Viewing posts from: Southern Libya

19
Nov
2019

Peace pact signed in Ubari to adress inter tribe violence

In an article published with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on 13 November 2019, Nate Wilson and Abigail Corey report on the peace pact signed in Ubari in September 2019 to address violence and retaliation between communities such as the Tebu and the Tuareg. In partnership with a local association, the Azgar Association, USIP worked with local actors and communities to address Ubari’s history of inter tribe violence. The peace pact stands as a result of this community-based initiative for dialogue.

Click here to read the article.

06
May
2019

External actors at the heart of Libyan tensions

In an article published on 5 May by WRAL.COM, Tim Lister summarizes the ongoing tensions and developments which have taken place in Libya over the course of the past month. Lister points out that, as exposed in Libya-Analysis Jason Pack and Lachlan Wilson’s article for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the current chaos in Libya provides opportunities for a significant resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya. Since the beginning of tensions around Tripoli, ISIS claimed two attacks in Southern Libya.

Click here to read the article.

18
Apr
2019

Analysis of Libya’s 2019 Municipal Elections – part 2

On 18 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections in Libya.

In Al-Khoms, the CCMCE decided to postpone the organisation of the municipal elections until further notice. No explanations were given.

The third round of municipal elections is to be held on 20 April. Below, the list of cities concerned by the deadline:

No Municipality البلدية Region Polling day
1 Brak Al Shati براك الشاطي South 20.04.2019
2 Al Gurda Al Shati القرضة الشاطي South 20.04.2019
3 Idri Al Shati ادري الشاطي South 20.04.2019
4 Ubari اوباري South 20.04.2019
5 Sbarata صبراته West 20.04.2019
6 Surman صرمان West 20.04.2019
7 Zoltin زلطن West 20.04.2019
8 Al Shuwayref الشويرف West 20.04.2019
9 Al Rehibat الرحيبات Nafosa mountain 20.04.2019

Dr Otman Gajiji also worked on the results of mayor elections, which took place on 16 April:

No Municipality البلدية Mayor name اسم العميد
1 Zowara زوارة – –
2 Batin Al Jabal باطن الجبل – –
3 Al Kalaa القلعة Walid Grada وليد ابراهيم ساسي قرادة
4 Nalut نالوت Abdul Wahab Salem –
5 Nisma نسمة – –
6 Ghadames غدامس Kasem Manaa قاسم المانع
7 Al Hawamed الحوامد Salah Masoud صلاح امحمد مدلل مسعود

Regarding Sabha, the municipal elections will be held on 27 April. The CCMCE  has set the limit on campaign spending to LD55K per list and LD27.5K for injured and women seats. The formula is based of the population of the city.

14
Apr
2019

Saudi Arabia’s financial support to Haftar’s operations

On 12 April, Jared Malsin and Summer Said reported in an article with the Wall Street Journal that prior to the launch of the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli, Saudi Arabia allegedly promised tens millions of dollars to Eastern Libyan General Haftar to support his operations. The article describes the support received by General Haftar and the LNA from foreign actors, such as the United States and some European members state over the past few months. Jonathan M. Winer, the former U.S. special envoy to Libya, argues that such support was granted as foreign actors believed Haftar’s commitment to the UN-led political process. For Wolfram Lacher, such support has enable Haftar to become the player he currently is on the Libyan political scene.

Click here to read the article.

11
Apr
2019

Analysis of voter participation in Libya’s 2019 Municipal Elections

On 11 April, Dr Otman Gajiji shared with Libya-Analysis his analysis of the municipal elections which took place in Libya at the end of March of this year. These elections were highly expected in Libya due to their importance as they constitute a step towards the restoration of the state’s legitimacy.

The second Libyan municipal elections started early this year. On 30th Mar 2019  the first round of municipal elections concerned 9 municipalities. The preliminary results were later published by the Central Committee for Municipal Elections (CCMCE) . Voter registration was opened for all municipalities to allow for more voters to register and voters who had registered for the first round which took place in 2013-2016 did not need to register again. The second round took place on 6th April and concerned a group of  7 municipalities located in Western Libya. The preliminary participation rates were also later published by CCMCE.

