Tuareg | Libya Analysis

Jan
2021

Terrorists and armed groups persist in Libya’s South

Jason Pack, the President of Libya Analysis, recently published a report commissioned by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom) on terrorist and armed groups in the Libyan South. Co-authored with Stefano Marcuzzi, the report explores the resilience of terrorist and armed group activity in the Fezzan region of south-west Libya. Despite airstrikes and ground attacks by Libyan and international actors, terrorist networks have thrived in the Fezzan, collecting revenue from criminal activity, including smuggling and human trafficking. In particular, the report considers the persistence of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya’s South. The report will be an invaluable guide for policy-makers and researchers alike.

Please click here to read the full report.

Jul
2019

Conflict in Libya’s Desertic South

In an article published with The New Arab on 16 July, Austin Bodetti identifies that a conflict has developed in Southern Libya, in the desertic parts of the country inhabited by ethnic groups such as the Tebu and Tuareg. For Bodetti, the rising tensions in the desertic areas of Southern Libya results from the ongoing competition between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) for the allegiance of the ethnic groups living in these areas.

Click here to read the article.

Mar
2019

Is Libya at risk of military escalation?

On 21 march, in an article published with Real Clear World, Nathan Vest warns about potential conflict between General Haftar’s forces and powerful Western militias, such as Misrata militias, highlighting that such a confrontation could have dire security and migration ramifications for Libya’s neighboring countries and Europe. Vest calls for an intervention of the United States as a neutral mediator to avoid violent escalation between Libyan factions.

Click here to read the full article.

Feb
2019

Tebu and Tuareg tribes unite under GNA umbrella to curb LNA advances in Southern Libya

In his latest article published with Middle East Eye on 10 February, Tom Wescott discusses shifts of alliances and strategies in Southern Libya to counter the advances of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in region. Wescott reports that indigenous Tebu and Tuareg tribes from Southern Libya are forging an alliance under the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to curb advances of forces loyal to eastern-Libya based General Haftar in the South. The threat posed by the advances of the LNA is pushing Tebu and Tuareg independent militias to move belong their long-standing divisions as they are military weak on their own but could defend their areas united. This shift in alliance is supervised by Ali Kanna, the new military commander for the south appointed by the GNA, who is a Tuareg. Wescott’s article provides an excellent and well-balanced overview of the historic context of Southern Libya and the alliances between local actors.

Click here to read the article.

Feb
2019

LNA operation in Southern Libya puts oil infrastructure at risk

On 7 February, François d’Alançon published with French newspaper La Croix an analysis of the operation launched by General Khalifa Haftar in Southern Libya and its potential impacts on the political and security situation in Libya. For d’Alançon, movements of the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated with General Haftar in Southern Libya are rekindling political and ethnic tensions in the country. D’Alançon highlights that the success of the operation would increase Haftar’s influence in Libya and open the door for a push of the LNA towards Western Libya and Tripoli and could put oil infrastructures at risk. The journalist notes that General Haftar’s operation has received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France, as well from Russia and Italy. Jalel Harchaoui, quoted in the article, explains that France has pushed General Haftar to launch the operation due to its involvement in Chad against rebel groups.

Click here to read the report.

Dec
2018

‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’

On 19 December, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi published for Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) in co-production with Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) and Conflict Armament Research a very interesting report on Southern Libya. Entitled ‘Lost in Trans-nation : Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border’, the report builds on ‘Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle’, written by the same authors and published by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research in June 2017 (Tubiana and Gramizzi, 2017). The report explores the issue of lawlessness in Southern Libya and provides an analysis of the different groups evolving in this area and their strategies. It is based on field research carried out in Niger in February–March 2017 and April 2018, as well as interviews conducted in Chad in May–June 2017 and January 2018, and in Europe in 2017–18.

The relevance of the report is high given the increasing tensions and violence in Southern Libya and the difficulty to understand the motives of the different actors and the issues at stake in the area. For the authors, Southern Libya is characterized by its ‘lawlessness’ and the presence of ‘autonomous, yet fragmented ethnic militias in control of southern Libya’s border’. The strategic nature of the area then ‘prompts northern Libyan forces as well as the governments of neighboring and European states to pursue alliances with them’, analyse Tubiana and Gramizzi. Among their main findings, the authors note that :

By pressuring Niger to criminalize migrant smuggling and block migrants in or on their way to southern Libya, European states have contributed to a series of destabilizing dynamics. Specifically, their policies have:

aggravated risks for migrants, as trafficking is now concentrated among fewer, more abusive actors, especially in Libya, where migrants from West Africa and elsewhere are systematically kidnapped for ransom, or forced into debt bondage, labour, or prostitution;

caused migrant smugglers to ply more treacherous routes or engage in more dangerous activities, such as drug trafficking, jihadism, and insurgency;

fuelled corruption among Nigerien forces and exacerbated tensions between Niger’s government and its northern communities, which are largely dependent on migrant smuggling for their livelihoods; and empowered Libyan and Sudanese militias.

