat to Libya’s oil resources given his military emprise through strategic Libyan National Army (LNA) positions. The article recalls that past attempts by General Haftar to seize oilfields and oil resources had been successfully blocked, thanks to the intervention of the United States. However, recent developments such as the seeming endorsement of Haftar by President Trump lead analysts to fear that further attempts to seize oil resources by Haftar could be successful.

Click here to read the article

May
2019

IRI: 2019 Libya Municipal Survey Research

A new poll of 15 municipalities in Libya, released on 15 May by the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research, indicates that municipal councils are well-regarded in comparison to national institutions, which tend to be negatively viewed across the board. Respondents from across the 15 municipalities identified poor government services as the single most important issue in their areas and were uncertain about councils’ roles and responsibilities within Libya’s turbulent political climate.

IRI indicated that respondents reported concerns about government’s inability to deliver basic needs, with pluralities in 14 out of 15 municipalities surveyed identifying poor government services – including transportation infrastructure, public service delivery or poor health care – as the single most important issue in their area. The economy and security rounded out the top three issues identified by most respondents in all municipalities surveyed.

This survey was conducted on behalf of the Center for Insights in Survey Research by Altai Consulting, under the supervision of Redstone Scientific. Data was collected between December 31, 2018 and January 31, 2019 through computer-assistance telephone interviews conducted from a call center in Tripoli. The sample consists of 4,636 respondents aged 18 and older with cell phone access from 15 municipalities across Libya, with a sample of approximately 300 per municipality. A gender quota and age category cap were used to enhance representativeness. The margin of error for the sample in each municipality does not exceed plus or minus 5.6 percent at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent. Figures in charts and tables may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. This poll was conducted with support from the United States Agency for International Development.

May
2019

List of elected mayors in Libyan Municipalities

On 16 May, Dr. Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis a summary of the results of the Libyan Municipal elections which took place in Libyan municipalities on April 2019.

The results are listed on the table below:

List of Elected Mayors (second round)
No	Municipality		Mayor		Date
1.	Zultn (زلطن)		Emhemed Rahuma Abdul Salam Al Anbat امحمد رحومة عبد السلام الانبط		13^th May 19
2.	Edree Al Shati (ادري الشاطي)		Ibrahim Omar Ibrahim Abul Gasem		13^th May 19
			ابراهيم عمر ابراهيم ابوالقاسم
3.	Gurda Al Shati (القرضة الشاطي)		Majdi Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Hizam		5^th May 19
4.	Brak Al Sahti (براك الشاطي)		Al Jilani Ali AL Jilani Dau		5^th May 19
5.	Ubari (أوباري)		Ahmed Matako Nino Mustafa		5^th May 19
6.	Bent Baya (بنت بيًه)		Ashref Khalifa Emhemed Al Muslih		5^th May 19
7.	Al Bawanis (البوانـيس)		Ali Faraj Abdullah Mohamed Akasha		5^th May 19
8.	Wazin (وازن)		Ahmed Isaa Said Kurdi		30^th Apr 19
9.	Wadi Itaba (وادي عتبة)		Abdul Rahman Mohamed Ahmed Al Salheen		30^th Apr 19
10.	Zoltin (زلطن)		Emhemed Al Mabruk Emhemed Al Lijabani		30^th Apr 19
11.	Al Gharifa (الغريفة)		Abdul Satar Al Sanusi Ali Musa		30^th Apr 19
12.	Al Rehibat (الرحيبات)		Al Sifaw Soliman Al Sifaw Al AMlti		30^th Apr 19
13.	Ragdalin (رقدلين)		Ali Mohemed Abdul Samad Salisel		30^th Apr 19
14.	Zuwara (زوارة)		Farhat Omran Abubaker Abu Al Shuwash		16^th Apr 19
15.	Baten Al Jabel (باطن الجبل)		Jamal Dau Khalifa Tameen		16^th Apr 19
16.	Al Galaa (القلعة)		Walid Ibrahim Sasi Grada		16^th Apr 19
17.	Nisma (نسمة)		Mahmoud Ali Al Mukhtar Al Ashtar		16^th Apr 19
18.	Ghadames (غدامس)		Kasem Mohamed Ali Al Manaa		16^th Apr 19
19.	Al Hawamed (الحوامد)		Salah Emhemed Mdalel Masoud صالح امحمد امدلل مسعود		16^th Apr 19
20.	Nalut (نالوت)		Abdul Wahab Salem Ahmed Al Hajam عبد الوهاب سالم علي الحجام		16^th Apr 19
MC completed elections, But NO mayor selection took place
21.	Al Riwawna (الرياينة)			Polling 30^th Mar 2019
MC Elections under way
22.	Sabrata (صبراته)	Voter registretation restarted on 5^th May 2019
23.	Misrata (مصراته)	Voter registretation restarted on 5^th May 2019
24.	Surman (صرمان)	Voter registretation restarted on 5^th May 2019
25.	Al Khomes (الخمس)	Voter registretation restarted on 5^th May 2019
26.	Al Asabia (الاصابعة)	Voter registretation restarted on 6^th May 2019
27.	South Zawia (جنوب الزاوية)	Voter registretation restarted on 6^th May 2019
28.	Al Haraba (الحرابة)	Voter registretation restarted on 6^th May 2019
29.	Kikla (ككلة)	Voter registretation restarted on 6^th May 2019
30.	Mislata (مسلاته)	Voter registretation restarted on 7^th May 2019
31.	Al Jufra (الجفرة)	Voter registretation restarted on 7^th May 2019
32.	Kabao (كاباو)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019, An Amazigh town in Jabal Nafusa.
33.	Tarhuna (ترهونة)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019, Armed forces are taking place in the Tripoli invation.
34.	AL Kufra (الكفرة)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019
35.	Ejkhera (إجخرة)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019
36.	Daher Al Jabl (ظاهر الجبل)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019
37.	Ghat (غات)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019 A Tawareg town in the west of Libya, by the Algiries border.
38.	Jadu (جادو)	Voter registretation restarted on 14^th May 2019, An Amazigh town in Jabal Nafusa.
Thinni Government appointed Mayors
1.	Sabrata	Mr Moftah Khalifa Salem Al Bernishini (مفتاح خليفة سشمثة البرنيشني) appointed mayor by Al Baida Government, 11^th April 2019, Link
2.	Gharian	Mr Ak Saed Al Gaod (الصيد القعود) Link
3.	Kufra	Mr Abdul Rahman Agoob was appointed on 21/3/2019, as head of Kufra Steering Commitee to replace the mayor. Link

May
2019

Why global and regional powers aren’t standing up against Haftar’s Libya offensive

In his latest article published with Al-Monitor on 15 May, Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack argues that outside support by international powers is likely key to the battle for Tripoli.

Given the propensity for stalemate in the Libyan way of war, foreign powers’ decisions vis-a-vis promoting a mediated solution or offering certain levels of support for different sides and factions are likely to be decisive in determining which actors emerge victorious. Since Libya is a penetrated system with an enduring internal balance of power, outside actors can tip the otherwise-balanced scales between warring coalitions.

Pack demonstrates the extent to which General Haftar’s international backers seem to be forced into maintaining their support to the Libyan National Army (LNA) even though they might not have agreed with General Haftar’s strategy as it still serves their interests.

These backers are likely to disagree with the timing and tactics of Haftar’s offensive and to have reserved some choice words for him in their private conversations. But they still seem forced to back him. A decisive defeat for the LNA at the gates of Tripoli, and the ensuing collapse of his influence throughout Libya, would mean a resurgence of exactly those Libyan actors to which Haftar’s backers are ideologically anathema.

He also advocates for the international community to try to look past such interests in order to find a common interest and allow for the stabilisation of Libya.

If the main international players would look past their sunk costs and find a common interest in a stable Libya, they might see a fairly simple way out of the seemingly endless wars of post-Gadhafi succession: denying all sides access to external sources of funding and arms, while also forcing the Libyan central bank and the internationally recognized government to eliminate subsidies and cut salaries to militiamen on all sides.

Click here to read the full article.