The security situation in the western and southern regions was taken into consideration given the recent turn of events in Western Libya.  CCMCE postponed Kikla elections (on the Nafusa mountain) before voting day, and both Al Asabia and South Zawia were stopped on the polling day.

The attached tables show voter and candidate registration for some municipalities. The last table of participation rates in this election also includes a comparison of participation with the first round of elections in 2014.

Municipal Elections Libya 2019

 

10
Apr
2019

Can anti-LNA forces sustain their defence of Tripoli?

The involvement of Misratan militias in defending Tripoli and attacking Libyan National Army (LNA) supply lines is crucial, especially in terms of air power. However, Misrata have mobilised to deter a specific, active threat. If fighting is drawn out or if Misrata or its neighbouring territories are attacked, then its forces may withdraw to Misrata and Sirte to reinforce positions there. This would leave Tripoli more vulnerable. In addition, the myriad militias currently fighting against the LNA are often bitterly divided among themselves, and are only working together because Haftar poses such a symbolic and potentially game-changing threat. If fighting is prolonged, it is more likely that this alliance will start to fracture and break down. The same is likely to happen if the Government of National Accord (GNA) alliance manages to secure a resounding defeat of the LNA – once that shared enemy is gone, infighting will resume and new alliances and power structures will be fought over.

09
Apr
2019

ISIS attack in Southern Libya

Reuters reported on 9 April that fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS) conducted an attack in Southern Libya. The attack targeted the town of Fuqaha in Jufrah and reportedly resulted in the killing of 3 people and one kidnapping. Analysts alert that the present state of tensions and violence in Libya following the Libyan National Army (LNA) offensive on Tripoli could make the ground for a resurgence of ISIS in Libya.

Click here to read the article.

05
Apr
2019

‘Pushing the limits without going beyond them’

Founder of Libya-Analysis Jason Pack was interviewed on 4 March by Al Jazeera and commented the advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Western Libya, near Tripoli. Pack analyses that Haftar’s decision to advance his position is most likely linked to the upcoming National Conference and does not necessarily indicate that there will be a military offensive targeting Tripoli. For Pack, Haftar is most likely to “push the limits without going beyond” and remain along the lines of the UN-led agreement which opposes a military solution in Libya.

03
Apr
2019

Uncertainty in Western Libya could lead to instability

In an article published with Middle East Eye on 31 March, Tom Wescott discusses the growing tensions surrounding Tripoli due to the advances of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) towards Wester Libya. Wescott reports that support for the LNA is growing in Western Libya, causing increasing tensions in the Libyan capital. For him, uncertainty prevails in Western Libya, and it could lead to instability in the short, medium-term.

Click here to read the article.

01
Apr
2019

Libya’s Central Bank at the heart of political disputes

In his latest article published on 1 April with War On the Rocks, Jalel Harchaoui argues that Libya’s most important financial institution, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), is increasingly at risk of becoming the target of maneuvers by Libyan factions to gain power. Harchaoui demonstrates that while a military offensive on Tripoli would be too risky, General Haftar’s strategy to increase his control over Libya could be to focus on the CBL. The institution, chaired by Sadiq al-Kabir, reportedly holds more than $70 billion of foreign-exchange reserves. The article presents the different national, regional and international actors which have attempted in a way or another to influence the control of Libya’s CBL. He notes that the lessened involvement of the United States in Libya puts at a greater risk Libya’s resources.

Click here to read the full article.

22
Mar
2019

A Minister, a General, and the Militias: Libya’s Shifting Balance of Power

In a report published on 19 March with the New York Review of Books (NYR) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Frederic Wehrey argues that Khalifa Haftar’s offensive in Southern Libya has caused a major shift in the balance of power in Libya. Wehrey recalls in this article recent interviews conducted with Libyan actors, among which Fathi Bashagha, who acts as Interior Minister for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) since late 2018.

Click here to read the article.