The authors develop their argument in four sections. First, the authors build the profile of the Tubu militias, situating the Tubu within the broader international political context as well as in Libya’s complex politics and history. Then, the authors focus on Libya’s southern neighbors and the strategies they have developed in the area. Drawing on, they provide an analysis of the strategic area of the Agadez-Fezzan corridor, the route between the Sahel and Libya and a place of important illegal trade and migration. Lastly, the fourth section presents data and analysis of regional weapons flows to support some of the findings discussed in the previous sections.

Click here to read the report.

Oct
2017

Libya’s Terrorism Challenge: Assessing Libya’s Salafi-Jihadi Threat

In this very useful and accessible report for the Middle East Institute, Lydia Sizer provides an overview of Libya’s Salafi-jihadi threat and the pull and push factors driving recruitment to Salafi-jihadi movements. She concludes that:

Salafi-jihadis have maintained an active presence in Libya due to a mix of push and pull factors. Historic participation in such groups, declining standards of living, the historical marginalization of minorities, and a pervasive sense of victimhood have all made Libya a ripe jihadi recruiting ground. Many Salafi-jihadis offer the status, salary, and services that the fractured state cannot provide. These movements can be diminished through investments like educational programs, aid to war-torn regions, demilitarization programs, and improved intelligence sharing by border officials in Libya’s neighboring states. However, until the political crisis that has plagued Libya for over three years ends, there is little Libya’s international partners can do to help confront these movements. And as long as the crisis continues, civil unrest will persist and institutions will remain weak. Such a scenario would provide the requisite chaos for the present Salahi-jihadi movements to flourish.

Click here to access the full report.

Aug
2017

How Libya’s Fezzan Became Europe’s New Border

The International Crisis Group has published a new report entitled ‘How Libya’s Fezzan Became Europe’s New Border’ looks at how the principal gateway into Europe for refugees and migrants runs through the power vacuum in southern Libya’s Fezzan region:

European policymakers increasingly are looking at the Fezzan, Libya’s vast and scarcely populated south west, as their frontier against sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees traveling the Central Mediterranean route to Europe. In 2016, over 160,000 took this route from Libya on makeshift boats; most had entered through this region, which connects the country’s southern border with its coast. Several European countries, chiefly Italy, hope that stabilising the situation in the Fezzan and reviving its economy will help curb migrant flows. The idea has merit, but this will be no easy task and cannot succeed without also addressing the broader crises gripping the country. Any European effort to address governance, economic and security problems in the Fezzan should be coordinated with the internationally recognised government and linked to wider, nationwide initiatives to tackle issues that plague the country as a whole.

Click here to read the full report.

Mar
2017

Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Southern Libya

In a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Frederic Wehrey discusses the sources of insecurity in Libya’s often ignored southern region and outlines some recommendations for Libyan authorities and the international community in order to combat the governance vacuum in the region.

Southern Libya remains a region of endemic instability wracked by communal conflict, a shortage of basic services, rampant smuggling, and fragmented or collapsed institutions. The region has long existed on the periphery of Libya’s politics and international concerns—but that must change. Increasingly, the vacuum of governance in the south has drawn in political actors from northern Libya and outside states. Extremists seeking refuge in the south and migrants being smuggled through the region directly impact the security of Libya, neighboring states like Tunisia, and Europe…

Though conflict and social tensions range far and wide in the south, two locations in particular—Sabha and Ubari—bear watching because of their propensity to draw in other social and political actors from across the region. Both suffer from a witches’ brew of afflictions: they are ethnically and tribally mixed; they suffer institutional weaknesses, especially in the security and justice sectors; and they are situated near major sources of fixed income, whether smuggling routes or oil fields. In addition, they have been the targets of meddling by northern and external actors…

Aside from these two flash points, the southern region faces a number of structural drivers of conflict related to its weak and fractured security sector; the absence of a meaningful local economy, despite the presence of oil fields, and effective border control; and harmful meddling by northern and outside actors. Jihadi militancy is currently a somewhat marginal threat to the south, but it could find greater social purchase among aggrieved tribes or communities or amid a worsening breakdown of governance.

Click here to read the full report.

Jan
2017

Musa Al-Koni Resigns From Libya’s Presidential Council

On 2 January, Musa al-Koni, a deputy prime minister in the UN-backed Presidential Council (PC) announced his resignation from the PC live on television saying that “I announce my resignation due the failure of the Presidential Council, because it holds responsibility for the killing, kidnapping, and rape that happened over the past year.” He added, “I don’t think we are unaware of what the citizens are suffering, but we are incapable, and I admit that we are failures because we didn’t solve the problems, which are many.”