May
2019

Libya’s Coming Forever War

On 15 May, Frederic Wehrey and Emadeddin Badi published with War On The Rocks an in-depth analysis of the current situation in Libya resulting from the offensive launched by Eastern-Libyan General Haftar on Tripoli. Wehrey and Badi aim at correcting misunderstandings regarding Haftar’s intentions and capacities and argue that international powers should not support Haftar with the idea that he can be a game-changing figure enabling unity and institutionalization in Libya. They write:

One of the truths of post-revolutionary Libya is that no single military or political actor has been able to exert a preponderance of control and sovereignty. Libya’s militia bosses and factional elites, including Haftar, have long had a mutual economic and political interest in keeping conflict simmering, eschewing both decisive outcomes on the battlefield and outside attempts to end the fighting.

Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On 15 May, Wehrey testified before the United States Congress on the situation in Libya to present his views on U.S policy towards Libya. Wehrey is a strong advocate of a renewed involvement of the U.S in Libya in support of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN-led efforts towards stabilisation.

Click here to read the article in full.

May
2019

Libyan oil fields in need of improvement

In an op-ed published with Libya Observer on 15 May, Professor Jamal S. Ellafi calls out to the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) to focus on improving the capacity of Libya’s oil fields instead of trying to attract further international companies to invest in Libya. For Ellafi, the current political and security environment will not allow for further international investments.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

International support shaped Haftar’s firepower

In an article published with Middle East Eye on 14 May Arnaud Delalande analyses General Haftar’s firepower. The article highlights the importance of the international support provided to Haftar, and points out the different international powers who supposedly supplied the Libyan National Army (LNA) with weaponry. The article is highly relevant to understand the constitution of the LNA as well as the scope of its military equipment. Delalande indicates that the LNA is composed of several groups of militias rotating around a regular army nucleus representing a force of about 25,000 men. The regular army itself regroups around 7000 members. There are also foreign units in the LNA, mostly from neighbouring countries such as Sudan and Chad).

Click here to read the article

May
2019

Tensions rise in Sirte as LNA mobilises near the city

On 11 May, the spokesperson for the Sirte Protection Force (SPF), Taha Hadid, asserted that the SPF was ready to repel any Libyan National Army Forces (LNA) attack on the city. This follows local sources reporting the deployment of LNA units in the outskirts of the city in the early evening, waiting for orders to advance on the city. Sources on the ground report that residents in Sirte are on high alert and many are preparing to leave the city in anticipation of looming conflict. The SPF has also reported Islamic State (ISIS) forces moving in the area south of Sirte in recent days, though details are limited.

The LNA has failed to make the inroads it expected into the capital, and needs to secure its supply lines in order to maintain its positions. Controlling Sirte and/ or the area around the city would allow it to better protect these routes. Any major assault or provocation on Sirte would likely see a swift response from Misratan forces based there or from Misrata itself. If mobilized, Misratan forces would likely be able to deflect the LNA forces given the limited number of LNA troops available to support such an attack. However, a significant Misratan mobilization to Sirte may result in Misratan forces being pulled away from Tripoli, leaving the capital’s defenses vulnerable. On the other hand, Misratans fighting in Tripoli may be reluctant to leave the city for fear they would lose their advantage to other western militias. Either way, a significant LNA move on Sirte could expose existing divisions within Misrata and the anti-LNA forces more generally, even if the LNA cannot take the city.

May
2019

Fighting continues in Tripoli with few significant territorial changes

The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) “Operation Flood of Dignity” against Government of National Accord (GNA) -aligned forces in southern Tripoli continued throughout the first week of Ramadan, with no significant changes in territorial control. The number of incidents and resulting casualties has slightly decreased compared to the previous week. Ground clashes continue around the Tripoli International Airport, al-Twaisha, Hay Funduq al-Sharef, al-Hira, Wadi al-Rabea, Ain Zara, Zatarna and Khallet Furjan. LNA airstrikes, predominantly at nighttime, targeting GNA-aligned forces’ alleged arms and weapons caches continue, with significant targets including Janzour Knights positions in western Tripoli. The LNA continues to operate from bases in Ghariyan, Tarhouna, Bani Walid and Sabratha, with the parallel government Minister of Interior, Ibrahim Bushnaf, restructuring security arrangements in these towns to consolidate LNA control. Reports continue to suggest that GNA militias are preparing a counter offensive, including an assault on Tarhouna, Ghariyan and possibly Bani Walid, but it is unclear when it will be launched.