20
Mar
2019

Renewed militia clashes in Tripoli reflect Libyan political divisions

On 17 March, clashes occurred in the same area between the Janzour Knights and General Security Service forces. On 18 March, clashes took place in the early hours of the morning between the Janzour-based National Mobile Force (NMF) and the General Security Service in the Ghayiran Brigade area in west Tripoli. A convoy of twenty NMF vehicles entered the neighbouring al-Siyahiyya area without coordinating their movements with the Hay al-Andalus Joint Security Room, leading to an exchange of gunfire with the forces at the Ghayran Brigade checkpoint. The General Security Service released a statement denying that they were involved in the event.

Tensions are emerging within and between Tripoli-based militias as a result of growing support among some armed groups for the Libyan National Army (LNA). Zintan has a long-standing relationship with the LNA and hence Zintani forces are likely to be a source of friction for Tripoli groups concerned about militias sympathetic to the LNA forming a fifth column in the capital. Moreover, the shuffling and removal of Trabelsi’s forces indicate an increasing desire by forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA) to remove any LNA-affiliated forces from strategic positions in the capital.

18
Mar
2019

Tensions in Southern Libya risk further marginalisation of ethnic groups

In an article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published on 15 March, Umberto Profazio argues that tensions between Libyan rival administrations risk reigniting ethnic tensions and jeopardise fragile agreements. The author refers to the campaign launched by Eastern-Libyan General Haftar in Southern Libya in early 2019, noting that both General Haftar and rival administration the Government of National Accord (GNA) are attempting to court ethnic groups for political or territorial advantages. Profazio analyses that the result of such upheavals could be the further marginalisation of Southern communities. In conclusion of his article, he highlights the increasing isolation of Fayez Al-Sarraj, head of the GNA, and warns about potential shifts in international alliances:

In comparison to France’s assertive support for Haftar, the US stance could be interpreted as extremely cautious, but it does seem to be a reflection of changes on the ground. Haftar’s advances have certainly raised doubts in Washington, which is reconsidering its relationship with Sarraj. He is a weakened partner who is not only losing the confidence of his major foreign allies, but also the support of militias in the capital and finds himself increasingly undermined by his own colleagues in Tripoli.

Click here to read the analysis.

15
Mar
2019

Libya’s wake-up call

Over the course of the week, Al-Ahram Weekly published an editorial relating to current events in Libya. For the Egyptian newspaper, the deployment of General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in Southern Libya is the latest ‘wake-up call on the urgent need to reach a political settlement among Libyan factions’. The recent events also demonstrate Libya’s need for a strong government and a strong army, according to the editorial. As a result, it reports that Egyptian efforts to find a solution to the Libyan crisis will continue, given the threat instability in Libya poses to Egypt.

Click here to read the editorial.

12
Mar
2019

Is the UN-led political process in Libya at risk?

On 7 March, Emadeddin Badi published with Middle East Institute an analysis of General Haftar’s Southern strategy and its potential repercussions. Along with other analysis that have been published over the past weeks, Badi alerts on the potential subversion and derailing of the UN process that could result from Haftar’s southern advances. Such reports contribute to demonstrate the growing concerns among scholars and analysts about the current turn of events in Libya.

Click here to read the analysis.

11
Mar
2019

Increasing tensions in Western Libya as General Haftar gains more power

On 9 March, Ulf Laessing reported for Reuters on General Haftar’s maneuver in Southern Libya, suggesting that fear regarding an attack by forces loyal to the Eastern-Libya based General on Western Libya is growing. Laessing analyses that in the event of an offensive of Haftar’s Libyan National Army on Western Libya, the city of Misrata would stand as Haftar’s biggest obstacle.

Click here to read the report.