His resignation comes against the backdrop of growing tensions and clashes between the Misratan Third Force and LNA Commander Bin Nayel’s 12th Force in south-west Libya. These developments could mark the beginning of the end for the PC and the Government of National Accord (GNA) in their current form.

Click here to read a Reuters article with more details on this development.

Jul
2015

What is a buzzleskabut?

[THIS POST IS HUMOUROUS AND NOT FACTUAL.]

This question has plagued many a researcher of the ancient Amazigh culture in North Africa. But due to newly discovered texts in the Algerian desert near the Libyan border we know that the Buzzleskabut (written in Libyan dialect as buzzugelgabut or in Fushaa as buzzuqalqabudh — the word comes from tamazighit) is a term for the ancient godhead of the prehistoric Libyan Berber and Tuareg populations which was frequently represented in the form of a rabbit in desert cave drawings in the early first millennial BC. The rabbit represented, for these ancient civilizations, the unity of the tribe with the desert and with nature itself. Today very few of the desert cave bunnies are still to be found in the Sahara desert. They tend to be concentrated in the caves and valleys of the Nafusa mountains, where they are still prized for their marvelous fur. Today the Buzzleskabut has come into greater prominence than at anytime in the 21st century as some Berber militias such as the thuwwar Jadu have taken the buzzleskabut as their mascot which appears on their various technicals and armed cars.

Oct
2014

Army Ordered to Move towards Tripoli as Tribal Leaders Gather in Egypt

As the third anniversary of Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s death passed almost unnoticed, the Libyan Tobruk-based government headed by PM Abdullah Thinni issued on Tuesday an order calling on army units to head towards Tripoli to regain control of it. To wrestle the capital city back from ‘Libya Dawn’ forces, the Government has also called on the city’s youth and inhabitants to take an active role in facilitating the liberation of the city. More specifically, the governmental statement incited the population to carry out acts of civil disobedience, so as to hamper the work of the al-Hassi administration, as well as to actively join the fight against militias stationed there, in a move reminiscent of Haftar’s televised call on Benghazinos to take up arms against members of the Benghazi’s Revolutionaries Shoura Council.

Meanwhile, during the past three days, notables and representatives from various Libya’s tribes gathered in Cairo, beind closed-doors, to lay out a framework agreement for the establishment of a National Council of Tribal Affairs. According to statements coming from participants who attended the meeting, the idea behind the council is that of establishing a new platform for carrying out national dialogue initiatives running in parallel to political ones. The rationale behind this being that societal reconciliation processes would be carried out more easily and effectively by taking full advantage of those tribal markers of identity and affiliations that still resonate very powerfully in contemporary Libya.

The council’s structure and composition should be finalised within one month time and, it was stressed, the council would not try to establish itself as yet another center of administrative or executive power. Nonetheless, given the venue chosen for carrying out these meetings, and the statements of support for the HoR as Libya’s sole legitimate body made by a few attendants, it remains to be seen if this body will manage to be inclusive enough so as to achieve the strong potential it has on paper. Given the presence of a Tubu representative at Cairo’s meetings, a first test for the council and its dialogue based initiatives could very well be represented by the latest flare-up in inter-tribal violence occurring in southern Libya. In fact, after almost a year of uneasy calm, armed confrontations have flared-up again between Tubu and Touareg groups in Obari, leading to several deaths and injuries despite mediation attempts by the HoR.

Sep
2014

Al-Thinni’s New Cabinet Approved amid Preparations for Negotiation Talks

This is proving to be a busy and eventful week for Libya. On Monday, the House of Representatives finally approved the new cabinet led by Abdullah al-Thinni. After seeing his proposed cabinets rejected twice, al-Thinni managed to overcome HoR internal fractures between federalists and members of the highly heterogeneous National Forces Alliance and to obtain a vote of confidence. In a sense, the approval of al-Thinni’s cabinet after such a long hiatus from his resignation last month was an obligatory move for the HoR at this stage. The institution is reportedly losing members on a daily basis and its inability to install a functioning executive was not simply taking a toll on its internal standing, but risked more broadly to evolve in an insurmountable issue leading to its complete collapse and demise.