With the GNA and LNA locked in a military stalemate south of Tripoli, and the international community divided, the conflict is likely to remain protracted for the foreseeable future. Military action in and around Tripoli is likely to persist throughout Ramadan, despite calls by the international community for a ceasefire. Night-time airstrikes by the LNA are likely to increase throughout the month. The GNA Western Military Region will pursue its attempts to severe the LNA’s supply lines and continue to defend against the LNA’s offensive.

May
2019

EU calls for immediate ceasefire

On 13 May, the European Union Council released a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire and reiterated that there was no military solution to the Libyan crisis. It urged all parties to stop any actions threatening the political process and to recommit to a political solution. The statement called the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s assault on Tripoli a “threat to international peace and security.”

The Government of National Accord (GNA)’s efforts to apply pressure on European powers to provide it with support and legitimacy appear to be backfiring and rather than nurturing its relationships, it instead appears to be actively antagonising them. Moreover, the GNA’s longstanding inability to control militias aligned with it or even identify those acting on its behalf has been a significant factor hampering the international community’s willingness to unite behind it. A UN staff member indicated that during the emergency United Nations Security Council (UNSC) session, it was “difficult” to identify the armed groups acting under the GNA and “the extent of their subordination to political authority.” The GNA’s international support base is becoming increasingly limited. While countries such as the UK, Italy and Germany continue to call for an end to the conflict and have previously tried to name Khalifa Haftar as the main aggressor in the escalating conflict, explicit international support for the GNA seems to be limited to Qatar and Turkey. The LNA’s offensive benefitted from direct regional and international support from Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. In Libya, the GNA is perceived to be purchasing its allies. Its reliance on money to buy loyalty is drying up liquidity in some banks, which is resulting in social discontent. While Serraj remains the GNA figurehead, in practice anti-Haftar military figures, predominantly from Misrata, have taken over GNA politics in Tripoli and this dynamic is likely to negatively impact the GNA’s legitimacy in the future.

Click here to read the statement.

May
2019

There will be no winner

In his latest article published with Reuters on 10 May, journalist Ulf Laessing describes the stalemate reached in Southern Tripoli, with fighting factions taking and losing positions day after day.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

Strong lobby influenced US position on Libya

A Wall Street Journal article published on 12 May reported that the United States were influenced by Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the matter of the crisis in Libya, and this lobby led to the conversation between US President Trump and Eastern Libyan General Khalifa Haftar in which the US President seemed to endorse Haftar’s action plan and offensive on Tripoli. Such an interference could be a significant game changer for the resolution of the Libyan crisis as for Jalel Harchaoui writing for L’Orient Le Jour Washington holds the key to putting an end to the crisis and stalemate in Libya.

Click here to read the report on the WSJ article and here to read Harchaoui’s article.

May
2019

The Business side of war

As conflict in Libya opens lucrative opportunities in Libya in the field of reconstruction and civil works for business, Ahmed Fouad reports for Al-Monitor on 12 May the worry of Egyptian business people. Fouad reports that Egyptian business-people fear Egypt’s strong support for General Haftar in the Tripoli fighting could jeopardize the chances of Egyptian businesses to be awarded with reconstruction contracts and current exchanges. Fouad notes that

Egyptian exports to Libya, especially construction materials, are considered one of the main pillars of the private sector’s participation in Libya’s reconstruction

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

Russia’s unchanged policy towards Libya

On 6 May, Yury Barmin analysed in an article published with Al-Monitor Russia’s positions towards Libya in the light of the recent events. Barmin argues that the offensive launched by General Haftar on Tripoli has not pushed Moscow to revise its policy towards Libya, which he analyses as mostly reactionary and driven by Russia’s will to impose itself as a relevant actor in Libya. However, Barmin highlights Russia’s lack of centralized policy planning and a complex web of alliances as obstacles to Russia’s predominance in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

ISIS’s resilience

On 8 May, Voice of America published the second article of a four parts series on the Islamic State (ISIS). In this piece, Jeff Seldin reports that, in spite of the defeats experienced over the past months, the number of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State continues to expand. The article looks at several countries, among which Libya. Quoting Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack, Seldin warns of the resurgence of the terrorist group in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