08
Mar
2019

French interventions in Sahel region to further tensions

On 8 March, Tarek Megerisi and Andrew Lebovich published with The European Council on Foreign Relations an analysis of France’s strategy in the Sahel drawing on the French intervention in Chad last February. They argue that interventions of foreign powers in the region, and of France in particular, could likely cause an escalation of risks in the region. According to them, the intervention showed both the lengths to which France is willing to go to protects regional partners such as Chad and also how European countries continue to focus on short-term solutions to the regional issues of security and migration. The two authors also demonstrate that the intervention also reveals France’s dependency on auxiliaries and partners to control issues of national interests, and that such partnerships can have damaging consequences. On that note, they refer to Libya and the French support to General Haftar and his armed forces since 2014 which contributed to Haftar’s rise. In this context, the French intervention in Chad appears connected to Haftar’s movements in South Libya. For the authors, these actions are largely contributing to disrupting the regional situation.

Click here to read the report.

06
Mar
2019

Sanallah lifts force majeure at Sharara oil field

On 4 March, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) officially lifted force majeure on Sharara oilfield after it said the armed militia who had blockaded the field had been removed. According to the NOC, its subsidiary Akakus, which operates the field, had received assurances from the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Petroleum Facilities Guards commander, Brigadier General al-Rifi Kennah Ahmed Ali, that all the individuals listed by the Attorney General (26 members of the Fezzan Anger Movement) for arrest have been expelled from the field and would not be allowed to re-enter. Production of around 80,000bpd is expected to resume on 5 March, with regular output of up to 300,000bpd to be reached over the coming days. Plans are also in place to repair the 20,000bpd lost production capacity destroyed by looting and vandalism during the blockade.

The manner of the lifting of force majeure is a victory for both Sanallah and the LNA. For Sanallah, he maintained his zero-tolerance, non-partisan approach to blockaders, willing to engage with either of the national actor who was genuinely able to fulfill the demands to ensure the safety of oil facility staff and neutrality of the field. For the LNA, they have now succeeded in securing and, crucially, opening the majority of Libya’s main oilfields, which will provide Haftar with additional leverage over national political, security and public domains.

06
Mar
2019

Mixed Libyan Reaction To Sarraj-Haftar Meeting

The Haftar-Serraj meeting in Abu Dhabi has provoked mixed reactions in Libya, though the most vocal reactions have been negative. While the meeting is a sign that Sarraj has been forced to dial back his opposition to the LNA’s advances in the South and that Haftar is keen to strengthen his international leverage and credibility, it could conversely be fairly damaging to rapprochement efforts on the ground. Indeed, the recent progress achieved in back-channel military rapprochement between the LNA and Government of National Accord (GNA) military structures, especially between Haftar and Misrata, appears to have been damaged by the ‘Abu Dhabi’ meeting.

The ‘constructive ambiguity’ employed by UNSMIL – namely the apparent dropping of the National Conference and emphasis on general elections without any clarity – is likely to reinforce concerns amongst anti-LNA groups and others in the western region that the UN process is a ruse for the return of military dictatorship in civilian guise. As such, this has taken away much of the political and social legitimacy enjoyed by Sarraj and his GNA within these communities, and has undermined some of the rapprochement efforts between forces on the ground. The international setting of the meeting is also raising sensitivities over foreign involvement in Libyan affairs, particularly UAE involvement – this is particularly potent as regards UNSMIL and the UAE given one of Salame’s predecessors negotiated a lucrative job in the UAE while in position as envoy.

04
Mar
2019

Haftar’s growing credibility to threaten GNA

On 3 March, Bel Trew published with The Independent an article on peace prospects in Libya. Reporting about the meeting between Governement of National Accord (GNA) Fayez Al-Sarraj and Haftar in Abu Dhabi for peace talks where they both agreed to the organisation of elections, she questions whether stability can truly be achieved. For the journalist, Haftar’s growing credibility in Libya gained through his campaign in Southern Libya is becoming more and more a threat to the GNA and Western Libya.

Click here to read the article.