As a response to al-Thinni’s cabinet, on Wednesday the GNC sworn in new members to its own government, labeled as a national salvation one, which is headed by Omar al-Hassi. Several members of the al-Hassi government have already taken control of Ministerial buildings in Tripoli and reiterated calls for Libya’s Arab and international partners to return to Tripoli for resuming their business and diplomatic activities. Nonetheless, what the al-Hassi government cannot rely on, is the international recognition as Libya’s sole legitimate representative institution that all of the country’s partners, including Turkey and Qatar, still give to the HoR. This position was implicitly reiterated in the closing statement of last week’s Madrid’s Ministerial Conference on stability and developments in Libya. Clearly, the legitimacy of the HoR and of the transition process for which it stands represent non-negotiable items for Libya’s international partners. This is further demonstrated by the fact that upcoming negotiations between Libya’s rival factions, which are set to start on Monday 29 September under the guidance of the UNSMIL, will adopt the following agenda, which in itself represents a defeat for the Misrata-affiliated institutional paraphernalia:

(I) Conclusion of a framework agreement on the rules of procedure of the House of Representatives (HoR) as well as an agreement on the critical issues relating to the governance of the country. Such key issues would require a qualified majority of 2/3 of the HoR membership to allow for decisions. All decisions of the HoR will be subject to the agreed upon rules of procedure.

(II) Agreement on the date, venue and ceremonial for a handover ceremony from the previous General National Congress to the current HoR.

With regards to oil production, after a temporary shut-down of the el-Sharara field and of the Zawiya refinery over the week-end, both structures are now back to work, helping Libya’s oil production to close in on the 900,000bpd mark. Two potential issues, however, emerged in the past days for the oil sector.

Firstly, tensions and armed confrontations have recently erupted in Obari, near the el-Sharara field and close to the border with Algeria. Reports indicate that Tuareg and Tubu militias have battled in and around the town after Tuareg militias prevented an attempt from Tubu groups to smuggle people from Algeria into Libya. On the other hand, rumors indicate that these confrontations might have also been spurred by recent overtures made by the Misratan establishment to local groups in the area in an attempt to obtain a direct control of oil production facilities. Secondly, after a first round of confrontations for the control of the Central Bank, Libya’s rival governments are likely to battle at an institutional level for the control of the oil sector as well. So far, the two government have adopted different approaches. Al-Thinni, in fact, has decided not to include an oil minister in his cabinet and opted to manage oil production entirely through the NOC, as in Qadhafi-era Libya. Al-Hassi, on the contrary, has appointed for the post of Minister of Oil Mashallah Zwai, who has already taken over the Oil Ministry building in Tripoli and looks ready to set off the battle for the control of Libya’s gold.

Jan
2014

Sebha Still Awaiting Military Support

According to the Libya Herald, “No military reinforcements from the north of the country have yet arrived in Sebha, despite government promises and media reports” since the fighting broke out there in early January. Read more here. This is stark indication at how low the government’s willingness and capacity to face down its enemies is.

Jan
2013

Details Emerge of Attack on Magarief in Sebha

Libyan President Survives an Assassination attempt– The Libya Herald presents Details Emerge of Attack on Magarief in Sebha . The long and the short of the episode is that Libya’s South appears to be veering increasingly towards becoming an ungovernable space and if the GNC does not intervene to placate warring tribes, Fezzan may end up destabalizing all of Libya.

Head of the General National Congress (GNC) Mohamed Magarief said last night, Saturday, that the hotel he was staying in on a visit to Sebha was attacked by gunmen who fired at the hotel while he and members of a GNC delegation were present.

Magarief had been on a visit to Sebha to meet with local council members and officials about the security situation in the town after it was declared a closed military zone on 16 December.

Jun
2012

Stand-off in Northern Mali

An AJE Opinion about the struggles between the secular and Islamist strands within the Tuareg Independence movment and the ramifications of the post-Qadhafi fallout for Mali — Stand-off in Northern Mali: Two groups wage a bitter fight for control over the West African nation.

The stakes couldn’t be higher – both for Mali and West Africa as a whole. If the Islamists in Ansar ud-Dine and their quietly Machiavellian leader Iyad Ag Ghali fail to come to terms with the nationalist and secular NMLA, then the prospect is either a protracted civil war in the north or a rapid defeat of the NMLA by the better-equipped and better-funded Ansar ud-Dine and their allies in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The wheeling and dealing between the two parties has revealed serious flaws in the political and military structures of the NMLA, flaws that Ag Ghali has exploited masterfully. That’s not surprising; he knows the arcane political mechanisms of the southern Sahara better than anyone else. The NMLA’s political wing in exile, based mainly in Nouakchott and Paris, is comprised of geopolitically savvy “internationalists”, with connections in the foreign ministries and governments of Europe and North America.

Blood ties tend to override ideological ones in Tuareg society. The NMLA’s leaders come predominantly from a distinct and rival tribe called the Idnane. The fight for supremacy between the Ifoghas and the Idnane in the Adagh, the name the Tuareg give to the far northeast of Mali, has been going on for a long time. For Iyad Ag Ghali and others like Alghabass Ag Intalla, son of the traditional Ifoghas chief Intalla Ag Attaher, the Ifoghas are the divinely ordained rulers of the region and no one has the right to try to usurp them. The NMLA’s struggle with Ansar ud-Dine is underpinned by a complex tribal conflict.

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