GNA PM goes on European tour to rally support

The Independent reported on 9 May about the meeting between Fayez Sarraj, the head of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), and UK Prime Minister Theresa May. During the meeting which was also attened by UK Foreign Secretary Hunt, Sarraj shared his concerns regarding the situation in Libya, the chaos provoked by the attack on Tripoli by forces affiliated with Eastern Libyan General Haftar. The UK representatives affirmed their support to Sarraj and the UN efforts, however, the article highlights the UK’s limited influence in Libya. Over the past week, GNA head Sarraj undertook an European tour during which he met with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, French President Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Angela Merkel to rally international support. The Independent reports that a trip to the United States of Sarraj could follow. As The stalemate on the ground in Tripoli continues, and these initiatives could pave the way for talks according to the article.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

News – Libya oil

Libyan media outlets reported on 10 May that over the course of the past week, Mustafa Sanalla, the chairman of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) held a series of meetings in Houston, United States, as part of a $60-billion NOC procurement drive. The NOC is exploring solutions to achieve a stated production target of 2.1 million barrels per day by 2023.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

NOC Chairman advocates for ceasefire to protect Libya oil

On 8 May, Mustafa Sanallah the Chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) published an op-ed with Bloomberg in which he advocates for a ceasefire between the factions of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces aligned with the UN-backed Governmen of National Accord (GNA) fighting in Southern Tripoli. Sanalla argues that a cease-fire is the only solution to protect Libya’s oil production which is a vital asset for the country and has already been impacted in various ways since the eruption of violence in early April. For Sanalla, a dual-key system for the oil sector must be maintained in Libya for the country to reach stability, meaning a system in which both GNA and LNA factions participate in the control of the sector, which is admnistrated by a third, neutral organisation such as the NOC.

Only a ceasefire and a return to the dual-key system will return stability to Libya’s oil sector. Libya’s civil conflict has raged for too long, and it is tempting to seek to break the deadlock once and for all. However, a violent swing of the pendulum, one way or the other, threatens to take offline much of Libya’s oil production – and along with it, Libya’s prospects for a peaceful and prosperous future.

Click here to read the full statement.

May
2019

The implication of Haftar’s offensive for Libya

In an article published on 3 May with Atlantic Council, Karim Mezran analyses the implication of General Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli. For Mezran, the future for Libya is likely to take the shape of a partition of a sort. He states:

After the battle sorts itself out there will be an opportunity for peace talks, but these must happen on a different level than the discussions that produced the Skhirat agreement of December 2015. The difference will consist in understanding the mutated situation on the ground and accepting that to obtain a degree of peace and stability the two parts of the country will have to be ruled according to the conditions that have evolved in the last few weeks.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

Baryoush or fasouliyah?

In this article published on 6 May, Voice of America (VOA) looks at breakfasts in Tripoli and what dishes can tell on political divisions within the country. For Mary Fitzgerald, the choice between “baryoush” or “fasouliyah” symbolizes the battle lines in the country.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

The United States and authoritarian rules

In his latest article published on 6 May with The Council on Foreign Relations, Steven A. Cook demonstrates the tendency of United States to endorse authoritarian rulers as an attempt to protect national interests. His demonstration draws on the recent exchange between U S President Trump and Eastern Libyan General Haftar that transpired as an endorsement of the offensive by the U.S.

Click here to read the full article.

May
2019

External actors at the heart of Libyan tensions

In an article published on 5 May by WRAL.COM, Tim Lister summarizes the ongoing tensions and developments which have taken place in Libya over the course of the past month. Lister points out that, as exposed in Libya-Analysis Jason Pack and Lachlan Wilson’s article for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the current chaos in Libya provides opportunities for a significant resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya. Since the beginning of tensions around Tripoli, ISIS claimed two attacks in Southern Libya.

Click here to read the article.

May
2019

The contradictions in France’s policies towards Africa

In an article published on 1 May with The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Youssef Tobi highlights the French tendency to use force to address tensions in Africa and how it comes in contradiction with president Macron’s foreign policy declarations advocating for soft approaches. For Tobi, such a contradiction can be clearly perceived in France’s strategy towards Libya, where it officially supports the UN-led plan for stabilisation while supporting General Haftar in the hope that placing a strongman in Libya would put an end to chaos.

Click here to read the article.

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