27
Feb
2019

GNA military asserts its position as LNA influence grows in North Western Libya

On 24 February, a convoy of fifty armed vehicles under the command of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Western Military Region deployed to the al-Qaryat-Mizdat area in response to concerns of the Libyan National Army (LNA) advancing in that direction. Moreover, at the weekend the GNA’s Western Military Region media office released a statement declaring that “all official military units in the western region” remain under their command, “except auxiliary forces in the Sabratha area, operating under the LNA”. The GNA’s deployment of armed vehicles and its statement stressing its control over western security forces comes amid signs of the LNA’s growing support in north-western Libya. For example, on 19 February the LNA’s 155 Battalion released a video showing four of its members somewhere in Tripoli, declaring their support for the LNA’s General Command. On 19 February, a Chadian national was arrested for having false identification close to Tiji, in south-western Libya. Tiji has been notably supportive of the LNA as it combats Chadian opposition groups in the south.

Such movements indicate that the LNA is attempting to assert its authority and counter the LNA’s narrative (and public perception) of its growing influence in the region. The LNA’s success in the South is leading to shifting alliances and allowing it to build new relationships in north-western Libya. The LNA’s Operation Cordon of Hamada (a security zone between south-west and north-west Libya, between Ghadames, Hamada and al-Qaryah) along with pledges of support from some groups in north-western towns, is also seeing an increase in the LNA’s military presence in this region. However, at present there are still far more militias and security forces in the western region who reject the LNA’s presence therefore a widespread ‘flip’ of allegiances to the LNA is not expected in the short term, though cannot be ruled out in the longer term.

25
Feb
2019

‘Libya’s conflict enters a dangerous new phase’

Wolfram Larcher published with Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) a report in which he argues that Haftar’s advances in Southern Libya are changing power relations in Libya. Larcher supposes that continued progress by Haftar in the South would have major consequences in Western Libya and further destabilize the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN’s ongoing attempts at brokering a political solution. He advocates for a renewed unity between Western governments on Libya to reinforce efforts for a negotiating process.

Click here to read the report.

21
Feb
2019

‘Democracy hasn’t worked out in Libya’

In his latest article for Reuters published on 21 February, Ulf Laessing shares local perceptions from Benghazi, illustrating the political narratives that have emerged in Libya along the divisions between West and East. Interviewing residents from the city, Laessing reports the growing disbelief in the solutions put forward by the international community and the UN, such as the forthcoming National Conference, and the increasing belief that Libya needs a strong political figure, such as General Haftar.

Click here to read the article.

19
Feb
2019

LNA advances in Southern Libya could increase GNA internal divisions

On 14 February, the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha gave an interview with al-Hurra television where he stated that the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, “played a role” in the military activities in Libya’s south and that it was “acceptable from the national point of view,” in the context of removing organised crime emerging from the region. However, Bashagha qualified his statement by saying that he hoped Haftar would play his role in national efforts, but not use the operation for political gain or to increase division.

Bashagha’s statements recognizing Haftar has a role to play are indicative of increasing rapprochement between LNA and key western figures, particularly Misrata. While such statements should not be taken to indicate the beginning of a hard and fast LNA-Misrata alliance, they nevertheless represent a willingness to tolerate one another which is at odds with Serraj’s stance towards the LNA since the start of the southern operations. This internal division within the GNA, combined with other factors, continues to drive political fragility within Libya and could lead to sudden escalations of instability.

15
Feb
2019

ICG analyst Gazzini on French-Italian rivalry for Aska News

On 13 February 2019 Aska News published a report on the situation in Southern Libya, marked by the advances of forces loyal to Eastern-Libya based General Haftar. The article quoted analyst Claudia Gazzini from International Crisis Group, who stated that General Haftar’s advances in Southern Libya could become a « game changer » in the Libyan political process. For Gazzini, the latest developments have seen France more involved on the ground, through its strikes targeting rebel groups in Chad whereas Italy does not seem to have formulated a political strategy regarding Libya.

Click here to read the report.

13
Feb
2019

NOC to lift force majeure at El Sharara oil field in exchange for workers’ security

On 11 February, Libyan National Army (LNA) Chief of Staff Abdurrazak al-Nathouri announced that dialogue was under way between the LNA and the 30th Brigade regarding the latter’s requirements to provide effective security in order to lift force majeure on the El Sharara oil field. The 30th Brigade is the Tuareg Petroleum Facilities Guard unit which currently guards Sharara and is aligned with Ali Kanna. Nathouri also said that the LNA had no intention of moving on al-Feel as the field is operating without security issues at present.

The security situation in the South is likely to remain extremely volatile in the short term. The positive implications of the LNA apparently taking control of Sharara could be a more secure and stable base for the restart of production from Sharara field, particularly given the LNA has stated it intends to allow the NOC to export the crude. However, this will depend on whether the NOC agrees to restart the field. Sanallah has already reiterated his stance this week that production will not restart until staff safety can be guaranteed. The negative implications are that with LNA units and nominally LNA-aligned local forces at Sharara, the oilfield will become a target for local forces who oppose the LNA’s presence in the region, destabilising the oilfield further and potentially putting infrastructure at risk.

12
Feb
2019

Tebu and Tuareg tribes unite under GNA umbrella to curb LNA advances in Southern Libya

In his latest article published with Middle East Eye on 10 February, Tom Wescott discusses shifts of alliances and strategies in Southern Libya to counter the advances of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in region. Wescott reports that indigenous Tebu and Tuareg tribes from Southern Libya are forging an alliance under the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to curb advances of forces loyal to eastern-Libya based General Haftar in the South. The threat posed by the advances of the LNA is pushing Tebu and Tuareg independent militias to move belong their long-standing divisions as they are military weak on their own  but could defend their areas united. This shift in alliance is supervised by Ali Kanna, the new military commander for the south appointed by the GNA, who is a Tuareg. Wescott’s article provides an excellent and well-balanced overview of the historic context of Southern Libya and the alliances between local actors.

Click here to read the article.

11
Feb
2019

LNA operation in Southern Libya puts oil infrastructure at risk

On 7 February, François d’Alançon published with French newspaper La Croix an analysis of the operation launched by General Khalifa Haftar in Southern Libya and its potential impacts on the political and security situation in Libya. For d’Alançon, movements of the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated with General Haftar in Southern Libya are rekindling political and ethnic tensions in the country. D’Alançon highlights that the success of the operation would increase Haftar’s influence in Libya and open the door for a push of the LNA towards Western Libya and Tripoli and could put oil infrastructures at risk. The journalist notes that General Haftar’s operation has received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France, as well from Russia and Italy. Jalel Harchaoui, quoted in the article, explains that France has pushed General Haftar to launch the operation due to its involvement in Chad against rebel groups.

Click here to read the report.

07
Feb
2019

LNA takes control of El Sharara Oilfield

On 7 February, media sources reported that the Libyan National Army (LNA) has taken control of El Sharara oilfield located in Southern Libya on 6 February. The oilfield has been closed since 8 December by groups of tribesmen, armed protesters and state guards demanding salary payments and development funds. Rreports suggest that they handed out the control of the site to the LNA without violence. Thus far, the National Oil Company and the Governement of National Accord (GNA) have not commented on the situation. Such a maneuver by the LNA is likely to raise concerns in Western Libya as to whether General Haftar is attempting to defy the authority of the GNA.

Click here to read the report.

Update 08/02: Following the initial reports that the LNA had seized El Sharara Oilfield, further reports on 7 February indicated that General Haftar’s armed forces took control of a substation of El Sharara Oilfield, but not the main field. Moreover, complementary reports suggest that LNA forces clashed with forces under the control of the newly-appointed commander of Sabha military zone Ali Kanna affiliated with the GNA.

06
Feb
2019

LNA Campaign In South Libya Wins Support Despite Reports Of Atrocities Against The Tebu

The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) advance into south Libya, launched two weeks ago, has won support among a large swath of the population in the region. In Sebha, the LNA struck social agreements and tribal guarantees with various powerbrokers from the mix of Arab, Tuareg and Tebu tribes in the city. This ensured a peaceful handover of key locations and arms depots, previously controlled by Awlad Suliman and Tebu tribal fighters, to new commanders appointed by the LNA, under the Sebha Operations Room. However, there have been a flurry of media reports accusing the LNA of committing war crimes and violations against Tebu communities in the South. Some Tebu members of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the parallel eastern government resigned from their positions last week in response to the LNA campaign

The longer-term implications of the LNA’s operation remain unpredictable at present. On the positive side, the LNA’s operation has had some success in winning over a large segment of the Libyan population, including some formerly opposed to Haftar, in a manner akin to what happened after the LNA’s takeover of the Oil Crescent and resumption of exports from that region in September 2016. This is likely to be a major boost for GNA and LNA reconciliation, especially in terms of military and security unification. It could also improve security and stability in the South, helping to normalise oil production from this region. On the negative side, the LNA’s operation runs a serious risk of triggering an ethnic war between the South’s tribal components, primarily between the Arabs and the Tebu.

17
Jan
2019

LNA Launches Military Operation In The South

On 15 January, a Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesman confirmed that an LNA operation to liberate southern Libya from “terrorist” groups is underway. He added that the operation was also intended to “ensure the public’s continued ability to maintain and control Libya’s oil and gas sector”. The spokesman advised civilians to avoid known militant bases, such as Sebha, and urged local hospitals to declare states of emergencies. LNA forces are reportedly grouping at Tamanhint Airbase in Sebha in advance of operations in the border regions with Chad, Niger and Sudan.

The LNA mobilisation to the southern region is being implemented on a much greater scale than previous times where the LNA has said it will undertake operations to remove militant and extremist groups from the region. A large armed campaign to remove these groups appears imminent. Haftar has previously met with regional leaders and discussed border security, as well as the security vacuum in the southern regions. The reported coordination with Chadian forces indicates that the LNA is making its greatest effort yet in the south in order to ensure Haftar’s image as the main military and security guarantor for Libya and its neighbours. Securing Sharara oil field is also likely to be a key strategic aim of this operation.

 

19
Dec
2018

‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’

On 19 December, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi published for Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) in co-production with Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) and Conflict Armament Research a very interesting report on Southern Libya. Entitled ‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’, the report builds on ‘Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle’, written by the same au­thors and published by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research in June 2017 (Tubiana and Gramizzi, 2017). The report explores the issue of lawlessness in Southern Libya and provides an analysis of the different groups evolving in this area and their strategies. It is based on field research carried out in Niger in February–March 2017 and April 2018, as well as interviews conducted in Chad in May–June 2017 and January 2018, and in Europe in 2017–18.

The relevance of the report is high given the increasing tensions and violence in Southern Libya and the difficulty to understand the motives of the different actors and the issues at stake in the area. For the authors, Southern Libya is characterized by its ‘lawlessness’ and the presence of ‘autonomous, yet fragmented ethnic militias in control of southern Libya’s border’. The strategic nature of the area then ‘prompts northern Libyan forces as well as the governments of neighboring and European states to pursue alliances with them’, analyse Tubiana and Gramizzi. Among their main findings, the authors note that :

By pressuring Niger to criminalize migrant smuggling and block migrants in or on their way to southern Libya, European states have contributed to a series of destabilizing dynamics. Specifically, their policies have:

  • aggravated risks for migrants, as trafficking is now concentrated among fewer, more abusive actors, especially in Libya, where migrants from West Africa and elsewhere are systematically kidnapped for ransom, or forced into debt bond­age, labour, or prostitution;
  • caused migrant smugglers to ply more treacherous routes or engage in more dangerous activities, such as drug trafficking, jihadism, and insurgency;
  • fuelled corruption among Nigerien forces and exacerbated tensions between Niger’s government and its northern communities, which are largely dependent on migrant smuggling for their livelihoods; and empowered Libyan and Sudanese militias.

The authors develop their argument in four sections. First, the authors build the profile of the Tubu militias, situating the Tubu within the broader international political context as well as in Libya’s complex politics and history. Then, the authors focus on Libya’s southern neighbors and the strategies they have developed in the area. Drawing on, they provide an analysis of the strategic area of the Agadez-Fezzan corridor, the route between the Sahel and Libya and a place of important illegal trade and migration. Lastly, the fourth section presents data and analysis of regional weapons flows to support  some of the findings discussed in the previous sections.

Click here to read the report.